STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LORI T.*
(SC 20520)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued April 25—officially released October 18, 2022
McDonald, D‘Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.
* In аccordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person‘s identity may be ascertained. Moreover, in accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim‘s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
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Syllabus
Pursuant to statute (
Convicted of three counts of custodial interference in the second degree, the defendant appealed. The defendant‘s children, who were under the age of sixteen years, were at her home for visitation оver a holiday weekend. F, the defendant‘s former husband and the children‘s father, had sole physical and legal custody of the children, whereas the defendant had visitation rights. Over the weekend, the children decided that they did not want to go home with F at the end of the long weekend. When F went to the defendant‘s home to pick up the children in accordance with the visitation schedule, the defendant told F that she wasn‘t sending the children out. The defendant stated that the children didn‘t want to come out to F and that she was going to do what the children wanted to do. Thereafter, F summoned a local police officer, who went to the defendant‘s home. Although the officer did not arrest the defendant, he encouraged her to seek legal counsel and to pursue the matter in family court. After F returned to his home, he contacted the children‘s school resource officer, N, and informed him of the children‘s refusal to return to his home. Soon thereafter, N contacted the defendant and asked her why the children had not been returned to F, and she told N that she was not going to make the children return to F. The children had also been absent from school during this time, and N told the defendant that she could be in trouble if she did not get the children back into school. The defendаnt agreed to return the children to school, and N agreed not to seek a warrant for her arrest. When the children continued to be absent from school, N again contacted the defendant, who said that she would not return the children to school. N then obtained an arrest warrant. After the defendant was convicted, she appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that
1. The defendant could not prevail on her unpreserved claim that
a. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that
The “refuses to return” element of
Allowing an individual to escape the requirements of
This court clarified that
There was no merit to the defendant‘s claim that, even if
Accordingly, this court concluded that the defendant‘s conduct fell within the core meaning of
b. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that
There was no risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement in the prеsent case insofar as the plain terms of
The fact that F‘s local police department charged the defendant with violating
2. There was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant “refuse[d] to return” her children to F within the meaning of
The evidence having established that the defendant told F, when he came to pick up the children, that she was not sending the children out of her house, that the children did not want to come out of the house, and that she was going to do what the children wanted to do, and the defendant having testified that she had told N that she did not make the children go outside to F because they did not want to go with him, that she was “supporting whatever [the children] needed,” and that the children had “convince[d] [her] of the reasons why they [did not] want to go,” the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had refused to take any steps to return the children to F upon his request and, instead, had affirmatively abdicated her parental responsibility by allowing the children to decide whether to comply with the defendant and F‘s custody and visitation order.
To the extent that the defendant claimed that her testimony reflected that she did not prevent the children from going with F and that she essentially urged them to go with F, the jury was not required to accept the defendant‘s version of events, and certain of the defendant‘s other testimony undermined the testimony that could be construed to indicate that she had urged the children to go with F.
Although certain evidence demonstrated that the children had agreed that they were going to refuse to go with F, that evidence focused on the actions of the children and other individuals, rather than the defendant, and the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, demonstrated that the defendant refused to do anything but follow the will of her children.
Argued April 25—officially released October 18, 2022
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with three counts of the crime of custodial interference in the second degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, geographical area number twenty, and tried to the jury before Hernandez, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, Prescott, Bright and Devlin, Js., which affirmed the trial court‘s judgment, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
James P. Sexton, assigned counsel, with whom were Megan L. Wade, assigned counsel, and, on the brief, John R. Weikart, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Ferencek, state‘s attorney, and Justina Moore, assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
The Appellate Court‘s opinion, as supplemented by the record, sets forth the facts and prоcedural history; see id., 677-80; which we summarize in relevant part. The defendant‘s four children, R, L, T and S, were at the defendant‘s home in Glastonbury for visitation over the Memorial Day weekend in 2015. At the time, the children ranged in age from nine to thirteen years old. The defendant‘s ex-husband, the children‘s father, had sole physical and legal custody of the children, and the defendant had visitation rights.1 R, however, had been staying with the defendant for several months following a physical incident between him and his father, in which the Norwalk Police Department and the Department of Children and Families had been involved.
Over the Memorial Day weekend, the children decided that they did not want to go home with their father at the end of the long weekend. During the weekend, the father received emails from one of the children telling him that she did not want
these matters with the family court.
The father returned to his home in Norwalk and contacted the children‘s school resource officer, Officer Jermaine Nash of the Norwalk Police Department. He informed Nash of the children‘s refusal to return to his home. A few days later, Nash called the defendant and asked her why the children had not been returned to their father. The defendant told Nash that she “[was] not going to make” the children return with their father. Nash also testified at trial that the defendant said that “the [children] didn‘t want to come out to [their father]. And then [Nash] made a comment, from [his] understanding, that ... if [the defendant is] the adult, why didn‘t [she] send them out, and [the defendant] stated that she will not do that. She won‘t make the children come out to [their father].” Because the children had also been absent from school during this time, Nash told the defendant that she could be in trouble if she did not get the children back into sсhool. The defendant agreed to return the children to school, and Nash agreed not to seek a warrant for her arrest. When the children continued to be absent from school for an additional week, Nash again contacted the defendant, who said that she would not return the children to school. Nash then obtained an arrest warrant on one charge of custodial interference in the second degree, and he contacted the Department of Children and Families.
Thereafter, on June 2, 2015, Nash and Officer David Hoover of the Glastonbury Police Department went to the defendant‘s home to execute the arrest warrant, and the defendant was taken into custody. In addition to the defendant, the defendant‘s aunt, the father, the four children, and the defendant‘s son from a prior marriage were also at the scene. L testified that Nash threatened her and the other children “by telling [them that], if [they] didn‘t go back to [their] father, [Nash] would ... pick [them] up and forcibly take [them] outside.” T stated that Nash was “yelling” and described him as “kind of harsh ....” After placing the defendant into custody, both Hoover and Nash tried to persuade the children to go with their father but were unsuccessful. As a result, Hoover called the Department of Children and Families, explained that he was “having a problem [with the] placement of the children,” and arranged a meeting for that day at its Manchester office. Hoover then drove the children to the Manchester office. After the children continued to refuse to go with their father, the Department of Children and Families issued a ninety-six hour hold, and the defendant‘s aunt was granted temporary custody of the children, who were later placed by the department with their maternal grandmother, with whom they resided for several months, until they reunited with their father.
interference in the second degree, one count for each child. Prior to jury selection, the state dropped the charge as to R, the child who had been staying with the defendant for several months, and proceeded to trial on the three remaining counts. In its operative long form information, the state charged the defendant in count one, in relevant part: “The [s]tate of Connecticut accuses [the defendant] of [c]ustodial [i]nterference in the [s]econd [d]egree and charges that, [in] the city of Glastonbury, on or about May 25, 2015 [Memorial Day], at approximately 7:30 [p.m.] . . . the [defendant] did . . . hold and keep for a protraсted period and otherwise refused to return a child, to wit: [L], who was less than sixteen years old, to such child‘s lawful custodian, to wit: [the father] . . . after a request by such custodian for the return of such child, knowing that she had no legal right to do so, in violation of . . .
From the trial court‘s judgment of conviction, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court. The defendant argued that
do things but that she decided to ‘let their voices be heard . . . .‘” (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 696.
Thereafter, the defendant filed a petition for certification to appeal, which we granted, limited to the following two issues: (1) “Did the Appellate Court incorreсtly conclude that . . .
We begin with the defendant‘s contention that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that
The defendant concedes that she failed to preserve this claim and seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). We conclude that the defendant‘s claim is reviewable because the record is adequate for review and the defendant raises a claim that is constitutional in nature insofar as it implicates her due process rights. See State v. Golding, supra, 239.
“The determination of whether a statutory provision is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law over which we exercise de novo review. . . . In undertaking such review, we are mindful that [a] statute is not void for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivocally is unconstitutional, making every presumption in favor of its validity. . . . To demonstrate that [a statute] is unconstitutionally vague as applied to [her], the [defendant] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [she] had inadequate notice of what was prohibited or that [she was] the victim of arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement. . . . If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness [because] [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Winot, 294 Conn. 753, 758-59, 988 A.2d 188 (2010).
“The United States Supreme Court has set forth standards for evaluating vagueness. First, because we assume that [people are] free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he [or she] may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. . . . [A] law forbidding or requiring conduct in terms so vague that [people] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates due process of law. . . .
“Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law
“Tempering the foregoing considerations is the acknowledgment that many statutes proscribing criminal offenses necessarily cannot be drafted with the utmost precision and still effectively reach the targeted behaviors. Consistent with that acknowledgment, the United States Supreme Court has explained: ‘The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. It is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.’ Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 32 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1972) . . ..” (Citations omitted.) State v. Winot, supra, 294 Conn. 760. “Simply put, [although] some ambiguous statutes are the result of poor draftsmanship, it is apparent that in many instances the uncertainty is merely attributable to a desire not to nullify the purpose of the legislation by the use of specific terms which would afford loopholes through which many could escape.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 760-61.
“Finally, even though a statutory term that is susceptible to a number of differing interpretations may be impermissibly vague as applied to some situations, the term is not necessarily vаgue as applied in all cases; rather, whether the statute suffers from unconstitutional vagueness is a case-specific question, the resolution of which depends on the particular facts involved. . . . Similarly, a term is not void for vagueness merely because it is not expressly defined in the relevant statutory scheme.” (Citation omitted.) State v. DeCiccio, 315 Conn. 79, 88, 105 A.3d 165 (2014).
A
We turn first to the defendant‘s claim that
We begin our analysis of the defendant‘s vagueness claim by applying our familiar principles of statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of the phrase “otherwise refuses to return.” See, e.g., Vitti v. Milford, 336 Conn. 654, 660, 249 A.3d 726 (2020). In doing so, we are mindful that, pursuant to
ions involving the statute, the common law, legal dictionaries, or treatises may be necessary to ascertain a statute‘s meaning to determine [whether] it gives fair warning.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Josephs, 328 Conn. 21, 31-32, 176 A.3d 542 (2018).
As the Appellate Court noted, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines “refuse” as “[t]o decline to do, accept, give, or allow . . . .” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th Ed. 2011) p. 1478. Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary defines “refuse” as “to express oneself as unwilling to accept” or “to show or express unwillingness to do or comply with . . . .” Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2014) p. 1047. Black‘s Law Dictionary defines “refusal” as “[t]he denial or rejection of something offered or demanded . . . .” Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2014) p. 1472. Because the question of whether a statute provides fair warning may also be ascertained by reference to other provisions in the penal code; see
“Return”
can Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines “return” as “[t]o revert to a former owner” or “[t]o send, put, or carry back . . . .” The American Heritagе Dictionary of the English Language, supra, p. 1500. The verb form of the word “return,” in our view, unquestionably denotes some level of action or activity required on the part of the subject: the child must be returned.
We conclude that the “otherwise refuses to return” element of
terization of an individual‘s obligation under the statute. Rather, we conclude that an individual is required to use efforts commensurate with the situation to satisfy the requirements of
We note that other states have similar statutes that criminalize the failure to return a child because it amounts to custodial interference. See, e.g., State v. Petruccelli, 170 Vt. 51, 60, 743 A.2d 1062 (1999) (“[c]ustodial interference, by comparison, generally occurs when a parent takes his or her child, or fails to return the child following a court-ordered visitation period, in a manner that prevents the other custodial parent from having contact with the child” (emphasis added)); see also, e.g.,
action manifests an intent substantially to deprive that parent of rights to parenting time or custody” (emphasis added));
Although the appellate courts of Connecticut have not previously addressed a parent‘s failure to act in the custodial interference context, we find the rationale of certain out-of-state courts, in related contexts, instructive. For example, the Colorado Court of Appeals has explained that the “[d]efendant was under a duty, recognized by the laws of [Colorado], to return the children at the time prescribed in the custody determination. [In the absence of] consent from the custodial parent, his failure to so act is conduct for which he may be prosecuted . . . .” (Emphasis added.) People v. Haynie, 826 P.2d 371, 374 (Colo. App. 1991). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Vermont has explained that, “[a]lthough most crimes are committed by an affirmative act, under some circumstances a failure to act can result in criminal liability. . . . To face criminal liability for a failure to act, however, a person must have been bound by a legal duty to act. . . . Here, [the] defendant had a legal duty under a court order to return the child to her lawful custodian in Vermont. . . . [When] there is a legal duty to act, failure to perform that duty is, for the purpose of jurisdiction, tantamount to an act.” (Citations
Similarly, in the contempt context, courts have concluded that a parent‘s refusal to take any steps to facilitate visitation supports a finding of contempt. For example, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed a father‘s appeal from the trial court‘s order for structured visitation and finding that he deliberately and persistently interfered with the mother‘s visitation. See Sisk v. Sisk, 711 N.W.2d 203, 206 (N.D. 2006). The initial custody stipulation gave the father physical custody of the children and provided the mother with reasonable and liberal visitation as agreed on. Id., 205. The mother had little contact for some time and, when the mother attempted to reinstitute contact, the children often refused to speak with her. Id. The father did not require or encourage the children to talk with their mother. Id. When the mother requested visitation, the children declined, and the father did not require their participation. Id. The father claimed that he made the children available to the mother, but he did not encourage or require them to cooperate when they resisted or refused visitation. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court held: “We believe [that] the evidence supports the trial court‘s
finding that [the father] has deliberately and intentionally interfered with visitation through his delay tactics, failure to cooperate, and refusal to in any way facilitate visitation between his children and their mother.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 210. The court went on to note that, “[b]y [the father‘s] own admission, his conduct is deliberate and intentional. He does not feel he needs to do anything to facilitate visitation.” Id., 212; see also, e.g., Ware v. Ware, Docket No. CA2001-10-089, 2002 WL 336957, *2 (Ohio App. March 4, 2002) (when court establishes visitation schedule concerning parties’ minor children, in absence of proof that visitation with noncustodial parent would cause physical or mental harm to children, or showing of some justification for preventing visitation, custodial parent must do more than merely encourage minor children to visit noncustodial parent). Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that a parent cannot abdicate her parental obligation by transferring responsibility for deciding whether to attend visitation to her child. See Martin v. Martin, 294 Neb. 106, 119, 881 N.W.2d 174 (2016) (upholding trial court‘s decision to hold custodial parent in contempt when parent consistently transferred responsibility of deciding whether to attend visitation to children and noncustodial parent was unable to exercise his court-ordered visitation).
These out-of-state cases lend further support to our conclusion that the “otherwise refuses to return” aspect of
In this case, the evidence, including from the defendant herself, established that the defendant refused to send the children out of her home to the father or to take any action whatsoever to facilitate the return of the children to their father. Specifically, when the father went to pick up the children on Memorial Day, pursuant to the custody and visitation order, “[the defendant] came out of her house and told [the father] that she wasn‘t sending the children out. The children didn‘t want to come out, and
coming out, and [she wasn‘t] bringing them out.” The defendant testified that she “wasn‘t making decisions for [her] children. [She] was supporting whatever they needed,” and the children “were convincing [her] of the reasons why they didn‘t want to go.” In short, the defendant abdicated her parental responsibility and allowed the children to decide whether to comply with the custody and visitation order.
The defendant nevertheless contends that, even if some action was required by
We agree with the Appellate Court that the defendant‘s conduct falls within the
dant‘s claim that
B
The defendant next claims that
To prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, “laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to [police officers], judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” (Footnote omitted.) Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972). “[A] legislature [must] establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. . . . [When] the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep [that] allows [police officers], prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983).
“As a practical matter, a court analyzing an as-applied vagueness challenge may determine that the statute generally provides sufficient guidance to eliminate the threat of arbitrary enforcement without analyzing more specifically whether the particular enforcemеnt was guided by adequate standards. In fact, it is the better (and perhaps more logical) practice to determine first whether the statute provides such general guidance, given that the [United States] Supreme Court has indicated that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. . . . If a court determines that a statute provides sufficient guidelines to eliminate generally the risk of arbitrary enforcement, that finding concludes the inquiry.
“[When] a statute provides insufficient general guidance, an as-applied vagueness challenge may nonethe-
less fail if the statute‘s meaning has a clear core. . . . In that case the inquiry will involve
Given our conclusion in part I A of this opinion that
We do, however, briefly address one misconception underlying the defendant‘s contention, namely, that she was the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because the Norwalk Police Department charged her under the statute and the Glastonbury Police Department declined to do so. The different approaches taken by the two police departments do not necessarily demonstrate arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement but, rather, the exercise of discretion. Cf. 4 W. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure (4th Ed. 2015) § 13.2 (b), p. 144 (“it is clear beyond question that discretion is regularly exercised by the police in deciding when to arrest“). Specifically, Barao, of the Glastonbury Police Department, exercised discretion in declining to press charges against the defendant, despite the fact that the Glastonbury Police Department has made arrests for custodial interference in other circumstances, instead suggesting that the parties first try to resolve their custody dispute in family court.7 Similarly, Nash, of the Norwalk Police Department, also exercised discretion when he initially declined to pursue an arrest warrant after the defendant promised to return her children to school. The defendant does nоt point to anything in the record that supports the conclusion that the Glastonbury Police Department or Nash, when he initially declined to pursue an arrest warrant, believed
The defendant has not established that
II
We next turn to the defendant‘s contention that there was insufficient evidence to prove that she “otherwise refuse[d] to return” her children.
The state contends that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the evidence was sufficient to provе that the defendant refused to return her children to their lawful custodian, as required by
We begin with the standard of review. “In [a defendant‘s] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence . . . [w]hether we review the findings of a trial court or the verdict of a jury, our underlying task is the same. . . . We first review the evidence presented at trial, construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the facts expressly found by the trial court or impliedly found by the jury. We then decide whether, [on] the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the trial court or the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [W]e give great deference to the [verdict] of the [jury] because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass [on] the credibility of witnesses.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Adams, 327 Conn. 297, 304-305, 173 A.3d 943 (2017).
“In evaluating evidence that could yield contrary inferences, the trier of fact is not required to accept as
dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant‘s innocence. . . . The trier [of fact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . . As we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the trier [of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether therе is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evi- dence that supports the [jury‘s] verdict of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Drupals, 306 Conn. 149, 158, 49 A.3d 962 (2012).
The evidence at trial, relevant to whether the state met its burden of proving the “otherwise refuses to return” element of
The defendant contends, however, that she did not “refuse to return” the children because her testimony reflected that she did not prevent the children from going with their father,8 and she essentially urged the children to go with their father. We disagree.
At trial, the defendant testified that, when the father arrived to pick the children up, “they refused to go. And, as a [mother], you have a certain amount of power to convince your children to do things. And, as I was like, you know, come on, they just kept giving me reasons why they didn‘t want to go. And it just [got] to the point where I felt that I had an obligation to let their voices be heard, to let them talk to some people.
I didn‘t refuse to let them go. They refused to go.” To the extent that the defendant‘s telling the children “come on” could be construed as her urging the children to go, the jury was not required to accept the defendant‘s version of events. “[I]t is the jury‘s role as the sole trier of the facts to weigh the conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses. . . . It is the right and duty of the jury to determine whether to accept or to reject the testimony of a witness . . . and what weight, if any, to lend to the testimony of a witness and the evidence presented at trial.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Morgan, 274 Conn. 790, 802, 877 A.2d 739 (2005). Moreover, the defendant‘s other testimony—namely, that she “wasn‘t making decisions for [her] children,” that “[she] was supporting whatever they needed,” and that the children “were convincing [her] of the reasons why they didn‘t want to go“—undermines her testimony that she essentially urged the children to go with their father.
We acknowledge that certain evidence demonstrated that the children had agreed that they were going to refuse to go with their father, that one of the children emailed the father, telling him she did not want to return to his home, and that the children refused to go with their father when he arrived to pick them up on Memorial Day. When the prosecutor asked L what prompted the children to make this decision, she responded that they had “been wanting to not go for a while, so, eventually, [they] just decided not to go with [their father].” We also recognize that Nash, members of the Glastonbury Police
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.