THE STATE v. TURNQUEST
S19A0157
Supreme Court of Georgia
305 Ga. 758
FINAL COPY
This is another DUI case requiring us to consider the meaning of the Georgia Constitution. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), the United States Supreme Court imposed on law enforcement a requirement to provide persons in custody with a prophylactic warning of their rights before subjecting those
In 2017, we reiterated that the Georgia Constitution‘s right against compelled self-incrimination is broader in one sense than the similar right protected by the United States Constitution; the Georgia right prohibits the compulsion of incriminating acts and testimony, while the federal right prohibits only the compulsion of testimony. See Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 235-246 (2) (c) (806 SE2d 505) (2017). That holding was based on the language, history, and context of Georgia‘s Constitution. Id. And earlier this year, we held that the Georgia Constitution‘s right against compelled self-incrimination prohibits the State from introducing evidence of a defendant‘s exercise of that right; the federal right is similar in its exclusion of evidence of a defendant‘s exercise. See Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 210 (IV) (824 SE2d 265) (2019). But our holding in Elliott was not based on federal precedent, which we found unpersuasive; instead, our conclusion was again based on the language, history, and context of Georgia‘s Constitution. Id. Today, we are asked to apply those opinions to conclude that a Georgia statute —
In Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222 (498 SE2d 262) (1998), we held that the failure to give the appellant ”Miranda warnings” rendered evidence regarding field sobriety tests inadmissible because the appellant was in custody when asked to perform the tests. Price, 269 Ga. at 225 (3). But that case was wrongly decided, and because stare decisis considerations do not warrant retaining that precedent to the extent that it is contrary to our conclusion about the meaning of the Georgia Constitution and
1. Facts.
The parties stipulated to the following facts. In March 2017, defendant Stephen Turnquest was involved in a single-vehicle accident. The responding officer arrested Turnquest for DUI. After arresting Turnquest and before asking him to submit to a breath test, the officer read the age-appropriate Georgia implied consent notice pursuant to
Turnquest was charged with DUI less safe, DUI per se, and failure to maintain lane. He filed a motion to exclude the results of the breath test on essentially two grounds. First, Turnquest argued that Miranda warnings must precede a request to perform a chemical breath test because, as we held in Olevik, submitting to a breath test is an incriminating act that the right against compelled self-incrimination, secured by
advisement misled him by stating that if he refused the test, that refusal could be used against him at trial and could affect his driving privileges. The trial court granted the motion on the basis that Miranda warnings must precede an officer‘s request for a breath sample from a suspect in custody. In
2. Miranda itself does not require suspects in custody to be warned of their constitutional rights before they are asked to submit to a breath test.
Although Turnquest argues that he was entitled to Miranda warnings, he cannot, and does not, rely on Miranda itself for his argument that the results of his breath test must be suppressed. Miranda provides — at least in part as a matter of “safeguard[ing] . . . the privilege against self-incrimination” as embodied in the
3. Neither the Georgia Constitution nor OCGA § 24-5-506 requires suspects in custody to be warned of any constitutional rights before they are asked to submit to a breath test.
Turnquest‘s argument thus turns on whether some aspect of Georgia law requires law enforcement to give a suspect in custody Miranda-like warnings before asking the suspect to consent to a breath test. We consider several possible Georgia law sources for such a requirement. Turnquest explicitly relies on
(a) Paragraph XVI does not require that a suspect be warned of his right against compelled self-incrimination or any other constitutional rights before being asked to submit to a breath test.
The
Georgia constitutional provisions may confer greater, fewer, or the same rights as similar provisions of the United States Constitution, and decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting those similar provisions are persuasive in our interpretation of the Georgia Constitution only to the extent that those decisions are rooted in shared history, language, and context.
Elliott, 305 Ga. at 187 (II) (C); see also Olevik, 302 Ga. at 234 (2) (b) n.3. It is not entirely clear that Miranda constituted an interpretation of any particular federal constitutional provision or provisions. But even to the extent that Miranda was a construction of one or more federal analogues to provisions found in the Georgia Constitution, it certainly involved no consideration of shared language, history, or context. And so Miranda and its progeny offer us no meaningful guidance as to whether
“[W]e interpret the Georgia Constitution according to its original public meaning.” Elliott, 305 Ga. at 181 (II). To determine a provision‘s original public meaning, we must consider the language, history, and context of that provision. Id. at 188 (II) (C). Because Paragraph XVI has been carried forward without material change since it first entered a Georgia Constitution in 1877 (the “1877 Provision“), we presume, absent some indication to the contrary, that it has retained the original public meaning it had in 1877. Id. at 183 (II) (A). Thus, we begin by examining the language, history, and context of the 1877 Provision.
(i) Nothing in the language, history, and context of the 1877 Provision indicates that it required a suspect to be warned of his right against compelled self-incrimination or any other constitutional rights before being questioned or asked to perform an incriminating act.
The 1877 Provision provided, “No person shall be compelled to give testimony tending in any manner to criminate himself.” Ga. Const. of 1877, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VI.2 At the time of the 1877 Constitution, the term “compel” was defined as “[t]o drive or urge irresistibly” or “[t]o take by force.” Noah Webster, A Dictionary of the English Language 80 (1878).3 The failure of an investigating officer to apprise a suspect of any constitutional rights, without more, does not render a subsequent incriminating act by the suspect “compelled” within the ordinary sense of that word, which carries
with it a connotation of involuntariness. Even in reaffirming the Miranda rule, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that failure to warn a suspect of any constitutional rights does not render a subsequent statement “involuntary” in that term‘s traditional sense. See Dickerson, 530 U. S. at 444 (“The disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that statements which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his ‘rights,’ may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result.“).4 The language of the 1877 Provision does not support a conclusion that the provision required a suspect to be warned of the right against compelled self-incrimination or any other
constitutional rights in order for a custodial statement to be admissible.
The history and context of the 1877 Provision also do not support a conclusion that it requires custodial statements to be preceded by warnings of constitutional rights. “For context, we may look to the broader context in which [the] text was enacted,
Turnquest concedes that English common law did not require a suspect in custody to be warned of any constitutional rights. And we have found no evidence that English common law as of 1776 required as much. A practice of warning suspects of their rights before questioning apparently began to develop in England or the United States around the turn of the 19th century at the earliest. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Magistrates’ Examinations, Police Interrogations, and Miranda-Like Warnings in the Nineteenth Century, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 777, 784-789 (2007) (“The first person ever to inform a criminal defendant he had the right to remain silent and anything he said could be used against him was likely an English magistrate conducting a preliminary hearing around the turn of the nineteenth century.“). But this development did not reflect an understanding that the common law right against compelled self-incrimination — or any other common law right — required such warnings; rather, it was likely an attempt to insulate confessions from exclusion on the basis that they were the product of a threat or promise. Id.
To explain further: American magistrates conducted much of the questioning of arrestees until the mid-1800s, a pretrial procedure borrowed from British statutes. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850-1940, 62 Rutgers L. Rev. 447, 454-455 (2010); Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 857, 897-898 (1995); Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1086, 1095 (1994). As the 18th century drew to a close, English and American courts increasingly excluded statements as improperly induced by threats or promises. Oliver, 81 Tul. L. Rev. at 786-789. Although it is not clear that the practice was widespread, magistrates in at least some jurisdictions developed the practice of warning arrestees of their right to remain silent as a means to ensure admission of the confessions that resulted from their interrogations. Id. at 789 (“Beginning in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, magistrates began to caution suspects they examined that their statements could be used against them. Courts began to allow the statements to be admitted, notwithstanding otherwise improper inducement, if the suspect was cautioned he was not required to answer the magistrate‘s questions and made aware of the consequences of confessing.“) (citation omitted). This practice, including a warning about the right to counsel, was codified in New York in 1829, and that statute was copied by Missouri and Arkansas shortly thereafter. See George C. Thomas III & Amy Jane Agnew, Happy Birthday Miranda and How Old Are You, Really? 43 N. Ky. L. Rev. 301, 301, 312-314 (2016); Oliver, 81 Tul. L. Rev. at 792; see also Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2625, 2660-2661 (1996) (“In New York City, magistrates began routinely to caution defendants in 1835[.]“). There is evidence that some American police also may have begun warning suspects of their rights by the mid-1800s. Oliver, 81 Tul. L. Rev. at 798-808. But it appears that at least one jurisdiction that claimed to have adopted the police practice of warning suspects of their rights abandoned any such practice by the end of the 19th century. See id. at 810-820 (discussing New York Police Department‘s abandonment of practice of giving warnings to suspects around 1875);
as general knowledge spread among the masses, and the preparation for testimony became more thorough, this practice seems to have disappeared in England, so far at least as any general rule was concerned. In this country both the rule and the trial custom vary in the different jurisdictions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
More importantly, prior to Miranda, it does not appear that the failure to warn a suspect of his rights, without more, was widely considered a basis to exclude a statement. At least one leading 19th century treatise made clear that failure to give such warnings was not itself a basis to exclude the statement:
Neither is it necessary to the admissibility of any confession, to whomsoever it may have been made, that it should appear that the prisoner was warned that what he said would be used against him. On the contrary, if the confession was voluntary, it is sufficient, though it should appear that he was not so warned.
1 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 229 (11th ed. 1863) (emphasis in original); see also Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the
In sum, there is no significant evidence from the common law as it was understood in 1776, Georgia law as of 1877, or the larger American legal context as of 1877 that the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination was understood to require suspects in custody to be warned of that right — or any other constitutional right — in order for their otherwise voluntary statements to be admissible. Nor have we found any evidence that in the years following adoption of the 1877 Provision that it was understood to require a suspect in custody to be warned of any constitutional rights in order for a confession to be admissible. Cf. Moore v. State, 130 Ga. 322, 332 (2) (60 SE 544) (1908) (holding that it was not error for a trial court to refuse defense counsel‘s request to warn a witness of his right against compelled self-incrimination, because a witness “is presumed to know the law,” including that he cannot be compelled to answer any question that would tend to incriminate him, and the right “is designed for the protection of the witness himself,” not another who may be interested in his testimony); Dunn v. State, 99 Ga. 211, 211 (2) (syllabus) (25 SE 448) (1896) (“The failure of the court to caution a witness that he need not answer a question if the answer would tend to criminate him, is not cause for setting aside a verdict against one upon whose trial for a crime this witness testified.“); see also Elliott, 305 Ga. at 217 (IV) (C) (ii) (noting that decisions issued shortly after the adoption of the 1877 Provision “could not change its original public meaning” but are “good indicators of its meaning” given their temporal proximity). Indeed, Turnquest conceded at oral argument that no Georgia case prior to Miranda required warnings to be given. We conclude that the original public meaning of the 1877 Provision did not preclude the admissibility of an incriminating act or statement of a suspect in custody merely because the suspect was asked to perform the act or provide the statement without first being warned of any constitutional rights.
(ii) We find no consistent and definitive construction or other significant legal developments prior to the 1983 Constitution that
changed the original public meaning of the 1877 Provision with respect to the necessity of warnings.
Of course, it is Paragraph XVI of the 1983 Constitution that is ultimately at issue in this case, not the 1877 Provision. But because the 1877 Provision was retained in the 1983 Constitution without material change, we presume absent a consistent and definitive construction or other significant developments to the contrary that Paragraph XVI carries the same meaning as that of the 1877 Provision. See Elliott, 305 Ga. at 183-184 (II) (A)-(B). We find no reason to depart from that presumption here.
It is certainly true that, well before the Miranda decision in 1966 and the adoption of the current Paragraph XVI in 1983, suspects in Georgia were at least occasionally warned of their right against compelled self-incrimination before being questioned. See, e.g., Russell v. State, 196 Ga. 275, 277-278 (26 SE2d 528) (1943); Whitworth v. State, 155 Ga. 395, 399-400 (2) (117 SE 450) (1923); see also Davis v. State, 122 Ga. 564, 565 (2) (50 SE 376) (1905) (noting, in context of grand jury testimony, that the “better practice is, not only to notify a witness that he will not be compelled to testify to anything that will criminate him, but also, when a particular question is asked, to warn him that the answer to such question might have that effect; and especially is this true where the witness belongs to an ignorant class“). And, prior to Miranda, we sometimes mentioned warnings or the lack thereof in determining whether a confession was admissible. See Russell, 196 Ga. at 282-286 (2) (noting warning that the defendant did not have to answer questions, while rejecting a challenge to the admission of the defendant‘s statement, given “no evidence of any force or even of persuasion brought to bear on the defendant“); Fairfield v. State, 155 Ga. 660, 668-669 (8) (118 SE 395) (1923) (no error in admitting defendant‘s statement at preliminary hearing for other suspects, despite lack of warning that he could decline to answer questions that tended to incriminate him, where defendant was not charged with offense for which he ultimately was tried at the time of the hearing); Whitworth, 155 Ga. at 399-402 (2) (finding confession admissible under state hope of benefit statute where sheriff told defendant he did not have to make a statement and did not tell defendant he would benefit from confessing); Adams v. State, 129 Ga. 248 (58 SE 822) (1907) (noting defendants were not informed that they were not required to testify before coroner‘s jury in concluding that such prior testimony was inadmissible under hope of benefit statute and statute providing that defendants’ statements in preliminary hearings should not be under oath).5
But the case law contains no indication — let alone a consistent and definitive construction — that such warnings were a constitutional prerequisite to admissibility of otherwise voluntary statements prior to the
(b) Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution does not require suspects in custody to be warned of any constitutional rights before being asked to submit to a breath test.
Given Miranda‘s due process elements, we also consider, and reject, the possibility that Paragraph I requires suspects in custody to be warned of any constitutional rights before being asked to perform incriminating acts like submitting to a breath test. Paragraph I provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.”
We recognize that “this Court has held in a number of other contexts that the process due under the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution is the same.” Miller v. Deal, 295 Ga. 504, 510 (2) n.11 (761 SE2d 274) (2014).8 In some such cases, we have alluded to the possibility that the Georgia and federal due process rights may be different, but declined to consider such a distinction because the parties failed to make any such argument. See, e.g., Carr v. State, 303 Ga. 853, 857-858 (2) n.8 (815 SE2d 903) (2018); Gregory v. Sexual Offender Registration Review Bd., 298 Ga. 675, 675 n.1 (784 SE2d 392) (2016). And in some older cases, we held that Georgia due process is not controlled by federal due process decisions. See, e.g., Pope v. City of Atlanta, 240 Ga. 177, 178 (1) (240 SE2d 241) (1977); Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 563 (67 SE2d 692) (1951); Nat. Mtg. Corp. v. Suttles, 194 Ga. 768, 771-772 (22 SE2d 386) (1942). Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how or why Georgians would delegate to the United States Supreme Court the authority to alter the meaning of the Georgia Constitution by unknown future federal decisions. See Olevik, 302 Ga. at 234-235 (2) (b) n.3.
But, of course, there is no decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that the federal Due Process Clause (or any other federal constitutional provision) requires Miranda warnings to precede a request for a breath test. So even if we were to interpret the Georgia due process right identically with federal interpretations of the federal due process right, Turnquest cannot prevail. And as we have already explained, a more careful analysis rooted not in federal case law but in Georgia text, history, and context shows no basis for any prophylactic warning requirement. Paragraph I does not require Miranda-style prophylactic warnings before law enforcement may ask persons in custody to submit to a breath test.
(c)
Although the trial court cited the precursor to
Thus, regardless of whether Turnquest is arguing that he is entitled to the same warning set forth in Miranda, or some alternative warning of the right against compelled self-incrimination specific to Georgia law, we conclude that neither the Georgia Constitution nor
4. Principles of stare decisis do not warrant retaining the holding of Price.
As noted at the outset of this opinion, we held in Price that the failure to give a suspect in custody ”Miranda warnings” rendered evidence regarding field sobriety tests inadmissible. 269 Ga. at 225 (3). Notwithstanding the reference to Miranda, Price was clearly a decision of state law.11 The basis for our ruling that Miranda warnings were required under state law was not entirely clear, however. Our opinion did not cite, let alone analyze, any particular Georgia statute or Georgia constitutional provision in support of its holding. Rather, we stated that “[d]ecisions of this Court and the court of appeals have routinely held that under Georgia law Miranda warnings must precede a request to perform a field sobriety test only when the suspect is ‘in custody.‘” Price, 269 Ga. at 225 (3) (citation omitted).
In support of that conclusion, we cited a decision of this Court in which we said that admission of the appellant‘s refusal to undergo an alco-sensor test12 notwithstanding a lack of Miranda warnings did not violate the appellant‘s rights under the federal and state constitutional provisions against compelled self-incrimination, or former
In addition, given that Keenan merely provided reasons for rejecting a claim where a defendant is not in custody, it is of little utility in determining whether warnings might be required where a defendant is in custody.
In support of our decision in Price, we also cited the Court of Appeals‘s decision in O‘Donnell, which apparently held that former
Whatever the specific basis for Price‘s holding, it is at odds with our conclusion that neither Georgia statutory nor constitutional law requires a Miranda warning or something like it in this context. Although Price‘s holding about field sobriety tests — which encompass a variety of tests with different characteristics, but not a breath test of the sort at issue here and in Olevik and Elliott — does not directly control the issue of whether the giving of Miranda warnings or something similar is a condition of admissibility of the results of a breath test performed by a suspect in custody, there is no principled basis for distinguishing Price‘s holding from the issue before us today. Thus, this case requires us to consider whether Price was rightly decided and, if not, whether we should nonetheless retain the rule as a matter of stare decisis.
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts generally stand by their prior decisions, because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Stare decisis, however, is not an inexorable command. Courts, like individuals, but with more caution and deliberation, must sometimes reconsider what has been already carefully considered, and rectify their own mistakes. In reconsidering our prior decisions, we must balance the importance of having the question decided against the importance of having it decided right. To that end, we have developed a test that considers the age of precedent, the reliance interests at stake, the workability of the decision, and, most importantly, the soundness of its reasoning. The soundness of a precedent‘s reasoning is the most important factor. Olevik, 302 Ga. at 244-245 (2) (c) (iv) (citations and punctuation omitted; emphases in original).
For the reasons discussed above, the reasoning of Price was unsound, which is the most important stare decisis consideration, especially in constitutional cases. Although Price appears to be a decision of Georgia statutory law, Georgia constitutional law, or both, it contains no discussion of any particular Georgia statute or constitutional provision. Neither our opinion in Price nor any of the authorities on which it relies contain any analysis of whether the language, history, and context of the Georgia Constitution required Miranda warnings as a matter of Georgia constitutional law; when such analysis is actually done, it is plain that the Georgia Constitution requires no such thing in
None of the remaining stare decisis factors indicate that we should retain this unfounded decision. On the age factor, we decided Price 21 years ago, and we have overruled decisions older than that. See Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (1) (796 SE2d 261) (2017) (overruling a 45-year-old precedent on premature motions for new trial); Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 808-814 (3) (771 SE2d 362) (2015) (overruling 24-year-old interpretation of justification statute); State v. Hudson, 293 Ga. 656, 661-662 (748 SE2d 910) (2013) (overruling 38-year-old precedent regarding when a new post-appeal sentence is unconstitutionally vindictive); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 659-660 (5), (6) (697 SE2d 757) (2010) (overruling nearly 29-year-old interpretation of felony murder statute); see also Olevik, 302 Ga. at 244-246 (2) (c) (iv) (overruling 17-year-old construction of Paragraph XVI); Ga. Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593, 601-602 (2) (755 SE2d 184) (2014) (reversing 19-year-old decision on sovereign immunity). Price also created no reliance interests of the sort normally considered in stare decisis analysis. See Olevik, 302 Ga. at 245-246 (2) (c) (iv). And the workability factor cuts neither in favor of nor against retaining the rule of Price. As Price by its terms requires Miranda warnings, which inform suspects of their “right to remain silent,” see 384 U. S. at 444, and not some Paragraph XVI-specific warning also apprising suspects of their right to refuse to perform an incriminating act, retaining Price would not actually serve the purpose of meaningfully informing DUI suspects of their state constitutional right to refuse a breath test. On the other hand, a rule under which law enforcement need not provide Miranda warnings to suspects in custody who are asked to perform a breath test means that police must take care not to engage in any interrogation within the meaning of Miranda before a warning is given.13
Accordingly, we overrule Price and other Georgia appellate decisions to the extent that they hold that either
5. We remand for the trial court to consider Turnquest‘s alternative argument in the light of Elliott.
We vacate rather than reverse the trial court‘s ruling, because the trial court‘s resolution of the motion to suppress based on Price meant that it did not consider alternative arguments for suppression raised by Turnquest. In particular, the trial court did not rule on Turnquest‘s argument that his breath test results should be suppressed because the implied consent advisement provided to him was misleading in that it suggested that if he refused the test, that refusal could be used against him at trial and could affect his driving privileges. This argument implicates our decision in Elliott, which had not been decided at the time the trial court ruled on the motion to suppress. We therefore remand for the trial court to consider Turnquest‘s alternative argument for suppression in the light of Elliott.
Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur.
Decided May 6, 2019.
Breath test; warnings. Gwinnett Superior Court. Before Judge Iannazzone, pro hac vice.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Samuel R. d‘Entremont, Assistant District Attorney; Brian W. Whiteside, Solicitor-General, Christopher M. DeNeve, Assistant Solicitor-General; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Fakiha Khan, Kendra F. Mitchell, for appellee.