Teamsters Local Union No. 348 v. Cuyahoga Falls Clerk of CourtTeamsters Local Union No. 348 v. Cuyahoga Falls Clerk of Court
Rendered on May 19, 2011
Doll, Jansen, Ford & Rakay, and Susan D. Jansen, for appellant Teamsters Local Union No. 348; Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Katie Tesner and Anne Light Hoke, for intervenor-appellant State Employment Relations Board.
Brian A. Reali and John A. Scavelli, for appellee City of Stow.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
BRYANT, P.J.
{¶1} Appellee-appellant, Teamsters Local Union No. 348 (“Union“) and intervenor-appellant, the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB“), appeal from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that reversed a SERB order
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On March 10, 2008, the Union filed a Request for Recognition with SERB, seeking to represent “[a]ll full-time Deputy Clerk of Courts, Secretarial/Deputy Clerk, Criminal Bookkeeper and Civil Bookkeeper” in the office of the Clerk of Courts, Cuyahoga Falls Municipal Court District. In a letter dated April 24, 2008, two judges of the Cuyahoga Falls Municipal Court objected to the Request for Recognition, contending “the employees requesting recognition are not ‘public employees’ pursuant to
{¶3} On September 19, 2008, the City of Stow filed a motion to intervene, noting the Cuyahoga Falls Municipal Court, under
{¶4} In November 2008, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ“) of SERB conducted an evidentiary hearing. In a recommended determination filed March 25, 2009, the ALJ concluded the employees in question are “public employees” within the meaning of
{¶5} Pursuant to
II. Assignments of Error
{¶6} The Union appeals, assigning the following errors:
- The Court of Common Pleas erred as a matter of law in reversing SERB‘s Directive finding certain employees of the Clerk of Courts, Stow Municipal Court District to be public employees under
R.C. 4117.01(C) . - The Court of Common Pleas erred as a matter of law in finding SERB‘s Directive is not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is not in accordance with law.
SERB also appeals, assigning the following error:
THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT REVERSED AND VACATED SERB‘S DIRECTIVE WHICH FOUND DEPUTY CLERKS OF THE STOWE [sic] MUNICIPAL COURT DISTRICT TO BE “PUBLIC EMPLOYEES” UNDER
R.C. 4117.01(C)(8) .
Because all the assigned errors raise the same issue, we address them jointly.
III. Standard of Review
{¶7} A common pleas court, in reviewing an order of an administrative agency under
{¶8} An appellate court‘s review of an administrative decision is more limited than that of a common pleas court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 1993-Ohio-122. The appellate court is to determine only whether the common pleas court abused its discretion. Id.; Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (defining an abuse of discretion). Absent an abuse of discretion, a court of appeals may not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency or the common pleas court. Pons at 621. An appellate court, however, has plenary review of purely legal questions. Big Bob‘s, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., 151 Ohio App.3d 498, 2003-Ohio-418, ¶15.
IV. Statutory Framework – Ohio‘s Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act
{¶9}
V. “Public Employee” – Judicial Function
{¶10} Because a deputy clerk who performs a judicial function is not entitled to collectively bargain, the seminal issue raised in all the assigned errors is the meaning of “judicial function.” Appellants assert the common pleas court erred in concluding the employees at issue perform judicial functions that exclude them from the definition of “public employees” entitled to engage in collective bargaining. They argue SERB‘s directive correctly interpreted
A. Responsibilities of the Employees Seeking Collective Bargaining
{¶11} The record indicates the clerk‘s office is divided into two divisions, civil and criminal/traffic. Of the 14 employees seeking certification, 11 persons have the title “deputy clerk of court,” five assigned to the civil division and six assigned to the criminal/traffic division. The remaining three employees hold the title secretary/deputy clerk, title criminal bookkeeper, or title civil bookkeeper. All of the employees seeking certification nonetheless are “deputy clerks” whom the clerk of courts appointed under
{¶12} The job duties of the deputy clerks vary depending on the division to which each belongs. The civil division deputy clerks answer phone calls, docket civil complaints and other case filings, and handle various fees and payments in civil matters. Upon request of a party or attorney in a civil case, the civil deputy clerks issue subpoenas by
{¶13} The criminal/traffic division deputy clerks are responsible for arranging for jailed defendants to appear at arraignment, entering case information into a computerized records system, calculating court costs, receipting money in criminal and traffic cases, and docketing case filings. They spend up to five percent of their time signing arrest warrants that accompany criminal complaints, and they accept returns of service on executed search warrants, which entails completing a checklist. They also are authorized to grant a continuance of up to one week in minor misdemeanor traffic cases only; they have no authority to grant a continuance in other criminal cases.
{¶14} The secretary/deputy clerk spends 60 percent of her time on deputy clerk duties and 40 percent of her time on secretarial duties. In general, the secretary/deputy clerk is responsible for issuing subpoenas, preparing felony cases for bindover to the common pleas court, entering payroll data into the computer system, handling purchase orders, and transcribing memoranda and letters from the clerk and chief deputy clerk. The two bookkeepers balance deposits, ensure incoming and disbursed monies are properly recorded, and send overdue fines to a third-party collections agency.
{¶15} All deputy clerks are cross-trained for the various job duties, and they rotate duties weekly within their assigned divisions.
B. Meaning of “Judicial Function”
{¶16} Although
{¶17} The common pleas court rejected SERB‘s test as too broad, describing it as a test that “essentially demand[s] that exempted clerk employees serve as surrogate judges.” (Decision and Final Judgment, 5.) The common pleas court also disagreed with SERB‘s employing the “substantial and regular basis” requirement, concluding it violates the basic rules of statutory construction because it “adds words that are not in the statute.” (Decision and Final Judgment, 6.) Although the common pleas court did not apply a universal definition of judicial function, it concluded deputy clerks who determine probable cause in issuing an arrest warrant perform a “judicial function” because the act requires “independent judgment.” (Decision and Final Judgment, 10.) The common pleas court further concluded all deputy clerks “must be viewed as fungible – doing the same work – and therefore all perform ‘judicial functions.’ ” (Decision and Final Judgment, 14.)
{¶18} The meaning of a phrase in a statute is a matter of statutory interpretation and thus is a question of law. State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, ¶8.
{¶19} SERB‘s interpretation of
{¶20} SERB, however, additionally decided the employee must perform a judicial function on a “substantial and regular basis” in order to be exempt from the right to engage in collective bargaining. SERB accurately noted the plain language of the statute “does not require a minimum quantum with which one must perform a judicial function.” (SERB Directive, 6.) SERB nonetheless included the “substantial and regular basis” requirement to avoid the “possibility of endless abuse” by public employers occasionally delegating a judicial function to each employee to prevent any employee from engaging in collective bargaining. (SERB Directive, 6.) SERB is not entitled to deference on its extended interpretation of the statute‘s requirements.
{¶21} As the common pleas court correctly pointed out, SERB‘s including the “substantial and regular basis” requirement adds language not found in the statute. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lorain v. Stewart, 119 Ohio St.3d 222, 2008-Ohio-4062, ¶36 (noting Supreme Court‘s refusal to add language to a statute), citing State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 427, 1999-Ohio-118 (stating that “[i]n construing a statute, [the court] may not add or delete words“). Even SERB freely acknowledges nothing in the plain language of the statute supports such an interpretation. Further, SERB‘s justification for adding the “substantial and regular basis” requirement to the statute is questionable in light of the general presumption that a public official “duly perform[s] the function that the law calls upon him to perform.” Toledo v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 373, 2008-Ohio-1119, ¶28, citing State ex rel. Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike Comm. (1953), 159 Ohio St. 581, 590 (stating “in the absence of evidence to the contrary, public officers, administrative officers and public
{¶22} Accordingly, the first half of SERB‘s interpretation of
C. Job Duties Qualifying as “Judicial Functions”
{¶23} The record is clear that most of the work of the deputy clerks is ministerial in nature. The possible exceptions relate to issuing subpoenas and arrest warrants. Only the civil division deputy clerks occasionally issue subpoenas as part of their employment. Although a subpoena commands a person to appear in court, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “[i]ssuing subpoenas is a ministerial, not a judicial function.” State v. Warner (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 45. Thus, the civil division deputy clerks do not perform any tasks that meet the SERB interpretation of “judicial function.”
{¶24} The criminal/traffic division deputy clerks, on the other hand, occasionally sign arrest warrants attached to criminal complaints. The testimony at the hearing indicated the procedure for signing arrest warrants recently had changed. Deputy clerks used to sign a line specifically indicating probable cause was shown. Although the deputy clerks no longer sign a line specific to probable cause, they still sign the arrest warrants. The criminal/traffic deputy clerk who testified at the hearing stated she did not believe she was making an independent judgment about probable cause when she signed an arrest warrant.
{¶25} In order to issue a valid arrest warrant, probable cause is required. See Whitely v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary (1971), 401 U.S. 560, 564, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 1035 (holding that before a warrant for either arrest or search can issue, the Fourth Amendment probable cause provisions “require that the judicial officer issuing such a warrant be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant“);
{¶26} Perhaps tellingly, SERB in applying its two-part test did not conclude signing arrest warrants did not involve “independent judgment” but rather determined the deputy clerks did not perform the function on a “substantial and regular basis.” Because
{¶27} The common pleas court took the analysis one step further and concluded all the deputy clerks at issue “must be viewed as fungible – doing the same work – and therefore all perform ‘judicial functions.’ ” (Decision and Final Judgment, 14.) In essence, the trial court determined that if one deputy clerk performs a judicial function, they all do.
{¶28} SERB‘s stated policy dictates “all public-employee determinations” involve “a case-by-case inquiry that the finder of fact should examine in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” (SERB Direcetive, 6.) SERB‘s policy represents a reasonable approach to ascertaining whether an individual employee meets the definition of “public employee,” an approach to which we will defer. See State Emp. Relations Bd. v. Miami Univ. The record further indicates a clear division in the responsibilities of the civil deputy clerks as compared to the criminal/traffic deputy clerks. Only the criminal/traffic deputy clerks issue arrest warrants and, in that task, perform a judicial function. Although the deputy clerks are cross-trained for the various responsibilities of the clerk‘s office, the record indicates they rotate only within their assigned division. Should anyone other than
VI. Disposition
{¶29} Based on the foregoing, the common pleas court erred to the extent it concluded that all deputy clerks, being fungible, perform a judicial function and thus do not qualify as “public employees” within the meaning of
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with instructions.
SADLER and TYACK, JJ., concur.
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