Taxiputinbay, L.L.C. v. Put-In-BayTaxiputinbay, L.L.C. v. Put-In-Bay
CROUSE, V.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, the Village of Put-in-Bay (“the Village“), appeals the judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas, declaring unconstitutional Section 866.01(a)(4) of the Codified Ordinances of the Village of Put-in-Bay, and permanently enjoining its enforcement. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
{¶ 2} The underlying facts of this case are undisputed.
{¶ 3} In March 2020, the Village amended Codified Ordinance 866.01(a)(4), which defines “Taxicab” or “cab” to include
any vehicle that seeks its business or part thereof on public streets or in quasi-public places, and which is operated on the streets of the Village for the purpose of transporting members of the general public under expectation of compensation or reward in any form. * * * Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, no vehicle operated as a taxicab shall exceed the width of 80 inches, including fender flare but excluding mirrors, and shall not exceed the overall length of 25 feet, as determined by the Village‘s inspection conducted under Section 866.14 of this Chapter. * * *
{¶ 4} Appellee, Taxiputinbay, LLC (“Taxiputinbay“), owns and operates taxicabs in Put-in-Bay. As a result of the amended ordinance, the Village declined to issue taxicab permits for three of Taxiputinbay‘s vehicles because they exceeded the 80-inch width limitation.
{¶ 5} Taxiputinbay initiated the present matter when it filed a three-count complaint against the Village, seeking (1) declaratory relief that the 80-inch width limitation in Section 866.01(a)(4) violated the Home Rule Amendment in
{¶ 6} The trial court granted a preliminary injunction to Taxiputinbay. Eventually, the parties submitted competing motions for summary judgment. On April 27, 2022, the trial court granted Taxiputinbay‘s motion for summary judgment, and denied the Village‘s motion for summary judgment. The trial court declared that the 80-inch width limitation was unconstitutional under both the Home Rule Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, and thus permanently enjoined the Village from enforcing the provision.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 7} The Village has timely appealed the trial court‘s April 27, 2022 judgment, and now presents three assignments of error for our review:
- The trial court erred in declaring that Put-in-Bay‘s 80-inch width limitation on vehicles that want the privilege of providing for-profit taxicab services on the village‘s streets violates the Home Rule Amendment,
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution . - The trial court erred in declaring that Put-in-Bay‘s 80-inch width requirement for taxicab permits violates the Equal Protection Clause,
Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution . The trial court erred in granting a permanent injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the 80-inch width requirement for taxicab permits in Chapter 866 of the Village of Put-in-Bay‘s codified ordinances.
III. Analysis
{¶ 8} The standard of review for the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate where (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and when viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978).
{¶ 9} Constitutional challenges to local legislation are also reviewed de novo. Put-in-Bay v. Mathys, 163 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-4421, 167 N.E.3d 922, ¶ 11. The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that “[D]uly enacted laws are afforded a strong presumption of constitutionality.” Id., citing Yajnik v. Akron Dept. of Health, Hous. Div., 101 Ohio St.3d 106, 2004-Ohio-357, 802 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 16. “To overcome this presumption, the party challenging the law must prove the law unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
{¶ 10} In its first assignment of error, the Village challenges the trial court‘s determination that Section 866.01(a)(4) violates the Home Rule Amendment in
{¶ 11} “A state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance when * * * * (1) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, (2) the statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute.” Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 17.
{¶ 12} Regarding the first requirement, the Village argues that Section 866.01(a)(4) is an exercise of local self-government, but Taxiputinbay argues that the section is an exercise of the police power. “While local self-government ordinances are protected under [the Home Rule Amendment], police-power ordinances ‘must yield in the face of a general state law.‘” Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 553, 2008-Ohio-92, 880 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 11, quoting Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 23. “An ordinance created under
{¶ 13} We agree with Taxiputinbay that Section 866.01(a)(4) is an exercise of the police power. “‘[A]ny municipal ordinance, which prohibits the doing of something without a municipal license to do it, is a police regulation’ within the meaning of the Home Rule Amendment.” State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 143 Ohio St.3d 271, 2015-Ohio-485, 37 N.E.3d 128, ¶ 17, quoting Auxter v. Toledo, 173 Ohio St. 444, 446, 183 N.E.2d 920 (1962). In Morrison, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the local ordinances were an exercise of the police power because they did not regulate the form and structure of the local government, but instead prohibited—and even criminalized—the act of drilling for oil and gas without a municipal permit. Id. at ¶ 18. Here, similarly, Chapter 866 of the Codified Ordinances does not seek to regulate the form and structure of the local government, but instead seeks to regulate and establish a permitting procedure for the operation of taxicabs within the Village in the interest of protecting the
{¶ 14} As to the second requirement, the parties do not dispute that
{¶ 15} The crucial issue in this case relates to the third requirement, which seeks to determine whether Section 866.01(a)(4) is in conflict with
{¶ 16} Here,
{¶ 17} In comparison, Section 866.01(a)(4) provides, in pertinent part, “Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, no vehicle operated as a taxicab shall exceed the width of 80 inches, including fender flare but excluding mirrors, and shall not exceed the overall length of 25 feet.”
{¶ 18} Taxiputinbay argues that
{¶ 19} A plain reading of
{¶ 20} On this issue, we find the Ohio Supreme Court‘s instruction in Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 31, to be particularly applicable:
Although on occasion a state statute and municipal ordinance will directly contradict each other, and thereby make a conflict analysis simple and direct, that is not always the case. It is in the context of more nuanced cases that the concept of “conflict by implication” has arisen. Rather than an independent test for identifying a conflict, conflict by implication is a
subset of the Struthers analysis and recognizes that sometimes a municipal ordinance will indirectly prohibit what a state statute permits or vice versa. “When determining whether a conflict by implication exists, we examine whether the General Assembly indicated that the relevant state statute is to control a subject exclusively.” Id. at ¶ 32. This concept of “conflict by implication” has been long-established in Ohio Supreme Court precedent examining the home rule authority of municipalities. In case after case, the court has examined whether the General Assembly demonstrated its intent to control a subject exclusively to determine whether there is a conflict.
{¶ 21} For example, in Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 86, 167 N.E. 158 (1929), the Ohio Supreme Court held that a municipal ordinance establishing a 15-mile-per-hour speed limit was in conflict with a state statute establishing a 25-mile-per-hour speed limit. In that case, the state statute expressly provided that the speed limit “shall not be diminished, restricted or prohibited by an ordinance, rule or regulation of a municipality or other public authority.” Id. at 85, quoting section 12608, General Code. Thus, the court recognized that “[i]t was the legislative purpose, clearly manifested by the provisions of sections 12603 and 12608, General Code, to permit vehicles to travel upon the streets and highways of the state at any rate of speed not expressly prohibited by statute.” Id. at 90. Therefore, the court concluded that “an ordinance of a municipality
{¶ 22} In Neil House Hotel Co. v. Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944), the Ohio Supreme Court held that a municipal ordinance that prohibited the sale of alcohol after midnight conflicted with a state regulation that prohibited the sale of alcohol between 2:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. The plaintiff in that case held a valid state liquor permit. Id. at 249. Section 6064-15, General Code, provided that one who holds such permits may sell beer and intoxicating liquors after the hour of 1:00 a.m. Id. at 252. Pursuant to express authorization granted by Section 6064-3, General Code, the Board of Liquor Control prohibited the sale and consumption of beer and intoxicating liquors between the hours of 2:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. Id. at 252. At the outset of its analysis, the court noted that the control and regulation of the “liquor traffic” is within the province of the state government, and
[t]he General Assembly of Ohio has undertaken to control and regulate the production, sale and dispensing of beer, wine and spirituous liquors throughout the state and has created an agency called the Board of Liquor Control to execute and administer the laws and to regulate the conduct of those who engage in the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages.
Id. at 251. The court held that after examining the state statutes and regulations, “it is difficult to escape the conclusion that plaintiff, under state authorization, may lawfully
{¶ 23} In Lorain v. Tomasic, 59 Ohio St.2d 1, 391 N.E.2d 726 (1979), the Ohio Supreme Court held that a municipal ordinance that prohibited the paying out of more than $1,200 in prizes during any single bingo session was in conflict with former
To allow ordinances to be enacted throughout the state reducing maximum pay outs in any amount would destroy a uniform application of the newly enacted statutory scheme and create a potential for totally emasculating a duly licensed charitable organization‘s ability to conduct a lawful bingo operation. Such a construction of
R.C. 2915.09(B)(5) would render its language virtually meaningless and nullify its effect.
{¶ 24} Am. Fin. Servs. likewise found that a conflict existed. In that case, a series of state statutes regulated a defined set of “covered loans,” which, at a basic level, consisted of mortgages with interest rates ten percentage points higher than the yield on U.S. Treasury securities. Am. Fin. Servs., 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, at ¶ 3. Following the enactment of the state statutes, the city of Cleveland passed a municipal ordinance with stricter limitations aimed at predatory lending. Id. at ¶ 14. However, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that “Through Sub.H.B. No. 386, the General Assembly has expressed its intent to preempt municipal regulation and occupy the field of regulation of predatory lending as an issue of statewide concern.” Id. at ¶ 31. Because the municipal ordinance applied to a broader swath of loans, and imposed stricter standards and additional requirements on lenders, the court concluded that “Cleveland has undertaken to regulate the making of a loan authorized by the General Assembly. This is directly contradictory to the syllabus in Struthers v. Sokol because these ordinances seek to forbid what the statutes allow.” Id. at ¶ 47-48.
{¶ 25} A few weeks after Am. Fin. Servs. was released, the Ohio Supreme Court held that no conflict existed in Cincinnati v. Baskin, 112 Ohio St.3d 279, 2006-Ohio-6422, 859 N.E.2d 514. In Baskin, a Cincinnati municipal ordinance prohibited the possession of any semiautomatic rifle with a capacity of more than ten rounds. Id. at ¶ 1. The state statute at the time prohibited the possession of “any semi-automatic firearm
There is nothing in the weapons-control measures in the criminal code that manifests an intent to prevent municipalities from regulating the possession of semiautomatic firearms that hold fewer than 32 rounds. There is no provision in the statute declaring or otherwise suggesting that the limitation upon firing capacity fixed therein is the only limitation controlling the possession of a semiautomatic firearm, that the limitation shall not be diminished or altered by municipal regulation, or that municipalities may not prohibit the possession of lower-capacity firearms than are prohibited by the statute.
{¶ 26} In holding that there was no conflict, the court reasoned,
Cincinnati has not undertaken to regulate or prohibit any conduct that the state has authorized. The relevant state statutes, i.e.,
R.C. 2923.11 and2923.17 , prohibit the possession of semiautomatic firearms that are designed or adapted to fire more than 31 cartridges without reloading. They do not, however, permit or authorize the possession of semiautomatic
firearms that are capable of firing 31 or fewer cartridges without reloading. * * *
In the absence of any limiting provision or declaration to the contrary, we conclude that the General Assembly intended to allow municipalities to regulate the possession of lower-capacity semiautomatic firearms in accordance with local conditions, requiring only that under no condition shall municipalities allow the possession of any semiautomatic firearm that is capable of firing more than 31 cartridges without reloading. Thus, the ordinance does not prohibit what the statute permits.
{¶ 27} Following Baskin, the Ohio Supreme Court again held that no conflict existed in Mendenhall, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255. That case involved a municipality‘s efforts to establish an “automated mobile speed enforcement system” that imposed a civil penalty for violating the speed limits set by the state. Id. at ¶ 4, 6. In holding that the civil penalty regime did not conflict with the state‘s criminal enforcement of the speed limits, the Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that “although the General Assembly has enacted a detailed statute governing criminal enforcement of speeding regulations, it has not acted in the realm of civil enforcement.” Id. at ¶ 32. The court concluded, “[B]ecause there is no indication that the state has intended to reserve to
{¶ 28} Turning to the case at bar, while
{¶ 29} Furthermore, unlike Schneiderman, Neil House Hotel, Tomasic, and Am. Fin. Servs., nothing in
{¶ 30} Thus, we hold that
{¶ 31} Accordingly, the Village‘s first assignment of error is well-taken.
B. Equal Protection
{¶ 32} In its second assignment of error, the Village argues that the trial court erred when it determined that Section 866.01(a)(4) violated the Equal Protection Clause in
{¶ 33} “The federal and Ohio equal-protection provisions are ‘functionally equivalent,’ and are to be construed and analyzed identically.” (Internal citations omitted.) Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, 127 Ohio St.3d 104, 2010-Ohio-4908, 936 N.E.2d 944, ¶ 17. “Simply stated, the Equal Protection Clauses require that individuals be treated in a manner similar to others in like circumstances.” Burnett v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-2751, 890 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 30, quoting McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 6.
{¶ 34} “Courts apply varying levels of scrutiny to equal-protection challenges depending on the rights at issue and the purportedly discriminatory classifications created
{¶ 35} “The rational-basis test involves a two-step analysis. We must first identify a valid state interest. Second, we must determine whether the method or means by which the state has chosen to advance that interest is rational.” Id. at ¶ 19, quoting McCrone at ¶ 9.
Under the rational-basis standard, a state has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and * * * courts have a duty to liberally construe statutes in order to save them from constitutional infirmities. The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden to negate every conceivable basis that might support the legislation.
(Internal citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶ 36} As to the first step, in her affidavit, the mayor of the Village stated that the 80-inch width limitation served several public safety purposes intended to protect both the Village‘s residents as well as tourists. “Legislative concern for public safety is not
{¶ 37} As to the second step, “Ohio courts grant substantial deference to the legislature when conducting an equal-protection rational-basis review.” Pickaway at ¶ 32, quoting Williams at ¶ 40. “A legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Id. “Furthermore, courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature‘s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational-basis review because ‘it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.‘” Id., quoting Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 58, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999).
{¶ 38} Here, as stated in the mayor‘s affidavit, limiting the width of taxicabs is rationally related to the goal of protecting public safety by reducing the threat to pedestrians and those on golf-carts, by reducing congestion on crowded, narrow streets, and by providing more room for the Village‘s emergency response vehicles to navigate the streets.
{¶ 39} In response, Taxiputinbay argues that the 80-inch width limitation is irrational (1) because it only applies to taxicabs and not to other, larger vehicles, such as
{¶ 40} However, “[a] legislative body may direct its legislation against any evil as it actually exists, without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are not forbidden.” Pickaway at ¶ 41, quoting Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 117, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957). “The task of classifying persons for * * * benefits * * * inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the fact the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial consideration.” Id., quoting Fitzgerald v. Racing Assn. of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108, 123 S.Ct. 2156, 156 L.Ed.2d 97 (2003).
{¶ 41} Here, it is reasonable to conclude that taxicabs would be most often used during the busiest times of the day. Thus, taxicabs pose a different danger than, for example, delivery trucks, which may deliver or operate during non-peak hours. Taxicabs
{¶ 42} Therefore, we hold that Section 866.01(a)(4) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it is rationally related to a valid state interest in protecting the safety of residents and tourists.
{¶ 43} Accordingly, the Village‘s second assignment of error is well-taken.
C. Permanent Injunction
{¶ 44} Finally, in its third assignment of error, the Village argues that the trial court erred when it granted a permanent injunction against the enforcement of Section 866.01(a)(4).
{¶ 45} “The test for the granting or denial of a permanent injunction is substantially the same as that for a preliminary injunction. However, in the case of a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must prove that he has prevailed on the merits, not merely that there is a ‘substantial likelihood’ of prevailing on the merits.” (Emphasis sic.) Gimex Properties Corp., Inc. v. Reed, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-1049, 2022-Ohio-4771, ---N.E.3d---, ¶ 62; W. Branch Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. W. Branch Edn. Assn., 2015-Ohio-2753, 35 N.E.3d 551, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.) (“A permanent injunction test requires a higher standard. It requires the party seeking it to demonstrate a right to relief under the applicable substantive law. Or in other words, the moving party must prove that he has
{¶ 46} Accordingly, the Village‘s third assignment of error is well-taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 47} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and summary judgment is entered in favor of the Village on Taxiputinbay‘s claims. Taxiputinbay is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment reversed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
JUDGE
Candace C. Crouse, V.J.
Pierre H. Bergeron, V.J. CONCUR.
JUDGE
JUDGE
Judges Candace C. Crouse and Pierre H. Bergeron, First District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Notes
Id. at ¶ 34. Here, in contrast, there is no direct conflict between Section 866.01(a)(4) andThe conflict between these sections is clear. Norton Codified Ordinances 440.01 permits persons to operate excessively wide vehicles on certain roads without engaging in the statutorily mandated permit process and without demonstrating good cause for the exception. While
R.C. 5577.05 and4513.34 prohibit such traffic without a permit, Norton Codified Ordinances 440.01(c)(1) explicitly permits it.