Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether a trial court has the authority to seal records relating to a dissolved civil protection order (“CPO”) without express statutory authorization to do so.
{¶ 2} Alan Schussheim has appealed a decision of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals that affirmed the trial court’s denial of his application to expunge and seal the record of proceedings regarding a dissolved CPO. Ohio has no statute either authorizing or precluding the sealing of records relating to CPOs in adult proceedings.
{¶ 3} In Pepper Pike v. Doe,
Factual Background and Procedural History
{¶ 4} On July 13, 2009, Michelle D. Henneman, f.k.a. Michelle D. Schussheim, filed a petition for a domestic-violence CPO against Schussheim, her husband,
{¶ 5} Shortly thereafter, Henneman moved to dissolve the order, and on August 14, 2009, the trial court dismissed the case and dissolved the CPO.
{¶ 6} In April 2011, Schussheim filed an application to expunge and seal the record of the CPO proceedings. He asserted that he and Henneman were going through a divorce at the time she obtained the CPO, that he was never charged with domestic violence, and that the existence of the record violated his constitutional right to privacy and could have adverse effects on his employment in regard to wage increases, promotions, and transfers. Significantly, Henneman filed an affidavit in support of Schussheim’s application, averring that she did not object to sealing the record and that she believed expungement was in the best interest of herself and their children.
{¶ 7} After conducting a hearing, the magistrate recommended that the application be denied. The magistrate noted the absence of any statutory authority to expunge or seal records in civil cases or CPOs and noted that the Twelfth District Court of Appeals has never held that courts have the authority to seal CPO records. The magistrate further decided that even if Pepper Pike applied, sealing the record would be inappropriate under the balancing test set forth in that case. In adopting the magistrate’s decision, the trial court agreed with the magistrate’s analysis and concluded that any adverse economic consequences were speculative and insufficient to justify sealing the records.
{¶ 8} Schussheim appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, where a divided court held that the trial court lacked statutory authority to expunge the CPO records and declined to apply the doctrine of judicial expungement established in Pepper Pike to noncriminal cases or proceedings.
{¶ 9} On appeal to this court, Schussheim contends that (1) a domestic-violence CPO is subject to judicial expungement pursuant to Pepper Pike and also because such an order implicates the accused’s constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, (2) the court should use the balancing test set forth in Pepper Pike to determine whether to grant this judicial remedy, and (3) a prima facie
{¶ 10} No opposing brief has been submitted.
Law and Analysis
{¶ 11} In Pepper Pike,
{¶ 12} At the time the motion for expungement was filed in Pepper Pike, a person who had been convicted of an offense could seek expungement and sealing of criminal records pursuant to statute, but no statute authorized expungement and sealing of records of those charged with, but not convicted of, criminal offenses. See id. at 376, fn. 4. Therefore, we considered whether a trial court had the power to grant the judicial remedy of ordering the expunging and sealing of records in the absence of legislative authorization to do so. Id. at 376. Based on the constitutional right to privacy, we recognized that courts have the power to grant this remedy and established a balancing test requiring courts to weigh “the interest of the accused in his good name and right to be free from unwarranted punishment against the legitimate need of government to maintain records.” Id. at 377.
{¶ 13} Applying that standard, we held that because the dismissal of an assault charge with prejudice constituted “unusual and exceptional circumstances,” the trial court appropriately exercised its power to grant this judicial remedy. We further explained that “[w]here there is no compelling state interest or reason to retain the judicial and police records, such as where they arise from a domestic quarrel and constitute vindictive use of our courts, the accused is entitled to this remedy.” Id. We cautioned that this was an “exceptional case” and that courts should not construe the decision “to be a carte blanche for every defendant acquitted of criminal charges.” Id.
{¶ 14} Similar to Pepper Pike, no statutory authorization exists for the court to expunge and seal records relating to a dissolved CPO in adult proceedings. In accordance with our recognition in Pepper Pike of a court’s inherent power to
{¶ 15} This appears to be a case involving “unusual and exceptional circumstances,” because the complainant who filed the petition for a CPO later moved to dissolve the CPO and now avers that she believes expungement is in the best interest of herself and her children. In addition, the fact that no related criminal charges were filed is also a factor to be weighed on remand. The trial court can consider whether Schussheim’s interests outweigh the government’s need to maintain the records.
{¶ 16} The inherent authority of a court to expunge and seal a record does not turn on whether a proceeding is criminal or civil. Rather, the determination is whether “unusual and exceptional circumstances” exist and whether the interests of the applicant outweigh the legitimate interest of the government to maintain the record.
Conclusion
{¶ 17} Courts have the inherent authority to expunge and seal records when a case involves unusual and exceptional circumstances and when the interests of the party seeking expungement outweigh the legitimate need of the government to maintain records. Such unusual and exceptional circumstances appear to exist in this case, as the complainant who petitioned the court for an ex parte CPO later moved to dissolve the CPO and submitted an affidavit that expungement was in the best interest of herself and her children. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 18} I join Justice French’s dissent, which cogently explains the substantive problems with the majority’s decision. I write separately to address what I perceive as the majority’s disturbing judicial activism. The majority improperly creates a new mechanism for expungement that is contrary to the public-policy decisions made by the General Assembly as evidenced by the statutes it enacted, and it does so by using Pepper Pike v. Doe,
The statutory scheme
{¶ 19} The majority begins its analysis where it also should end: by recognizing that there is no statutory authorization for courts to seal records relating to civil protection orders (“CPOs”) in adult proceedings. That the majority must modify its assertion with the clause “in adult proceedings” is fatal to its rationale.
{¶ 20} By asserting that there is no statute that precludes sealing of records in adult proceedings and therefore the court may rule to allow it, the majority fails to acknowledge the significance of the General Assembly’s enactment of a comprehensive statutory scheme that permits the sealing of records related to CPOs but limits the applicability of the sealing provision to juvenile proceedings. If the legislature had wanted to afford adults the same sealing provision, it would have done so.
{¶ 21} In 2010, after more than a year of consideration, debate, and revisions, the 128th General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 10 (“H.B. 10”), which is known as the Shynerra Grant Law and provides for the issuance of a CPO against a juvenile. The legislation was enacted in response to the death of Grant, who in 2004 secured the only judicial protection available to her, a no-contact order from the juvenile court, after her ex-boyfriend broke her jaw. Parents of Murdered Teens Say New Law Will Help Courts Curb Youth Violence, Hannah Report (Mar. 17, 2010); Senate Passes Bills on Juvenile Stalking, Railroad Crossing Regulation, Hannah Report (Mar. 9, 2010). At that time, the law did not provide Grant the option of obtaining a CPO against him because they were both minors. Id. Within the year, Grant’s ex-boyfriend fatally shot her and killed himself. Provance, New Ohio Statute to Safeguard Teens, The Blade (Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://www.toledoblade.com/local/2010/03/17/New-Ohio-statuteto-safeguard-teens.html#sSmUDJFjZiyUyLvt.99 (accessed Oct. 2, 2013).
{¶ 22} H.B. 10 created a proceeding in juvenile court for obtaining a CPO that parallels the proceeding applicable to adults. But in recognition of the unique considerations present when dealing with children, the General Assembly also enacted several special rules applicable only to juvenile proceedings. See the Judicial Impact Statement prepared by the Ohio Judicial Conference regarding
{¶ 23} Notably, when H.B. 10 was first introduced in 2009, it contained no expungement procedure or sealing provision. 2009 H.B. No. 10, available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=128_HB_10_I (accessed Oct. 2, 2013). “One of the stumbling blocks in getting the bill passed was some lawmakers’ concerns that a single incident or a false accusation could haunt an individual into adulthood.” Provance, New Ohio Statute to Safeguard Teens, The Blade (Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://www.toledoblade.com/local/2010/03/17/ New-Ohio-statute-to-safeguard-teens.html#sSmUDJFjZiyUyLvt.99 (accessed Oct. 2, 2013).
{¶ 24} The bill was approved unanimously by the House of Representatives, 153 Ohio House Journal, First Regular Session, 631-632, but only after an expungement procedure was incorporated in R.C. 2151.34(E)(6), Sub.H.B. No. 10, unofficial version available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfrn7ID= 128_HB_10_PH (accessed Oct. 2, 2013). The Senate replaced the expungement procedure with a sealing provision, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 10, unofficial version available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm7ID=128_HB_10JPS (accessed Oct. 2, 2013), and unanimously approved the bill, 153 Ohio Senate Journal, First Regular Session, 2498-2500; the House then approved the Senate amendments by a vote of 96 to 1, 153 Ohio House Journal, Second Regular Session, 2459-2462.
{¶ 25} The bill’s sponsor, Representative Edna Brown, explained that the sealing provision was added to ensure that juvenile respondents had “the opportunity for second chances.” Parents of Murdered Teens Say New Law Will Help Courts Curb Youth Violence, Hannah Report (Mar. 17, 2010). Likewise, Senator Bill Seitz explained that the juvenile-proceeding sealing provision, as enacted, was needed to “ensure that youths aren’t saddled for life with the fault of one childhood mistake.” Senate Passes Bills on Juvenile Stalking, Railroad Crossing Regulation, Hannah Report (Mar. 9, 2010).
{¶ 27} The maxim of statutory construction “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” means “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other.” “For example [according to the maxim], the rule that ‘each citizen is entitled to vote’ implies that noncitizens are not entitled to vote.” Black’s Law Dictionary 661 (9th Ed.2009). Likewise, the law that juveniles are entitled to seal CPO records implies that adults are not entitled to seal CPO records.
{¶ 28} Application of the maxim in this case is also consistent with the apparent intent of the legislators. State ex rel. Curtis v. DeCorps,
{¶ 29} A judicial remedy may not contravene the public policy expressed in duly enacted, constitutional legislation. E.g., Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc.,
Pepper Pike: the smokescreen
{¶ 30} The majority blithely asserts as support for its holding that “[i]n Pepper Pike v. Doe,
{¶ 31} The majority extends Pepper Pike to civil proceedings. And it contends that its authority to do so springs from the Constitution. As Justice French explains, there is no constitutional right to expungement. Justice French’s dissenting opinion at ¶ 76.
{¶ 32} The majority claims that the authority comes from the constitutional right to privacy, which Pepper Pike stated was the “basis” for expunging records relating to a false criminal charge. Pepper Pike at 377. In so holding, Pepper Pike cited Roe v. Wade,
{¶ 33} Pepper Pike recognized that the right to privacy justified expunging records that a court generated because a third party had perpetrated fraud on the court. The majority here expands Pepper Pike while ignoring that the state has a legitimate interest in maintaining public records that relate to valid court proceedings.
This case is not “unusual or exceptional”
{¶ 34} That this case is not a criminal case is not the only fact that distinguishes it from Pepper Pike. It is equally important to recognize that this case is not, as in Pepper Pike, a case in which court records arose from a person’s use of the court as a vindictive tool to harass. Pepper Pike,
{¶ 36} Two days after the second incident of abuse, Henneman successfully petitioned the court for an ex parte domestic-violence CPO. The judge who heard her allegations and had the opportunity to evaluate her credibility in making the assertions against Schussheim ordered him to vacate the home and stay at least 100 yards away from Henneman and their daughters.
{¶ 37} In response, Schussheim did not move to set aside the CPO on the ground that it was incorrect or inappropriate, even though a local rule expressly provided for an expedited hearing on such a motion and even though any modification thereby could “be made retroactive to the effective date of the ex parte order.” Loc.R. 2.9A of the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County, Domestic-Relations Division. Instead, Schussheim filed a facially frivolous motion to dismiss the matter for improper venue because the family was in Pennsylvania at the relevant times.
{¶ 38} On July 21, 2009, the court held a hearing in response to the CPO. Schussheim attended, represented by counsel. After the hearing, the court modified the CPO to permit Schussheim visitation with the daughters — only if it was supervised — and to permit limited communications by e-mail between Schussheim and Henneman.
{¶ 39} The court determined that the CPO should otherwise remain in full force, and it extended the CPO’s effect to July 13, 2010. Several weeks later, Henneman moved the court to dissolve the CPO. After a hearing, the court dismissed the CPO without prejudice.
{¶ 40} Nearly two years later, Schussheim moved to expunge and seal the record of the CPO proceedings. In support of his motion, he filed Henneman’s affidavit, which was printed on Schussheim’s attorney’s letterhead. In its entirety, the affidavit provides:
1. Iam the Petitioner in the above captioned matter;
*142 2. I have no objection to the application of Alan C. Schussheim’s Application to Expunge and Seal the Record of Case # 09DV4460;
3. Alan C. Schussheim was never charged with an act of domestic violence related to this incident or at any other time during our marriage;
4. Alan C. Schussheim and I co-parent our two minor children;
5. I believe it would be in the best interest of both myself, Alan and our children if the record of proceedings in this matter was expunged and sealed.
{¶ 41} This case is ordinary and usual: There is nothing to indicate that this CPO was not issued for valid reasons.
{¶ 42} The underlying CPO case was dismissed without prejudice, giving rise to the inference that Henneman’s motion to dissolve the CPO was based on changed circumstances rather than on a recantation of the facts she swore to in order to obtain the CPO. That Henneman no longer needed the CPO after four weeks does not change the fact that she needed it in the first instance. And that she shortly thereafter notified the court that the CPO should be dissolved gives rise to the inference that she had responsibly, rather than vindictively, used the courts to secure only the protection that she needed for only the time period that she needed it.
{¶ 43} With regard to Schussheim’s application to expunge that he filed two years later, Henneman’s affidavit states, without explaining, that she has “no objection” to Schussheim’s application because it would be in the family’s best interest to seal the record. She states in her affidavit that Schussheim was never charged with domestic violence in connection with the allegations contained in the CPO petition, but she does not state that he never committed the domestic violence described. Henneman has never recanted the allegations of domestic abuse and never claimed to have sought the CPO for incorrect or inappropriate reasons.
{¶ 44} Moreover, Schussheim has never denied the acts described in the underlying petition. Notably absent from the record is any affidavit from Schussheim stating that the allegations set forth in the CPO petition are untrue. One would imagine that Schussheim would have readily sworn out such a statement if he could have done so truthfully.
{¶ 45} What, then, would justify sealing the records in this case? Henneman is entitled to express her lack of opposition to Schussheim’s application, but the fact that she does not oppose his application does not entitle him to relief. See Pepper Pike,
{¶ 46} There is no need to remand this case for an application of the Pepper Pike balancing test because even under Pepper Pike, a trial court’s authority to expunge is limited to eases “where such unusual and exceptional circumstances make it appropriate to exercise jurisdiction over the matter.” Pepper Pike at paragraph two of the syllabus. Such circumstances do not exist here. Nevertheless, the majority remands for exactly that purpose, and in doing so, it makes the heavy-handed assertion that “unusual and exceptional circumstances appear to exist in this case.” Majority opinion at ¶ 17.
{¶ 47} That assertion is curious both in light of this record and in light of the fact that the trial court already applied the Pepper Pike balancing test and determined that Schussheim was not entitled to expunge the records. After concluding that Pepper Pike did not apply in this case, the magistrate explained:
Even, however, applying the balancing test of Pepper Pike v. Doe, the request to seal the record in this case is denied. Here, the only reasons [Schussheim] provided for sealing the record is that the case was dismissed and that there have been no further acts or conduct of domestic violence and no criminal charges pending and that he fears the record could inhibit future employment.
{¶ 48} Accordingly, the magistrate recommended denying the application to seal. The trial court adopted that recommendation, over Schussheim’s objections.
{¶ 49} Is there any reason to believe that the outcome will be different on remand? If so, the majority has not only extended Pepper Pike but has also redefined “unusual and exceptional.” In any event, the majority opinion is pure legislation.
{¶ 50} This case perfectly illustrates the problem with the judiciary involving itself in policy-making.
No adversarial testing
{¶ 51} This case was litigated without the benefit of adversarial debate. And Schussheim’s attorney, Jerry H. Shade, glossed over some points that must be highlighted.
{¶ 52} Attorney Shade represented to this court in his brief that “[t]he incident that formed the basis for the ex-parte order did not actually involve domestic violence, but was exaggerated so that [Henneman] could secure tactical advan
{¶ 53} Contrary to Shade’s assertion, the acts alleged in the CPO constituted domestic violence. See R.C. 2919.25(A) through (D) (defining domestic violence). According to the petition, twice within two weeks, Schussheim shoved one of his daughters against a wall. But Shade repeatedly asserted that “there was no violence alleged.” That is simply not true. The acts of domestic violence plainly involved physical violence.
{¶ 54} Shade also represented that Henneman had exaggerated the incidents of domestic violence in order to gain an advantage in an upcoming divorce. That assertion is totally without support in the record. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. As I have already explained, there is every indication that the CPO was issued for valid reasons. Henneman did not object to the records’ being expunged. That position does not translate into a recantation of the allegations or a confession of improper motive in securing the CPO.
{¶ 55} Yet Shade represented to the court during oral argument that Henneman’s affidavit, which was printed on Shade’s letterhead, stated that the allegations contained in the CPO petition were not true. It is difficult to believe that Shade would not have been aware of the inaccuracy of that statement when he made it to the court.
{¶ 56} Finally, Shade repeatedly referred to the ex parte order issued in this case. In doing so, he failed to mention that eight days after the court issued the ex parte CPO, it conducted a hearing to give Schussheim an opportunity to respond to the ex-parte order. Schussheim was present at that hearing, as was his counsel, James Whitaker, who was Shade’s law partner at the time. That hearing provided an opportunity for Schussheim to be heard. And it resulted in the court’s issuing an additional order, and that order reflects the court’s determination that the CPO should remain in effect for a year. Schussheim also wants that record to be sealed.
{¶ 57} The sparse and limited information before this court stands in sharp contrast to the extensive and expansive information that was before the General Assembly when it in enacted H.B. 10. The rule of law that this court issues in this case will apply to CPO cases throughout Ohio.
{¶ 58} In enacting H.B. 10 and limiting the sealing provision to juvenile proceedings, the General Assembly heard from opponents and proponents of the bill, including numerous experts in domestic violence and the law. The legislators also considered testimony from domestic-violence victims. The bill was drafted with input from the Juvenile Judges Association and the Family Violence Prevention Center Advisory Council of the Ohio Department of Public Safety.
{¶ 59} We, on the other hand, heard from one lawyer on one side of one case.
{¶ 60} With this limited information, we cannot know whether the majority’s new law is good public policy for Ohio. As a practical matter, there is great potential for unintended consequences in the majority’s decision. Most obviously, it increases the risk that respondents will use fear, intimidation, false promises, or threats to procure favorable affidavits from domestic-violence victims.
Conclusion
{¶ 61} Our democracy is not designed to permit four justices to heedlessly override the studied policy judgment of 129 legislators and one governor. Unfortunately, the majority fails to exercise the judicial restraint on which the design relies. Because I do not condone the majority’s judicial activism, I dissent.
{¶ 62} But I am left with the lingering question of how far the majority will go to bury these records for Schussheim. Will it order this opinion to be sealed if Schussheim prevails on remand?
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 63} I cannot agree that Pepper Pike v. Doe,
Record “Expungement” and Pepper Pike
{¶ 64} “Expungement” is a legislative construct with no universally applied definition. It stems from a correctional philosophy that gained momentum in the 1950s and 1960s, when a minority of states enacted laws to allow those with juvenile-delinquency records or criminal-conviction records to avoid the social stigma attached to those records by allowing courts to order the records erased or sealed. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 Wash.U.L.Q. 147, 148-149 (1966). Despite their varying approaches, rationales, and terminology, expungement
{¶ 65} Ohio followed suit, enacting legislation allowing expungement of juvenile-adjudication records in 1969, see former R.C. 2151.358, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 320, 133 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2040, 2066, and expungement of adult-conviction records in 1974, see former R.C. 2953.32, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5, 135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 70 (“S.B. No. 5”). In its original form, former R.C. 2953.32 authorized an adult first-time offender to apply to the sentencing court for the “expungement of the record of his conviction” after a specified period of time. Former R.C. 2953.32(A), S.B. No. 5 at 70. The statute described “expungement” as a court-ordered “seal[ing]” of official records and “deleting]” of index references pertaining to a criminal conviction. Former R.C. 2953.32(C), S.B. No. 5 at 70-71. An order of expungement restricted the purposes for which law-enforcement officers could inspect the records, restored “all rights and privileges not otherwise restored by termination of sentence or probation,” and prohibited employment applications from asking about the existence of expunged convictions. See former R.C. 2953.32(D), 2953.33(A), and 2953.33(B), S.B. No. 5 at 70-72. The General Assembly replaced the term “expungement” with “sealing” in 1979, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 105, 138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1638; however, “expungement” remains a common colloquialism used to describe the process. See Pepper Pike at 378 (referring to R.C. 2953.32 as “Ohio’s criminal expungement statute”); State v. LaSalle,
{¶ 66} Some jurisdictions criticized the emerging expungement statutes because they did not also apply to persons charged with but not convicted of a crime. Several courts, concerned that arrest records may be as stigmatizing as conviction records, invoked a “narrow” power of expungement in the absence of statutory authority. United States v. Linn,
{¶ 67} We followed these jurisdictions in Pepper Pike,
{¶ 68} We reversed, holding that “trial courts in Ohio have jurisdiction to order expungement and sealing of records in a criminal case where the charges are dismissed with prejudice prior to trial by the party initiating the proceedings.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Given “the inherent lack of precision in the term ‘expungement,’ ” we adopted the remedy set forth in R.C. 2953.32(C) and (F), which authorize a trial court to order sealed all official records and all index references pertaining to the case, but allow the government to retain the arrest record “in its appropriate files.” Id. at 377-378, and fn. 5. We cautioned, however, that the expungement of such records should be used only in the “exceptional case, and should not be construed to be a carte blanche for every defendant acquitted of criminal charges in Ohio courts.” Id. at 377. “When exercising this power, the court should use a balancing test which weighs the privacy interest of the defendant against the government’s legitimate need to maintain records of criminal proceedings.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 69} The narrow remedy we recognized in Pepper Pike—i.e., expungement of arrest records in the absence of statutory authority — existed for less than three years before the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2953.51 et seq., which authorize courts to seal criminal records following an acquittal, dismissal, or no bill. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 227, 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2382, 2386. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.52, a trial court must, consistent with Pepper Pike, “[w]eigh the interests of the person in having the official records pertaining to the case sealed against the legitimate needs, if any, of the government to maintain those records.” R.C. 2953.52(B)(2)(d). We have described R.C. 2953.52 as an exception to the general rule of openness in the public-records context. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler,
Pepper Pike Is Inapplicable Here
{¶ 70} Two obstacles prevent Pepper Pike from authorizing nonstatutory expungement of domestic-violence civil-protection-order (“CPO”) records. First,
{¶ 71} With R.C. 3113.31, the General Assembly established a civil proceeding by which a person can obtain a protection order in cases of domestic violence. The statute vests jurisdiction with the domestic-relations division (in common pleas courts with such a division) to grant an ex parte protection order upon a showing of “[immediate and present danger of domestic violence to the family or household member,” which includes situations in which the respondent has threatened the family or household member with bodily harm. R.C. 3113.31(A), (B), and (D)(1).
{¶ 72} Not only has the General Assembly created CPO proceedings, it has identified the agencies that must maintain records of such proceedings and the class of individuals who may apply to seal those records. R.C. 3113.31(F)(1) requires trial courts to issue a copy of “any protection order” to all law-enforcement agencies with jurisdiction to enforce the order, and R.C. 3113.31(F)(3) directs those law-enforcement agencies to “establish and maintain an index” for the protection orders. This “statewide enforcement, communication, indexing, and authority” is one of the distinguishing features of a domestic-violence CPO. Felton v. Felton,
{¶ 73} This level of legislative attention leaves little room for the equitable remedy recognized in Pepper Pike. The maxim “equity follows the law” advises against inventing such judicial remedies where doing so would extend the scope of existing legislative remedies. Civ. Serv. Personnel Assn., Inc. v. Akron,
{¶ 75} Aside from the fact that the CPO statutes do not allow for the equitable expungement power recognized in Pepper Pike, the definition of “expungement” relied on in Pepper Pike is unworkable in the CPO context. In Pepper Pike, we followed the expungement provisions in “Ohio’s criminal expungement statute,” R.C. 2953.32(C) and (F), for the purpose of ensuring “clarity and uniformity” with the existing legislative scheme. Pepper Pike,
{¶ 76} Admittedly, the rationale in Pepper Pike was imprecise, namely, our statement that “[t]he basis for such expungement * * * is the constitutional right to privacy.” Id. at 377. But that statement does not stand for the proposition that expungement is an individual right or a judicial power guaranteed by the constitution. Although we stated that the right to privacy was the basis for exercising the expungement power in that case, we never said that it was the source of that power. In the very next sentence, we said, “[W]e follow other jurisdictions which recognize the power to grant this judicial remedy.” Id. at 377. Those jurisdictions that identified the source of a court’s expungement authority relied on the concept of “inherent equitable powers.” Webster,
{¶ 77} This is not to say that a common pleas court is powerless over its own records. We have long recognized that a court has “supervisory power and control over its docket,” State ex rel. Buck v. McCabe,
{¶ 78} If the majority is correct — if “unusual and extraordinary circumstances” can create an undefined, judicial expungement power — then what is so unusual or extraordinary about this case? While appellant’s ex-wife eventually agreed to dissolve the CPO at some point during or after the divorce proceedings, there is no evidence that she used the CPO as a “vindictive tool to harass,” as did the complainant in Pepper Pike. Id.,
{¶ 79} Pepper Pike is distinguishable from this case in every way that matters. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that the expungement remedy recognized in Pepper Pike does not apply to domestic-violence CPO proceedings conducted in accordance with R.C. 3113.31. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Notes
. There was, however, a statute permitting expungement in cases in which a misdemeanor arrest resulted in an agreed bail forfeiture, former R.C. 2953.42, Am.S.B. No. 192, 137 Ohio Laws, Part I, 460, and a statute allowing certain persons to seek the return of the fingerprint record made upon their arrest if the charges were subsequently dismissed or they were found not guilty of the charges, former R.C. 109.60, Am.S.B. No. 170, 137 Ohio Laws, Part I, 447.