STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 19 MA 0024
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MAHONING COUNTY
March 24, 2020
[Cite as State v. Watkins, 2020-Ohio-1366.]
BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Gene Donofrio, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio Case Nos. 2008 CR 1174; 2009 CR 142
JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
Atty. Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecutor and Atty. Ralph M. Rivera, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor, Youngstown, Ohio 44503, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Atty. Rhys B. Cartwright-Jones, 42 N. Phelps Street, Youngstown, Ohio 44503-1130, for Defendant-Appellant.
{¶1} Appellant John Watkins takes issue with the January 22, 2019 Mahoning County Common Pleas Court judgment entry granting the state’s motion to unseal his expunged criminal records. For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} Appellant was convicted and sentenced in two cases in the trial court after entering guilty pleas. In the first, case number 2008 CR 1174, Appellant was convicted and sentenced to five years of incarceration on each of two counts of robbery in violation of
2008 CR 1174
{¶3} In case number 2008 CR 1174, Appellant filed a request for modification of sentence on February 3, 2010, approximately two weeks after sentencing. That motion was overruled. On August 9, 2010 Appellant filed a motion for judicial release. The state
{¶4} On January 24, 2013, Appellant filed a motion for early termination of his community control sanctions. No response was filed by the state. The trial court overruled the motion. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider and again the state filed no response. After a hearing, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion for early termination on June 7, 2013, because Appellant planned to relocate to Nevada. Community control sanctions were ordered to be terminated when Appellant relocated to Nevada, as planned.
2009 CR 142
{¶5} Appellant’s filings in 2009 CR 142 follow a nearly identical timeline. Appellant filed a motion for judicial release on August 9, 2010. The state did not file a written response motion. In a judgment entry dated September 17, 2010, the trial court noted the state was opposed to judicial release and overruled Appellant’s motion. In early 2011 Appellant again sought judicial release and the state filed no response. The trial court ordered an institutional conduct report of Appellant from Grafton Correctional Institution. A hearing was held on April 5, 2011. The trial court granted Appellant’s motion
{¶6} As he had in case number 2008 CR 1174, on January 24, 2013 Appellant filed a motion for early termination of his community control sanctions. No response was filed by the state. The trial court overruled the motion. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider without response from the state. After a hearing, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion for early termination on June 7, 2013, and community control sanctions were ordered to be terminated when Appellant relocated to Nevada.
Appellant’s Applications To Seal His Criminal Record
{¶7} On April 9, 2015, after his move to Las Vegas, Nevada, Appellant filed a motion to vacate his guilty pleas in both cases. On January 29, 2016, he filed applications seeking to have his criminal records in both matters sealed, explaining that he had established himself in Las Vegas in the hospitality industry. The record does not contain a response by the state. On February 12, 2016, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to vacate and his applications for expungement. On May 19, 2016, Appellant filed motions seeking reconsideration of the applications to seal his records in these matters. In a single entry dated June 22, 2016, without holding a hearing, the trial court ordered the records in both cases sealed. We note that the state did file motions in opposition to Appellant’s motions to reconsider, but these were not filed until June 28, 2016. There was no direct appeal of the trial court’s judgments.
{¶8} Almost two years later, on June 26, 2018, the state filed a motion to unseal Appellant’s records in both cases, with a memorandum in support. The state’s motions
The Court finds the State initially failed to respond to the request from the Court for its position on the sealing of the records. However, upon review of the State’s now submitted brief the Court finds the State’s Motion to be meritorious. Therefore the Court order [sic] the unsealing of Defendant, John Watkins records since it was in error to seal them originally.
(1/22/19 J.E.)
{¶9} Appellant raises a single assignment of error on appeal.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in re-opening appellant’s criminal convictions years after sealing them.
{¶10} Appellant argues the trial court erred in unsealing his criminal records because the trial court had no jurisdiction to vacate its earlier order sealing these records,
Jurisdiction
{¶11} Before turning to the parties’ arguments on the merits, the threshold matter of the trial court’s jurisdiction must be examined. Both parties claim the court lacked jurisdiction, but at different times and for different reasons. Jurisdiction provides the trial court with statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case. Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11. There are two types of jurisdiction: subject matter, and over the person. Id. As the parties raise no question involving personal jurisdiction, it will not be addressed. Subject matter jurisdiction involves the court’s power to adjudicate the merits of a case. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be challenged at any time in the process. If the court at issue lacks the underlying subject matter jurisdiction, any judgment issued by that court is void and can be vacated at any time. Pratts quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002); Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶12} Subject matter jurisdiction also involves the court’s ability to exercise its jurisdiction within a particular case, and involves the court’s authority to determine a specific case or a specific issue arising in a case even though the court may have subject
{¶13} Some Ohio courts have relied on State v. Thomas, 64 Ohio App.2d 141, 411 N.E.2d 85 (8th Dist.1979) for the proposition that if a trial court issues an order sealing a defendant’s record when the offender is statutorily ineligible for such order, this order is void and can be vacated at any time. These cases rely on the fact that the trial court had no statutory authority to take the action in question. In Thomas, the state filed a motion to vacate a two-year-old expungement order after it was discovered that the applicant was not a first-time offender, and was therefore ineligible for expungement. Id. The newly-enacted expungement rules were interpreted by the Eighth District, which held that an applicant’s status as a first-time offender was a jurisdictional requirement, necessary in order to seal the offender’s record. Id. The Thomas court declared the expungement order at issue void, and vacated it for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 145.
{¶14} The Thomas rule has been followed by other Ohio districts. See, e.g., McCoy, at ¶ 11; State v. Lovelace, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110715, 2012-Ohio-3797, 975 N.E.2d 567; State v. Stephens, 195 Ohio App.3d 724, 2011-Ohio-5562, 961 N.E.2d 734 (2nd Dist.); State v. Potts, 11th Dist. Trumbull Nos. 2001-T-0016, 2001-T-0017, 2001-Ohio-8828. However, many districts, including the Eighth District from which Thomas emanated, have abandoned the Thomas rule following the release of two cases by the
{¶15} In Pratts, the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated murder with death penalty and firearm specifications. The defendant agreed to submit his plea to one judge rather than to a three-judge panel as required by the statute. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the trial court lacked the legal authority to sentence the defendant under these circumstances. However, although the trial court erred in exercising its jurisdiction in this particular case by not appointing a three-judge panel, it did not divest itself of subject matter jurisdiction generally over pleas in death penalty cases. Pratts at the syllabus. The Court defined it as an error in the exercise of the trial court’s existing subject matter jurisdiction that was voidable on direct appeal, but not subject to a collateral attack. Id. at ¶ 32, 36. In Pratts, the Supreme Court explained, [t]here is a distinction between a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and a court that improperly exercises that subject-matter jurisdiction once conferred upon it. Id. at ¶ 10. The court noted that distinguishing between them is important because, [i]t is only when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction that its judgment is void; lack of jurisdiction over the particular case merely renders the judgment voidable. Id. at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 846, ¶ 22.
{¶16} In another case clarifying void versus voidable judgments, In re J.J., supra, the Ohio Supreme Court relied on its holding in Pratts and concluded that a magistrate’s order transferring a permanent custody case to a visiting judge was an error involving the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over that particular case, rendering it voidable, but that
{¶17} In abrogating its Thomas rule, the Eighth District held:
After reviewing the relatively recent Ohio Supreme Court’s jurisdictional analyses in Pratts and In re J.J., * * * we find that the 30-year-old rule of Thomas has been superseded by a more accurate and thorough understanding of the nuances of jurisdiction. Thus, we hold that an order granting expungement to an applicant who is later discovered to be ineligible for expungement because he or she is not a first offender is voidable. It is therefore only subject to attack by direct appeal or a
Civ.R. 60(B) motion.
Mayfield Hts. v. N.K., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93166, 2010-Ohio-909, ¶ 29.
{¶18} There is no dispute in this case that the trial court has general subject matter jurisdiction over an expungement application. The state does not contend that applications for expungement are not appropriate for the common pleas court from whence the convictions arose. The state argues, however, that Appellant was an ineligible offender who did not qualify for expungement and, thus, any judgment granting expungement was void. The state relies on a number of cases from the Tenth District concluding that judgments sealing the records of ineligible offenders are void and not voidable, and can be vacated at any time. State v. Tauch, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-327, 2013-Ohio-5796; State v. Barnes, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-355, 2005-Ohio-6891; State v. Dominy, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-124, 2013-Ohio-3744; State v. McCoy, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-121, 2004-Ohio-6726. We note that the Tenth
{¶19} Appellant does not address whether the order to seal his records was void or voidable, but instead relies on the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Schussheim v. Schussheim, 137 Ohio St.3d 133, 2013-Ohio-4529, 998 N.E.2d 446. In Schussheim, the Supreme Court held that a trial court has the inherent authority to order the expungement of records relating to a dissolved civil protection order when unusual and exceptional circumstances exist. Id. at ¶ 3. Appellant concedes that his matter does not involve the dissolution of a protection order and that there are specific statutes governing expungement that apply here, but contends broadly that the trial court has additional authority to seal criminal records in unusual and exceptional circumstances pursuant to Schussheim, and that his circumstances are exceptional. Appellant also argues that if the state wished to object to the trial court order sealing his records, it should have filed a direct appeal or a
{¶21} A review of this record reflects that Appellant initially filed his applications for expungement in both of his criminal cases on January 29, 2016. The trial court did not hold a hearing on the matter, instead denying the applications for expungement on February 12, 2016. While the judgment entry indicates the state was opposed to the application, there is no written opposition motion on file. Even though the February order was final and appealable, Appellant filed a motion seeking the court to reconsider its decision on May 19, 2016. Again, there is no record that the state filed in opposition to this motion, and again, no hearing was held on the matter. However, on June 22, 2016, the trial court issued a judgment entry sealing Appellant’s records in both criminal matters. There was no direct appeal filed with this Court.
Civ.R. 60(B) Motion
{¶23} At the outset, we note that in order to prevail, any motion filed under
{¶24} In addition, in order to prevail on a
{¶25} It is clear the state’s motion was not made within one year from the order of expungement. Thus, analyzing the state’s motion under a
{¶26} Turning first to GTE Automatic, the initial requirement is that the movant must show he or she has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted. The state’s motion rests on two main contentions: (1) that the judgment sealing the
{¶27} However, we come to a different conclusion when examining the state’s second contention. The state correctly argues that Appellant is ineligible for expungement based on the relevant statutes. Ordinarily, we review a trial court’s decision on an application to seal a criminal record for an abuse of discretion. However, to the extent that the trial court’s judgment here involves an interpretation and application of the statutes governing the sealing of a criminal record, a de novo standard of review is applied. State v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-Ohio-5590, 918 N.E.2d 497, ¶ 6. [E]xpungement is an act of grace created by the state, and is a privilege, not a right. State v. Hamilton, 75 Ohio St.3d 636, 639, 665 N.E.2d 669, 672 (1996). Expungement should be granted only when all requirements for eligibility are met. Id. at 640. An expungement proceeding is not an adversarial one; the primary purpose of an expungement hearing is to gather information. Id. Because expungement proceedings are not adversarial, the Rules of Evidence do not apply. See
{¶29} Moreover, under the version of
(A) Eligible offender means anyone who has been convicted of an offense in this state or any other jurisdiction and who has not more than one felony conviction, not more than two misdemeanor convictions, or not more than one felony conviction and one misdemeanor conviction in this state or any other jurisdiction. When two or more convictions result from or are connected with the same act or result from offenses committed at the same time, they shall be counted as one conviction. When two or three convictions result from the same indictment, information, or complaint, from the same plea of guilty, or from the same official proceeding, and result from
related criminal acts that were committed within a three-month period but do not result from the same act or from offenses committed at the same time, they shall be counted as one conviction, provided that a court may decide as provided in division (C)(1)(a) of section 2953.32 of the Revised Code that it is not in the public interest for the two or three convictions to be counted as one conviction. (Emphasis added.)
{¶30} In September of 2008 Appellant was convicted in case number 2008 CR 1174 on two counts of robbery, felonies of the second degree. In December of that year he was convicted in case number 2009 CR 142 on six counts of identity fraud, felonies of the fifth degree. Appellant sought expungement in both cases. Based on the relevant law, it is readily apparent Appellant was not eligible for expungement of those records pursuant to
{¶31} Appellant does not dispute these provisions. Instead, he contends that notwithstanding the statutes, trial courts can also grant expungement of criminal records in unusual or exceptional circumstances pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Schussheim. Id. at ¶ 3. In Schussheim, a complainant who sought a civil protection order against her husband later moved to dissolve the CPO and submitted an affidavit that expungement of the records regarding the CPO was in the best interest of herself and her children. Citing to Pepper Pike v. Doe, 66 Ohio St.2d 374, 421 N.E.2d 1303 (1981), the Court concluded that, as in Pepper Pike, there was no statute relevant to expunging a dissolved CPO in an adult proceeding. As there were no set statutory guidelines or prohibitions, the Court concluded it had the discretion to decide the matter
{¶32} Here, there are clear, relevant statutory provisions that expressly prevent the trial court from sealing Appellant’s records, both for committing his offenses of violence and for his multiple felony convictions. Appellant’s argument that Schussheim permits the trial court to circumvent the statutory prohibition if he can raise unusual and exceptional circumstances is a misstatement of the law. It is also important to note that post-Schussheim, the general assembly enacted legislation relative to the sealing of CPO records and chose not to follow the unusual and exceptional test set forth in Schussheim. See
{¶33} The second GTE test requires that the state demonstrate it is entitled to relief under
{¶34} As to the third GTE prong, the state was required to file its motion within a reasonable time. This motion was filed by the state two years after the judgment entry granting Appellant’s application for expungement. The state does not argue the reasonableness of the timing for their request, nor does the state directly discuss reasons for the delay. These reasons, however, may easily be gleaned from the record in this
{¶35} The state was mistaken in its belief that the trial court’s judgment ordering expungement was void. The judgment of the trial court in this matter was voidable, meaning that it could only be challenged on direct appeal or pursuant to
Conclusion
{¶37} Based on the foregoing, Appellant’s assignment of error is without merit and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Donofrio, J., concurs.
Robb, J., concurs.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.