State v. CollierState v. Collier
MAES, Chief Justice.
{1} Greg Collier (Defendant) was indicted in August 2006 for extreme cruelty to animals, a fourth-degree felony, after a horse that Defendant had been training died shortly after a training session. A jury acquitted Defendant of felony extreme cruelty to animals but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, on which the district court, at the State‘s request, instructed the jury without objection from Defendant. The issue on appeal is whether the State can retry Defendant for the lesser offense, which was not explicitly charged in the indictment, without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We hold that the State can retry Defendant for the lesser included offense because retrial after a mistrial caused by jury deadlock does not violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy.
{2} In the cross-appeal, we consider whether retrial on the lesser included offense is barred by the period set by the two-year statute of limitations for that crime. The State indicted Defendant for felony extreme cruelty to animals less than seven months after the horse‘s death, but the district court did not instruct the jury on misdemeanor cruelty to animals until aftеr the statute of limitations period for that offense had run. We hold that the statute of limitations was satisfied because our statutes of limitations prescribe time limits within which the State must commence a prosecution by filing the initial charging document in a case, not time limits within which a defendant must be brought to trial. The statute of limitations does not bar retrial on the lesser included offense.
{3} Additionally, Defendant asks this Court to consider the merits of his speedy trial claim, on which the district court has not ruled. We decline to consider Defendant‘s speedy trial claim in the first instance and remand Defendant‘s case to the district court.
BACKGROUND
{4} The State alleges that on February 13, 2006, Defendant injured a horse he was training, causing the horse‘s death. On August 31, 2006, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant with one count of extreme cruelty to animals, a fourth degree felony,
{5} The State has tried Defendant twice under the indictment. The records of Defendant‘s previous trials are not in the appellate record before this Court. At Defendant‘s first trial, held in March 2008, the jury failed to reach a verdict on the felony offense, and thus the district court declared a mistrial based on manifest necessity due to jury deadlock.
{6} At the second trial in January 2009, the State again triеd Defendant on the felony extreme cruelty charge but this time requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of cruelty to animals. See
{7} Following the second trial, the district court set Defendant‘s case for retrial under the original indictment on the lesser included misdemeanor offense of cruelty to animals. One week prior to commencement of the third trial, which was scheduled to begin July 22, 2009, Defendant moved the district court to dismiss his case. Defendant argued that any one of three grounds warranted dismissal: (1) the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, (2) New Mexico‘s two-year statute of limitations for the misdemeanor cruelty to animals offense, or (3) Defendant‘s right to speedy trial. The district court granted Defendant‘s motion to dismiss because the State did not explicitly charge Defendant with misdemeanor cruelty to animals within the two-year statute of limitations period for that crime.
{8} The State appealed to the Court of Appeals. See State v. Collier, No. 29,805, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2011). The Court of Appeals held “that cruelty to animals is a lesser included offense of extreme cruelty to animals and that the statute of limitations did not bar trial on the misdemeanor chаrge.” Id. at 2. But the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court‘s dismissal of the case because “subsequent prosecution of the Defendant on the misdemeanor charge following his acquittal on the felony charge would violate the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.” Id.
{9} The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that principles of double jeopardy do not preclude the State from retrying Defendant on the lesser included offense because the jury hung on that charge, causing the district court to declare a mistrial. Defendant filed a cross-petition for writ of сertiorari, arguing that a third trial on the misdemeanor charge would violate both the statute of limitations and his right to a speedy trial. We granted certiorari on both petitions.
The State may retry Defendant for the misdemeanor offense without violating Defendant‘s double jeopardy rights
{10} Defendant asks us to uphold the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that retrial on the lesser included offense would violate Defendant‘s double jeopardy rights. Defendant relies only on the double jeopardy clause in the federal constitution and does not argue that the New Mexico Constitution affords him greater protеction. See
{11} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall be “twice put in jeopardy” for the same offense.
{12} Defendant asserts that retrial in this case would constitute a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. In response, the State relies on State v. Desnoyers, arguing that “double jeopardy principles are not implicated” when the State retries a defendant “following a mistrial in which the jury could not reach a verdict on a рarticular count.” 2002-NMSC-031, ¶ 33, 132 N.M. 756, 55 P.3d 968 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds as noted by State v. Forbes, 2005-NMSC-027, ¶ 6, 138 N.M. 264, 119 P.3d 144; see also State v. O‘Kelley, 113 N.M. 25, 27, 822 P.2d 122, 124 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing New Mexico case law that relies on federal precedent and stating that it “is well established under New Mexico case law that a retrial after a mistrial caused by a hung jury does not violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy“). We agree that the State may retry Defendant for misdemeanor cruelty to animals without implicating Defendant‘s double jeopardy rights.
{13} A criminal defendant‘s double jeopardy right to be free from a second prosecution for an offense does not arise until jeopardy has attached and then terminates for that offense. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984). In other words, two prerequisites for a meritorious successive-prosecution double jeopardy claim are (1) the attachment of jeopardy and (2) the termination of jeopardy. In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches “when the jury is sworn” to try the case. State v. Saavedra, 108 N.M. 38, 41, 766 P.2d 298, 301 (1998). Jeopardy is terminated by the entry of a final judgment, usually a conviction or an acquittal. See Richardson, 468 U.S. at 325 (explaining that the protection against double
{14} Unlike a сonviction or an acquittal, “a trial court‘s declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy to which [the defendant] was subjected.” Richardson, 468 U.S. at 326. Rather, retrial following a hung jury “is considered a continuation of the first [trial], and the defendant is thus placed in jeopardy only once.” Desnoyers, 2002-NMSC-031, ¶ 33 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has followed this rule for over one hundred and eighty years. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 579-80 (1824) (holding that if the jury is unable to agree on a verdict and the trial court discharges the jury for “manifest necessity,” double jeopardy does not bar retrial of the defendаnt for the “same offence“). Likewise, New Mexico courts have long held that a retrial following a mistrial declared for manifest necessity does not implicate the double jeopardy clause. See State v. Martinez, 120 N.M. 677, 678, 822 P.2d 715, 716 (1995); see also O‘Kelley, 113 N.M. at 27-28, 822 P.2d at 124-25 (citing cases). “This rule accords recognition to society‘s interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.” O‘Kelley, 113 N.M. at 28, 822 P.2d at 125 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{15} Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that jeopardy attached to the felony offense, extreme cruelty to animals, at Defendant‘s first trial. Jeopardy on the felony offense did not terminаte at the end of the first trial because the district court declared a mistrial for manifest necessity due to jury deadlock. Thus, jeopardy continued on the felony offense during Defendant‘s second trial, when it also attached to the lesser included misdemeanor offense via the jury instruction on that offense. The district court‘s final judgment of acquittal on the felony offense at the end of the second trial terminated jeopardy for the felony offense. But Defendant remains in continuing jeopardy for the misdemeanor offense because the jury was unable to reach a verdict on that offense. Aсcordingly, we conclude that the State may retry Defendant for the lesser included offense of misdemeanor cruelty to animals without violating Defendant‘s double jeopardy rights.
{16} Defendant‘s arguments to the contrary do not change our conclusion. Defendant acknowledges the rule of continuing jeopardy discussed above but insists that principles of continuing jeopardy should not apply in this case because (1) retrial is barred under Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1997); (2) Defendant has been acquitted of the only offense explicitly charged in the indictment, and the State seeks to retry Defendant for the same alleged conduct; (3) the issue preclusion aspect of double jeopardy bars retrial; and (4) it would be unfair to allow retrial under the circumstances of this case.
{17} Relying on Brown, 432 U.S. 161, Defendant argues that the State cannot retry him for misdemeanor cruelty to animals because he has been acquitted of—what is for double jeopardy purposes—the “same offense.” In Brown, the United States Supreme Court
{18} Defendant argues that misdemeanor cruelty to animals is a lesser included offense of felony extreme cruelty to animals and that, as in Brown, the State is precluded from bringing successive prosecutions for the greater and lesser included offenses because they constitute the same оffense for purposes of our double jeopardy analysis. But unlike Brown, where the defendant‘s initial misdemeanor charge resulted in a conviction prior to the second prosecution, the jury in this case never reached a verdict on the misdemeanor charge, and thus no multiple indictments or successive prosecutions ever occurred. See id. at 165 n.5 (noting that the Supreme Court was “not concerned . . . with the double jeopardy questions that may arise when a defendant is retried on the same charge after a mistrial“). Principles of double jeopardy do not prohibit the State from trying a defendant for greater and lesser included offenses in a single prosecution, as occurred in this case. See Martinez, 120 N.M. at 678, 905 P.2d at 716 (explaining that Brown does not apply where multiple charges are prosecuted simultaneously). Thus, Brown is inapplicable.
{19} Defendant also contends that the State cannot retry him for the uncharged, lesser included misdemeanor offense because a jury acquitted him of the sole offense explicitly charged in the indictment. Defendant‘s position fails to recognize the significance of
{20} For example, in United States v. Gooday, 714 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the defendant‘s argument that retrial on an uncharged, lesser included offense would violate the defendant‘s double jeopardy rights. The defendant in Gooday “was tried under a one-count indictment for first-degree murder.” Id. at 81. At the defendant‘s request, the trial court instructed the jury “on the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter.” Id. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree murder, the only offense expressly charged in the indictment, but failed to reach a verdict on the three
{21} The Ninth Circuit rejectеd the defendant‘s argument, relying in part on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure under which a “defendant may be found guilty of any lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged.” Id. at 82 (citing
{22} Like the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, our
{23} Defendant also argues that double jeopardy bars his retrial as a matter of issue preclusion because the jury already determined an issue of ultimate fact—that he did not cruelly abuse an animal—by acquitting Defendant of the felony charge. We disagree.
{24} Issue preclusion in the double jeopardy context “means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970) (applied by this Court in Rodriguez, 2005-NMSC-091, ¶ 15, 138 N.M. 21, 116 P.3d 92). Thus, we must determine whether Defendant‘s acquittal of felony extreme cruelty to animals necessarily decided all of the issues of ultimate fact that the State would have to prove in a retrial on the misdemeanor offense.
{25} With regard to the felony offense, the district court instructed the jury that in order “to find the defendant guilty of extreme cruelty to animals, the state must prove . . . beyond
{26} Finally, Defendant argues that, as a matter of fairness in its review of his double jeopardy claim, this Court should consider federal due process considerations, even though Defendant concedes he makes this argument without support. The State contends that this Court should not address Defendant‘s due process argument because, as an argument not raised in either the State‘s petition or Defendant‘s cross-petition for writ of certiorari, it is not properly before this Court. We agree with the State that “it is improper for this Court to consider any questions except those set forth in the petition[s] for certiorari.” Fikes v. Furst, 2003-NMSC-033, ¶ 8, 134 N.M. 602, 81 P.3d 545 (citing
{27} Finding none of Defendant‘s arguments persuasive, we hold that the State may retry Defendant for misdemeanor cruelty to animals without violating the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The State indicted Defendant within the statute of limitations period for misdemeanor cruelty to animals
{28} The district court dismissed Defendant‘s case because the State did not charge Defendant with misdemeanor cruelty to animals within the statute of limitations period for that offense. In his cross-petition for writ of certiorari, Defendant asks this Court to uphold the district court‘s ruling.
{29} The parties do not dispute the facts relevant to the statute of limitations in this case.
{30} The parties agree that the Legislature established the relevant statute of limitations in
{31} The State argues that it filed the indictment within the limitations period for both felony extreme cruelty to animals and misdemeanor cruelty to animals, satisfying the requirements of
{32} Despite this straightforward application of
{33} Adopting Defendant‘s approach would ignore the purpose of a criminal statute of limitations, which is to ensure the timely initiation of a prosecution. See
{34} Defendant‘s argument conflates the statute of limitations issue with the separate issue
{35} Defendant also contends he lacked notice that he would be required to mount a defense to misdemeanor cruelty to animals because he was not originally charged with the lesser included offense. We agree that “[p]rocedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires the State to provide reasonable notice of charges against a person and a fair opportunity to defend.” State v. Dominguez, 2008-NMCA-029, ¶ 5, 143 N.M. 549, 178 P.3d 834 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But we disagree that Defendant was entitled to any additional notice. This Court has long recognized that notice of a criminal charge necessarily includes notice of any lesser included offenses. See Meadors, 121 N.M. at 44-45, 908 P.2d at 737-38 (explaining that the “instrument” charging a defendant with a greater offense gives the defendant adequate notice of potential lesser included offenses even though lesser included offense instructions are not given until the district court has seen the “the evidence adduced at trial“);
{36} Finally, in support of his statute of limitations argument Defendant cites a law review article and several cases from other jurisdictions addressing how a court should handle lesser included offenses when the government has filed the initial charging document within the limitations period for the explicitly charged offense but after the period has run on lesser included offenses. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 450 (1984); Cowan v. Superior Court, 926 P.2d 438, 439 (Cal. 1996); Tucker v. State, 417 So. 2d 1006, 1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 634 (Vt. 1994); State v. Muentner, 406 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Wis. 1987); Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial, 37 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 199, 200-03 (1995). We conclude that such authorities are not relevant here because in this case the State filed an indictment on the felony, which necessarily included the lesser included misdemeanor offense, within the limitations period for both the charged felony offense and the lesser included misdemeanor offense.
The Court will not consider Defendant‘s speedy trial claim because the district court has not ruled on that claim
{38} Defendant argues that, even if we reject his double jeopardy and statute of limitations claims, we should affirm the district court‘s dismissal of his case because the State violated his constitutional right to speedy trial. See
{39} New Mexico courts еvaluate speedy trial claims using the framework of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1972), to balance “the following four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons given for the delay, (3) the defendant‘s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 11, 135 N.M. 279, 87 P.3d 1061. In order to rule on a speedy trial motion the district court must first “make certain factual determinations and legal conclusions.” State v. Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 19, 283 P.3d 272 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On appeal, “we give deference to the [district] court‘s factual findings, but we review the weighing and the balancing [of] the Barker factors de novo.” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
{40} The State contends that it would be inappropriate for this Court to consider the merits of Defendant‘s speedy trial claim in the absence of any factual findings from the district court. Defendant filed two speedy trial motions in the district court, one on January 15, 2009, and one on July 15, 2009. But the parties do not cite, and this Court has not found, any portion of the record demonstrating that the district court ever held an evidentiary hearing or ruled on the motions. Instead, the parties agree on appeal that the district court never issued a ruling on either of Defendant‘s speedy trial motions. Nonetheless, Defendant asserts thаt this Court is in as good a position as the district court to analyze whether a third trial would violate Defendant‘s right to a speedy trial because this Court reviews speedy trial issues de novo.
{41} We disagree with Defendant and decline to consider his speedy trial claim absent a ruling by the district court. Ruling on a speedy trial motion requires a court to weigh factually based factors, and “[f]act-finding is a function of the district court.” State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 52, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If a defendant does not raise a constitutional speedy trial issue before the district
CONCLUSION
{42} We conclude that the district court erred by dismissing Defendant‘s case and hold that retrial on misdemeanor cruelty to animals is not barred by the two-year period set by the statute of limitations for that offense. We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that the State can retry Defendant for misdemeanor cruelty to animals without violating the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
{43} IT IS SO ORDERED.
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice
Topic Index for State v. Collier, No. 32,915
CRIMINAL LAW
Cruelty to Animals
Misdemeanor
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Double Jeopardy
Speedy Trial
Double Jeopardy
Indictment
Lesser Included Offense
Mistrial
Speedy Trial
Statute of Limitations