State v. Gardner

Utah, Appellee, Plaintiff and STATE GARDNER, Lee Defendant

Ronnie Appellant.

No. 21027.

Supreme Court of Utah. 31, 1989.

Jan.

Rehearing Denied Nov. floor, Wil- encountered next defendant serviceman, Miller, vending machine

burn accompany defendant him to and forced building. As outside outside, free and broke Miller stepped inside the window through a teller’s dived defendant, outside, wound- building. Once police, shackled, ed, and surrounded gun and surrendered. down threw Valdez, Valdez, A. James A. Andrew pretrial filed motions counsel Defense City, for defendant Watt, Lake Salt C. Joan venue, change seeking a recusal appellant. and prohibition evidence of judge, and a on Dam, Sjogren, L. Van Sandra Paul R. by defendant. The other crimes committed Hornak, City, for Lake K. Salt Kimberly The denied. third first two motions were appellee. and plaintiff understanding granted with the that was Justice: HOWE, Chief Associate of was neces- crimes some first of convictions his appeals Defendant elements of the offenses sary prove Ann.1 Code murder, Utah degree charged other evidence of defendant’s and first attempted (h); (e), & 76-5-202(l)(c), as im- past would be admissible record § (k); (h), 76-5-202(l)(e), & murder, degree § if took the stand. peachment defendant 76-5-302(l)(a), kidnapping, trial, § At the defense moved for a mistrial aggravated of possession 76-8-309; and escape, security on the the (b); based amount § incarcerated by denied, weapon dangerous courtroom. The motion was and a 76-10-503(2). guards four plainclothes the and defendant person, § charges an incident that stem from The n seated until the were directed remain was April Defendant on occurred left The prison the courtroom. officer transported the maximum se- being from had to the had who led defendant stairwell to the Utah Prison curity unit the a pretrial made statement that defendant Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice Salt However, “glassy-eyed.” on direct was hearing appear at a on a second City to testimony, he characterized defendant as charge. As he entered murder “being there.” After the defense had all Hall, he handed lobby of the was basement brought the previous out statement on accomplice. a He fumbled a female gun cross, stopped the trial court counsel both guards weapon; unfamiliar his with the going aspect that from back over Gunfire was parking lot. recross, retreated stating, “I think it testimony on exchanged, and defendant was shot developed by you both has been as to room, entered an archives He shoulder. what said.” was cross-examination, On building. defendant way of the denied looking for a out having a clerk, pris- Wayne conversation with Jorgen- a a court There encountered sen, prison assigned guard officer officer, attorneys. him three Two while he the hospital. recovered at refuge the office On attorneys sought behind rebuttal, prosecution them, Jorgensen, pointed called turned on Defendant door. other, who recounted the content his and then the conversa- gun at one tion with objection defendant. While no fired, killing attorney Burdell. Michael prison officer, Thomas, trial, Richard was at was raised defendant now contends forced to lead defendant out of the archives statements were taken without room ato stairwell leading to the benefit of a warning second Miranda and violated As floor. lobby, crossed his fifth and sixth rights. amendment Kirk, bailiff, During trial, Nick penalty phase uniformed came down defendant, stairway investigate give in an attempt the jury disturbance. Defendant basis on seriously proportionality shot assess wounded penalty Kirk proceeded up imposed, and then which should stairs. On (1953). 1. All are statutes cited to Utah Code Annotated discussed, already of attor-

sought the admission of affidavits didn’t capital neys involved in other day who had been talk about on the initial in.” came to ad- cases. The court refused impression homicide This is indicative of the me- affidavits. It also declined to ac- mit the reports dia on the prospective jurors. made cept testimony by associates of the victim They were aware basic circumstanc- regarding opposition pen- their to the death es, is, someone had handed defendant alty. killed, gun, person one and defen- person injured. dant and another were penalty phase, close of the defen-

At the knowledge prejudicial Such was not moved for a mistrial on the basis of dant defendant, however, way to because these prosecutorial misconduct. The motion was disputed placed basic facts were not jury, previously denied. The which had counts, issue defendant and were guilty returned a verdict of on all established through appeals. testimony. sentenced defendant to death. He own direct argument step Defendant carries the one Change I. of Venue argues only further and that not Defendant contends that the trial court knowledge widespread of the incident denying him a abused its discretion community, but there was a common change of venue. He that due to maintains guilty, he precluded belief that was pretrial publicity and the fact extensive any possibility obtaining of his a fair trial county that his trial was held in the court- jurisdiction. support, in the In Hall, house across the street from the it telephone poll a registered took of 400 vot- him impossible was for to receive a fair County. (Jury ers in Lake Salt lists are County. trial Salt Lake voters.) registered drawn from He asserts process requires Due that the ac poll percent that that showed 78 receive a trial a fair and im cused before thought guilty that defendant was and 12 partial jury, free from outside influences. percent thought probably that he was Pierre, 1338, (Utah v. 572 P.2d 1348 State guilty. survey The results of the are mis- 1977), denied, reh’g 576 P.2d 857 First, leading aspects. only in several 23 1978), denied, 882, 439 99 cert. U.S. S.Ct. percent surveyed identify of those could 219, Dowd, (1978); 58 L.Ed.2d 194 Irvin v. person defendant as the in the involved 717, 722, 1639, 1642, 366 U.S. 81 S.Ct. 6 Second, if he incident. when asked was 751, (1961). L.Ed.2d 755 The fact that a “guilty,” explanation given no was prominently reported in the case is news Therefore, charges. any lay opinion as to alone, media, standing presump does not merely guilt was an affirmation that he tively deprive process. a defendant of due incident, person a was the involved Pierre, v. 572 P.2d at 1349. Defen State typi- fact conceded the defense. This is points nearly dant to the fact that all of the po- following fied comment from a prospective exposed to at jurors had been juror tential on voir “From the news dire: facts of the incident. least the fundamental know, it kind of you just, you accounts However, exposure pre neither does that it, but, shows that he was there and he did sumptively deprive pro a defendant of due know, you I know that I sat and don’t 794, Florida, ” Murphy cess. thought guilty.’ ‘He is 2031, 2036, 44 95 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d following: We subscribe to the (1975). examining reports In the news 594 any of To hold that the mere existence pages in evidence and more than 700 of guilt or preconceived notion as to the dire, apparent it transcript voir accused, more, is without innocence of an reports did not infect the that the news a presumption to rebut the sufficient any jurors prejudice minds of with or bias impartiality would be prospective juror’s following against defendant. The com impossible standard. It is to establish an by juror at “I ment was made a voir dire: lay juror if the can aside giving any sufficient don’t recall them [the media] opinion render a ver- impression or involving the case that we haven’t details presented right Neeley, in tional to a fair trial. State v. diet based (Utah 1988); P.2d Harvell v. court. State, (Okla.Crim.App. Dowd, at Irvin U.S. 1987); Wixon, Wash.App. pool prospective Each one (1981). oath rath- qualified jurors stated under he could meet this candidly er that or she of a trial to recuse Failure standard. have, even where he should based on the proximity that the Defendant contends appearance possible prejudice, bias also the scene of crime the trial to require does not reversal unless the “sub However, change he required a of venue. party are rights stantial affected.” any that there were unau- does not contend for Utah R.Crim.P. 30. The test harmless scene, nor does thorized views of the just-quoted language under the from error specific identify any prejudice. The trial 30 is rule whether “there was reasonable separate Hall to was moved from the likelihood a more favorable result for building danger and courtroom. Hutchison, the defendant.” State v. trial any prejudice would result because the (Utah 1982); v. Knight, P.2d great was held at that location was not so (Utah 1987). alle 918-20 No required. Hav- change of venue was made, prejudice gation of actual was nor record, can- ing carefully reviewed the does our review of the re careful record say change of venue neces- allegation. for such veal basis impar- fair sary to insure defendant a any showing preju the absence of of actual jury. change Denial of a tial venue defendant, any error of dice not an of discretion. See abuse failing judge to recuse was harmless. 439, (Utah 1988). Bishop, P.2d 753 459 II. Recusal Constitutionality III. Defendant filed an affidavit of Penalty Death prejudice against judge the trial bias and challenges Defendant raises several appeal, he worked in the Hall. because On capital constitutionality to the of Utah’s allege any defendant does actual bias scheme, sentencing (1978, 76-3-207 1988 § argues judge that a trial recuse but should (1) Supp.). Briefly, his contentions are appearance himself where there is an sentencing scheme does not narrow the agree. judicial canons bias. We penal to which the death class of offenders judge disqualify that a ethics state should applies, required ty Furman v. Geor might rea impartiality himself where his 2726, 238, 408 92 33 L.Ed.2d gia, U.S. S.Ct. sonably questioned. Code of Judicial 346, denied, 902, 89, reh’g 409 U.S. 93 S.Ct. 3(C)(1)(1972). If the alle Conduct Canon (1972); (2) penalty 34 L.Ed.2d 163 the death they gations are and in the affidavit true process and due and violates state federal person cause to give would reasonable (3) protection provisions; equal section 76- impartial judge doubt whether the could be vague; 3-207 overbroad and circumstances, under the he should recuse I, penalty violates 9 of death article section Nothing damaging is more to himself. the Utah and the ban on cruel Constitution legal system than public confidence punishment in the and unusual contained appearance prejudice of bias or eighth amendment of the United States However, judge. though we part of the Constitution. of the control share defendant’s statement challenges penalty These death Utah’s rule, failure ling agree we do not sentencing thoughtfully scheme were judge to recuse himself Wood, carefully considered State v. requires instant reversal. The Code curiam), (Utah (per P.2d cert. de 648 71 standards of Judicial Conduct establishes 988, 341, nied, 74 that, violated, 459 U.S. 103 S.Ct. may subject if Morris, (1982); v. However, L.Ed.2d 383 Andrews discipline. it does not establish denied, 816, (Utah), P.2d 823-24 cert. parameters of a defendant’s constitu- 607

279 891, 254, 101 L.Ed.2d 120 449 U.S. S.Ct. 66 another under of the following cir- Morris, (1980); 812, Pierre v. P.2d cumstances: 607 denied, (Utah), 891, cert. 814-15 449 U.S. 254, (1980); 120 101 S.Ct. 66 L.Ed.2d (h) The previously actor was convicted Andrews, 709, (Utah 1977), v. P.2d 710 574 of first or second murder or of a denied, 576 P.2d 857 (Utah), cert. reh’g felony involving the use or threat of vio- denied, 439 U.S. 882, 219, 99 S.Ct. 58 person. lence to a Codianna, (1978); L.Ed.2d 194 573 He allowing contends that the admission denied, 343, (Utah 1977), cert. 348 439 prior of two of his guilt convictions in the 882, 219, 58 U.S. 99 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 194 phase unfairly prejudicial of the trial was Pierre, (1978); 1338, jury, upon because the learning of his other denied, 1345-46, (Utah 1977), reh’g convictions, prone to convict him be- (Utah 1978); see Andrews v. 576 P.2d 857 cause of his “bad character.” We do not

Morris, (Utah 1983). 83-84 agree that prior evidence of his two convic- Most of these claims have also been treated any prejudicial tions had effect. by the U.S. District Court for the District surrounding The facts the incident out of of Utah and the Tenth Circuit Court of which the instant case arises are inter- Shulsen, Appeals. Andrews twined around the basic fact that defen- (D.Utah 1984), aff'd, 802 F.2d F.Supp. 408 attempting dant was escape from lawful denied, (10th Cir.1986), cert. U.S. prison thus, custody; possible it was not reh’g 108 S.Ct. 99 L.Ed.2d present jury any picture of the factu- denied, 485 U.S. S.Ct. setting al revealing without at least one of Shulsen, (1988); Selby L.Ed.2d 718 aggra- defendant’s convictions. The (D.Utah 1984), sub nom. F.Supp. 432 aff'd vating required by circumstance section Shulsen, Pierre v. (10th 802 F.2d 1282 76-5-202(l)(h) proven by entering into denied, Cir.1986), cert. 481 U.S. copies of defendant’s commit- reh’g S.Ct. 95 L.Ed.2d 536 ments to the robbery Utah State Prison on denied, However, charges. attempt no was made (1987). L.Ed.2d reasoning Since the try thereafter defendant on the basis of per the above-cited cases is sound and Throughout his character.” “bad the re- suasive on the urges issues defendant now trial, prosecution only mainder of the the Court, upon unnecessary this we find it prior they referred to the convictions as repeat analysis opinion. that in this We related to the elements of the crimes penalty applied hold that the death as un charged. Defendant took the stand and statutory der our scheme is in accordance disclosed criminal record in his extensive requirements with the of the Constitution testimony. his direct He revealed other and the United States Constitution potentially prej- convictions that were more Bishop, of the State of Utah. 753 udicial, including aggravated assault and 439, v. (Utah 1988); State Till P.2d 460 aggravated prison guard. assault on a He man, 546, (Utah 1987). 572 stipulated introduction of evi- challenged dence here. Felony IV. Use of Prior Violent as an guilt Because was manifest defendant’s Aggravating Circumstance evidence, by overwhelming direct we can- Defendant asserts that section 76- say not the inclusion of his con- that 5-202(l)(h) right process denies his to due as element of the crime of first victions guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth degree any prejudicial unfair murder had amendments to the United States Constitu or of his effect on the conduct outcome I, tion and article section 7 of the Utah application trial. we find that Since provides: That Constitution. section 5—202(l)(h)did not violate his section 76— case, right process homicide constitutes mur- to due in the instant Criminal ruling constitutionality of degree der in the first if the actor inten- reserve on the briefly tionally knowingly that We also note that causes death of section. 280 Texas, 45, v. 38, 100 Adams 448 U.S. essential section not that is application of Cf. 581, 2521, (1980). 2526, L.Ed.2d 65 589 S.Ct. first conviction of

to defendant’s unanimously also murder since he have Copinga that did not Mr. stated aggravating circum- found two additional strong way one or the commitment first the conviction of upon stances He penalty. only stated other on death rests, creating a namely, degree murder preference that he would rath- personal his person than to a other great risk of death spend the rest of his life die than er for committing homicide victim a and apply that he He said would confinement. effecting escape defendant’s purpose strictly according to the evidence the law (e). 76-5-202(l)(c), custody. from lawful § imposing that when it came to and leaning toward he was not more penalty, con no merit defendant’s We find life in or death. He con- prison either aggravating circum the same tention that very prison punish- life in a severe sidered guilt relied upon cannot be stance bi- properly When informed of the ment. penalty phase. Lowen phase and in the that proceeding nature of the and furcated Phelps, v. 108 S.Ct. field must out- aggravating circumstances denied, reh’g L.Ed.2d circumstances, mitigating he weigh 944, 108 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. asked, phase, you if penalty “In (1988). requirements found that those were met, you could vote for life?” He answer- Challenge for Cause V. clear-cut, ed, I “If it was think that don’t any problem.” there would be that he was Defendant contends challenge for cause. improperly denied challenge, defense withdrew prejudicial to be error have held it We ruling. no Defendant judge made used to challenge peremptory where now contends that nevertheless juror should prospective who remove a Copinga on court’s have excused should cause. State for have been excused motion the failure to do so own 1981). Brooks, (Utah constituting an abuse of discretion prejudicial error.” “manifest Copinga, Defendant asserts Mr. Tillman, A 750 P.2d at 553. review ex juror, should have been prospective voir Copinga’s dire reveals entire expressed cused for cause because im- capital punishment would not views on penalty. personal preference for the death according ability pair his to decide Norton, Therefore, law as instructed. denied, 1983), cert. U.S. Norton, dis- enunciated the standard overruled 80 L.Ed.2d required. missing him cause was not for Hansen, grounds, v. other (Utah 1986), we stated: Security VI. Court imposi- the cannot vote for Persons who contends that excessive punishment in circum- capital tion of Defendant courtroom, which compelled security was feel used persons stances and who right to trial. pun- adversely affected his a fair imposition capital of to vote for the Four murder find no merit to this contention. in circumstances of We ishment all present plainclothes guards were The unarmed properly are excluded for cause. defendant, and two trial: two sat behind legal partiality is whether at proper test of in the courtroom. capital punishment were stationed elsewhere juror’s views about day impair noon on the second substantially At the recess prevent or would mistrial, trial, for a claim conscientiously taking defendant moved him or her from security in court ing that the performing his excessive juror’s the oath and impression he jury the the that following gave the room juror by her duties as dangerous The capital man. trial was a court’s on the law instructions instructed defendant the the motion but applying them to denied punishment and seated security guards remain and the particular case. facts of the nois, 129, 132, 748, 750, had the courtroom. Pre- 390 U.S. jury until the left 88 S.Ct. viously, guards or two had stationed one 19 L.Ed.2d (citing Alford States, jury between and defendant themselves the United 687, 694, 282 U.S. Throughout the re- when court recessed. (1931)). 75 L.Ed. trial, guards the remained mainder of the claim, reviewing defendant’s to see look left the seated until courtroom. if trial court its in abused discretion limiting and, so, cross-examination if if by This case is unlike cases cited to him. was prejudicial result defense where the defendant was tried Maestas, 564 P.2d at 1388. People prison garb See and shackles. Duran, 282, 127 Cal.Rptr. 16 Cal.3d prior trial, Some six months Thomas (1976). The secur gave concerning a recorded statement ity was even less intrusive than that trial, shooting. At he testified on cross-ex- 560, 572, Flynn, Holbrook did amination that he certain recall 1340, 1348, S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d questions that were asked him when he it preju where the Court held that was not gave the statement or his answers. He armed, four dicial for uniformed state given transcript was then of the state- troopers occupy immediately the seats ment, stating after he recalled that court, The behind the defendant. being had characterized defendant as allowing security, protecting extra was glassy-eyed shooting. at the time of the legitimate maintaining state interest again repeated He the earlier statement on custody since still defendant he was again After redirect. he was asked on under sentence from convictions and statement, about previous recross Id. at was held bail. being without stated, am going trial court “I to cut it off The S.Ct. at 89 L.Ed.2d at 536. developed by on both sides. It has been security additional measures the instant you both as to what was said.” prudent were since defendant was trial for in an events occurred aborted opportunity Both counsel had the during escape appearance, they a court question previous the witness about accomplished through were the least obtru statement; contents the statement sive methods When available. times; repeated were several tran- complained of the guards, action script placed into evidence. Defendant immediately measures were taken obvi was on recross-examination and cover- had any potential prejudicial ate We effect. points prosecu- brought ed the out no prejudice find that undue occa tion on redirect. At the time the court cut security employed sioned trial. questioning, off line defendant was repeating points asked answered on VIL Cross-Examination of agree cross-examination. While we Richard Thomas broad latitude should be afforded a defen- Defendant contends that his sixth cross-examination, dant on the trial court right amendment to confrontation was by cutting abuse its off did not discretion abridged when the trial court cut off his questioning point. repetitive at this recross-éxamination of Richard Thomas. right to cross-examine is an invaluable Testimony Jorgensen Officer VIII. of I, right in section 12 the embodied article of at trial that af Defendant testified Utah the sixth Constitution and amend shot, daze, eyes in ter he was he his was ment of the United States Constitution. focus, objects Maestas, him were 1386, 1387 were out of before State v. 564 P.2d blurred, ringing. were Conse 1977). However, his ears “the extent of cross-ex quently, he to be to recall with to an claimed unable respect appropriate amination shot. inquiry happened much of what after he was subject of is within the dis sound rebuttal, State, attempt the in an to may cretion of trial court. It a On the exercise through prior incon judgment determining impeach in defendant his reasonable when Illi- statements, exhausted.” Smith v. subject as a witness Offi- sistent called Thus, prison assigned purpose. for Jorgensen, a officer to that limited when the cer received, recuperating evidence was was faced while he was guard defendant deciding only Jorgensen with whether or Jorgensen related state- hospital. telling defendant was the truth. After the by made defendant ments and admissions testimony for was offered received this they alleg- in him conversation which to purpose opportunity and counsel had to which indicated edly hospital had in the potential impact jury, its on the assess no fully was of what he defendant aware that limiting requested. No instruction was ex- way his attempted he find doing as was ception was taken to note absence of escape. Hall and Defendant out of the any limiting Given the instruction. nature ever that the conversation took denied testimony, of objective the State’s testimony of place and contends it, offering it and the manner which was al- Jorgensen contained statements Officer evidence, say received into we cannot in a legedly made custodial there was manifest error the failure of Mi- interrogation without the benefit give limiting the trial court to instruction Arizona, randa, 436, v. Miranda sponte. sua 1602, (1966) (requir- 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ing that defendants be informed of their Manslaughter IX. Instruction right right to remain counsel and silent interrogation), and Defendant contends that the court prior to custodial with- instructing jury regarding erred in violation of out the benefit counsel States, manslaughter. His 201, lesser offense theo Massiah v. United U.S. ry support of the case on which he relied to 1199, (1964). 12 L.Ed.2d 246 S.Ct. giving manslaughter instruction While will address when re- we issues accomplice from time viewing a penalty death which were briefed him or gun, handed a loaded at least from objected appeal properly but were not shoulder, he the time was shot in the Tillman, below, 552, P.2d at acting an “extreme emotional need not reach the merits of defen- disturbance.” Miranda alleged violation. Even dant’s provides: Section 76-5-205 assuming taken in the statements were vio- Massiah, lation Miranda they were Criminal homicide constitutes man- only slaughter purposes on rebuttal for if the actor: offered impeachment and such are admissible. McManaman, v. States 606 F.2d United (b) causes death of another under v. 919, (10th Cir.1979); Walk- State 924-25 the influence of extreme emotional dis- er, 138 Ariz. 675 P.2d which there is turbance for a reasonable People, (1984); P.2d Lemasters v. explanation or excuse. (Colo.1984); Cartwright, State 542-43 Although differs in some our statute re- (1982); 200 Mont. spects penal from the model code version Holland, 98 Wash.2d based, on which it was the official com- Mills, (1983); applicable are ments the model code (1985). Or.App. 149-50 determining when emotional disturbance subject, is excusable. the drafters On the failure Defendant asserts that following code the model offered the limited jurors instruct as to the use insight: they make could statements was error,” requiring

“manifest reversal of his emotional disturbance is excusable [A]n objection disagree. provocation, We No “if it is occasioned conviction. which the Jorgen- was made to introduction of event situation for offender culpably responsible.” was not testimony. sen’s The issue of whether the Under formulation, violation Mi in of were taken this extreme emotional dis- statements randa and were admissible only for im not reduce murder to man- turbance will intentionally, if the actor has trial; so, slaughter not at even peachment was raised recklessly, negligently or knowingly, only was on the evidence offered rebuttal

283 or disturbance is to deter- mental distur- emotional be brought his own about bance, viewpoint in a of a by involving mined from reasonable such as himself person existing crime. the then circum- stances. (official draft & 210.3 Model Penal Code § comments, 1980, II, (em- at 64 Part

revised added.) (Emphasis omitted) added; (quoting the citation phasis Although majority reject- a this Court on Reform of Federal National Commission portions given ed in similar instruction Law, Brown Final Commission Criminal Bishop, any P.2d at error State v. 1602(b))). Report triggering here harmless. The event comment coincides with instruction This theory according to defendant’s of the case court, which given by the trial read: No. escape in attempt was his which he was Thus, wounded. defendant’s "emotional INSTRUCTION NO. product know- “his disturbance” Manslaughter apply, the For “ex- ingly intentionally involving in or himself or disturbance” treme mental emotional of a not commission crime” could something triggered by Therefore, external must be any “excusable.” error accused, his reaction to given from was harmless. instruction2 must be such external stimulus reason- able, given terms and the must be X. Oral Instruction meaning give them in common you would Defendant contends that everyday use. Such disturbance there- giving trial court erred oral instruc brought been about cannot have

fore in sponte. argues tion sua He peculiar mental pro- own the defendant’s precluding had the struction effect knowing cesses or his intentional or jurors considering any of the lesser from reckless acts. they offenses until were unani included excessive, or far ad- “Extreme” means acquitting degree him first mur mous in vanced, grievous. or der. relating existing or “Mental” means judge, giving instruction in the mind. murder, added the follow- first refers to a state of be- “Disturbance” instruc- ing oral clarification to the written disturbed, disordered, agitated, ing or tion: distressed. I, deter- you reference to count With pertains to emotions and “Emotional” capital guilt mine his or innocence of passions. feelings has to with or do If homicide, degree. first murder in the determining whether or not the de- verdict, have you then don’t your that is influence of fendant acted under the ex- consider the included offenses further disturbance, treme mental or emotional I. within count the circum- you should consider all of see, you if from youAs can start surrounding the death of the vic- stances being up, and work them bottom [sic] defendant, you If Ron- tim. find offenses, you will more included find Gardner, nie Lee caused the death of exist, you so start or of those to all Burdell, Joseph while under the Michael I, work down as top under count or emotional influence of extreme mental you in the last sen- I have instructed disturbance, you next determine must tence. whether or not there was reasonable guilty find him of murder you If explanation excuse for such distur- then consider degree, you shall expla- first The reasonableness bance. guilt or innocence for the extreme mental nation or excuse note, manslaughter where Gallegos, instruction in State v. 2. We also stated 104-05, killing prejudicial. is not P.2d finds an intentional Utah 2d 415-16 J., (Durham, 54, 58, Valdez, Bishop, (1964), P.2d at 2d 30 Utah and State concurring). generally an error capital they the lesser included offense of may offense before consider lesser homicide, degree. murder in the second Instead, they included offenses. may be they instructed that should consider the Clayton, they lesser included if offenses do not find (Utah 1983), we held that it was not error guilty charged the defendant of the of- for the jury trial court to direct the to fense. While the in wording difference begin by determining whether the defen- subtle, it any possible avoids misunder- guilty charged dant was offense. must, standing jury that the However, a unani- we believe that it would be well vote, acquit mous the defendant on the suggestion to do this means of rather charged may than an offense before it absolute direction. So held the consider the Supreme Michigan People Court of lesser included The oral instruc- offenses. 619, 623, Mays, 407 Mich. case, N.W.2d given tion in the instant when read in curiam). There, (per the court connection with other written instructions stated: given jury, could not reasonably have

It suggest is not error to an order of any created confusion. Instruction No. 48 consideration of offenses. The required a unanimous vote to convict. In- may suggest jury that it consider you struction No. 15 stated: “If find that charged offense first and it would be the defendant in this case has committed a helpful suggest that consideration be you criminal homicide but have a reason- given to “greater” offenses with a num- able doubt as to which of two or more ber of elements considering before those degrees guilty, of that crime you he is with a “lesser” number. must convict him degree of the lowest case, In that the court set out following instructions, only.” These when read aas suggested may given, instruction which must, gave whole as we defendant the full making it clear that such an instruction is benefit the reasonable doubt standard mandatory: the jury give proper allowed consid- may give You to all consideration eration lesser included offenses. verdicts,

possible you begin but should your by considering (the deliberations XI. Verdict/Sufficiency Directed offense). charged you Unless all of the Evidence agree (the guilty to find the defendant prosecution’s At the close of the offense), charged you may consider the chief, case defendant moved the court to upon other offenses which I have in- direct a depraved verdict of either indiffer you structed in the order in which the degree manslaugh ence second murder or given. may instructions were You con- ter. His motion was denied. any sider of those offenses without hav- ing agreement reached concerning the prosecution’s At the close evi- guilt defendant’s or innocence on dence, may the court charge dismiss a if purpose other of them. The in- this presented the evidence legally is not suffi- struction is to aid and not your to control cient to establish the elements of the of- deliberation. 17(o). Here, fense. Utah R.Crim.P. People Mays, 288 N.W.2d at n. 1. prosecution presented evidence that defen- dant shot and killed Michael Burdell

Although the given oral instruction circumstances from which the could the instant case is not a model of clarity, infer that his knowing we do not find that it act either demands or even implies presented intentional. Evidence the need for a was also unanimous vote of acquittal jury may aggravating before the factors consider less- which elevate However, er included the crime Having offenses. order to first murder. any possible avoid misunderstanding by prima by present- established a facie jurors, it would be well in ing the future evidence on each element of the of- fense, instructing they avoid them that prosecution must find was entitled to have guilty the defendant not of the charged charge jury. submitted to the There

285 exclusionary sibility under the rules of denying defendant’s motion no error in Aggravating evidence.... circumstanc- directed verdict. for a as outlined in 76-5- es shall include those jury verdict to determine reviewing In 202. evidence, sufficient if it was based on argues that since the lan- infer- Defendant presented and all

view the evidence statute, degree guage of the first murder drawn therefrom ences that can be 76-5-202(l)(h), “previous section refers to favorable to the verdict. Jack- light most 307, 319, or second 99 convictions”3 of first 443 U.S. S.Ct. Virginia, v. son murder, 560, (1979); precluded put- from 2781, 2789, the State was 61 L.Ed.2d 573 (Utah 603, prior homicide in McClain, ting on evidence of 706 P.2d v. evidence, penalty phase of his trial since he did 1985). any includ- Where there is plead guilty prior to the crime until that can be ing reasonable inferences it, commission of the offense in the findings of all after the drawn from from which prior support, to trial. crime can be made instant but the elements of the Balderas, doubt, People cites inquiry our beyond a reasonable 184, 144, 216-18, Cal.Rptr. sustain the verdict. Cal.3d complete and we will 480, 605; proposition for the McClain, at also Jack- P.2d 513-14 see 2792-93, prior that convictions to the commission of son, at at 443 U.S. S.Ct. the offense indicate that the defendant was L.Ed.2d at 578. conviction, prior undeterred but light most favorable to the Viewed in the postdating the incident were convictions verdict, of the witnesses the observations purpose. not relevant for ac- shooting, as well as defendant’s to, reasoning following the Defendant’s is not sound. prior during, and tions sufficient, with admission of convic- competent Balderas deals shooting, comprised felonies. Even knowingly acted or tions of nonviolent evidence that defendant scheme, sentencing Mi- under the intentionally causing in the death of California placed on the there is no such limitation Burdell. We find therefore chael Id., Cal.Rptr. use of violent crimes. sufficient evidence to sustain there was 217, 711 P.2d at 514. The violent nature of verdict. to the de-

the crimes makes them relevant Aggravating/Miti- character, XII. Presentation of key which is a focus fendant’s Penalty in Phase gating Factors sentencing proceeding. that the trial

Defendant contends under sec- Aggravating circumstances admitting, aggravation include, erred in court limited but are not tion 76-3-207 previous homi penalty, evidence of to, 76-5-202. Evi- those listed section 76-3- he had committed. Section cide is not aggravating factors dence of other 207(2) provides part: in relevant that information is prohibited long “as as character of the defendant

(2) proceedings, relevant to the sentencing In these crime.” Bar- of the presented or the circumstances may be as evidence 939, 967, Florida, 103 S.Ct. 463 U.S. clay to sen- matter the court deems relevant tence, 77 L.Ed.2d including not limited to the but crime, 878- (citing Stephens, of the Zant nature and circumstances 2743-44, character, 77 L.Ed.2d background, the defendant’s condition, (1983)). prior homicide was physical 250-51 history, mental and character, back- to defendant’s aggravation relevant any other facts admissible history and was Any ground, and mitigation penalty. language of section 76-3- plain probative force deems to have the court yet resulted though it had not even regardless of its admis- may be received beyond finding by a reason- the fact finder Lafferty, to a In State v. 1988), guilt of those that evidence of other violent as to the defendant’s we held able doubt in convictions is which have not resulted crimes other crimes. subject aggravation penalty, admissible shooting guidelines time a conviction at the set down the United States Court, Supreme case. the instant nor was it an abuse of discretion. Defendant also contends that the trial admitting court erred in not certain evi- testimony The regarding offered mitigation penalty. in dence He opposition of the victim’s associates to attorneys offered affidavits of who had penalty the death properly was likewise appeared capital as counsel in other homi- excluded as irrelevant to the character of briefly cide The cases. affidavits summa- the accused or the nature of the crime. In given rized the facts in and sentences those Norton, 577, (Utah 675 P.2d 588 They provide cases. were offered to 1983), allowing we stated that the defen jury with a basis on which to determine the present any mitigation dant to evidence in “nature” of defendant’s crime. Defendant of his crime was “not intended to turn a a,so testimony offered of associates of the sentencing proceeding into a forum to con regarding opposition victim their to the appropriateness capital punish sider the penalty. death general.” ment in The United States Su nature of defendant’s crime Court, The preme in Maryland, Booth v. 482 fully explored presented 496, 503-504, 2529, 2533, U.S. 107 S.Ct. 96 jury, as were the attendant circumstances. 440, (1987), L.Ed.2d held that victim Comparison with other homicide cases impact statements were not relevant to the presented capsulized in form would shed no sentencing proceeding and tended to shift crime, light further on defendant’s but away the focus from the character of the encourage would instead to consid defendant and the circumstances of the er information extraneous to defendant’s reasoning crime. The sug of that case character and the circumstances of of his gests opinions victim, that the which the State, fense. In Williams 445 So.2d family, and his regard associates had 798, (Miss.1984), denied, cert. 469 U.S. ing capital punishment properly could 1117, 803, (1985), 105 S.Ct. 83 L.Ed.2d 795 excluded as imposition irrelevant to the Mississippi Supreme upheld Court sentence. We find no abuse of discretion psychological testimony exclusion of com in the trial court’s refusal to admit the paring typical the defendant with the killer. proferred testimony. It held that while the defendant enti character, testimony tled to regarding his XIII. Proportionality Review required the trial court was not to allow Defendant contends that the sen concerning the characters of other given tence in proportionate his case is not capital Likewise, murder defendants. in compared when given to the sentences case, required the instant the court was not capital all other cases in this state. In capsulizing to admit the affidavits the facts Tillman, State v. 750 P.2d at we held given and sentences in other homicide comparative proportionality review cases. As stated the United Su States required by was not either the federal or Ohio,

preme Court in Lockett v. the state constitution. n. 2965 n. (1978), “Nothing L.Ed.2d 990 n. 12 seeking comparative In proportionality opinion review, authority this limits the traditional defendant misreads our case law exclude, irrelevant, Wood, court to evi statutes. State v. bearing (Utah) curiam), denied, dence not (per the defendant’s char cert. acter, record, or the circumstances of U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 383 statutory gives his offense.” Our scheme we stated that automatic review of the trial “any discretion to admit a death sentence is conducted in order to matter the court deems relevant sen “determine whether the sentence of death 76-3-207(2). error, tence.” prejudice The court’s deci resulted from or arbitrari § ness, disproportionate.” sion to exclude the affidavits is not con or was Section trary statutory requirements to our provides part: or the 76-1-104 in relevant (3)

(2) phase; stating penalty phase this provisions The [criminal] escaped Gardner had from maximum secur- code be construed accordance shall (4) ity; reading report general purposes.... from a that was with these into received evidence. test penalties pro- are Prescribe which alleged we measure misconduct was of the of- portionate to seriousness Tillman, articulated permit recognition or fense and which 1987). look to if the We see possibilities in rehabilitation differences or remarks counsel call the actions to among offenders. individual jury matter it not attention a would above-quoted the Neither this section nor justified considering determining be language type calls for the from Wood and, so, if the its verdict circum- would comparative review defendant have case, particular the stances of whether Determining this Court undertake. wheth- “the prejudicial error is substantial and proportionate to the penalty er the is crime a such that there is reasonable likelihood thoughtful and requires a careful consider- absence, that in its there would have been defendant the ation the individual and a for the more favorable result defendant.” surrounding his crime. Fo- circumstances on individual defendant and his acts cus the alleged, In the first instance the 76-1-104, not is called in section com- for by prosecution wrong called defendant the and parison with other criminals their though name. Even the name was that of individual, crimes. Each defendant is notoriety,4 another defendant of some it unique Any in its facts. and each case is reference, prejudicial. was not The taken attempt comparisons to draw broad be- context, inadvertent, was was immedi specu- or calls for tween defendants crimes corrected, ately and interrupt did not the why particular a lation as to proceedings jury’s flow of or focus jury by crime with in that was dealt improper on an basis for the ver attention many particular fashion. The factors dict. decision may jury’s influence can- allegation Defendant’s second is identified, easily quantified. not be let alone laughed prosecuting attorney dur allowing We convinced that are therefore ing presentation portion of a of defense proportion- comparative conduct argument penalty phase. in the counsel’s ality review would confuse issues actions, While we cannot condone such we away particular shift the focus from (cid:127) accept explanation the State’s miti- aggravating defendant and those reacting prosecutor merely defen was gating in his factors onto counsel, dant’s who had removed exhibits application penalty of the death the ab- placed jury. had before unpersuaded by stract. We are the evi- judge promptly prose admonished the presented necessity dence for this cutor that his action was and determined proportion- comparative Court undertake significant prejudicial. neither Where nor cases, nor ality penalty review all death discretion, there no abuse of such compelled accept do feel defendant’s the trial will not re by decision invitation to conduct such a review volun- Valdez, appeal. versed on See State tarily in the instant case. Utah 513 P.2d at 426. Our review 2d nothing record reveals that would Prosecutorial Misconduct XIV. its dis indicate that the trial court abused cites four of behav- Defendant instances point. denying cretion in mistrial this prosecutorial he mis- ior characterizes as last claimed in (1) referring “de- Neither of the conduct: to defendant as improper. The reference to Bishop”; laughing during was pre- fendant stances escape security maximum penalty from sentation defense counsel Gardner’s trial, Gary coverage See v. Bish- Preceding Bishop in the local media. this Arthur (Utah 1988). young boys. op, tried the murders several for prominent His trial and conviction received Here, interpretation. was a matter of He was we need not determine being security” held in “maximum at the whether counsel’s claimed shortfalls meet escapes, time of his both in 1984 and in prong the first of the test. The failure to though even outside the con- object testimony Jorgen- Officer security fines of the maximum unit of the sen, VIII, supra, did as discussed in section prison escapes when the occurred. This prejudice defendant. Even if his coun therefore, jury; fact was made clear objection sel had raised the and had been misrepresent the remark did not the facts showing successful in a violation of Mi jury’s improp- or focus the attention on an randa, the evidence was still admissible for Likewise, er for basis its decision. purpose offered; for which it was portion report the medical referred to therefore, prejudice no resulted from the prosecution read had been into the objection lack of an point. to this Dr. record; therefore, though even the written Heinbeeker, psychiatrist, a forensic testi evidence, report had not been received in fied on possible defendant’s behalf as to prosecution arguing from evidence behavior, sources of defendant’s such as in the record. We find no basis on which environment, genetics, possible and brain judgment to reverse the or sentence based damage. Mr. Fuchs was a member of the prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant Board of Pardons and was called claims, makes other but because there is no testify defense to generally to as arise, record of the they facts from which reviewing Board’s role in sentences and we cannot reach them. determining parole dates. Defendant does identify any not instance where his counsel XV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel object any questions failed to to asked dur Defendant, supplemental in briefing, ing cross-examination of either witness. raises the issue of ineffective assistance of review Our of the record does not show Specifically, points counsel. he out coun- conduct of counsel during testimony of object sel’s failure to testimony of either witness which lacking in Heinbeeker, Jorgensen, Officer Dr. and Mr. aspect of effective assistance. Having Fuchs. carefully reviewed transcript pro In v. Washington, Strickland ceedings below and the appeal, briefs on 668, 694, 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d we are convinced preju that there was no denied, reh’g 104 U.S. dice to in regards. these Defen S.Ct. 82 L.Ed.2d 864 the Unit- allegations dant makes other of ineffective Supreme ed States Court set forth a two- However, assistance of counsel. no record part examining test to be in used claims was made on which we can review them. upon ineffective based assistance of coun- show, first, sel. The spe- defendant must XVI. Cumulative Error cific acts or omissions fall outside Having fully reviewed the extensive range professionally competent the wide of case, record in this we are convinced that and, second, assistance that reasonable rights defendant’s constitutional were cau- probability exists that but for er- counsel’s tiously guarded phases at all pro- of the ror, the result would have been different. that, ceeding overall, the trial was con- (Utah Pursifell, 746 P.2d in dignified ducted the fair and fashion a Frame, Ct.App.1987); capital reject case deserves. We defen- (Utah 1986) Strickland, (citing dant’s assertions that the cumulative effect U.S. at at S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d at . alleged irregularities discussed 699). Speer, 750 P.2d above denied him a fair trial. (Utah 1988), adopted approach sug- sentences, Defendant’s convictions and gested in it Strickland is easier “[i]f including the sentence of death for the first dispose to of an ineffectiveness claim on conviction, degree murder are affirmed. ground prejudice, of lack of sufficient

... that course should be followed.” See Pursifell, HALL, C.J.,

also concurs. STEWART, (concurring): rigidity evidentiary could matters that Justice consequences. have untoward Evidence of opinion. majority How- I concur may appropriate prior crimes be or neces- ever, today’s opinion might other- because guilt phase sary in the for a posi- casting doubt on wise be taken as variety may reasons. Such evidence majority of the Court on one of a tion 404(b) pursuant prove Rule admissible append I comments. important point, these motive, intent, identity, other material necessary is majority that it The holds See, issues under certain circumstances. admissibility reach the issue Forsyth, e.g., State prove capital prior evidence used to crime 1982). may There even be instances when aggravating factor under Utah homicide prior a defendant chooses to adduce crime 76-5-202(l)(h) the ad- Ann. because Code § evidence, example, for to establish an alibi was at most harm- mission of evidence by showing that was incarcerated at ruling dis- error. That sufficient less addition, alleged time of an crime. In position here. issue Legislature has a number of instances Nevertheless, especially important it is prior made crimes elements of other sub- capital case make the law as clear stantive crimes. Constitutionalization of unnecessary error in possible so as to avoid might the rule affect use of reason, I think it future. For unanticipated ways. ef- crimes net my with appropriate state concurrence fect all this is that exclusion in this case opinion Zimmerman’s Justice prior aggravating of crimes as circum- evidence of other crimes which holds that process grounds on due could have stances aggravating prove used to circumstance far-reaching I ramifications that am not 76-5-202(l)(h) proved af- must be under § prepared confront. jury a first found a defendant ter has guilty underlying intentional homi-

cide. ZIMMERMAN, (concurring): Justice Bishop, In State join majority opinion. in the How I (Utah 1988), I joined Justice Zimmerman’s ever, point separately to out that the I write concurring opinion expressed a similar admitting in evidence of erred trial court legal in a different context. view somewhat prior convictions the before Gardner’s Nevertheless, expressly refrained from I whether had determined Gardner joining opinion insofar as it was based knowing a or international homic guilty of I grounds. Again, constitutional decline James, P.2d ide.1 See State adopt basis for rule. a constitutional (1989); Bishop, 556-557 (Zimmerman, J., 1988) historically The have had inherent courts 494-99 Durham, power joined over the of and supervisory concurring, order adduc- Stewart phase procedure ing J.J.). guilt in a case. Reliance on that evidence The bifurcated re is said was power preferable majority in this case is since it of the Court that a unanimously ordinarily Bishop to avoid constitutional in and that we quired better fol have been ruling is for in should imposed when there another basis deci- James James, 767 present of the rule re- in the case. See sion. Constitutionalization lowed 556-557; Payton, degree could lead to a quiring bifurcation P.2d at cf. Instructions, Inefficacy Limiting 9 Law & prior doubt that evidence of 1. If there of Note, 37, 37-39, (1985); acts tremendous convictions other bad has 41-47 Hum. Behav. unfairly; potential sway the finder of fact Judges' Non- Appearance Verbal and Justice: of dispelled be several re Trials, those doubts should Jury 38 Stan. Behavior in Criminal verbal See, e.g., empirical Greene & Lof cent tus, studies. & & 99 Table 120-24 n. L.Rev. Trial, & are at 9 Law When Crimes Joined 129-30, uniformly (1985). The studies 193-94, 196-98, 201, 204-06 Hum. Behav. involving the same or similar that in cases show facts, Teitelbaum, Johnson, (1985); & Sutton-Barbere prior convic- evidence of the admission of Prejudicial Evaluating the Evidence: Effect of charges signifi- joinder separate of tions or Judges Identify Impact Improper Evi Can accused cantly that the increases likelihood Juries?, 1983 Wis.L.Rev. 1173-74 dence on convicted. will be 4; Saks, nos. & Wissler & On & Table E (holding that (La.1978) J., (Zimmerman, concurring). 870-74 at 498-99 So.2d in introduced may not be convictions prior procedure preserves This both the ac- and that a murder guilt phase in cused’s interest a fair trial and as elements not serve they may therefore punishing repeat offend- State’s interest must murder but degree first the crime severely. legitimate ers more We found no penalty to introduction limited be by requiring state interest to served justify- circumstances aggravating phase as prior introduction of the unrelated crimes penalty). the death imposition of ing during guilt phase.2 virtually identical to that in A situation James, ago, issued several weeks present James both unanimously prior held that evidence of Bishop. During guilt presented in may convictions not be introduced Bishop’s trial for sexual abuse phase of guilt phase a first murder trial murder, the offered evidence of until after the finder fact has deter- prior sexual crimes. The many unrelated guilty mined whether the defendant is of a Justice, joined by Associate Chief Chief knowing killing. or intentional 767 P.2d at Howe, that the admission concluded Justice holding sepa- 556-557. That followed the during guilt phase did of this evidence majority Bishop, rate it but extended rights deny Bishop his constitutional 5—202(l)(h).3 James, section See by section 76-5- 76— because it was authorized P.2d at 556-557. Code, makes one 404.1(3)(g)of the eligible of sexual abuse of child convicted question The next is whether the trial if the penalty for an enhanced convicted proceeding court’s erroneous mode re- more than five other person has committed prejudicial sulted error. As Associate Bishop, 753 P.2d acts of sexual abuse. See notes, only Chief Justice Howe evi- 483-88; Utah Code Ann. satisfy dence of crimes introduced However, 76-5-404.1(3)(g) (Supp.1988). § 5—202(l)(h) requirements of section 76— opinion majority separate of the Code related to two robberies. See Stewart, Court, consisting of Justice Jus- 5—202(l)(h)(Supp. Code Ann. Utah § 76— Durham, me, held that the intro- tice 1988). previous After evidence of the the prior during duction of the crimes admitted, prosecutor crimes was re- guilt phase permitted by sec- was prior only ferred to the convictions as nec- 5—404.1(3)(g). Bishop, 753 P.2d tion See 76— essary to that the had demonstrate (Zimmerman,J., concurring). at 494-97 Al- proven aggravating element of first ternatively, we held that even if section (h). degree subpart murder contained in 76-5-404.l(3)(g) did authorize introduction took stand and Gardner disclosed his during guilt phase, of this evidence record, extensive criminal which included supervisory would exercise our inherent preju- other convictions that were more power require over trial courts to Finally, dicial than the two robberies. guilt trier of fact to determine on the un- had, in Gardner did not contest that he derlying charge un- before evidence of fact, committed the murder of which he prior related conduct could be admitted to convicted; only penalty. Bishop, 753 P.2d was defense was that enhance See 76-5-202(l)(h), provision Bishop, chal- 2. In Justice Durham and I would have 3. Section James, gone lenged present further and held that the Chief Justice’s and in both in l(3)(g) reading of section 76-5-404. violates the indistinguishable 76-5-404.1(3)(g), from section I, process due clause of article section 7 of the fact, Bishop. the section at issue Utah Constitution. 753 P.2d at 497-98. Justice separate majority opinion Bishop cites section ques- Stewart found no occasion to reach that 5—202(l)(h) produces as statute 76— case, present tion. In the there is no need to that the same evil that led to the conclusion question revisit the constitutional since the proof the trial order of followed already unanimously expressed itself Court has Bishop, Bishop improper. P.2d at was See being the evi- of the view that admission of J., (Zimmerman, concurring). 499 n. 8 improper dence of crimes was on noncon- James, grounds. stitutional See State Clatterbuck, (1989); P.2d 556-559 In re (Utah 1985). P.2d 1080-81 first intent for requisite have the did not murder. circumstances, I conclude these Under court by the trial the error committed standard contained harmless Rules of Criminal rule 30 of Utah Rules rule of the Utah

Procedure Bishop, 753 Evidence. See State v. J., (Zimmerman, concurring);

at 499-500 200, 204-05 & Hackford, 737 P.2d 30; 1987); Utah

n. 1 Utah R.Crim.P. error I also that the conclude

R.Evid. federal constitu- harmless under the standard, appli- error if it is

tional harmless 753 P.2d at 500-01 Bishop, here. See

cable J., Hackford,

(Zimmerman, concurring); at 205-06 n. 3. & reasons, I join foregoing

For the convic- holding

majority that Gardner’s be affirmed.

tion should

DURHAM, J., concurs ZIMMERMAN,

concurring opinion J. EQUALIZATION BOARD OF

COUNTY COUNTY, LAKE STATE OF

OF SALT

UTAH, Petitioner, TAX OF UTAH STATE COMMISSION Peters, Yocom, David E. Bill Thomas rel. ex SUNKIST SERVICE County. City, for Lake Lake Salt Salt COMPANY, Respondent. Skolnick, Wilkinson, F. L. Michael David No. 870261. City, for Tax Com’n. Lake Salt Pugsley, City, for Philip Lake C. Salt Supreme Court of Utah. Service Co. Sunkist March STEWART, Justice: filed petition is here on a This case Equaliza- County Lake Board the Salt an of the Utah State to review order tion prop- that real which held Tax Commission Company erty belonging Sunkist Service by Salt subject to reassessment was not County “escaped assessment” Lake Ann. 59-5-17 Utah Code §

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Gardner

Court Name: Utah Supreme Court

Date Published: Jan 31, 1989

Citation: 789 P.2d 273

Docket Number: 21027

Court Abbreviation: Utah