Malcolm Tanksley, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Cecil Howell et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 19AP-504
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
September 1, 2020
2020-Ohio-4278
BROWN, J.
(C.P.C. No. 18CV-2296); (REGULAR CALENDAR)
DECISION
Rendered on September 1, 2020
On brief: Rosenberg & Ball Co., LPA, and David T. Ball, for appellant.
On brief: Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, Denise DePalma, and Nick A. Soulas, Jr., for appellees.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
BROWN, J.
{1} Plaintiff-appellant, Malcolm Tanksley, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the
{2} On March 15, 2018, Tanksley filed a complaint against Howell, Mueller, and Johns in their individual capacities. The complaint asserted claims for race discrimination and retaliation, in violation of
{3} Tanksley, an African American male, has been employed by the court since August 8, 2005. Tanksley works predominately with juvenile probationers. At the times relevant to the present case, Howell was a probation officer supervisor at the court, Mueller was the court‘s chief probation officer, and Johns served as the court‘s director.
{4} In 2016, Elisa Batchelor was Tanksley‘s probation officer supervisor. On October 18, 2016, Tanksley filed a grievance with the court‘s human resources (“HR“) department alleging that Batchelor was displaying favoritism and creating a hostile work environment. Tanksley explained that Batchelor would scrutinize notes Tanksley was required to keep on his probationers “more than she did some of [Tanksley‘s] other counterparts.” (Tanksley Depo. at 35.)
{5} Danyel Marcus, the court‘s deputy director of HR, conducted two meetings with Tanksley regarding his October 2016 grievance. At the meetings, Tanksley provided Marcus with some of Batchelor‘s case note reviews for the probation officers in her unit. The court‘s HR department reviewed the case notes and determined that, although “there were inconsistencies with the case notеs, the policy and how the policy and procedures were administered and audited throughout the entire probation department,” there was no evidence to “indicate [Tanksley was] being targeted and/or harassed or that any member in the unit was being favored over the other by Ms. Ba[t]chelor.” (Tanksley Depo., Ex. 5.)
{6} On April 7, 2017, Tanksley received a written reprimand for insubordination from probation officer supervisor Jan Maloney. Maloney was the supervisor in charge of the electronic monitoring devices (“EMD“) used by the probation department. The reprimand asserted Tanksley had submitted an EMD referral form to the probation clerk without a supervisor‘s signature. Court pоlicy required that “[a]ll referrals are to have a supervisor‘s signature.” (Tanksley Depo., Ex. 6.) Tanksley appealed the written reprimand to Mueller pursuant to the court‘s employee discipline policy. Mueller upheld the written reprimand on April 21, 2017.
{7} On May 1, 2017, Howell became the supervisor for the probation officers in Tanksley‘s unit. Howell presented the probation officers in the unit with a letter of expectations and asked them to sign the letter. The letter instructed each probation officer to send Howell “an electronic mail or call to inform [him] of [their] arrival and departure” when they were “in the office,” and to “send a text at the start and end of [their] day” when
{8} On June 7, 2017, Tanksley came into the office and checked in with Howell. Tanksley was wearing his court-issued polo shirt embroidered with the Franklin County court seal. Tanksley contends he told Howell he was going to go to the courtroom to “support [his probationer]. And [Howell] said okay. You can‘t cover that case in your polo. [Tanksley] was like oh, okay, fine. I‘m not going up to cover anyway in a polo, I‘m just going up [t]here to support her.” (Tanksley Depo. at 48.) Howell claims Tanksley told him he was going to the courtroom to cover the hearing and that Howell “made it clear” to Tanksley he was “not to go in the courtroom with that shirt on.” (Howell Depo. at 46-47.) A probation officer “covers” a hearing when they present the court with the “probation update for the youth who is in court.” (Bass-Smith Aff. at ¶ 12.) Tanksley went into the courtroom on June 7, 2017 wearing his polo shirt. Tanksley did not cover the hearing.
{9} On June 14, 2017, Howell issued a notice of policy violation to Tanksley for insubordination. The notice stated that Howell informed Tanksley on June 7, 2017 “to not go into the court rоom due to having [his] court issued field attire on. This directive was based on policy, ‘Staff Uniforms/Dress Code.’ ” (Tanksley Depo., Ex. 9.) The court‘s dress code “required” probation officers to wear their court-issued polo shirts “while performing duties in the community.” (Tanksley Depo., Ex. 16.) The notice further stated that on “Monday June 12th, 2017 [Tanksley] failed to follow the directive of reporting in [at the] start and end of the day” as required by the letter of expectations. (Tanksley Depo., Ex. 9.) Howell checked a box on the notice of policy violation indicating he was requesting a one-day suspension as discipline.
{10} On June 15, 2017, the court‘s HR department scheduled a disciplinary hearing to address the allegations contained in the notice of policy violation. On June 16, 2017, Tanksley filed a charge of race and gender discrimination against the court with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC“).
{11} Bradley Martinez served as the hearing officer at the June 27, 2017 disciplinary hearing on the notice of policy violation. Tanksley, Howell, probation officer
{12} Tanksley appealed the hearing officer‘s decision to court director Johns. Following a hearing, Johns issued a decision upholding the suspension on July 21, 2017. Johns determined that Tanksley had ” ‘violat[ed] the [dress code] policy that states the uniform/shirt is strictly for “performing duties in the community.” ’ ” Johns noted Tanksley had “admit[ted] that he violated the directive” to check in and out with Howell on June 12, 2017. Johns concluded the “[f]ailure to follow one or both of these directives would cause [him] to support the Hearing Officer‘s Decision.” (Tanksley Depo., Ex. 15.) On July 26, 2017, Mueller informed Tanksley he was to serve his one-day suspension on July 28, 2017.
{13} On April 5, 2019, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in the trial court. Defendants asserted they were entitled to immunity from Tanksley‘s race discrimination claim pursuant to
{14} On April 26, 2019, Tanksley filed a memorandum in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Tanksley asserted defendants were not entitled to immunity on his race discrimination claim, as their discriminatory conduct satisfied the exception to political-subdivision employee immunity in either
{15} On May 3, 2019, defendants filed a reply in support of their motion for summary judgment and a motion to strike. The motion to strike asked the court to strike certain paragraphs from the affidavits Tanksley had submitted.
{16} On July 3, 2019, the common pleas court issued a decision and judgment entry granting defеndants’ motion for summary judgment and motion to strike. The court concluded there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether defendants’ alleged discriminatory conduct satisfied the
{17} Tanksley appeals, presenting the following sole assignment of error for our review:
The trial court erred in granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
{18} Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion when viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party, and that conclusion is adverse to the non-moving рarty. Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54, 2010-Ohio-4505, ¶ 29, citing Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Appellate review of
{19} When seeking summary judgment on grounds the non-moving party cannot prove its case, the moving party bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on an essential element of the non-moving party‘s claims. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). The moving party does not discharge this initial burden under
{20} Tanksley asserts the trial court erred in granting defendants summary judgment on his claims for race discrimination and retaliation.
{21} In order to prevail in an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent and may establish such intent through either direct or indirect methods of proof. Ricker v. John Deere Ins. Co., 133 Ohio App.3d 759, 766 (10th Dist.1998), citing Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 583 (1996). A plaintiff may prove discriminatory intent indirectly through the analysis established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Veal v. Upreach, LLC, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-192, 2011-Ohio-5406, ¶ 20, citing Mauzy at 584.
{22} The first step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Plumbers & Steamfitters at 197. In order to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she: (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) suffered an adverse employment action, (3) was qualified for the position in question, and (4) was replaced by someone outside of the protected class or that the employer treated a similarly situated, non-protected person more favorably. Veal at ¶ 21, citing McDonnell Douglas at 802; Hall v. Ohio State Univ. College of Humanities, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1068, 2012-Ohio-5036, ¶ 15. Establishing a prima facie case “creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
{23} If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. Veal at
{24} However, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine at 253. “The McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question.” Id.
{25} We need not resolve whether Tanksley has established a prima facie case of race discrimination, as Tanksley fails to adduce evidence to support his ultimate burden to demonstrate that he was suspended because of his race. See Kirkland v. James, 657 Fed.Appx. 580, 585 (6th Cir.2016) (noting that “[u]nder the facts of this case, however, we need not resolve whether [the plaintiff] made a prima facie case of discrimination * * * because her claims fail at step three—she has not shown that [her employer‘s] neutral reasons for reducing her leave hours were pretextual“); Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 226 Fed.Appx. 587, 591 (6th Cir.2007) (finding no need to address the plaintiff‘s prima facie case as the plaintiff‘s discrimination “case [did] not survive on the question of pretext“).
{26} Defendants proffer two reasons for Tanksley‘s suspension: Tanksley‘s failure to comply with Howell‘s directive not to wear his polo shirt into the courtroom on June 7, 2017, and Tanksley‘s failure to comply with Howell‘s directive to check in and out on June 12, 2017. (Appellees’ Brief at 16.) The employer‘s burden to set forth legitimate, non-
{27} Tanksley asserts defendants’ first proffered reasоn is factually false, as Howell never told Tanksley that he could not wear his polo shirt into the courtroom on June 7, 2017. However, Johns determined that Tanksley‘s conduct violated the court‘s dress code, not Howell‘s alleged verbal directive. Johns noted in the appeal decision that Howell gave Tanksley a “clear directive,” but that in “Tanksley‘s opinion the directive was ambiguous which led to [Tanksley] entering the courtroom in the non-approved attire.” (Tanksley Depo., Ex. 15.) Johns explained at his deposition that as both Howell and Tanksley “felt that their directive was clear,” Johns “did not find that [he] had enough information to support [Howell‘s] decision on discipline for [Tanksley] wearing the * * * shirt in the courtroom.” (Johns Depo. at 47, 38.)
{28} Tanksley asserts Johns’ appeal decision “falsely describes the court‘s Dress Code policy,” as the dress code did not expressly prohibit probation officers from wearing their polo shirts in the courtroom. (Appellant‘s Reply Brief at 18.) However, we need not address the precise requirements of the dress code policy, since Johns determined that Tanksley‘s “failure to follow one or both” of the directives at issue in the appeal would cause Johns to uphold the suspension. (Tanksley Depo., Ex. 15.) Thus, Johns’ decision held that Tanksley‘s failure to check in and out on June 12, 2017 was a sufficient reason to uphold the suspension independent from the polo shirt issue.
{29} “When an employer offers more than one independent, legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, even if one is found to be
{30} Tanksley contends that Howell‘s decision to include the check in and out violation in the notice of policy violation was a pretext for discrimination. But he points to nothing in the record that contradicts the trial court‘s observation that Tanksley “presented no evidence to suggest that his [earlier] insubordination did not actually motivate Defendants to discipline him, and cannot name any other probation officer outside the protected class who engaged in the same conduct (violating directives of their superior) and was not disciplined.” (Decision at 10.) And Tanksley affirmed he did not believe the ultimate decisionmaker, Johns, “made his conclusions and his decisions because [Tanksley is] an African American.” (Tanksley Depo. at 134.)
{31} “[W]hen ‘an employee challenges his termination as improperly motivated by a supervisor‘s discriminatory animus and then seeks to impute that animus to the neutral decisionmaker who ultimately terminated the employee,’ the plaintiff ‘must offer evidence that the supervisor‘s racial animus was the cause of the termination or somehow influenced the ultimаte decisionmaker.’ ” Harris v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 133 Fed.Appx. 288, 295 (6th Cir.2005), quoting Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 877 (6th Cir.2001). Known as a “cat‘s paw” theory of liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate the “biased subordinate, who lack[ed] decisionmaking power, use[d] the unbiased decisionmaker as a
{32} Martinez and Johns both held hearings on the alleged violations where they heard testimоny from Tanksley, Howell, Stanley, and Carter. Tanksley affirmed that he was able to “present all of the information that [he] wanted to present” at the disciplinary hearing. (Tanksley Depo. at 125.) See Cariglia v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 363 F.3d 77, 87 (1st Cir.2004), fn. 4. Although Howell testified at the hearings, there is no evidence indicating that Howell‘s recommendation drove either Martinez‘s or Johns’ decisions. See Gunderson v. BNSF Ry. Co., 850 F.3d 962, 970 (8th Cir.2017) (finding that, although the supervisors “participated in the investigations and testified at the disciplinary hearings,” there was no evidence indicating that the supervisors influenced the discharge decisions). Compare Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 353 (6th Cir.2012) (finding genuine issues of material fact in a cat‘s paw claim where a biased human resources manager “actively inserted himself in thе decisionmaking process” and “misinformed and selectively informed” the decisionmakers about the incident in question).
{33} Johns reviewed the evidence and came to his own independent conclusions regarding the policy violations at issue in the case. Regarding the check in and out directive, Johns observed that the directive was contained in the letter of expectations and Tanksley admitted he violated the directive. Johns noted that Tanksley “verbally told [him]” he did not check in or out on June 12, 2017. (Johns Depo. at 61.) Thus, Johns independently concluded that Tanksley‘s violation of the check in and out requirement was a sufficient reason to uphold suspension. See Wilson v. Stroh Cos., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir.1992) (concluding that, although the plant manager who may have harbored racial animus toward the plaintiff “brought [plaintiff‘s] misconduct to [the general manager‘s] attention,” such
{34} There is no indication in the record that Tanksley‘s failure to check in or out on June 12, 2017 had no basis in fact, was not the actual reason Johns upheld the suspension, or was insufficient to explain the suspension. As such, Tanksley fails to establish that Johns’ reliance on the check in and out violation as a basis for the suspension was a pretext for discrimination.
{35} Viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of Tanksley, reasonable minds could only conclude that Tanksley was not suspended because of his race. As such, the common pleas court did not err in granting defendants summary judgment on Tanksley‘s race discrimination claim.
{36} Absent direct evidence of retaliation, a plaintiff may establish an inference of retaliation using the burden-shifting framework promulgated in McDonnell Douglas. Nebozuk v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-591, 2014-Ohio-1600, ¶ 40, citing Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 544 (6th Cir.2008). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, (2) the defendant was aware of the protected activity, (3) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff, and (4) that a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Reid v. Plainsboro Partners, III, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-442, 2010-Ohio-4373, ¶ 56, citing Woods v. Capital Univ., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-166, 2009-Ohio-5672, ¶ 45; Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324, 2007-Ohio-6442, ¶ 13.
{37} If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 414-15 (6th Cir.2009); Imwalle at 544. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason proffered by the defendant was not the true reason for the employment decision, but was a pretext for discrimination. Lindsay at 415; Imwalle at 544.
{38} Tanksley contends that both his October 18, 2016 grievance and his June 16, 2017 OCRC charge constituted protected activity. “An employee‘s activity is ‘protected’ for purposes of
{39} ” ‘In order to engage in a protected opposition activity * * * a plaintiff must make an overt stand against suspected illegal discriminatory action.’ ” Jackson v. Champaign Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 10th Dist. No. 00AP-170 (Sept. 26, 2000), quoting Comiskey v. Automotive Industry Action Group, 40 F.Supp.2d 877, 898 (E.D.Mich.1999). While “[m]agic words are not required,” opposition activity “must at least alert an employer to the employee‘s reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination is at issue.” Brown v. UPS, 406 Fed.Appx. 837, 840 (5th Cir.2010). Thus, an employee ” ‘has to at least say something to indicate her [race] is an issue. An employee can honestly believe she is the object of discrimination, but if she never mentions it, a claim of retaliation is not implicated, for an employer cannot retaliate when it is unaware of any complaints.’ ” Sitar v. Indiana Dept. of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir.2003), quoting Miller v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1008 (7th Cir.2000). See Daniels v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir.2015); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir.1989). “General complaints of unfair treatment not stemming from racial animus or some other form of discrimination are not protected activity” under
{40} Tanksley‘s October 18, 2016 grievance stated that Batchelor was targeting him and “search[ing] for unsubstantiated issues with [his] job performance,” when there were “other workers within [the] unit that [were] not in compliant [sic] with court policy, when it comes to case notes.” The grievance indicated that Batchelor was “rude” and “harassing” toward Tanksley. (Tanksley Depo., Ex. 4.) However, the grievance does not indicate that Batchelor‘s conduct toward Tanksley was premised on his race or some other protected category. Tanksley admitted at his deposition that the October 2016 grievance
{41} Tanksley contends he informed the court‘s HR department that “Batchelor was treating him differently than the white Probation Officer,” S.G. (Appellant‘s Brief аt 22.) Tanksley explained at his deposition that he believed Batchelor favored S.G. because “[h]e‘s a white male.” (Tanksley Depo. at 204.) Yet, Tanksley testified as follows regarding his meetings with HR concerning the grievance:
Q. And in your meetings [with HR], whether or not they occurred on the 25th or 28th of October, whenever those two meetings occurred with [Marcus] present, do you recall whether you ever said to [Marcus] that you believed [Batchelor] was treating you differently because you are an African American male?
A. No, I don‘t remember saying that to her.
(Tanksley Depo. at 87.) Tanksley also affirmed the “first time [he] opposed a discriminatory practice by the court [was] when [he] filed [his] civil rights charge.” (Tanksley Depo. at 212.)
{42} Thus, Tanksley‘s discussions with the court‘s HR department regarding his October 18, 2016 grievance did not alert the court that unlawful discrimination was at issue. Although Tanksley may have believed Batchelor‘s alleged favoritism was racially motivated, there is nothing in the record indicating Tanksley communicated that belief to his employer. As such, the October 18, 2016 grievance did not amount to protected activity. See Jackson (finding the appellant‘s letter to the bank‘s human resources officer did not constitute protected activity, as the appellant merely made “vague references to gender, comparing her performance to that of the male lenders in her office,” but the letter did not “alert the bank that [the] appellant believed she was being treated unfairly because of her gender“); Coch v. GEM Indus., 6th Dist. No. L-04-1357, 2011-Ohio-3045, ¶ 33.
{43} Tanksley‘s June 16, 2017 charge of unlawful discrimination before the OCRC constituted protected activity. See HLS Bonding at ¶ 21. However, Howell issued the notice of policy violation on June 14, 2017, two days before Tanksley filed the OCRC charge. See Thomas v. AT&T Servs., 933 F.Supp.2d 954, 969 (N.D.Ohio 2013) (noting that “any [employer] activity that pre-dates Plaintiff‘s [protected activity] cannot, as a matter of law, serve as the basis for Plaintiff‘s retaliation claim“). Mueller did not possess any discretion
{44} Johns did take an adverse employment action against Tanksley. Johns also worked with the court‘s attorney to help her “get an understanding of the situation” at issue in Tanksley‘s OCRC charge. (Johns Depo. at 54.) Although Johns could not recall the precise time he worked with the court‘s attorney, the evidence could support an inference that Johns was aware of Tanksley‘s OCRC charge when he issued the appeal decision. See Proffitt v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 150 Fed.Appx. 439, 442-43 (6th Cir.2005), quoting Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir.2002) (noting that ” ‘a plaintiff may survive summary judgment by producing circumstantial evidence to establish’ ” that the defendant was aware of protected activity in a retaliation case).
{45} Tanksley, however, relies solely on the temporal proximity between his June 16, 2017 OCRC charge and Johns’ July 21, 2017 appeal decision to demonstrate the causal connection element of his prima facie case. Ohio courts have held that “although the timing of an employee‘s termination can contribute to an inference of retaliation to meet the causal connection element * * *, ’ “temporal proximity alone is insufficient to support a finding of a causal connection” ’ even with respect to a prima facie case.” Sells v. Holiday Mgt., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-205, 2011-Ohio-5974, ¶ 35, quoting Cunningham v. Steubenville Orthopedics & Sports Med., Inc., 175 Ohio App.3d 627, 2008-Ohio-1172, ¶ 73 (7th Dist.), quoting Buehler v. AmPam Commercial Midwest, 1st Dist. No. C-060475, 2007-Ohio-4708, ¶ 25.
{46} There are federal courts which find temporal proximity alone sufficient to demonstrate the causal connection element of a retaliation prima facie case. Clark Cty. School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001), quoting O‘Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir.2001) (observing the cases that “accept mere temporal proximity * * * as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly
{47} The events giving rise to Johns’ appeal decision pre-dated Tanksley‘s June 16, 2017 OCRC charge. Indeed, the incidents addressed in Howell‘s June 14, 2017 notice of policy violation occurred on June 7 and 12, 2017. Moreover, it was Tanksley‘s April 2017 written reprimand for insubordination which enhanced the discipline applicable to the June 2017 infraction to a suspension without pay. Accordingly, even if mere temporal proximity was sufficient to establish the causal connection element, Tanksley could not rely solely on temporal proximity in the present case. As such, Tanksley fails to demonstrate а causal connection between his OCRC charge and Johns’ appeal decision.
{48} Thus, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Tanksley, he fails to establish a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to Howell, Mueller, or Johns. As such, we need not proceed further under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Dautartas v. Abbott Laboratories, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-706, 2012-Ohio-1709, ¶ 42; Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm. v. Sundance Rehab. Corp., 466 F.3d 490, 503 (6th Cir.2006).
{49} As the common pleas court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Tanksley‘s sole assignment of error is overruled. Having overruled Tanksley‘s sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
LUPER SCHUSTER and NELSON, JJ., concur.
Notes
Tanksley brought suit against Howell, Mueller, and Johns individually; Tanksley did not file suit against the court.