*1 hearsay “of a or data are if the facts inadmissible otherwise particular subject.” upon experts reasonably type relied upon forming opinions or inferences field in qualifica- expert’s experience regardless or of an Thus, at 1260. Id. presenting party evidence proffering the burden bears tions, the § 24-9-67.1. reliability of OCGA the standards to meet in order eviscer- supra, otherwise would To hold at 279-280. Mason, testimony, expert gatekeeper all and allow role court’s ate the trial opinion nothing of one than the untested more on that based even individual. any satisfy appellees Daubert factors failed to
Because could measure the court which criteria reasonable reliability the trial court’s within conclusions, it was Thomas’ testimony. his to exclude discretion testimony, admissibility ruling light Thomas’ on the of its 3. court erred the trial address whether did not the Court of negli- simple summary judgment claim of granting gence. the asserted on remand whether to determine is directed The court professional negligence simple remaining than a rather claim is there remains negligence genuine sо, if whether and, cause of action claim. as to that of material fact issue All the Judgment direction. remanded with and the case reversed concur. Justices June Decided July 26, 2010. denied
Reconsideration Gregory Readdick, Wheeler,Brown, Copeland Stair, H. Carlock, & Jr., Brown, Bumgartner, Watkins, A. Richard Carter, & Strickland Blackerby, appellants. for G. Steven Savage, Savage, Karsman, Martha W. Brent J. Turner, & Pinson Pinckney, appellees. Kathryn Kraeuter, H. Williams, Robert S. al. JACKSON et THE STATE v. S10A0070.
(697 SE2d NAHMIAS, Justice. Woodley Appellees, Jackson and Warren Carlester defendants drug conspired dealer at allegedly to rob a Jerold Daniels Smith, gunpoint. he armed, be out to however, also turned victim, The County grand A Cobb Daniels in self-defense. and killed shot along and Smith on counts of indicted Jackson three The the (279 with other offenses. defendants moved to dismiss pursuant murder counts State
695) (1981). granted dismiss, trial court and the motion to asking thorough appeals, overrule After State now us to Crane. review, overruled, we and we there- conclude Crane should *2 presented fore reverse. causation be decided The issue should using customary proximate properly instructed trial, cause standard. easy Georgia appellate
This should be case for court. The presented question is what the term “causes” means as used in the (c) (“A felony murder statute. See also OCGA felony, when, in commits offense murder commission irrespective being he causes the death of another human of mal- ice.”). interpreted Crane, cases both before and after this Court very require “proximate term addition, that causation.” In there Appeals, are dozens of other cases from Court and the Court of Crane, and after that before hold that the same term as used in other many homicide means and in statutes other criminal and civil contexts cause. This case is difficult There, because Crane. a short opinion any Georgia’s not did mention extensive causation felony law, case held Court that the “causes” in word murder requires statute not causation, but death be directly” by parties underlying felony. “caused one of the Id. Applying conception at 779. this new and more restrictive of causa- guilty tion, the Court concluded that a defendant found cannot be felony underlying fеlony when intended victim of the accomplice, kills the defendant’s because that death is “caused directly” by the victim rather than the defendant. See id. opinion poorly below,
As shown in Crane reasoned, perhaps incongruous Georgia because it is so with the law, rest of consistently applied by has not been this Court or the Court of ensuing holding in the three decades. Its has not been applied uniformly specific in the murder, context of nor has its reasoning construing been followed the same causation in other case, homicide statutes. The relevant however, facts of this today are almost to Crane’s, identical and so we must either reaffirm reject After it. careful consideration, we have concluded important that Crane must be overruled. doctrine, Stare decisis is an straightjacket. age statutory it is but not a Crane’s nature are outweighed by undermining precedential the other factors its au- thority, important reasoning and it is its refute longer pollute ensure that the case can no cited in efforts streams of our law. Background Case This and Procedural
The Factuаl parties stipulated, purposes dismiss, of the motion The 1. conspired to commit an armed Jackson, Smith, Daniels drug robbery dealer. the defendants believed was of someone who handgun, approached with intended victim armed with Daniels waiting getaway nearby The vehicle. and Smith Jackson exchanged gunfire Daniels, and he victim, armed, who was also ultimately and Smith killed self-defense. Jackson shot and Daniels charged with, The defendants later arrested. indictment were statutory Tracking among guage, lan- offenses, murder. others alleged “did cause the and Smith Count both Jackson being, in the commission Daniels, Jerold a human . . . while death of charged felony, Aggravated The indictment Assault.” wit: alleging that he caused Daniels’s death counts, two more Smith with possession of a firearm while in the commission convicted felon. charges.
The moved to dismiss the defendants They argued fired the shot that killed their that because the victim co-conspirator, they Daniels’s death. trial did granted the motion to decision court, bound this Court’s *3 (a) § appeal under 5-7-1 filed direct OCGA dismiss. State this (1), asking us to overrule Crane. Georgia’s in Means Homicidе Statutes Proximate Cause
“Cause”
provides
“[a]
that
also
2. The
murder statute
felony,
when, in the
commits the offense of murder
commission
being irrespective
he
human
of malice.”
causes the death of another
(c) (emphasis supplied).
question
§
in
As in
OCGA
case is whether a defendant who commits a
whose
this
intended victim kills
co-conspirator
“causes” that death. The
straightforward. Georgia
proximate
should
is
cause
answer
meaning
specific definition
another
is not indicated
state. When
interpreted
customarily
in almost all
context,
or
“cause” is
term
— “[t]hat
legal
“proximate
which, in a
contexts to mean
cause”
by any
sequence,
efficient inter-
and continuous
unbroken
natural
injury,
vening
produces
cause,
and
which the result would
without
(5th
1979).
Dictionary 1103
ed.
have occurred.” Black’s Law
not
explained
proximate
is
cause
Thus, this
has
that
general.
e.g., Skaggs v.
See,
State,
in
for criminal cases
standard
(In
159) (2004)
case,
a criminal
SE2d
“
played
proximate
or
accused’s
‘act
omission
cause exists when the
(victim’s)
actually causing
part
bringing
or
in
about
substantial
damage
injury
injury
damage
a direct
. . . the
or
was either
or
”
reasonably
consequence
probable
or
result or a
act
omission.’
(citations omitted)).
proximate
is the
We have also said that
cause
e.g.,
general. See,
for
State,
standard
homicide cases
James v.
492) (1983) (“In
Wilson
861) (1940),
following
set
test for
we
out
determining
in homicide
‘Where one inflicts an
causation
cases:
injury,
injury
efficient,
unlawful
such
be accounted as the
proximate
appear,
death,
cause of
whenever
shall be made
either
(1)
injury
proximate
itself
constituted
sole
cause
(2)
injury directly
materially
death;
or
contributed
subsequent
happening
accruing
immediate cause
injury materially
death;
death,
or
accelerated the
”).
although proximately
by pre-existing
occasioned
cause.’
many
general
rule,
Consistent with this
we have held
cases
many
proximate
and for
decades that
causation is the standard
prosecuted
statute,
murder cases
under the murder
now codified as
long
Thus,
OCGA 16-5-1.
held,
cases,
we have
in numerous
proximate
is the test
murder,
causation
for malice
crime defined
(a)
using
phrasing.
the identical “he . . . causes”
See OCGA 16-5-1
(“A person
unlawfully
commits the offense of murder when he
aforethought,
express
implied,
with malice
either
causes
Finally,
being.”).1
respect
statutory
of another human
with
general
text at
case,
issue
and in full accord with the
rule for
criminal and homicide cases and with our
construction
(a)
language in
identical
statute,
subsection
of the same
we have
repeatedly
phrase
held, before and after Crane, that the
“he causes”
(c)
in OCGA 16-5-1
establishes
causation as the stan-
liability
dard for
murder cases.2
1 See, Wilson,
e.g.,
(upholding proximate
Indeed, of homicide charged voluntary involuntary including frequently the and statutes, manslaughter statutes, the Assem- vehicular homicide General and very employed phrasing.3 bly And the same or similar causation has robbery Certainly killing part gestae and felony.’ is a the res the this case ... is one the of of incidental, probable consequences design robbery.” the of of the execution of the to commit the (citations (277 18) (1981) omitted)); State, 470, 470-471, (holding, Dupree SE2d 472 brought by injuries during heart stress and incurred where the victim died of robbery, failure appellant the to find “the conduct of the evidence sufficient deceased”); robbery proximate perpetrating of the death constituted the cause of 365) (1981) State, (upholding felony 247 murder Larkin v. SE2d conviction Ga. against “he the defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient show that caused his assaulting died when he her while his wife and she later from mother-in-law’s death” stabbed wound, pulmonary complication surgery explaining the knife proximate a “[wjhere as a of re-stitch embolus injury injury, of death if the one inflicts an unlawful such is the cause ‘directly materially subsequent injury happening accruing of a and contributed ” (citation omitted)); immediate cause of the death’ Durden 237) (1982) responding (affirming murder conviction where a store owner to a defendant, exchanging explaining burglary died of a attack after shots with the that “the heart another, may felony upon rule be stated as follows:Where one commits such to be efficient, appear proximate as the cause of the death whenever shall be made to accounted felony directly materially happening subsequent and either that the accruing although contributed to materially death, death, injury that the immediate cause of accelerated by cause.”); proximately pre-existing occasioned Williams v. 691) (1985) (relying uphold felony on Durden to murder conviction where the vehicle, leg, causing him to of his then defendant shot victim fall out which rolled him, aggravated “directly materially over and killed assault and contributed to his because by asphyxiation”); Cross, (holding death State v. felony murder, (c),defining requires § death caused “OCGA 16-5-1 need an injury during felony” gestae upholding which occurred of and an indictment that res baby year (emphasis charged the death more than a after the defendant her of shook 19-20, Skaggs, (applying general original)); a 278 Ga. at test causation in holding aggravated by hitting that the defendant’s assault and case proximately by causing fatally kicking the victim caused the victim’s death him to fall and hit ground, rejecting argument upon on the Crane that the his head based cause erroneously upon expounding proxi- “failed include instruction additional ”). does mate cause when the accused ‘not the death’ 3 See, who, emphasis supplied, {“Anyperson § all without OCGÁ 6-2-5.2 person through malice aforethought, causes the death another the violation of Code Section 6-2-5.1 of .”); [operating influence] aircraft of aircraft. under commits the offense homicide . . (a) (“A manslaughter person voluntary of he 16-5-2 commits the offense when causes the being death another human under circumstances which would otherwise be and if (a) (“A violent, solely sudden, passion ....”);§ he acts as the result of a and irresistible 16-5-3 involuntary person [felony] manslaughter in the commission of an commits the offense of being any when without intention to unlawful act by he causes the death another human do so (b) (“A felony.”), person than a the commission of an unlawful act other commits the manslaughter involuntary act [misdemeanor] in the commission of a lawful in an offense being any manner he causes another human without intention to unlawful when the death of so, by likely great do of a lawful in an unlawful manner to cause death or commission act (b) (“A harm.”); bodily person willfully of feticide it or she 16-5-80 commits offense he any legal justification injury an to the mother without causes death unborn child (d) (“A child....”), voluntary person manslaughter such commits the offense unborn person such an unborn under which would child when otherwise be feticide and causes child circumstances solely sudden, violent, person if the result of such acts (a) who, passion ..”); {“Anyperson aforethought, irresistible . . without malice through [various statutes] the death the violation of motor vehicle causes another
651
interpreted
by Georgia’s
have been
the extent
those statutes
to
courts,
regularly
term “cause” has been
again
once
the
appellate
causation.4
as requiring proximate
construed
(b)
.”),
(“Any
by
degree . . .
in the
driver
the
of homicide
vehicle
first
commits
offense
of
who,
aforethought,
causes the death
without malice
сauses an accident which
motor vehicle
of
(b)
person
of Code
scene of the accident in violation of subsection
another
and leaves the
(c)
.”),
degree
by
in the first
...
40-6-270 commits the offense of homicide
vehicle
Section
so, by violating
person,
(“Any person
an intention to do
causes the death
another
without
who
of
by
any
in the second
provision
[other]
of
title . .. commits the offense of homicide
vehicle
this
(b) (1) (“A
.”);
person
§
degree
the cause
death . . .
40-6-393.1
when such violation is
said
of
by
degree
an
first
if he or
causes the death
of feticide
vehicle in the
she
commits the offense
of
by
by any injury
in
the mother of such child which would be homicide
vehicle
unborn child
(“A
(c) (1)
....”),
by
person
the
degree
of feticide
vehicle in
the first
commits the offense
degree
by any injury to
mother of
if he or she
the death
an unborn child
the
second
causes
of
any
by
by violating
provision
[other]
child
this title . . . which would be homicide
vehicle
such
of
(a)
who,
aforethought,
degree....”);
(“Any person
§ 40-6-396
without malice
in the second
(a)
person through
of
the
the violation of subsection
Code Section
causes
death
аnother
of
by
an official traffic-control device
40-6-26 commits the offense of homicide
interference with
(a)
signal.
.”);
who,
sign
(“Any person
railroad
or
. .
without malice afore-
or
52-7-12.2
thought,
person through
sections]
[various
causes the death
another
the violation of
code
of
(b)
by
degree.”),
(“Any operator
of homicide
in the first
a vessel
commits the offense
vessel
of
who,
aforethought,
a collision
accident
causes the death
without malice
causes
or
which
of
of
(a)
person
of
or
in
another
and leaves the scene
the collision
accident
violation of subsection
(c)
.”),
by
degree..
in
commits the offense of homicide
vessel
the first
.
Code Section 52-7-14
so, by violating
(“Any person
person,
causes
an intention to do
who
the death
another
without
of
any
by
provision
[other]
[misdemeanor]
of this title ... commits the
offense of homicide
vessel
(b) (1) (“A
death”)-,
degree
the cause
52-7-12.3
in the second
when such violation is
said
of
degree
person
by
the
if
commits the
of feticide
vessel in
first
he or she causes the death
offense
any
by
injury
through
[various
the
an unborn child
mother of suсh child
the violation of
of
(c) (1) (“A
....”),
by
sections]
code
the offense of feticide
vessel in the second
commits
any injury
degree
by
if he
causes
death
an
child
the mother
child
or she
the
unborn
of such
....”).
provision
by violating any [other]
title
4
(190
(1937) (“In
371)
See,
State,
376,
e.g.,
App.
v.
Ga.
SE
Cain
55
381-382
a case
death,
manslaughter,
negligence
proximate
the
must
in
defendant
he the
cause
wrongful
such
...
does a
act
answerable for all the
order
constitute
crime.
‘Whoever
is
events,
may
consequences
ordinary
though
consequences are
in the
course of
such
ensue
cause,
directly brought
by
intervening
intervening
immediately
if
about
an
such
cause
original
wrong-doer,
reality
through
in
a condition on or
which
set motion
or was
” (citations omitted));
State,
negligent
operated
injurious
Coley v.
act
to induce the
result.’
(“To
452) (1968)
(159
149,
involuntary
App.
151
117 Ga.
SE2d
convict
the offense
act,
manslaughter
necessary, among
things, that
of an unlawful
it is
other
commission
Or,
stated,
proximate
may
of
jury
the death he the
result
the unlawful act.
otherwise be
(citations
proximate
cause of the homicide.”
unlawful act must
found
to be
(214
423) (1975)
State,
omitted));
357,
App.
(аpproving
v.
359
detailed
Cook
134 Ga.
SE2d
murder, voluntary
involuntary manslaugh
manslaughter,
proximate
cause instruction on
(“The
(317
213) (1984)
433,
State,
charges);
App.
v.
170 Ga.
SE2d
term
ter
Johnson
many
concept
proximate
applied
has been
in vehicular homicide cases
this state for
cause
426) (1988)
State,
(rejecting
years.”);
App.
claim in
Hickman v.
SE2d
voluntary
direct,
manslaughter
that the
did not die “as a
result of
case
victim
intervening
to an
inflicted
defendant because
cause of
was due
strike
strikes
906)
citing
State,
pulmonary embolism,”
App.
factor:
Heath v.
(1948));
(approving charge on
Anderson
act,
“excerpt
manslaughter
explaining
involuntary
that the
in the commission of
unlawful
charge
complained
plainly
the act
with the entire
instructed
of when considered
deceased”);
must
the death of the
Miller
of the defendant
have been
27) (1999) (“In
cases,
App.
vehicular homicide
the State
original matter, therefore,
As an
we would decide this case
simply by applying
customary legal meaning
which
“cause,”
supported by
ample precedent interpreting
provision
provision
issue,
its
statute,
identical sister
in murder
substantiаlly
many
provisions
and identical or
similar
phrase
We
hold
homicide statutes.
would
“he causes” as
(c)
requires
prove
used in OCGA 16-5-1
State
underlying felony
defendant’s
conduct
the commission of the
*6
proximately
person.
caused the
In
another
the context of
(to
proximate
case,
this
felony
causation would exist if
use
rule”
“the
Crane)
year
deciding
murder that the
stated a
Court
after
“directly
materially
the defendants committed
and
contrib-
happening
subsequent accruing
uted to the
immediate cause of
(to
death,” Durden,
250 Ga. at
or if
use
from case
“
Crane)
years
[was]
decided 16
before
‘the homicide
committed
gestae
felony’
within the res
of the
. . . and is one of the incidental,
probable consequences
design
the execution
to commit the
(citations omitted).
robbery,” Jones,
State v. Crane original legal not, however, matter. The same issue 3. This is nearly years presented, in scenario, much the factual same ago in three case, Crane. Crane and confederates were burglarizing killed a home shot and one when the homeowner property. See them in defense of himself and his 779. recognized “he on whether the term case turned *7 statute, causes,” murder can extend to as used in the by accomplice the intended victim. Id. In its death of an killed page opinion, however, the Crane Court did not one-and-a-half customary legal meaning of “cause” or look to our consider then-existing interpreting case that term as used law statute, statute, the malice murder homicide and other baldly general. Instead, asserted that criminal statutes in the Court limiting felony it was faced with the choice between directly by parties underlying of deaths “caused one felony” construing those “to include also deaths statute (footnote parties.” indirectly omitted; Id. caused one Reflecting only interpretations emphasis supplied). “he on the two “[w]e would, if considered, the Court stated that causes” that choice, would the construction which criminalize allowed favor present case.” Id. at 780. Because criminal conduct involved in the statute interpreted, being however, the concluded that Court was by principle to in behalf of the accuseds.” “we are constrained rule Id. adopt lenity require agree that rule of would the Court to
We applying interpretation if, all the accuseds after that favored statutory construction, determined that the Court other tools only “indirectly possible “directly were the causes” and causes” (c) meanings of the word “causes” in OCGA 16-5-1 and that equally strong reasoning supported interpretation, leaving either ambiguous. statute Banta v. (“ lenity applies only ‘The . . . when, rule after statutory consulting construction, traditional canons we are left ” ambiguous (quoting statute.’ United v. Shabani, States 225) (1994)). 382, 130 S. LE2d 10, 17 U. SC But the Crane Court apply statutory not did traditional canons of construction before jumping binary reading conclusion, to that of the causation proposed element the Crane Court finds foundation in no our legal law, tradition or our case none of which Court mentioned. discussing Indeed, than other Crane and cases we have found single not a instance in our extensive causation case law where the suggested only “directly Court has that the word “causes” can mean “indirectly causes” or causes.” contrary, consistently employed
To the
we have
the more nu-
concept
proximate causation,
anced
which does
track
binary,
unhelpful,
dichotomy
and often
direct-indirect
Crane.
imposes liability
reasonably
Proximate causation
for the
foreseeable
tortious)
(or,
results
in
independent,
context,
of criminal
the civil
if
conduct
there
intervening
no sufficient,
and unforeseen
cause.
include,
That definition
would
least
some factual scenarios, a
deadly response against
perpetrators by
оne
the intended
dangerous felony
robbery.
burglary
victim of a
like
or armed
Application
Holding
The Inconsistent
Crane’s
reasoning,
4. No later cases have bolstered Crane’s
nor do the
today
any
dissents
make
Indeed,
effort
do so.
neither this Court
consistently applied
holding
nor the
that the
has
Crane’s
“require
“he causes” in the
words
murder statute
directly parties
underlying
death to be caused
one of the
(footnote omitted).
felony.”
nearly
247 Ga. at
decades,
three
applied
just
wholeheartedly
the Court has
two occasions.
support
holding
“[o]ther
Crane Court offered for its
jurisdictions
issue,
apparently
split
majority favoring
negative
are
on this
the numerical
answer,” citing
any analysis
an ALR annotation without
*8
the
whether
murder statutes
jurisdictions
Georgia’s.
Crane,
case
(citing
and
law in those
mirror
&
See
by engaging gunfight who case, may holding be this no effect on the It noted that had immediate because shootout, police during and defendant killed the officer and his malice murder conviction Hill, 281, However, 279, 284, crime were at 287. death sentence for that affirmed. See capital upon conviction of Hill’s due the Eleventh Circuit later vacated the based violations (11th 1998). rights 1411, process Turpin, at Hill v. trial. See 135 F3d Cir. Hill, Looking to a footnote in see 250 Ga. at n. Chief Justice Hunstein’s dissent unambiguous language argues holding compelled plain that “the in Crane and 16-2-20, persons may charged § and OCGA the statute that identifies those who be Dissenting Op. convicted of the commission of a at 661. The Court did not crime.” suggest holding compelled by 16-2-20, mentioning predecessor § that its version was OCGA try passing, that statute see n. and the Chief Justice does not reasoning Moreover, footnote, rely. defend the did in its the Hill causation which Crane why liability majority explaining § not The was was limited OCGA 16-2-20. liability “directly acсepted cause[d]” Court instead had Crane’s limitation of to deaths might expand looking party-to-a-crime and if it used to defendant statute see liability & n. 3. incorrect to “a crime one did not commit.” Ga. at 280 On the authority assumption, the cites for the “direct causation” was no. Chief Justice no answer imposes proximate proposition party-to-a-crime To statute limitation on causation. contrary, expands liability § criminal acts criminal from a defendant’s own OCGA (and (and agents proximate consequences) accomplices their the criminal his acts of consequences). Thus, question in the defendants their this case is whether co-conspirator; intentionally by killing their the victim caused their victim commit a crime reasonably question acted in self-defense and committed no crime. The is whether could committed, co-parties predicate intentionally felonies the alone or as find that defendants (b) (3) (4), proximately caused Daniels’ death when their intended under OCGA 16-2-20 robbery. against law traditional victim defended himself the armed Our question affirmatively. Finally, answers that liability we notе that the effort limit liability problem based on OCGA 16-2-20 into the same as the effort to limit runs reasoning apply on a the same should to all similar based constricted view causation: cases, done, below but has never as the discussion criminal homicide been short, nothing opinion expand are to alter OCGA 16-2-20. We demonstrates. In does simply interpreting murder statute. *9 656 827) (1996). 372,
Smith v.
To reach
result,
the Court had to redefine the Crane test as whether the
bystander
“directly
by willing partici-
death of the
was
caused”
“a
(rather
co-party)
pant”
gunfight.
than
in the
267
at
Ga.
375. The
distinguish
struggled
Court
to
Crane and Hill as cases in which “the
by either
homicides were not committed
acting
the defendant
someone
Smith,
in
him.”
at
in
concert with
376. The shooter
plainly
parties
[defendant’s]
however,
“one of the
was
under-
(footnote
lying
omitted),
felony,” Crane,
In Crane, other cases since we have murder hardly convictions where the death could be said to have been directly” by McCoy State, “caused the defendant’s acts. See 646) (1993) felony (upholding Ga. murder by finding firefighter conviction that the death of a fell who into a burning asphyxiation “directly well behind house and died of was setting attributable” to the in defendant’s felonious conduct fire to house); (affirming Durden, Ga. at 329 murder responding burglary conviction heart where storeowner died of a defendant). exchanging after attack shots with several simply ignored applied cases, other we have Crane and proximate e.g., post-1981 cause test. See, cited cases in footnote 2 above. reasoning holding deserving
Moreover, if
Crane's
solid and its
precedential
Thompson’s
suggests,
value,
as Justice
dissent
see
Dissenting Op. at
then
the term
“causes”
the identical or
substantially
language
Georgia’s
similar causation
in
used
susceptible
“directly
homicide statutes
also
should
be
the same
“indirectly
posited
ambiguity
causes” versus
causes”
in Crane. And
penal,
lenity
all those
because
statutes are also
the rule of
should
require
“directly
interpretation
applied
causes”
in those
happened.
contrary,
contexts as well. But that has not
To the
apply
Court and the
have continued to
e.g.,
traditional
See,
cause standard
those situations.
post-1981
cases cited
footnotes 1 and 4 above.
Crane has caused the most tension in
cases,
vehicular homicide
which, like
cases,
involve
sometimes
deaths that are
“directly”
parties acting
caused
innocent third
as a result of the
precipitating
Thus, Hill,
defendant’s
criminal acts.
this Court held
that,
under
defendant did
“cause” the death of another
guilty
police
and so was not
murder when a
officer
shooting
at whom the defendant
back
shot
and killed an
Appeals,
bystander.
Yet the Court
See
(2005), and defendant, the influence was under who oncoming fleeing police, pursuing police into car to veer caused a police killing officer. Buick, traffic, where the car collided with in at Like who fired the fatal shot id. 94-96. the homeowner See Crane, the of the officer’s death the driver “direct cause” was Appeals, again Crane, without mention of Buick. But the Court of jury’s supported upheld conviction because the evidence finding conduct that the defendant’s criminal App. See at 95-96. cause of the officer’s death. 274 Ga. 866) (2006), App. In McGrath McGrath, of even indirect. who was chain driving causation was more recklessly a car 1-85, and the influence on crashed into under wrecked, McGrath and Kar driven Kar. Both vehicles were and injured. Burroughs-Brown, stopped nurse, saw the and wreck were to assist. Another car Burroughs-Brown by Ramirez,
driven could not see who poor visibility, hit her. until too late due to it was pinned briefly then cars, Kar’s and Ramirez’s but She was between highway, her. See fell where other vehicles ran over she onto two Citing argued he did not id. at 826-827. McGrath Burroughs-Brown’s application death, faithful Crane’s and of reasoning required But of would indeed have reversal. the Court upheld Appeals again under the cause test. the conviction App. footnote, court McGrath, 277 Ga. See distinguished 828-830. ground Crane it “involved subject interpretations” statute, to two which was “[s]uch here, is not the case since vehicular asserted that interpreted consistently applied.” Id. homicide has statute been similarly Appeals distinguished in an 830, n. The Crane at earlier vehicular homicide case. See 4. Court of App. at 434 Johnson, clearly inapposite {“Crane no there is is the instant case where of an construction of indirect causation which involves evidence statute.”). entirely different may in “en- be defined Vehicular homicide and tirely sections, but the statutes, in of their Code different” terms indistinguishable, compare language OCGA relevant causation (a) {“Anyperson aforethought, who, malice 40-6-393 without causes through [various another the violation code sections] commits the homicide offense of vehicle the first (c) (“A degree.. (emphasis supplied)), per- ..” with OCGA 16-5-1 when, son a of murder also commits offense the commission of being felony, irrespective he causes the death another human (emphasis supplied)). good law, ...” If malice. Crane is then this (c) language Court’s construction of the causation OCGA binding interprets should be on the Court of when virtually identical causation in the vehicular homicide Const, (“The VI, VI, statute. See Ga. Art. Sec. Par. VI Supreme decisions Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”). good longer however, no is, law.
Stare Decisis Considerations
important principle
promotes
5. Stare decisis is an
the rule
statutory
particularly
interpretation,
law,
the context
where
easily
our incorrect decisions are more
corrected
the democratic
process.
Baptiste,
Smith v. Salon
(2010) (Nahmias,
concurring specially).
J.,
However, stare decisis is
“
command,’
not an ‘inexorable
nor ‘a mechanical formula of adher
‘principle
ence to
latest decision.’ . . . Stare decisis is instead a
”
S. __ (130
policy.’
Commn.,
Citizens United Fed. Election
U.
753) (2010) (Roberts,
concurring)
876, 920,
SC
J.,
175 LE2d
C.
*11
(citations omitted).
considering
prior
In
whether to
a
reexamine
holding,
importance
having
erroneous
we must balance the
of
the
question
against
importance
having
right.
the
decided
it decided
doing
age
precedent,
Id. In
so,
consider
such
the
we
factors
as
of the
workability
the
stake,
reliance interests at
decision, and,
the
importantly,
reasoning.
Montejo
most
soundness
its
See
S. __ (129
955)
Louisiana,
2079,
556 U.
SC
2088-2089, 173 LE2d
(2009).
reasoning
above,
As demonstrated
Crane’s
is unsound and
contrary
body
holding may
of our law. Crane’s
be
in
workable
—
specific
by
co-party
its
context
a
caused
underlying felony.
just
intended victim of the
discussed, however,
As
unwilling
the Court of
have been
or
unable
apply
reasoning
Crane’s
to all
cases,
murder
much less to the
many
language.
other homicide statutes that use the same causation
property
In addition, Crane
no
affects
or contract
and estab-
issues
rights,
meaningful
lishes no substantive
so it
no
reliance
creates
(To
potential conspiring
sure,
interests.
be
felon who is well-read
slightly
might
committing
in the law
less deterred from
a
dangerous
by
co-conspirators
that if
belief
one
his
he
not face
officer,
will
or a police
intended victim
killed
usually
the lаw
of reliance
is not the sort
charge,
but
analysis.)
in the stare decisis
recognizes
its
Crane, only
its
age
reaffirming
leaves, on the side
That
dissent relies upon.
Thompson’s
That is all Justice
nature.
statutory
three decades
663-665. nearly
is indeed
at
Dissenting Op.
we
cases in which
and in Crane subsequent
two
old,
noted
expressly
the Court
holding,
its
actually applied
Crane,
We have Moreover, Crane’s do not refute. the dissеnts overrule which of its both holding inconsistent application and the reasoning odd acquiescence” particu- to “legislative courts make resort appellate and the Court our Court because large part dubious.8 larly dissent, Contrary the Court has never Justice Hunstein’s to the assertion Chief provide Assembly for criminal OCGA 16-2-20 to suggested needs to “amend General Indeed, argues Dissenting Op. for the liability that dissent nature.” at 663. in situations of this (c), 16-2-20, opposed in OCGA 16-5-1 to the causation element time ever that OCGA first requires footnote 6 above. the result reached Crane. See rely heavily circumstances, perilous to peculiar it can be Even aside these from interpretation is correct. legislative statute and inaction to conclude that a court’s silence statutory discerning proper Legislative poor is a beacon to follow silence statutory years baptize quiescent cannot be invoked route... . The verdict of many impermissible. times reconsidered gloss This Court has is otherwise legislature]. passively [the statutory that have been abided constructions unawarenеss, preoccupation, paralysis. frequently [Legislative] inaction betokens adoption [legislative] alone the find in silence “It is at best treacherous to [(66 States, SC controlling 328 U. S. rule law.” Girouard v. United *12 (1946). 1084)] us, Where, that a there is no indication . as in the case before LE . . particular problem, Assembly] we subsequent itself to the [General has addressed ap- acquiescence, let alone ... unpersuaded that silence is tantamount are proval .... 345) (1969). Helvering 314, Allen, 168, 24 LE2d See also n. 21 SC v. 396 U. S. 185 & Zuber 604) (1940) (“To explain 444, cause of Hallock, 84 LE U. S. SC light legislature] is to venture into legislature] itself sheds no [the [the when non-action unrealities.”). speculative consistently applied have not Crane, it has not had the sort obviously far-reaching likely effects that are to stimulate a legislative response. prosecutors only rarely go Moreover, will charging felony appears apply, trouble of murder where Crane appealing much less the issue when the trial court follows our (as must). precedent Consequently, the trial courts most of Crane’s — felony prosecutions direct effect that are never — brought goes unseen. Assembly go Furthermore, it is not clear how the General would correcting legislature about Crane. If the revised the “he causes” (c) language say proximately in OCGA 16-5-1 “he causes,” simultaneously revising without all the other homicide statutes that language (including provi- use similar causation the malice murder (a) statute), sion subsection of the same the effort could backfire. expect appeals by arguing We could to see defendants legislature’s provision language revision of one indicates that the — remaining provisions something in all the other means else what “directly we said such in Crane, is, meant causes.” legislatures commonly highly Nor do undertake to enact the detailed required respond very specifically amendment that would be — assuming light application that, in of the inconsistent Assembly Crane, the General could tell even for sure what it needed to correct. light of these considerations, we do not believe “that we can
properly place [the Assembly] on the shoulders of General burden of the Court’s own error.” Girouard v. States, United 1084) (1946). “Certainly, U. S. SC applied 90 LE stаre decisis should not be to the extent that an error in the law is perpetuated,” Etkind Suarez, (1999), objectives and it predictability, would not foster the stability, development legal principles and consistent to reaffirm a away path prior decision subsequent that branched from the rarely truly causation law, has followed, been if followed would disrupt many areas of settled law.
Conclusion hereby 6. For reasons, these we overrule State v. subsequent relying upon
779, and our cases Crane. We hold that the requires only murder statute that the defendant’s felonious proximately person. conduct cause the death of another Wetherefore reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case for the question to decide the causation at trial.
Judgment reversed and concur, case remanded. All the Justices except Thompson, Hunstein, J., JJ., C. and Benham and who dissent. *13 Justice, dissenting. Chief
HUNSTEIN,
the felony
and Smith with
Jackson
charged appellees
The State
by Hogan
killed in self-defense
shot and
Daniels, who was
murder of
Hogan
to rob
attempted
Daniels,
appellees,
with
together
after
(279 Crane,
OCGA 16-2-20 (a) concerned in the commission Every person with and may charged thereto and crime is a party of the crime. convicted of commission (b) of a crime A concerned the commission is person if he:
(1) crime; commits the Directly (2) some other Intentionally person causes circumstances the crime under such commit crime either guilty any the other is not person incapacity; fact or because of legal (3) in the commis- aids or abets Intentionally crime; or sion advises, hires, encourages, Intentionally the crime.
counsels, another to commit procures (Emphasis supplied.) on the § the effect of OCGA 16-2-20
This Court
recognized
(1) (b) (295 SE2d
in Hill v.
Regardless appellees directly proximately whether or not caused question the death of Daniels, as Crane held, there is no stipulated by parties appellees under the facts that did not alleged they commit crime; hence, cannot come within (b) (1). § the ambit of OCGA 16-2-20 A review of the indictment allege appellees establishes that the State does not that “intention- ally [d]” Hogan, robbery the intended armed victim, to shoot (b) (2) § applicable. and kill Daniels,11so that OCGA 16-2-20 is not Finally, Hogan allegations present considering the facts and no basis for “person alleged be a concerned in the commission of” the felony any provision § murder under other in OCGA 16-2-20. (c) By § reinterpreting OCGA 16-5-1 to authorize defendants appellees charged such as to be with and convicted of unintentionally “proximately” when a defendant but causes some person majority other judicially to commit murder, has (b) § category rewritten OCGA 16-2-20 liability. Contrary to add a fifth of criminal majority’s “[o]ur
to the note, neither traditional questionable interpreting cause law” nor the case law (a) § majority’s expansion OCGA 40-6-393 authorizes the cavalier (b). § Maj. Op. p. many OCGA 16-2-20 655, n. 6. I understand that pertinent The charges appellees in the indictment “with the offense of [appellees] felony, MURDER for that . . . while in the commission of a to wit: AGGRAVATED alleged Indictment, Daniels, ASSAULT as in Count 4 of this did cause the death of Jerold being.” alleged appellees unlawfully human upon Count 4 that “did make an assault person Hogan, parties stipulated Hogan of Arthur with a person firearm....” The that was the appellees intended to rob. Legislature, despite this Court are frustrated members e.g., Hyman repeated see, exhortations, our 708) (2000) (authored J.), by Carley, has declined to liability provide in situations for criminal amend OCGA currently nothing in OCGA 16-2-20 enacted nature. As this unintentionally person person criminally when that liable makes a person proximately а crime. But to commit but causes some liability theory creating all on our own blatant this fifth of criminal gets judicial Legislature, Court, The decide activism. this party person type I crime. this of situation is whether prerogative. judicial usurpation legislative agree to this cannot (b) expressly provides OCGA 16-2-20 Instead, because “only person if” he the commission crime comes is concerned thereby unambiguously setting categories, of its four within one recognized liability legally forth all theories criminal allegation qualified appellees under and there is no any or evidence categories parties murder, of those four the crime I would hold that trial court’s dismissal of the against appellees charges be affirmed. was correct and should Accordingly, respectfully majority’s opinion. I dissent joins
I Benham in this am authorized to state Justice dissent. dissenting.
THOMPSON, Justice, “[a] Georgia provides murder statute when, also commits the offense of murder in the commission of a being irrespective *15 felony, he causes the death of another human (279 (c). § In v. 779 Crane, malice.” OCGA State 247 Ga. SE2d 695) (1981), unanimously this Court held “death of one thаt a underlying at the the intended of the would-be felons hand of victim felony” phrase not invoke because the does rule strictly “he in the to mean one causes” statute must be construed supra Crane, the defendants caused the death. 779. The factually accurately on all fours and State concedes Crane is Georgia, urges it to overrule it. states the law but interpreta- meaning open possible “causes” two Crane, and we one that the accused rather tions chose the favored already nearly Id. As 30 than the State. we have said twice “ ‘ years [i]f a defect in our since this result viewed as ” remedy legislature.’ statute, lies (quoting Hyman SE2d v. Ga. 518) (1982)). Hill SE2d “[E]ven regard something those who ‘stare decisis’ with recognize principle less than enthusiasm has even greater weight precedent where[, here,] relates to interpretation [Cit.] reinterpretation aof statute.” A Assembly’s implicit acceptance statute after the General original interpretation judicial the pation would constitute a usur- legislative function. 83) (2010) Baptiste, (Nahmias, Smith v. J., concurring specially), quoting Abernathy City Albany, 13) (1998). strong 88, 90 Without reason to set aside a long-standing interpretation, we will not do so in the face of legislative acquiescence. wrong “If this Court has been from the beginning, subject, legislative power on this let the be invoked to prescribe power, a new rule for the future; until altered we disposed are long applied by to adhere to the rule which has been so legal profession.” our Courts and is so well known to the Etkind v. (5) (519 210) (1999). Suarez, 271 Thus, unless and Assembly until the General declares that the element of causation in actually murder statute means causation, we interpretation should adhere to our of the statute as set forth in Crane. judicial
“[N]o system society’s eyed could do work if it each (Cit.) every issue afresh in case that raised it. . . . The application of the doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the performance system jurisprudence. of a well-ordered practical utility most instances, it is of more to have the law open up settled and to let it remain so, than to to new personnel may constructions, change, as the of the court though grave may even doubt arise as to the correctness of (Cits.)” interpretation originally given [Cit.] to it. (5). supra Etkind, at 356-357
Certainly, applied stare decisis should not be perpetuated. [Cit.] extent However, that an error in the law is [Crane] is not an erroneous statement of the law Georgia, merely pronouncement by majority but proper [criminal] this Court as to the construction of the impression. law of this state on a matter of first “ *16 (5). supra preferred Etkind, at 357 ‘Stare decisis is the course promotes predictable, because it the evenhanded, and consistent development legal principles, judicial fosters reliance decisions,
665 judicial integrity perceived and to the actual contributes ” (Nahmias, concurring supra Baptiste, J., 31 process.’ v. Smith specially). pattern in Crane is now was considered fact identical remained unaltered
again statute has Court, and the before years. passage Assembly despite All that has 29of the General not composition and should changed We cannot of the Court. statutory language expand upon upon ourselves take it legislature. expressed To and not intended result not achieve a continuity stability, predictability, that is to eliminate do so is system. judicial I reasons, must For these to a well-ordered essential respectfully dissent. Hunstein and Justice Justice
I to state that Chief am authorized join in this dissent. Benham June Decided July 26, 2010. denied
Reconsideration Attorney, Norman, D. Head, Dana J. Jesse District Patrick H. Attorneys, appellant. Evans, for Assistant District appellees. Tony Axam, Edwards, Jr., A. L. Calvin MOODY. S10A0103. WILLIAMS v.
(697
199)
SE2d
Justice.
Benham,
robbery
Moody
Appellee
was convicted of armed
Jammie K.
County
20-year
aggravated battery to a
term
Coffee
and sentenced
imprisonment
affirmed
the Court
in 2002. His conviction was
of
of
App.
opinion. Moody
unpublished
v.
(2005).
corpus
Moody
petition
habeas
filed a
for writ of
XXV
County
Superior
he
where he asserted
Court of Chatham
right
of counsel at
his constitutional
to effective assistance
afforded
appeal.
Lucey,
SC
See Evitts v.