STATE OF NEW MEXICO v. KELSON LEWIS
NO. S-1-SC-36428
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
November 1, 2018
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI, Christina P. Argyres, District Judge
B. Douglas Wood, III, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Petitioner
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Marko David Hananel, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Respondent
VIGIL, Justice.
{1} In this appeal we address two issues which arise when a jury is asked to render a verdict on a count that includes both greater and lesser offenses and it deadlocks in its deliberations on the greater offense. First, we clarify what is required of the district court under
I. BACKGROUND
{2} The State prosecuted Defendant, Kelson Lewis, under a five-count indictment.
{3} The jury was therefore instructed that there were three possible verdicts for Count 1: guilty of CSCM, guilty of battery, or not guilty on the entire count. The jury was not provided with a verdict form for a not guilty verdict on CSCM specifically. The district court also instructed the jury, “If you should have a reasonable doubt as to whether Defendant committed the crime of [CSCM], you must proceed to determine whether he committed the included offense of battery.” See
{4} On the third day of deliberations, the jury sent a note to the district court asking, “If we cannot come to a unanimous decision for Count 1, do we move on to discuss/decide on the lesser charge for Count 1[?]” After consulting with defense counsel and the State and receiving their consensus, the district court responded by sending a note to the jury stating, “If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt on Count 1, only then do you move to consideration of the included offense of battery.”
{6} Roughly thirty-five minutes later, the jury sent a note stating that it had completed its deliberations on the other counts. The district court then confirmed with the jury that it had completed its deliberations as to Count 1.
{7} After calling the jury into court, the district court had the following exchange with the jury foreperson:
THE COURT: I‘m also understanding none of the forms are signed as to Count 1. And based on the note you all sent, it‘s my understanding that there‘s no possibility for juror agreement on Count 1; is that correct?
THE JUROR: That is correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And I‘m seeing heads shaking in the jury box that there‘s not -- you‘re unable to reach unanimous verdict. Is that correct[?]
THE JUROR: That‘s correct.
The district court stated it would declare a mistrial as to Count 1. The district court issued an order finding manifest necessity to declare a mistrial as to CSCM on the
{8} Defendant appealed the district court‘s order to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the district court failed to properly poll the jury on Count 1 and therefore retrial on the greater charge of CSCM would subject him to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution. State v. Lewis, 2017-NMCA-056, ¶ 2, 399 P.3d 954. The Court of Appeals rendered an opinion affirming the district court‘s order. Id. ¶ 17. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court asking us to review the Court of Appeals’ opinion, which we granted pursuant to
II. DISCUSSION
{9} We proceed to address two issues which lie at the core of the jury‘s inability to agree on a verdict of guilty or not guilty on the greater charge of CSCM. First, we address whether retrial of Defendant on the greater charge of CSCM would violate constitutional protections against double jeopardy—being tried twice for the same crime—where the district court did not strictly comply with the formal requirements of
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Declaring a Mistrial on All Offenses Under Count 1 Where it Had Established a Clear Record That the Jury Was Deadlocked on the Greater Charge of CSCM
{10} “A double jeopardy challenge is a constitutional question of law which we review de novo.” State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 279 P.3d 747. Central to that question in this case is whether the district court erred by determining that the jury was deadlocked on the charge of CSCM based on the notes sent during deliberations and its exchange with the jury foreperson after deliberations. We review a district court‘s determination that the jury was deadlocked on a particular charge under a count with greater and lesser included offenses for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Phillips, 2017-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 1, 14, 396 P.3d 153; State v. Wardlow, 1981-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 12-13, 95 N.M. 585, 624 P.2d 527. “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is contrary to logic and reason.” Roselli v. Rio Cmtys. Serv. Station, Inc., 1990-NMSC-018, ¶ 11, 109 N.M. 509, 787 P.2d 428.
{11} The constitutional protection against double jeopardy prevents retrial of a crime after a jury has rendered a verdict of either guilty or not guilty as to that offense; on the other hand, a defendant may be retried if the jury is deadlocked or hung on that offense. State v. Collier, 2013-NMSC-015, ¶¶ 11, 14, 301 P.3d 370; Phillips, 2017-NMSC-019, ¶ 1. Because the protection against double jeopardy prevents a retrial of
Importantly, the judge must confirm that the jury did not unanimously agree that the defendant was not guilty of one or more of the included offenses because the constitutional protection against double jeopardy precludes the State from prosecuting the defendant for such offense(s) since the jury‘s unanimous agreement on a verdict of not guilty constitutes an acquittal.
Id. In such a count with greater and lesser included offenses, it can be difficult to determine on which offense the jury is deadlocked and which offenses, if any, it has unanimously agreed to acquit. The manner for making this determination is set forth in
If the jury has been instructed on one or more lesser included offenses, and the jury cannot unanimously agree upon any of the offenses submitted, the court shall poll the jury by inquiring as to each degree of the offense upon which the jury has been instructed beginning with the highest degree and, in descending order, inquiring as to each lesser degree until the court has determined at what level of the offense the jury has disagreed. If upon a poll of the jury it is determined that the jury has unanimously voted not guilty as to any degree of an offense, a verdict of not guilty shall be entered for that degree and for each greater degree of the offense.
{13} We have recognized that the language of
{14} In Castrillo, we held that there is no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial on the greater offenses and the defendant may only be retried on the least included offense where “the record is not clear as to which of the included offenses the jury was considering at the time of its discharge.” 1977-NMSC-059, ¶ 14. The defendant in Castrillo was tried for first-degree murder with the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Id. ¶ 1. After deliberations, the foreperson announced that the jury was deadlocked and the district court declared a mistrial. Id. ¶¶ 1, 14. The district court asked for the numerical division of the jury and the foreperson indicated that nine jurors were for acquittal and three were for “some degree of conviction,” but the court did not otherwise inquire as to which charge the jury was deadlocked. Id. ¶ 14. The defendant was retried, convicted of
{15} Since Castrillo, when deciding whether a district court erred in finding manifest necessity to declare a mistrial on counts containing lesser included offenses, we unequivocally consider whether a clear record was established by the district court when determining on which offense the jury was deadlocked. In Wardlow, the foreperson stated that the jury was deadlocked on the greater charge but was unanimous against the lesser charge. 1981-NMSC-029, ¶ 4. Upon questioning by the district court, the foreperson explained that the jury did not believe the lesser charge to be appropriate but had not executed the not guilty form for that lesser charge. Id.
{16} More recently in Phillips, when the jury indicated that it was deadlocked, the district court polled the jury and received conflicting and ambiguous responses from the jurors as to whether they were deadlocked on the greatest charge in the count. 2017-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 11, 14. The district court then denied the defendant‘s request that the court clarify the ambiguity in the jurors’ responses and declared a mistrial as to all the charges under the count. Id. ¶ 12. On appeal, we concluded that, by failing to clarify the ambiguous responses to the jury poll, the district court failed to create “a clear record indicating the crimes on which the jurors had failed to reach a unanimous verdict” and therefore “it was an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude that the jury was hung and that there was manifest necessity justifying a mistrial on all of the crimes in [the count].” Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
{17} In accordance with this precedent, the purpose of the polling requirement of
{18} During deliberations in the present case, the jury sent two notes indicating that it was deadlocked on the CSCM charge. The first stated that it was unable to reach unanimity on “Count 1” and asked the district court if it should proceed to consideration of “the lesser charge for Count 1.” The second note expressly stated that the jury was unable to reach unanimous agreement “[o]n the count of criminal sexual contact” and again asked the district court if it should proceed to the “lesser charge of battery.” Then, after the jury indicated that it was finished deliberating on the count, the jury foreperson confirmed in open court that there was no possibility for unanimous agreement on Count 1. These exchanges render the record clear—the jury was deadlocked on the greater charge of CSCM.
{19} Defendant contends that the level of offense on which the jury was ultimately deadlocked is unclear because the jury continued to deliberate for approximately thirty-five minutes after sending the notes and therefore the notes do not reflect the
{20} Therefore, unlike in Phillips and Castrillo, the district court‘s discourse with the foreperson in open court, along with the substance and timing of the notes, established a clear record “as to which of the included offenses the jury was considering at the time of its discharge.” Phillips, 2017-NMSC-019, ¶ 18 (quoting Castrillo, 1977-NMSC-059, ¶ 14). Because the district court clearly established on the record that the jury was deadlocked on CSCM, the purpose of
B. A Jury Should Be Instructed That It May Deliberate on the Greater and Lesser Offenses Under a Count in Any Order It Sees Fit, but Must Return a Not Guilty Verdict on the Greater Offense Before the Court May Accept Any Verdict on the Lesser Offense
{21} We next turn to the issue of how a district court must instruct a jury regarding its deliberations on counts with lesser included offenses, recognizing that
[I]n this case as to the charge of criminal sexual contact of a minor contained in Count 1 there are three possible verdicts.
One, guilty of criminal sexual contact of a minor child under the age of 13; or, two, guilty of the battery; or, three, not guilty.
You must consider each of these crimes. You should be sure that you fully understand the elements of each crime before you deliberate further. You will then consider whether the defendant is guilty of the crime of criminal sexual contact of a minor. If you find him guilty of that crime, then that is the only form of verdict which is to be signed.
If you have a reasonable doubt as to his guilt of that crime, you would go on [to the] crime of battery. If you find him guilty of that crime, that is the only form of verdict which should be signed. But if you have a reasonable doubt as to his guilt of the crime of battery, then you should find him not guilty and sign only the not guilty form.
You may not find the defendant guilty of more than one of the foregoing crimes. If you have reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant committed any one of the crimes, you must determine that he‘s not guilty of that crime. If you find him not guilty of all of these crimes in Count 1, you must return a verdict of not guilty as to this count.
{23} Having received these instructions, the jury was nevertheless uncertain whether it was permitted to proceed to consideration of the lesser offense of battery when it was unable to agree on whether Defendant was guilty of the greater offense of CSCM and asked the court how to proceed. The district court considered the instruction modeled on
{25} Here, the district court‘s understanding of
{26} For these reasons, we conclude that
{27} Despite our previous acceptance of jury instructions which allow juries to proceed to consider lesser offenses if they are unable to agree on the greater offense, we have never conducted an in depth analysis of the legal and policy rationales for and against such instructions. See, e.g., Castrillo, 1977-NMSC-059, ¶ 6; Phillips, 2017-NMSC-019, ¶ 4. We have simply acknowledged that such instructions are consistent with a policy of refraining from interference with jury deliberations. State v. Chamberlain, 1991-NMSC-094, ¶¶ 33-34, 112 N.M. 723, 819 P.2d 673 (“The court
{28} Therefore, the disparate, yet equally rational, interpretations of
1. Types of transitional instructions
{29} There are at least four types of “transitional instruction” used by various jurisdictions. Id.; see generally Jay M. Zitter, When Should Jury‘s Deliberation Proceed from Charged Offense to Lesser-Included Offense, 26 A.L.R. 5th 603 (1995) (collecting and discussing cases considering how a jury should be instructed on how and when to proceed to consideration of lesser included offenses). First, several
{30} Second, two jurisdictions have adopted a “modified acquit first” instruction, allowing a jury to deliberate in the order it sees fit but requiring that it acquit the defendant of the greater offense before returning a verdict on the lesser offense. See Dresnek v. State, 697 P.2d 1059, 1060-64 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff‘d, 718 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1986); People v. Kurtzman, 46 Cal. 3d 322, 250 Cal. Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572, 576-80 (1988) (in bank). These instructions “distinguish between the jury‘s right to
{31} Third, several jurisdictions have adopted “unable to agree” or “reasonable effort” instructions, which allow the jury to consider a lesser offense if it is unable to agree on the greater offense after reasonable deliberation. See, e.g., State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 924 P.2d 441, 442-44 (1996) (in banc); People v. Richardson, 184 P.3d 755, 764 n.7 (Colo. 2008) (en banc); Morris v. State, 303 Ga. 192, 811 S.E.2d 321, 327 (2018); State v. Ferreira, 8 Haw. App. 1, 791 P.2d 407, 408-09 (1990), cert. denied, 71 Haw. 668, 833 P.2d 901 (1990); State v. Parker, 301 Kan. 556, 344 P.3d 363, 368 (2015); Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 9 N.E.3d 812, 827-31 (2014); People v. Handley, 415 Mich. 356, 329 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1982) (per curiam); Tisius v. State, 183 S.W.3d 207, 216-17 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 80 P.3d 93, 95-97 (2003) (per curiam); State v. Mays, 158 N.C. App. 563, 582 S.E.2d 360, 367-68 (2003), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 510, 588 S.E.2d 379 (2003); Thomas, 533 N.E.2d at 291-93; Graham v. State, 2001 OK CR 18, ¶¶ 4-7, 27 P.3d 1026, 1027-28; Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 283-84 (Utah 1989); State v. Wright, 154 Vt. 512, 581 A.2d 720, 723-24 (1989); State v. Labanowski, 117 Wash. 2d 405, 816 P.2d 26, 35-36 (1991) (en banc); State v. Truax, 151 Wis. 2d 354, 444 N.W.2d 432, 436-37 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 446 N.W.2d 286 (1989).
{32} Finally, a few jurisdictions use the “optional approach,” which allows the defendant to choose between an acquit first or an unable to agree instruction. See, e.g.,
2. We adopt the modified acquit first approach
{33} Courts adopting acquit first instructions have generally considered these instructions to promote the jury‘s duty to carefully deliberate on the greater charge and reduce the chances of the jury compromising on the lesser offense. See, e.g., Sawyer, 630 A.2d at 1073 (“Anything less [than an acquit first instruction] dilutes the right of the state and the defendant to have the jury give its undivided attention and most serious deliberations to the offense with which the defendant is charged and flies in the face of the unanimity requirement[.]“); Boettcher, 505 N.E.2d at 597 (“[I]t is the duty of the jury not to reach compromise verdicts based on sympathy for the defendant or to appease holdouts, but to render a just verdict by applying the facts it finds to the law it is charged.“); Daulton, 518 N.W.2d at 722 (“The primary difficulty with the unable to agree instruction is it dilutes the requirement of unanimity and encourages the jury to bypass the charged offense on its way to a compromise verdict[.]“); Davis, 266 S.W.3d at 907-08 (concluding that an acquit first instruction promotes structured and thorough deliberations, assures reliable verdicts, and “reduces the risk of a compromise verdict“).
{34} On the other hand, several courts consider unable to agree instructions to reduce the risk of a hung jury, mistrial, and subsequent retrial by allowing juries the
{35} For these reasons, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an often cited case, concluded that both acquit first and unable to agree instructions have advantages and disadvantages for both the state and the defendant:
[An acquit first instruction] has the merit, from the Government‘s standpoint, of tending to avoid the danger that the jury will not adequately discharge its duties with respect to the greater offense, and
instead will move too quickly to the lesser one. From the defendant‘s standpoint, it may prevent any conviction at all; a jury unable either to convict or acquit on the greater charge will not be able to reach a lesser charge on which it might have been able to agree. But it entails disadvantages to both sides as well: By insisting on unanimity with respect to acquittal on the greater charge before the jury can move to the lesser, it may prevent the Government from obtaining a conviction on the lesser charge that would otherwise have been forthcoming and thus require the expense of a retrial. It also presents dangers to the defendant. If the jury is heavily for conviction on the greater offense, dissenters favoring the lesser may throw in the sponge rather than cause a mistrial that would leave the defendant with no conviction at all, although the jury might have reached sincere and unanimous agreement with respect to the lesser charge. An instruction permitting the jury to move on to the lesser offense if after all reasonable efforts it is unable to reach a verdict on the greater likewise has advantages and disadvantages to both sides—the mirror images of those associated with [acquit first instructions]. It facilitates the Government‘s chances of getting a conviction for something, although at the risk of not getting the one that it prefers. And it relieves the defendant of being convicted on the greater charge just because the jury wishes to avoid a mistrial, but at the risk of a conviction on the lesser charge which might not have occurred if the jury, by being unable to agree to acquit on the greater, had never been able to reach the lesser.
Tsanas, 572 F.2d at 346 (footnote omitted).
{36} Upon review of these considerations, we recognize that the unable to agree approach adopted by several jurisdictions and approved by
{37} Due to these concerns, we are persuaded that the modified acquit first approach of Alaska and California is the most sound approach. First, because under modified acquit first instructions the jury may deliberate as it sees fit, this approach is consistent with our stated policy of not interfering with jury deliberations. See Chamberlain, 1991-NMSC-094, ¶ 34. Second, by requiring the jury to return a verdict of not guilty on the greater offense before returning a verdict on the lesser
{38} For the aforementioned reasons, we adopt modified acquit first instructions for all counts with lesser included offenses and refer this issue to our Criminal Uniform Jury Instructions Committee to revise our jury instructions to conform with our holding. These instructions should make clear that the jury has the discretion to choose the manner and order in which it deliberates on the offenses in the count but that it must return a unanimous verdict of not guilty on the greater offense before the court may accept a verdict on the lesser offense. See
III. CONCLUSION
{39} Because the district court‘s questioning of the foreperson, in the context of the notes sent by the jury during deliberations, established a clear record that the jury was deadlocked on the charge of CSCM at the time of its discharge, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding manifest necessity to declare a mistrial on both charges under Count 1. Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s denial of Defendant‘s motion to bar retrial on the greater offense of CSCM.
{40} Furthermore, to address the ambiguity and inconsistency in our current uniform jury instructions, we adopt a consistent approach to the consideration of counts with lesser included offenses. Henceforth, juries shall be instructed that they have discretion to choose the order in which they deliberate on the offenses within a count but that they may not return a verdict on a lesser included offense unless they unanimously find the defendant not guilty on the greater offense.
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice
WE CONCUR:
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
GARY L. CLINGMAN, Justice