State v. HarrisState v. Harris
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Court of Appeals’ decision below. State v. Harris, 27 Wn. App. 2d 522, 533 P.3d 135 (2023). They are not disputed here.
In 2011, 17-year-old Harris fatally stabbed an acquaintance approximately 21 times and stole his wallet. Harris later admitted to the stabbing. The State charged Harris with first degree murder with a deadly weapon. Based on a prior juvenile adjudication for assault, Harris faced a standard range sentence of 240 to 320 months, with additional “flat time” for the deadly weapon enhancement.
After months of protracted negotiation, Harris pleaded guilty to second degree murder while armed with a deadly weapon and to first degree robbery. The standard range was 142 to 244 months for the murder charge and 41 to 54 months for the robbery. Harris and the State jointly recommended a sentence of 220 months for the second degree murder charge, with 24 months for the deadly weapon enhancement, and 54 months for the robbery to be imposed concurrently. In total, the parties agreed to recommend 244 months (approximately 20 years) of confinement.
Harris pleaded guilty, and the trial court accepted the plea. At sentencing, the prosecutor told the court that the plea was an agreed recommendation. Harris‘s defense attorney urged the court to follow the recommendation because it “was a heavily negotiated plea.” Tr. of Proc. (Aug. 17, 2012) at 38. The judge followed the
In 2020, Harris filed a personal restraint petition. Harris, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 528. Harris argued he was entitled to resentencing primarily based on Houston-Sconiers in order for the court to consider the mitigating qualities of youth. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as frivolous, noting among other things, that Harris presented no evidence of mitigation. Ord. Dismissing Pers. Restraint Pet., In re Pers. Restraint of Harris, No. 37530-7-III, at 4 (Wash. Ct. App. June 2, 2020).
In May 2021, Harris filed a notice of appeal. The State moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. In response, Harris sought an extension of time under RAP 18.8(b), arguing he was not prоperly advised of his right to appeal. Comm‘r‘s Ruling, State v. Harris, No. 38217-6-III (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2021). The Court of Appeals commissioner granted the extension of time.
At the Court of Appeals, the parties disputed whether Harris “ever bound himself [to the plea agreement] in a way that would limit his freedom to seek a lesser sentence.” Harris, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 529. Pursuant to a reference hearing, the court found that Harris had agreed to join the State‘s recommendation and not to seek a lesser sentence. Id. at 529-30; see also Findings of Fact for Ref. Hr‘g on Plea Agreement & Sent‘g, State v. Harris, No. 11-01-00945-4, at 1 (Yakima County Super. Ct., Wash. Apr. 14, 2023).
First, the court concluded that any resentencing hearing in which Harris explicitly or implicitly sought a lesser sentence would breach his plea agreement and the State would be entitled to rescind the agreement. Id. at 532-35. Next, the court recognized that as a new rule, Houston-Sconiers applies retroactively to all cases pending on direct appeal or that are not yet final. Id. at 536 (citing State v. Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 444, 114 P.3d 627 (2005)). Thus, the court held that Houston-Sconiers applies to Harris‘s case as a direct appeal. The State did not dispute that consideration of Harris‘s age was required, arguing instead that the error was harmless. Alternatively, the State argued that the remedy was not resentencing but for Harris to withdraw his guilty plea.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the State could not show the error was harmless. There was no way to know what information the sentencing court would have yielded in complying with Houston-Sconiers, therefore the Court of Appeals had no way to assess whether the information would have affected sentencing. Id. at 537 (quoting Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 319, 111 S. Ct. 731, 112 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1991)).
Despite finding a Houston-Sconiers violation, the Court of Appeals held that resentencing was not the appropriate remedy. Harris did not explain how he would avoid breaching the plea agreement at resentencing, and the State should not be required to participate in a resentencing process that is materially different to what the parties
The State filed a mоtion for reconsideration. When that motion was denied, the State petitioned for review in this court. Pet. for Rev. at 1, 4. Harris answered and filed a cross petition for review only on the appropriate remedy. Answer & Cross-Pet. for Rev. at 2-3.
We granted both petitions. State v. Harris, 2 Wn.3d 1010 (2023). We also received amici curiae briefing from the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys in support of the State and from Human Rights for Kids in support of Harris.
ANALYSIS
Houston-Sconiers requires trial courts to consider a juvenile defendant‘s youth and exercise discretion when sentencing juvenile offenders in criminal court. 188 Wn.2d at 21. We have not examined Houston-Sconiers‘s broad language in the context of plea agreements with joint sentencing recommendations on direct review. This case presents such an opportunity.
Because this case sits at the confluence of Houston-Sconiers, plea agreements, and the obligations for courts and parties flowing therefrom, it is useful to first examine those authorities.
Houston Sconiers
Houston-Sconiers extended Eighth Amendment protections against disproportionate punishment to all juveniles subject to the adult standard Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) sentence ranges and enhancements. Id. at 20-21;
Simply put, Houston-Sconiers directs courts to consider the full range of possible sentences—contemplating that defendants will most often be presenting mitigating evidence and advocating for a lesser sentence based on that evidence. See 188 Wn.2d at 21-23; State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 434, 387 P.3d 650 (2017) (quoting
Plea agreements
A plea agreement is a contract. State v. Sledge, 133 Wn.2d 828, 838-39, 947 P.2d 1199 (1997). Because plea agreements concern an accused‘s fundamental rights, due process considerations are also at play. Id. at 839. Due process requires the prosecutor to act in good faith and prohibits undercutting the terms or by conduct evidencing an intent to circumvent the terms of a plea agreement. Id. at 840, 843. Defendants owe the same duty of good faith. See In re Pers. Restraint of Breedlove, 138 Wn.2d 298, 307, 979 P.2d 417 (1999). Whether a plea agreement is breached is an objective inquiry. State v. Van Buren, 101 Wn. App. 206, 213, 2 P.3d 991 (2000).
The State is not obligated to enthusiastically make a sentencing recommendation, but it must participate in sentencing proceedings, answer the court‘s questions with candor, and cannot withhold relеvant information regarding the plea agreement. Sledge, 133 Wn.2d at 840.
A breach can occur when a party offers unsolicited information through a “report, testimony, or argument” that undercuts the party‘s obligation under the agreement. State v. Carreno-Maldonado, 135 Wn. App. 77, 83, 143 P.3d 343 (2006); State v. Williams, 103 Wn. App. 231, 236-39, 11 P.3d 878 (2000) (State breached the plea agreement when it made unsolicited references to aggravating factors and suggested the court go beyond
When a plea agreement is breached, the nonbreaching party has the choice of remedy: specific performance or recession. Id. at 36-37 (“Just as a defendant has the option to specifically enforce or rescind a plea agreement after a breach by the State, the State has the option to specifically enforce or rescind a plea agreement after a breach by the defendant.” (citations omitted)); In re Pers. Restraint of James, 96 Wn.2d 847, 850, 640 P.2d 18 (1982) (specific enforcement is available “provided the defendant has complied with the agreement“); State v. Hall, 32 Wn. App. 108, 110, 645 P.2d 1143 (1982) (“The State is expected to keep its bargains unless the defendant has failed to keep [theirs].“); State v. Harrison, 148 Wn.2d 550, 557, 61 P.3d 1104 (2003) (stating that the nonbreaching party may “withdraw [a] plea and be tried anew on the original charges or receive specific performance of the agreement“). The nonbreaching party‘s choice of remedy controls unless compelling reasons exist not to allow it. Id.
Judges play no role in plea negotiations.
Houston-Sconiers and Plea Agreements
Prosecutors and defendants continue to reckon with Houston-Sconiers and plea bargaining.1 Plea bargaining is an “essential” and “highly desirable” part “of the administration of justice.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971); 13 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3401, at 2 (3d ed. 2004) (“Plea negotiations are an important, if not essential, part of the criminal justice system.“). The negotiation of pleas leads to the majority of final dispositions in criminal cases. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012) (97 percent of federal convictions and 94 percent of state convictions result from guilty pleas); 13 FERGUSON, supra, at 2-3 (noting the majority of defendants are convicted by pleading guilty rather
Plea bargaining also allows swift closure for victims and preserves time and expense for all involved in the administration of criminal trials. Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (recognizing that plea agreements can benefit both parties based on the “potential to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources and for defendants to admit their crimes and receive more favorable terms at sentencing“). “[O]urs ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.‘” Id. at 143 (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012)). Plea bargaining is an integral tool in the criminal justice system and will continue to be widely used.
Houston-Sconiers did not consider plea agreements. The juvenile defendants in that case did not enter pleas; they were convicted and sentenced at a contested sentencing hearing. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 12-13.
Indeed, much of our juvenile sentencing case law involves contested sentencings rather than negotiated pleas with agreed sentence recommendations. E.g., State v. Scott, 190 Wn.2d 586, 588-89, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018) (holding the Miller-fix2 statute is an adеquate remedy when a juvenile received an exceptional sentence after a contested sentencing); Ord., State v. Vazquez, No. 97964-2, at 1-2 (Wash. June 5, 2020) (remanding
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the issue before us.
Harris argues that Houston-Sconiers requires the judge to consider the mitigating qualities of youth and that he must be allowed to present such evidence in spite of his plea bargain and agreed sentencing recommendation. We disagree.
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Houston-Sconiers and the cases interpreting it have done so almost exclusively in the context of contested sentencing hearings. The current case presents a different situation—a plea agreement with a joint sentence recommendation accepted by the court without meaningful consideration of the juvenile defendant‘s youth.4 None of our juvenile sentencing cases have addressed this issue. That is, whether a trial court in the first instance must independently collect mitigating evidence of youth even if it is not raised or argued for by the parties.
This issue of first impression implicates two competing interests: Houston-Sconiers‘s requirement that courts meaningfully consider a juvenile defеndant‘s youth and the critical role of plea bargaining in our legal system. To balance these interests, we hold that when parties negotiate a plea agreement requiring neither party to advocate for a lesser sentence, a trial court is not required to sua sponte ask the parties to provide mitigating evidence of youthful qualities if the court accepts the agreed recommendation. In such cases, the parties must answer the court‘s questions with candor. See Sledge, 133 Wn.2d at 840 (parties must candidly answer the court‘s questions and hold back no relevant information regarding the plea agreement). Nevertheless, parties must also take care not to violate the plea agreement when answering the court‘s questions. State v. Talley, 134 Wn.2d 176, 187, 949 P.2d 358 (1998) (the State must not “contradict its recommendation for a standard range sentence“); In re Pers. Restraint of Palodichuk, 22 Wn. App. 107, 111, 589 P.2d 269 (1978) (prosecutor undercut an agreement by expressing reservations about the agreed disposition to the court); State v. Coppin, 57 Wn. App. 866, 875, 791 P.2d 228 (1990) (prosecutor did not breach the agreement when explaining why he did not seek an exceptional sentence in response to a direct inquiry by the court).
Conversely, if the parties have not reached an agreed recommendation or if a court does not accept a plea and agreed recommendation, a trial court must meaningfully consider mitigating evidence related to the qualities of youth as required by Houston-Sconiers. The court must call on the defendant and the State to answer its questions about mitigating or aggravating factors, if relevant, to determine whether mitigation controls the court‘s sentencing decision. See Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21.
Holding otherwise risks destabilizing the plea-bargaining process in Washington. Such a holding would undo long-settled plea agreements for juveniles who negotiated and received recommended sentences. It would also increase the work of trial judges, requiring them to independently elicit evidence from defendants, who may not as a matter of strategy wish to (or cannot effectively) argue mitigating qualities of youth.
Accordingly, we hold that no error occurred when the trial court did not inquire into Harris‘s youth before accepting the plea agreement and imposing the recommended sentence.
2. Houston-Sconiers does not relieve the parties of the joint sentence recommendation
Alternatively, Harris contends that if he cannot present mitigation evidence and advocate for a lesser sentence, this should relieve the parties of the joint sentence recommendation. We disagree.
Harris bases this claim primarily on a quartet of California cases, which concludes that plea agreements incorporate subsequent changes in the law. Resp‘t‘s Suppl. Br. at 17-18 (citing John Doe v. Harris, 57 Cal. 4th 64, 66, 71, 73, 302 P.3d 598, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 290 (2013); People v. Carter, 97 Cal. App. 5th 960, 974, 315 Cal. Rptr. 3d 895 (2023); People v. Harrell, 95 Cal. App. 5th 161, 169, 313 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234 (2023));
In Doe, the California Supreme Court held that as a general rule in the state, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate and contemplate existing law and the power of the state to amend or enact additional laws. 57 Cal. 4th at 70 (“[T]he Legislature, for the public good and in furtherance of public policy, . . . has the authority to modify or invalidate the terms of an agreement.“). That parties entered a plea agreement, lawful at the time of negotiation and accepted by the court, “‘does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.‘” People v. Prudholme, 14 Cal. 5th 961, 975, 531 P.3d 341, 309 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814 (2023) (quoting Doe, 57 Cal. 4th at 66). “[R]equiring the parties’ compliance with changes in the law made retroactive to them does not violate the terms of the plea agreement.” Doe, 57 Cal. 4th at 73 (emphasis added).
California courts applying Doe closely examine the legislative intent of a subsequent law tо determine whether it was intended to apply to previous plea agreements, as well as whether the law spoke to remedies. E.g., Harris, 1 Cal. 5th at 989 (noting the later statute expressly referenced “serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea” (emphasis added)); Prudholme, 14 Cal. 5th at 975, 978 (unlike Harris, unambiguous statutory language did not exist and the court considered legislative history to determine intent and remedy); Harrell, 95 Cal. App. 5th at 164-69 (reviewing the text and legislative history of amendments relating to whether persons serving stipulated sentences were eligible for a certain type of relief); Carter, 97 Cal. App. 5th at 972-73 (holding the legislature intended to prohibit a prosecutor from withdrawing from a plea for any reduction in sentence); People v. Coddington, 96 Cal. App. 5th 562, 565, 314 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610 (2023) (holding the legislature intended to preclude a prosecutor from withdrawing from a plea when a certain offense is struck but allowing withdrawal if the sentence is otherwise reduced), rev. denied, No. S282336 (Cal. Jan. 31, 2024).
In his statement of additional authorities, Harris provides only one Washington case in support—State v. McRae, 96 Wn. App. 298, 304-05, 979 P.2d 911 (1999).6 McRae considered a due process challenge to an offender score—the defendants argued their juvenile adjudications must be excluded from their adult offender scores based on their plea bargains. Id. at 303. The Court of Appeals disagreed that the defendants had a substantive right stemming from earlier sentencing laws in their plea agreements that the prosecutor violated. Id. at 305. Instead, the court concluded the statements alleged to give rise to specific performance to exclude certain offenses were not promises from the State to disregard future changes in the law or assurances that the law would not change.
It does not appear that McRae and the cited California cases apply outside the legislative context. McRae involved later amendments to sentencing laws. Id. at 300. Doe, and the cases in its line, “incorporated only laws amended or enacted by a legislative body. It did not consider the impact of post-plea changes in decisional law.” Laura Arnold, The “Romeo & Juliet” Scenario in the Aftermath of Johnson v. Superior Court, 45 SW. L. REV. 959, 983 (2016) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
McRae and the California cases are inapposite. Nevertheless, even if we adopt those cases and assume that plea agreements in Washington are not insulated from changes in the law, Houston-Sconiers did not involve a statutory change. Moreover, the intent of the legal change at issue (Houston-Sconiers) did not contemplate previously made plea agreements. See Prudholme, 14 Cal. 5th at 975.
Houston-Sconiers was intended to prevent disproportionate sentencing for juvenile offenders subject to adult standard SRA sentences. 188 Wn.2d at 21. This is accomplished by ensuring that judges have wide discretion when sentencing juveniles and that they exercise that discretion in a meaningful way. But the decision does not speak to modifying plea agreements, especially a plea that contains an express promise not to seek a lesser sentence. Houston-Sconiers requirements also anticipate that defendants will most often present mitigating evidence supporting a lesser sentence. See Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 434. Neither Houston-Sconiers nor any other decision has required
Considering Houston-Sconiers‘s facts and reasoning, as well as the lack of precedent requiring courts to independently collect mitigation evidence, Houston-Sconiers did not intend its requirement that courts must consider mitigation evidence should be applied to plea agreements where defendants received the sentences for which they bargained.7 Harris provides no reason to relieve the parties of their joint sentence recommendation.
3. The remedy for a Houston-Sconiers violation is resentencing
The Court of Appeals found a Houston-Sconiers violation but, in light of the parties’ plea bargain, held that the remedy in this context is for Harris to withdraw his
A motion to withdraw a plea made after entry of judgment is reviewed as a collateral attack, even if raised via direct appeal. State v. Buckman, 190 Wn.2d 51, 60, 409 P.3d 193 (2018); State v. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 124-26, 285 P.3d 27 (2012). We permit defendants to withdraw pleas when it appears withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, that is, if a plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 794, 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. A.N.J., 168 Wn.2d 91, 119, 225 P.3d 956 (2010).
A voluntary plea made pursuant to then applicable law does not become vulnerable because of subsequent judicial decisions. Pet. for Rev. at 8-11; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) (“[A] voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.“). Lamb explained that a defendant must be “informed of the direct consequences of the plea that existed at the time of the plea.” 175 Wn.2d at 129. Applied to Harris, a postplea change in the law would not render his plea invalid because he was properly informed of the consequences in force at the time he was sentenced. See id.
While no Houston-Sconiers error occurred here, the proper remedy if it had would be resentencing. See id. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding on this issue.8
CONCLUSION
To balance the competing interests of parties who have reached an agreed sentencing recommendation with Houston-Sconiers protections for juvenile defendants, we hold that when a sentencing court intends to follow a plea agreement and sentencing recommendation, there is no requirement that the court solicit mitigating and/or aggravating factors from the parties. On the other hand, if the sentencing court does not follow the proffered agreement and intends to impose a different sentence, Houston-Sconiers requires meaningful consideration of a defendant‘s youth. In that case, a party does not violate its agreement by strictly answering the sentencing court‘s questions and does not advocate for a lesser sentence. Similarly, the State does not breach its agreement if it responds to a trial court‘s questions regarding aggravating evidence.
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals on different grounds and reverse in part. We affirm Houston-Sconiers‘s application to Harris because this case is on direct
Because we conclude no error occurred and affirm Harris‘s sentence, we decline to address the remaining issues regarding notice and breach of a plea agreement on resentencing.
Madsen, J.
WE CONCUR:
González, C.J.
Johnson, J.
Owens, J.
Stephens, J.
Yu, J.
Whitener, J.
While I join the majority, I nevertheless write to acknowledge my support for the dissent‘s vision of juvenile justice reform and the disappointment in the lost opportunities of prior decisions. However, I do not join the dissent because the majority correctly strikes the balance between application of our current case law, the need to protect juvenile privacy, and respect for the role of defense counsel in our adversarial criminal legal system.
As a matter of both statutory and constitutional law, trial judges are authorized to cоnsider youthfulness of a juvenile defendant sentenced in adult court, with “full discretion to depart from mandatory sentencing enhancements and to take the particular circumstances surrounding the defendant‘s youth into account.”
Defense counsel may present oral argument or submit a presentence report to outline the defendant‘s circumstances, such as youthfulness, in support of a sentencing recommendation, joint or otherwise. See
A judge cannot and should not assume anything regarding what information was discussed in plea negotiations. The only inquiry that ought to be vigorously pursued is whether the person understands the nature of the charges, the consequences, and whether the plea is voluntary. Dangerous assumptiоns cannot be avoided if trial judges were required to seek out mitigating information regarding youthfulness before accepting a joint sentencing recommendation in every case involving a juvenile defendant. I agree with the majority that such a
A rule requiring trial judges to solicit mitigating information about a defendant‘s youth could have a negative impact by undermining the defense attorney‘s role and placing the trial judge in the position of a defense advocate. Conversely, because the trial judge cannot know what occurred during plea negotiations, a probe into the defendant‘s life in search of circumstances that relate to youthfulness may inadvertently unearth aggravating points that could be used to increase, rather than decrease, the defendant‘s sentence. In either scenario, the trial judge risks stepping outside their role as neutral adjudicator by substituting their assumptions for counsel‘s profеssional judgment.
Requiring trial judges to question juvenile defendants about their personal histories in adult court undermines the defendant‘s interest in privacy, creating “very real and objectively observable negative consequences.” State v. S.J.C., 183 Wn.2d 408, 432, 352 P.3d 749 (2015). In contrast to juvenile court proceedings, juvenile defendants placed in adult court are not afforded the same benefit of having their court records sealed pursuant to statute. See id. at 430, 434. Therefore, these defendants can expect no confidentiality at sentencing. The statements made by, and about, a juvenile defendant in adult court will become part of the public record. This public information could lead to the “denial of
In juvenile courts, “‘[a]ccess to and the use of juvenile records should be strictly controlled.‘” Id. at 429 (alteration in original) (quoting INST. OF JUD. ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASS‘N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE RECORDS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 115-16 (1980)). Hоwever, within the context of juveniles tried in adult court, the only barrier that protects a juvenile defendant‘s privacy is defense counsel. In consultation with their client, defense counsel alone can control whether mitigating information about youthfulness is disclosed to a trial judge and, if so, how it can be done in a way that furthers the defendant‘s objectives and priorities.
Defense counsel may have strategic and tactical reasons not to disclose certain information about a defendant‘s life in open court. They are entitled to a presumption of effective advocacy in making this decision, even if the undisclosed information could be viewed as mitigating by a sentencing judge. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). By exercising restraint and respecting defense counsel‘s role, trial judges can ensure
The dissent‘s vision for juvenile justice reform is one in which I wholeheartedly share. However, it is imperative that trial judges remain neutral and impartial to best serve the interests of justice throughout the criminal legal system, including juvenile justice reform efforts. Trial judges cannot maintain their neutral role if they are required to solicit mitigating evidence sua sponte before accepting a juvenile defendant‘s plea and joint sentencing recommendation. Further, courts must take care to limit the amount of private information a juvenile defendant is compelled to provide in open court, respecting defense counsel‘s duty and ability to obtain the best possible outcome for their client.
For these reasons, I respectfully join the majority.
Yu, J.
Whitener, J.
As this court has repeatedly recognized, “‘[c]hildren are different.‘” State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 8 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012)). Children possess diminished culpability compared to adults, which renders certain punishments unconstitutionally disproportionate for youth. Id. at 19 n.4 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-71, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010); Miller, 567 U.S. at 483). In Houston-Sconiers, we held thаt when punishing children convicted as adults, the
In this case, no one disputes that Houston-Sconiers applies to Harris or that his sentencing hearing failed to comport with the constitutional requirement that the
The State and the majority focus on the plea agreement as binding Harris and the State, preventing Harris from presenting mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing—though all agree the parties would have to answer candidly any questions
Sentencing judges are “not bound by any recommendations contained in an allowed plea agreement.”
The majority‘s holding that a person such as Harris can never have a proper, constitutional sentencing hearing forces us to confront the truth: that this error of constitutional proportions has no remedy. Houston-Sconiers was decided during a period where this court acted as a front-runner in recognizing the robust constitutional protections for children accused of committing crimes. E.g., State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 72-73, 85-90, 428 P.3d 343 (2018) (life without parole (LWOP) sentences for children are categorically unconstitutional under the Washington Constitution); In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 311-13, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (plurality opinion) (mandatory LWOP sentences for young adults at least up to age 20 are unconstitutional under the Washington Constitution).
For example, we have recognized that not only did Houston-Sconiers announce a new rule applicable to all cases that are not yet final—it also applies retroactively to cases on collateral review as a substantive constitutional rule that prohibits adult sentences that would be disproportionate punishment for juveniles with diminished culpability. Ali, 196 Wn.2d at 237. In doing so, we explicitly held that “[t]he substantive protection of proportionate punishment ceases to exist without the mechanism to determine whether the juvenile belongs in the class of culpability
Once again, “the majority . . . is either mistaken or dishonest” in its view that no Houston-Sconiers error occurred here, where the record shows the sentencing did not comport with the mandatory requirements of Houston-Sconiers, and that Harris is not entitled to any remedy. Id. at 309 (Yu, J., concurring in dissent). The majority holds that in light of a plea and agreed recommended sentence, the defendant cannot raise and the court need not consider the mitigating qualities of youth that we
To be sure, to so limit the efficacy of Houston-Sconiers in the context of plea agreements will have vast consequences. As the majority acknowledges, the overwhelming majority of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas. Majority at 9. That means that in reality, astonishingly few children charged as adults will actually receive sentenсing that comports with Houston-Sconiers if, as the majority‘s result compels, those
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Montoya-Lewis, J.
Gordon McCloud, J.