AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, CENTRAL STATE UNIVERSITY CHAPTER, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. CENTRAL STATE UNIVERSITY, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE.
No. 97-568
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
October 20, 1999
87 Ohio St.3d 55 | 1999-Ohio-248
Submitted August 25, 1999. UPON REMAND from the United States Supreme Court.
- The classification contained in
R.C. 3345.45 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution because it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. R.C. 3345.45 is a valid exercise of legislative authority underSection 34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution .
{¶ 1} Effective July 1, 1993, the General Assembly enacted
“On or before January 1, 1994, the Ohio board of regents jointly with all state universities, as defined in
section 3345.011 of the Revised Code , shall develop standards for instructional workloads for full-time and part-time faculty in keeping with the universities’ missions and with special emphasis on the undergraduate learning experience. These standards shall contain clear guidelines for institutions to determine a range of acceptable undergraduate teaching by faculty.“On or before June 30, 1994, the board of trustees of each state university shall take formal action to adopt a faculty workload policy consistent with the standards developed under this section. Notwithstanding
section 4117.08 of the Revised Code , the policies adopted under this section are not appropriate subjects for collective bargaining. Notwithstanding division (A) ofsection 4117.10 of the Revised Code , any policy adopted under this section by a board of trustees prevails over any conflicting provisions of any collective bargaining agreement between an employees organization and that board of trustees.”
{¶ 2} Also enacted as part of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 152 was Section 84.14, uncodified, which provides:
“Pursuant to
section 3345.45 of the Revised Code , the Ohio Board of Regents shall work with state universities to ensure that no later than fall term 1994, a minimum ten per cent increase in statewide undergraduate teaching activity be achieved to restore the reductions experienced over the past decade. Notwithstandingsection 3345.45 of the Revised Code , any collective bargaining agreement in effect on the effective date of this act shall continue in effect until its expiration date.” 145 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4539.
{¶ 3} Pursuant to the standards in
“The normal full-time teaching load will be a range of 36 to 40 contact hours per academic year. The normal teaching load in any quarter will not exceed 15 contact hours. Faculty members shall have at least ten office hours distributed over the five day work week.”
{¶ 4} CSU then notified the certified collective bargaining agent for full-time faculty members at CSU, the American Association of the University Professors, Central State University Chapter (“AAUP“), that, in accordance with
{¶ 5} The trial court held
{¶ 6} Upon appeal and cross-appeal to this court, we were asked to determine the constitutionality of
{¶ 7} The United States Supreme Court reversed AAUP I to the extent that it held the statute unconstitutional under the United States Equal Protection Clause. Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter (1999), 526 U.S. 124, 119 S.Ct. 1162, 143 L.Ed.2d 227 (”Central State“). The United States Supreme Court emphasized in Central State that AAUP I misapplied federal rational-basis review by requiring the state to provide evidence of a rational relationship between the statute and its goal. The Supreme Court held that
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., Donald J. Mooney, Jr., and Mark D. Tucker, for appellee and cross-appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor, pro hac vice, Lawrence J. Miltner and Jan A. Neiger, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant and cross-appellee.
Snyder, Rakay & Spicer and Peter J. Rakay, for amicus curiae Ohio Education Association.
COOK, J.
{¶ 8} This case returns to us for consideration of
Equal Protection
{¶ 9} To avoid duplication, we begin our equal protection analysis of
- the classification created by
R.C. 3345.45 is subject to rational-basis scrutiny; - the inquiry under the rational-basis test is whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest;
- the goal of
R.C. 3345.45 — to effect a change in the ratio between faculty activities in order to correct the imbalance between research and teaching at four-year undergraduate state institutions — serves a legitimate state interest.
{¶ 10} Accordingly, the sole issue remaining for our determination is
{¶ 11} Under federal rational-basis analysis, a classification “must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Fed. Communications Comm. v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993), 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211, 221. A rational relationship will exist under rational-basis review if “the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. [1985], 473 U.S. [432], 446 [105 S.Ct. 3249, 3257, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 324].” Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992), 505 U.S. 1, 11, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2332, 120 L.Ed.2d 1, 13.
{¶ 12} Importantly, a state has no obligation whatsoever “to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.” Heller v. Doe (1993), 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643, 125 L.Ed.2d 257, 271. “[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Beach Communications, supra, 508 U.S. at 315, 113 S.Ct. at 2102, 124 L.Ed.2d at 222. “‘[T]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.‘” Heller, supra, quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. (1973), 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, 35 L.Ed.2d 351, 358. Furthermore, “courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature‘s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational-basis review because ’ “it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.” ‘” Dandridge v. Williams [1970], 397 U.S. [471] 485 [90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 501-502], quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 [31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369, 377] (1911). * * *” Heller, 509 U.S. at 321, 113 S.Ct. at 2643, 125 L.Ed.2d at 271.
{¶ 13} Applying the federal standard to its analysis of
{¶ 14} AAUP, however, maintains that Ohio‘s Equal Protection Clause is to be construed differently from its federal counterpart. Specifically, AAUP would have us modify the application of the federal test to require factual evidence of a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. As a result, AAUP contends that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Central State has no bearing upon the Ohio analysis because Ohio‘s standard is more stringent. In support of that
{¶ 15} Despite the use of that language, this court has never held Ohio‘s equal protection standard to be different from that employed under the federal analysis. See, e.g., Desenco, Inc. v. Akron (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 535, 544, 706 N.E.2d 323, 332; Keaton v. Ribbeck (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 443, 445, 12 O.O.3d 375, 376, 391 N.E.2d 307, 308, citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563; Beatty v. Akron City Hosp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 483, 491, 21 O.O.3d 302, 307, 424 N.E.2d 586, 591-592. Notably, even the courts in Dayton and AAUP I espoused adherence to the federal standard before straying from it in the manner set forth above. For example, the AAUP I majority specifically stated that the federal and Ohio Equal Protection Clauses “are functionally equivalent, and the standards for determining violations of equal protection are essentially the same under state and federal law.” 83 Ohio St.3d at 233, 699 N.E.2d at 467. In fact, it was under that reasoning that the AAUP I court announced its intention to determine the equal protection issues “under both * * * [the Ohio and United States] constitutional provisions as a single question.” Id. Thus, the AAUP I court had no intention of renouncing the federal standard when it suggested that the legislature must provide evidence of a rational
{¶ 16} This recent confusion concerning the federal standard of rational-basis review should not serve as support for its abandonment in Ohio. The United States Supreme Court‘s analysis and construction of this standard has evolved over many years of review. It is only one part of a carefully conceived structure of equal protection review, with each section occupying its own place in a larger scheme. Were we to modify this portion of the review in the manner suggested by AAUP I and Dayton and impose greater judicial scrutiny on classifications under rational-basis review, every other step of the analysis would likewise be disturbed. We see no reason to create such a disturbance when the existing federal standard is workable and exceedingly well reasoned. We affirm, therefore, that the federal and Ohio Equal Protection Clauses are to be construed and analyzed identically. We also specifically set forth that the state has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification under Ohio‘s standard of rational-basis review.
{¶ 17} Having confirmed that Ohio‘s Equal Protection Clause tracks its federal counterpart, we follow the United States Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Central State and hold that the classification contained in
Section 34, Article II
{¶ 18} AAUP next challenges the constitutionality of
{¶ 19} AAUP urges us to construe Section 34 as a restriction upon the General Assembly‘s authority to pass employee-related legislation. Specifically,
{¶ 20} This court has repeatedly interpreted
{¶ 21} The General Assembly routinely enacts legislation that serves precisely the purpose AAUP would have us declare impermissible.
{¶ 22} These statutes provide only a few examples of laws burdening employees based upon legislative decisions to regulate the employment sector in the public interest. None of these statutes was enacted to benefit employees, but there can be no question that they constitute important legislation that the General Assembly has the constitutional authority to enact.
{¶ 23}
{¶ 24} We conclude that
{¶ 25} We hold, therefore, that
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in judgment only.
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., dissent.