*1
Appellee.
Ohio,
Williams,
v.
Appellant,
The State
Williams,
v.
State
[Cite as
statute, with along statutes, its related authorizes common pleas court to continuing jurisdiction exercise over a criminal defendant who has been charged with a violent first- or second-degree felony and who has been found incompetent to stand trial and expiration remains so after the one-year of R.C. 2945.38’s time restoring frame for competency. R.C. 2945.39 pleas authorizes the common to order facility of such a mental-health statutory when the follow, criteria are met. For the reasons we determine that R.C. 2945.39 is civil statute and that provisions its and those of related statutes do not violate principles рrocess of due or equal protection. We ,to therefore reverse the judgment which held appeals, contrary. History Procedural
I. Facts and (a first- Williams, rape *2 was indicted Thonex Defendant-appellee, of plea Williams entered in December 2005. and other offenses degree felony) A evaluation. a mental-health insanity and underwent reason of guilty by not determined, consistent of Common Pleas County of Court judge Montgomery the to examiner, incompetent that Williams was the the mental-health report with could probability that he be restored that was substantial stand trial and there The one-year period by time R.C. 2945.38. prescribed within the competency to Valley for restora- to Twin Behavioral Healthcare trial court committed Williams tive treatment. later mental status six months trial cоurt’s review of Williams’s The trial, to stand incompetent that remained
resulted in a determination Williams the maximum time R.C. continuing treatment. As under and the court ordered report indicated a mental-health-examination approached, 2945.38 for restoration and that he could not be opined to stand trial incompetent that Williams remained limitations his serious within the statute of for most competency restored to charge, rape. at a for trial court to retain orally hearing state then moved the The
4}{¶ 2945.39(A)(2). indictment, to under Williams moved dismiss jurisdiction R.C. jurisdiction pursuant trial to R.C. arguing continuing that the court’s exercise process equal him of to deprive rights protection. 2945.39 would his due defending constitutionality of the court’s responded by After the state trial denied the motion retaining hearing, and аfter an oral court jurisdiction, held R.C. is constitutional. to dismiss and that 2945.39 trial held R.C. hearing under On November 5}{¶ 2945.39(A)(2) jurisdiction. trial court found to whether to retain decide (1) convincing rape that Williams committed the offense clear and evidence (2) subject to person hospitaliza- was he was a charged, with which he (4) (3) order, trial, statutory competent was not to stand tion he expired. rejected treatment had The court Williams’s time limit for restoration court for a under arguments belonged that the matter commitment jurisdiction to 2945.401 5122. The trial court retained R.C. Chapter R.C. Valley. at Twin hospitalized and ordered Williams remain 2945.402 Appeals Court appeal, Williams’s the Second District reversed Upon on majority held that R.C. 2945.39 is unconstitutional a divided decision. The that under grounds. First, three held commitment majority “criminal, that Williams’s not civil in nature” and constitutional statute he all the procedural were therefore violated because had received rights hearing he should have received safeguards in his R.C. 2945.39 as a criminal defendant undergoing prosecution. 179 Ohio 2008- Ohio-6245, 49. Second, the appellate majority held R.C. violated Williams’s
right equal protection because that procedures committing statute’s for persons under for a felony apply indictment serious offense do not also persons who have been procedures convicted of the same offense and because the for terminating commitment are more onerous for a committed under R.C. 2945.39 than Id. at committed 5122. 66- Third, the appellate majority agreed with Williams’s arguments 2945.39 violated his right due process because common court’s pleas retention of jurisdiction criminal pursuant permitted indictment and the *3 length of the commitment—the maximum term that he could have received for the most serious offense in the reasonably indictment —are not related to the commitment, purpose of which is to protect society dangerous who persons ill. Id. at mentally 79-82. The dissenter with the disagreed majority’s conclusions on each of {¶ 9} grounds constitutional considered and would trial have affirmed the court’s (Wolff, P.J., commitment order. Id. at 85-92 dissenting). accepted We the state’s under appeal jurisdiction our discretionary
{¶
10}
review three
law
propositions
regarding
whether
commitment
under R.C.
or
nature,
2945.39 is civil
criminal in
whether such a commitment
violates a defendant’s equal-protection rights, and whether such a commitment
a
violates
defendant’s due-process rights.
1438, 2009-0hio-1638,
121 Ohio St.3d
II. The Relevant Statutes A summary of the several statutes in which applicable {¶ cases a 11} (here defendant charged with a serious offense violence rape, first-degree felony) is ill mentally is to an understanding useful of this Under matter. R.C. 2945.38(B)(1) (C)(1), and a common pleas presiding court over a criminal case involving a defendant with a charged violent first- or second-degree felony who has been found incompetent to pursuant may stand trial to R.C. require the defendant to undergo up treatment for year. one One situation which the court is authorized to order treatment it when finds that there is a “substantial probability” that the incompetent defendant will competent become 2945.38(B)(1)(a). to stand trial within year one while undergoing trеatment. R.C. If one-year time for expires treatment and the {¶ defendant remains 12} 2945.38(H)(3) incompetent trial, to stand R.C. directs further proceedings 2945.39, 2945.39(A) 2945.401, must occur under R.C. and provides 2945.402. R.C. mentally ill. who is pursued point defendant that can be options two civil commit- attorney may seek the defendant’s First, prosecuting the court or 2945.39(A)(1). Second, the R.C. Chapter under R.C. probate court ment court retain pleas seek to have the common prosecuting attorney court or 2945.39(A)(2). R.C. jurisdiction the defendant. over find, by convincing trial must clear and court jurisdiction, To retain offense that the committed hearing, after a both defendant evidence subject ill mentally hospitalization person that the and defendant 2945.39(A)(2)(a) (b). hospitaliza- ill “Mentally R.C. order. 5122.01(B), forth meaning has as set R.C. by court order” the same tion whо, illness, a substantial risk represent of mental and includes because manifested evidence of recent violent behavior or harm to others as physical 5122.01(B)(2). 2945.37(A)(7) In re Burton dangerousness. See present R.C. one of (1984), paragraph Ohio St.3d OBR (a whether a who is syllabus governs test totality-of-the-circumstances 5122.01(B)). under hospitalized to be should be R.C. alleged 2945.39(A)(2) it findings, If does make R.C. must the court both 14} {¶ unless court or the discharge the defendant dismiss indictment civil attorney files for the defendant’s prosecuting 2945.39(C). charges But under 5122. R.C. dismissal “[a] 2945.39(C)] further on the proceedings is not bar to criminal based same [R.C. Id. conduct.” 2945.39(A)(2) If then findings, court does make both R.C.
2945.39(D)(1) a hospital operated by the court to commit the defendant to directs facility. or to another The court Department appropriate the of Mental Hеalth placed in the commitment must order that the defendant be least-restrictive welfare, public safety with and the defendant’s alternative available consistent Id. protecting public safety.” “giv[ing] preference 2945.39(D)(1),all Once a court commits a defendant under R.C. further {¶ 16} (which proceedings by proceedings regarding R.C. 2945.401 include governed status; the termination the placement nonsecured possible defendant’s commitment; clinical recommendations on the defen- reports clinical periodic commitment; confinement, and termination of competence, degree dant’s possi- hearing requirements) (regarding trial court 2945.402 defendant’s release). 2945.39(D)(3). ble conditional R.C. 2945.401(J)(l)(a) (c), through pursuant R.C. commitment Under (a) upon the earlier of the trial court’s determination
R.C. 2945.39terminates ill hospitalization no longer the defendant is (b) could have order, prison of the maximum term the defendant expiration if received the defendant had been convicted of the most serious offense charged,1 (c) or trial court’s termination commitment under R.C. 2945.401(J)(2)(a)(ii), which requires findings that the defendant is competent trial stand and is no longer mentally person subject to hospitalization by court order. If jurisdiction the trial court’s is terminated pursuant
2945.401(J)(l)(b) because the defendant’s commitment ends upon expiration received, the maximum term prison the defendant could have the court or prosecuting attorney may seek the defendant’s civil commitment in probate court 2945.401(A). under R.C. 5122. R.C. Analysis
III. Each of assignments Williams’s of error appeals the court of challenged the faciаl constitutionality of R.C. 2945.39. Williams did not challenge way the trial court applied R.C. 2945.39 and related statutes to his situation. case, therefore, The resolution of this turns on the evaluation of R.C. 2945.39’s facial constitutionality on each of the three grounds considered the appellate court. All enjoy statutes a strong presumption of constitutionality. State v. (1998), 404,
Cook
409,
83 Ohio St.3d
570,
700 N.E.2d
citing State ex rel. Dickman
(1955),
v.
142,
164 Ohio St.
57 O.O.
128 N.E.2d
paragraph
Defenbacher
one of
syllabus.
To overcome the presumption, one must
prove beyond
reasonable
Bloomer,
doubt
the statute is unconstitutional. State v.
122 Ohio
¶
200,
A. Is R.C. Criminal in Nature? appellatе court held that an involuntary commitment under 2945.39 is criminal rather than civil in nature and that Williams’s constitutional rights were therefore violated because in his R.C. 2945.39 hearing, he was not afforded the procedural safeguards required by the Constitution *5 criminal prosecutions. In holding, applied so it the employed test” “intent/effects Cook, by this court in v. 415, 570, State 83 Ohio at St.3d to consider whether sex-offender legislation enacted in 1996 was civil or purposes criminal for parties agree 1. applicable years. that the maximum term this case is ten 70 Clause, 10, I of Article the Ex Post Facto Section analysis an conducting States Constitution.
the United
the
test, a court first considers whether
In
the
applying
intent/effects
(and
civil)
(and
penal
therefore
or
the statute to be remedial
intended
legislature
criminal,
сriminal).
and
penal
intent was that the statute be
Id. If the
therefore
However,
statute
remedial
if the intent was that the
be
the
ends.
inquiry
then
civil,
must be examined. The statute
specific
the statute’s
effects
and
then
negate
if its
a remedial
and criminal
effects
punitive
be determined to be
still
v. Ward
N.E.2d 570. See also United States
417-418,
at
700
intention.
Id.
2636,
(1980),
242, 248-249,
Court Kansas
U.S.
S.Ct.
case,
of Kansas statute
constitutionality
In
the court evaluated the
501.
that
had
“sexually
who
predators”
state to institutionalize
violent
permitting the
person-
but
had mental abnormalities or
their criminal sentences
who
completed
disorders,
350-353, 117
likely
Id. at
they
that
would
reoffend.
ality
indicated
2072,
in nature
L.Ed.2d
The court held that the statute was civil
138
501.
S.Ct.
or the Ex Post
Id.
Jeopardy
did not violаte the Double
Clause
Facto Clause.
370, 371,
at
117
included the fact that the 2072,138 code, 361,117 id. did not in its criminal S.Ct. L.Ed.2d the statute deterrence, goals of criminal implicate primary not retribution or which the 361-363, 117 statute did id. at S.Ct. 138 L.Ed.2d the punishment, scienter, id. at 138 501. The require finding S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Hendricks, pointing court in the case at out that R.C. appellate distinguished bar and that implicated 2945.39 and statutes are in the state’s criminal code other no a civil in R.C. explicit purpose there is indication of 2945.39.
584,
71 to the maximum of detention length link the maximum the relevant statutes if It determined have received convicted. the defendant could criminal sentence of civil commitment purposes to the connection bears no relation that this or dangerousness solely not used as evidenсe charged that the offense is shows ¶ Id. at 47. appropriate. is whether commitment determining mental illness court, “strongly framework statutory According appellate to the adequate under R.C. 5122 procedures that commitment suggests Id. at mentally ill confining dangerous persons.” society’s interest address attempts R.C. 2945.39 “although court stated appellate 48. The commitment, proce- as civil goals some of the same accomplish defen- incompetent to confine overriding 2945.39 reflect an intent dures of R.C. if convicted they felonies as had been charged who have been with serious dants ¶at they until can be tried.” Id. or that the intent of R.C. 2945.39 is court found appellate Because reason, it did not consider the that the statute is criminal for
penal, and test. prong “effects” of the intent/effects contrast, 2945.39 is In with the trial court R.C. agreed the dissent 29}
{¶ to the authority functions as a transfer of commitment “merely civil nature and subject hospital- from the court for criminal court order, is demonstrated present dangerousness ization whose (Wolff, P.J., felony.” dissenting). of a Id. at 87 commission serious away leads us consideration of R.C. 2945.39 and related statutes Our incompetent commitment of an defendant under R.C. from the view the defendant. We see equivalent criminally confining 2945.39 is the functional or criminal defendants punish no indication of an intent to confine overriding statutory within the framework. Rather, designed primarily and related statutes as we view R.C. 2945.39 In we note that R.C. protecting public. particular,
for the
purpose
2945.39(D)(1),
trial
to order the least-restrictive commit-
requires
which
and the defendant’s
public safety
ment alternative available consistent with
2945.39,
if
states that
explicitly
welfare
it enters
commitment order under R.C.
This statement
give preference
protecting public safety.”
the court “shall
underlying
to the
intent
R.C. 2945.39.
gives
predominant
voice
(who,
of a
offender
as a threshold
present dangerousness
specific
The
32}
{¶
offense,
2945.38(C)(1),
matter,
to be
charged
must have been
with a serious
issue)
critical
of an R.C. 2945.39
component
to the statutes at
is the
a reasonable indicator of the level of
type
charged
of offense
proceeding.
plays
The seriousness of the
offense
dangerousness.
the offender’s
whether the
role in the trial court’s determination
permissible
highly
relevant
Hendricks,
See
appropriate.
offender’s commitment under R.C. 2945.39
(a
cоnduct
person’s prior
117 S.Ct.
138 L.Ed.2d
U.S.
finding
dangerousness).
support
be considered
permissibly
2945.39,
Moreover,
with the statute under consideration
as
*7
Hendricks,
scienter,
implicate
a
of
nor does it
retribution
require
finding
does not
deterrence,
objectives of criminal
and the
primary
punishment
or
which are the
in
that a
statute is criminal
nature. See id. at
telling
particular
two most
factors
2072,
361-363,
implicate
117
As the dissent
court
committed under R.C.
“[I]individuals
they
longer mentally
2945.39 must be released when
have been found to be no
* * *
subject
ill
hospitalization by
provision
order.
release
[T]he
emphasizes
primary purpose
provide
of R.C. 2945.39 is to
stricter
ill
particularly dangerous.
confinement for
who are
As noted
Hendricks,
Supreme
the United States
Court in
the confinement of the
dangerously mentally
objective
ill ‘is a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
117
historiсally
regarded.’
has been
so
521 U.S.
S.Ct.
138 L.Ed.2d
(Wolff, P.J.,
584,
fects is whether the statute framework nothing statutory civil intent. see the effects of the negate We that have caused us to conclude negates its civil intent. The same features an overriding purpose that the statute is intended to be remedial nature with also the conclusion that the effects the statute protecting public support In particular, and consistent with the remedial intent. are remedial nature deterrence, implicate require R.C. 2945.39 does not retribution or does scienter, that commitments under the statute must finding provides longer mentally hospitalization terminate when the is no order. a civil Consequеntly, person We conclude R.C. 2945.39is statute. *8 rights committed under the statute need not be afforded the constitutional prosecution. judgment afforded to a defendant a criminal The of the court of appeals on this issue is therefore reversed.
B. Equal-Protection Considerations
Protection
of the
Amendment
to the
Equal
Clause
Fourteenth
* * *
United
Constitution
shall
to
provides,
deny
any person
States
“No State
jurisdiction
within its
of the laws.”
Protection
equal protection
Equal
Ohio’s
Clause,
2,
Constitution,
Section Article I of the
“All
provides,
political power
Ohio
is inherent in the people.
equal protection
Government is instituted for their
* *
benefit
These two
equal-protection provisions
functionally equivalent
the same
require
analysis. Eppley
Tri-Valley
v.
Local School Dist. Bd. of
¶
Edn.,
56,
to
implicate
this level of
a statute that does not
a fundamental
or a
right
suspect classification
if
equal-protection principles
rationally
does
violate
it is
56,
legitimate government
related to a
interest.
2009-
Eppley,
Ohio St.3d
¶
Ohio-1970,
401,
15,
Queen
(1990),
at
citing
City
908 N.E.2d
v.
Metro
Menefee
27, 29,
181; Oliver,
278,
{¶ 40}
(2000),
an
ing
equal-protection rational-basis review. State v. Williams
88 Ohio
513, 531,
only
they
St.3d
protection rely
large
on Jackson v. Indiana
406 U.S.
92 S.Ct.
part
(1966),
32 L.Ed.2d
and Baxstrom v. Herold
383 U.S.
86 S.Ct.
Jackson,
In
involuntary
New York statute of a
who had
criminal
completed his
*9
equal protection
person
sentence violated
because the
did not receive the benefit
judicial
of a
to
a
hearing
dangerous,
hearing
determine whether he was
he would
have had if he had not
in
at
civil
prison
proceeding
been
the time the
commitment
Id. at
was instituted.
86 S.Ct.
»{¶44} justified because its are the in rights, procedures by restraining state’s interest subject ill a hospitalization who have committed serious agree. crime. We accept arguments presented by by We as valid the the state and the curiae, Ohio, attorney
amicus that a commitment under general R.C. many 2945.39 and related statutes has of the same attributes as a commitment
75 are not as the two differences between and that the Chapter under R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)(b) term uses the R.C. example, For asserts. appellee substantial as and defines court order” by hospitalization “mentally person 2945.37(A)(7). 5122.01(B). More- R.C. See it is defined R.C. exactly as term “regarding 2945.401(B) 5122 Chapter of R.C. over, provisions states R.C. they are not to the extent apply shall or institutionalization hospitalization chapter.” conflict with this 150-151, 464 11 OBR Burton, 11 at in In re Ohio St.3d This court standards Chapter 5122’s constitutionality of R.C. upheld
N.E.2d chal- equal-protection and due-process face of commitments of those many incorporates that R.C. 2945.39 to the extent Certainly, lenges. standards, principles. it not violate equal-protection does same 2945.39(A)(2)’s court must make that a requirement specific R.C. evidence) commit- that the defendant convincing finding (by clear threshold is commitment ordering the defendant’s he is with before ted the crimes an But not create this does Chapter not found in R.C. requirement regard in this violation, the standards for сommitment because equal-protection Chapter 5122. than those under R.C. actually 2945.39 are stricter under R.C. Jackson, an equal-protection which this case distinguishes This factor subjected in that case was person accused part found in because the violation was (Em- others. than was applicable commitment standard” to “a more lenient added.) 1845, L.Ed.2d 435. 406 U.S. S.Ct. phasis are some differences between there The state concedes probate through committed involuntarily by which procedures which a procedures by and those Chapter R.C. court under 2945.39, respective proce- well as in the under R.C. as involuntarily committed For those committed example, has been ordered. once the commitment dures 5122.15(C) compare R.C. hearings, earlier initial review given court are probate (H) 2945.401(C); scrutiny public- as do not face the same level with R.C. 5122.15(C) 2945.39(A)(2) (D)(1); concerns, with R.C. compare, e.g., R.C. safety reduced, compare the institution have their restrictions within easily can more for the 2945.401(D); stringent procedures less and have 5122.20 with R.C. R.C. commitment, termination of including possible termination of court’s 5122 without pursuant officer a chief medical 2945.401(1). 5122.21(A) with R.C. compare approval, however, differing differences, justified by statutory These subject of R.C. The fact that the types the two of commitments. contexts of *10 has been to others and also danger been found to be commitment has 2945.39 case, in this felony, rape such as the committed a violent found to have under R.C. commitment from one an R.C. 2945.39 fundamentally distinguishes 5122. It is a distinction that Chapter may permissibly be taken into account. Public-safety reasonably justify assigning concerns to the common pleas court that entered the commitment order an important person’s role the committed possible reduction restrictions and in the determination of whether Although commitment should be terminated. a person committed under R.C. 2945.39 have to wait to receive an initial longer hearing person review than a 5122, 2945.401(C), Chapter committed under R.C. see difference is not unreasonable, already because such a has been subjected to the extensive evaluation procedures R.C. 2945.38. Even though only R.C. 2945.39 concerns persons who are under
indictment and
does
include others with a
history
committing serious
felony
indictment,
offenses who are not under
the General Assembly “could
rationally conclude that an
present
individual’s
involvement in the criminal-justice
system indicates a greater degree
dangerousness.”
statutes that are less favorable to the facing commitment than are the provisions governing court commitment under 5122 are rationally related to legitimate government interests. Consequently, R.C. 2945.39 withstands equal-protection scrutiny, and appellee has not successfully borne his burden of establishing equal-protection violation. See State v. Bretz (Dec. 30, 1999), CA-98-001, 5th Dist. No. 2000 WL *9 that an (holding involuntary commitment under R.C. 2945.39 does not violate equal-protection rights). Because we that an involuntary hold commitment under R.C.
does not equal protection, violate the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed on this issue also.
C. Due-Process Considerations
into
inquiry
whether R.C. 2945.39
due-process protections
violates
{¶ 53}
governed by
is also
Indiana,
rational-basis standard. As
stated
Jackson v.
77
(2001), 90 Ohio
v. Sullivan
also State
is committed.” See
for which the individual
502, 506,
commitment. not restraint However, physical free from to be right L.Ed.2d 323. statutes consistently upheld has absolute; Supreme Court the United States control are unable to of who civil commitment authorizing the forcible safety public, “provided to the of the danger and who a pose their behavior evidentiary stan- to pursuant proper procedures takes place confinement 501; Hendricks, 2072, L.Ed.2d 356-357, 117 138 521 U.S. at S.Ct. dards.” 80, 1780, 437. (1992), 71, 112 118 L.Ed.2d Foucha v. Louisiana 504 U.S. S.Ct. appellee due comport process, fails to with arguing In that R.C. 2945.39 in Court’s statement Supreme on the States great emphasis United places Jackson, 1845, 435, that “a L.Ed.2d at 92 S.Ct. 32 U.S. of solely on account his who is committed a with a criminal offense State of period than the reasonable trial cannot be held more proceed to to
incapacity
that he
probability
a substantial
whether there is
necessary
time
to determine
also relies on this
Appellee
foreseeable future.”
capacity
will attain that
Sullivan,
502,
committed
trial,
on account of his
incapacity
proceed to
unlike the
Jackson,
defendant
at
Rather,
U.S.
92 S.Ct.
determining whether the defendant committed the crime charged does not violate Instead, the defendant’s due-process rights. a trial court’s finding this evidentiary standard that the defendant has committed the offense charged only used to determine the degree defendant’s of dangerousness. The state asserts that support Sullivan does not appellee’s argument
that his due-process rights were
purpose
violated here. The
of the commitment
Sullivan,
which
2945.38,
involved the former version of was to restore defendant to
competency
order to stand trial.
probabili-
Because there was no
statute,
the former
by
within the time set
ty
could be restored
competency
purpose
to the
of
relationship
no rational
period
treatment
bore
mandatory
therefore,
were violated.
commitment, and,
due-process rights
the defendant’s
limited decision in
Sullivan,
N.E.2d
defendant’s or by permit- the defendant to competency, continued efforts restore allowing maximum term equal for a term to the ting defendant be committed “Al- charged. that he could for the most serious offense imprisonment receive * * * the maximum committed until though may expiration defendant be offense, term could have received for the due imprisonment he if he is no longer the fact that he be released sooner process is satisfied *13 Williams, 179 Ohio 2008- hospitalization court order.” (Wolff, P.J., Moreover, Ohio-6245, dissenting). at 90 as the observed, a person of not correctly principles process prevent dissent due do If being competency. under R.C. reevaluated for committed 2945.39 ill, mentally is restored while is still he can “be tried on competency for illness. remaining the offense while committed his mental R.C. 2945.401(J)(2).” at 91. Id. herein, we that the nature For the reasons conclude expressed
{¶ 63} commitment occurs under R.C. 2945.39 bear a reasonable duration of the that Jackson, is 406 relationship purpose to the for which the committed. See 32 U.S. аt S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 435. that an commitment 2945.39 not involuntary We hold under R.C. does
{¶ 64} process. judgment appeals of due the court of principles violate of reversed on this issue.
IV. Conclusion involuntary is that appellee’s arguments every The crux commitment through probate proceeding of the here court under type issue should occur practice constitutionally we Chapter but hold such does, a common required. pleas It is reasonable to as R.C. 2945.39 provide, has had interaction with a defendant already extensive defendant; an involuntary over that jurisdiction can continue exercise in a exclusively in this situation not be pursued commitment need Chapter And even an R.C. 5122 commitment be though be constitutional. way one to handle the of a defendant who has committed a serious triаl, offense of violence and who is not presently competent to stand availability procedures under R.C. way does not stand in the Assembly’s the General ability create alternative procedures who pose especially high degree safety of risk to the public. We hold that nature, because R.C. 2945.39 is civil in a person committed
under the statute need not be afforded the constitutional rights afforded to a defendant in a criminal prosecution. We also that an involuntary hold commit- ment under R.C. 2945.39 does not principles violate of equal protection or due process. The judgment reversed, of the court of appeals is and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.
Judgment reversed. Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, JJ., O’Donnell, concur. JJ., dissent. Lanzinger,
Pfeifer
Brown, C.J., not participating. J., dissenting.
Lanzinger, I respectfully dissent from majority’s holding R.C. 2945.39 is
civil nature. First, the General Assembly enacted part R.C. 2945.39 as of Ohio’s criminal code. already has a civil commitment process pursuant to R.C. Chapter 5122 regarding those who and R.C. Chapter 5123 regarding those who are developmentally disabled. Second, tying the length of a criminal defendant’s commitment to the
maximum possible prison term for the most serious offense also indicates that the commitment is criminal in nature. If the maximum period of commitment is reached without the trial, defendant’s becoming competent to stand he or she is discharged, 2945.401(J)(l)(b). unless the state seeks civil commitment. R.C. In words, other the general division of the common pleas no longer has the authority to punish the defendant for the offense once the time has been served. Finally, unlike person committed under the process, civil a defendant who is committed under R.C. 2945.39 remains a pending indictment. The proceeding part occurs as of the and, therefore, defendant’s criminal case defendant should be afforded all the rights of criminal defendant. J., concurs the foregoing opinion.
Pfeifer, J. Attorney, Carley Jr., Prosecuting Montgomery County Mathias H. Heck appellant. for Ford, Attorneys, Prosecuting Assistant and Melissa M. Ingram Comunale, appellee. for Anthony General, Mizer, General, Solicitor Benjamin C. Cordray, Attorney
Richard
Solicitor,
Loeser,
Solicitor,
Assistant
Jeffrey R.
P.
Stephen
Carney, Deputy
curiae,
Attorney
amicus
Ohio
General.
reversal for
urging
Appellant.
Racing
Equipment, L.L.C.,
Appellee,
Roberts,
v.
Kauffman
Roberts,
v.
Racing Equip., L.L.C.
[Cite as Kauffman
81,
personal over on the Inter- publication allegedly defamatory on that defendant’s statements follow, trial when it net. For the reasons that we hold that the court erred in this jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant personal declined to assert case. Background
Factual and Procedural (“KRE”), is an Ohio Kauffman L.L.C. Appellee, Racing Equipment, 2}{¶ high-perform- and related limited-liability engine that constructs blocks company Although dealings sale. its business equipment public ance automotive Glenmont, nationwide, operations KRE maintains its sole business and office Ohio. has Roberts, Roberts 30-year Virginia. is a resident Appellant, Scott *15 6, 2006, the name “Central February using Ohio. On physically
never entered