STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. TIMOTHY HAAG, Petitioner.
No. 97766-6
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
September 23, 2021
En Banc
WHITENER, J.
In 1995, Haag was sentenced to mandatory life without parole for a crime he committed at the age of 17. In 2018, at a Miller-fix1 resentencing conducted pursuant to
We hold that the resentencing court erred because it gave undue emphasis to retributive factors over mitigating factors. We also hold that Haag‘s 46-year minimum term amounts to an unconstitutional de facto life sentence. We reverse and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 1994, at the age of 17, Haag killed Rachel Dillard, his 7-year-old neighbor. At that point in his life, Haag had already gone through several difficult experiences: abandonment by his father; poverty; bullying at school; “psychological maltreatment by his stepfather[;] and the sudden loss of his best friend,” Alex Dillard2—the victim‘s older brother—who had recently fled the Dillard family home. Clerk‘s Papers (CP) at 68. He was also a closeted gay juvenile in a small community in the early 1990s; he worried that if anyone learned he was gay, he would be rejected. Id. at 71-72.
Convicted in 1995 of aggravated first degree murder for the killing of Rachel Dillard, Haag has spent the decades since in prison. During that time, Haag has shown tremendous growth and maturity. He accumulated only one infraction, in 1997. Id. at 88-89. He earned a high school diploma “as soon as he got to Walla Walla [State Penitentiary].” 2 VRP (Jan. 12, 2018) at 159. He has worked throughout his incarceration, including in the prison chapel and in the kitchen. Id. He became a Jehovah‘s Witness, testifying
In 2018, Haag was resentenced under our Miller-fix statutes,
Both of Haag‘s expert witnesses independently administered the SAVRY test (Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth test) to analyze whether, at the time of the crime, Haag would likely have reoffended. CP at 76, 90. Both concluded that Haag would have been at a low risk of reoffending at the time of the offense. Id. at 77, 92.
One of the experts, Dr. Roesch, performed further tests: the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), a self-reported test used to analyze “adult personality and psychopathology,” and the HCR-20 (Historical Clinical Risk Management-20), which assessed Haag‘s current risk of reoffending. Id. at 89, 92. According to Dr. Roesch, “the PAI does not indicate any serious mental health issues that would demand treatment.” Id. at 90. Similarly, the HCR-20 showed that Haag “is currently considered a low risk for reoffending.” Id. at 93.
Haag also presented evidence that he has matured in prison. Pearson, the volunteer prison chaplain, testified by video recording that Haag is “a mature adult.” 2 VRP (Jan. 12, 2018) at 108. Dr. Roesch concluded similarly. Id. at 83. Haag himself testified about the sincere remorse he feels for the crime. Id. at 161. He also testified that he knew he would not commit another violent act because prison had presented him with situations where he could have responded with violence, but he had chosen not to. Id. at 165-66. Haag requested a 25-year minimum term. CP at 59.
In contrast, the State offered no expert testimony and no testimony designed to rebut the evidence produced showing that Haag was unlikely to reoffend. Instead, the State offered victim impact testimony from Judith Rodger Dillard, Rachel‘s mother; Alex Dillard, Rachel‘s brother; Susan Kahn Dillard, Rachel‘s older sister; John Dillard, Rachel‘s father; and Dan Huntington, a family friend and Rachel‘s former tae kwon do instructor. Alex Dillard testified, “I do not believe that this man is capable of being—I do not believe that this crime is capable of reform.” 2 VRP (Jan. 12, 2018) at 141 (emphasis added). He also stated, “I don‘t think that you can equate a 25-year sentence for, you know, someone who murdered someone in a bar fight, and give that same sentence to a baby killer.” Id. (emphasis added). His family expressed similar sentiments. See, e.g., id. at 142-47. The prosecutor asserted that the “sentencing isn‘t about [Haag]” but “about justice for an innocent little girl whose last 15 minutes of life were a struggle for breath while being throttled by that man‘s hands.” Id. at 114 (emphasis added). The State requested a 60-year minimum sentence. Id. at 121.
The resentencing court acknowledged that the “State offered nothing to rebut [the] conclusions and assertions” of Haag‘s experts regarding Haag‘s rehabilitation. 1 VRP (Jan. 19, 2018) at 23. However, it also found that “there is no analysis that informs the Court that Mr. Haag has addressed and overcome certain factors that led to the violent murder of . . . [a] small child.” Id. In deciding on Haag‘s new sentence, the court explained its reasoning:
So the Court is faced with the daunting task of properly weighing a multiplicity of factors, which include a vile, cowardly, and particularly heinous multi-step strangulation and drowning of a defenseless, sixty-five pound little girl committed by a three hundred pound[,] seventeen-year-old young man that resulted in a convict[ion] for aggravated murder in the first degree. I‘m also to consider the then-youthful brain of Mr. Haag with diminished decision-making capacity, who simultaneously lived through some very difficult circumstances while still enjoying a supportive relationship and activities. And also, a man convicted of murder who has exhibited a stellar track record in prison and has been
assessed as a low risk for violently re-offending. In balancing these pieces of the puzzle, the Miller court and the statutory factors, and all the other factors that I mentioned earlier, the Court does now hereby impose a sentence—a minimum sentence of forty-six years in prison and a maximum of life in prison.
Id. at 27.
Haag appealed, arguing that the resentencing court failed to meaningfully weigh the mitigating factors and that his sentence amounted to an unconstitutional de facto life sentence. State v. Haag, No. 51409-5-II, slip op. at 13, 15 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019, as amended Sept. 17, 2019) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2051409-5-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. The Court of Appeals upheld his sentence. Id. at 13-16.
Haag petitioned this court for review. The State filed an answer. We stayed our decision to grant review pending our decision in State v. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 456 P.3d 806 (2020). We then requested and received supplemental briefing regarding granting review from both parties. The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality also filed two amicus briefs in support of granting the petition for review. We granted review. Haag and the Korematsu Center filed further briefs. Subsequent to oral argument, we requested and received further briefing on Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 209 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2021).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We will reverse a sentencing court‘s decision only if we find ‘a clear abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law.‘” Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 116 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Blair, 191 Wn.2d 155, 159, 421 P.3d 937 (2018)). “A trial court abuses its discretion when ‘its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds.‘” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 127, 285 P.3d 27 (2012)).
A decision is based on untenable grounds when its factual findings are unsupported by the record. Id. (quoting Lamb, 175 Wn.2d at 127). “We review findings of fact for substantial evidence,” which “‘exists where there is a sufficient quantity of evidence in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding.‘” Id. (citing State v. Dobbs, 180 Wn.2d 1, 10, 320 P.3d 705 (2014), and quoting State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994)).
ANALYSIS
Haag argues that the sentencing court erred because it placed more emphasis on retribution than mitigation and that his sentence amounts to an unconstitutional de facto life sentence. We agree. At a Miller-fix sentencing conducted pursuant to
I. Juvenile sentencing under federal and state law
Haag‘s appeal arises out of a line of cases and statutes that control juvenile sentencing in our state. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments [to the United States Constitution] forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.” Then, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids “the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”
Next, the Court decided Miller, 567 U.S. 460. Noting that ”Roper and Graham establish[ed] that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing,” id. at 471, the Court held that “mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate
The Court based its holding on several principles. These included “juveniles[‘] . . . diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,” which was derived from “common sense” as well as “science and social science.” Id. at 471. In particular, the Court made clear that “‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.‘” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 71).
Miller did more than just prohibit mandatory life without parole for juveniles. It also “determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is excessive for all but ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.‘” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80). Under Miller, it is not enough for a sentencing court to merely consider how children are different. Id. Rather, “[e]ven if a court considers a child‘s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects ‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.‘” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479). While ”Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement” that sentencing courts find a child is incorrigible or irreparably corrupt, states are not “free to sentence a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without parole.” Id. at 211. Such a punishment for such a child violates the Eighth Amendment. Id.3
Most recently, the Court decided Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307. There, the Court reaffirmed that Miller does not require a juvenile defendant to be found to be incorrigible before sentencing that juvenile defendant to life without parole. Id. at 1311.
In response to Miller, our state legislature enacted what are commonly referred to as Miller-fix statutes, including
In setting a minimum term, the court must take into account mitigating factors that account for the diminished culpability of youth as provided in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)[,] including, but not limited to, the age of the individual, the youth‘s childhood and life experience, the degree of responsibility the youth was capable of exercising, and the youth‘s chances of becoming rehabilitated.
Our court has expanded on this background. In State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, we held that ”Miller . . . appl[ies] to juvenile homicide
When conducting a Miller-fix hearing governed by
Additionally, in our state the “resentencing courts must consider the measure of rehabilitation that has occurred since a youth was originally sentenced to life without parole.” Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 121 (emphasis added). Such hearings must therefore be forward looking, focusing on rehabilitation rather than on the past. See id. at 122.
It is on this foundation that Haag‘s case has come before us.
II. The resentencing court clearly misapplied the law because it emphasized retribution over mitigation
Haag argues that the resentencing court erred because of its “fixation on retribution,” which “overshadowed its obligations to conduct a sentencing that meets the requirements of Miller.” Pet. for Review at 20. We agree.
The Miller Court made clear that retribution cannot take precedence in juvenile sentencing. See 567 U.S. at 472 (“Because ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale’ relates to an offender‘s blameworthiness, ‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.‘” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 71)). It, instead, focused on the “‘mitigating qualities of youth.‘” Id. at 476 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 125 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1993)). This followed the Court‘s decision in Graham, where the Court noted that states must provide juvenile offenders with “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 560 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 473 (”Graham‘s reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile.“).
Our Miller-fix statute followed suit. “[T]he purpose [of the Miller-fix statute] is to require sentencing courts to ‘take into account mitigating factors that account
Miller-fix resentencing hearings must, therefore, focus on mitigation evidence. Resentencing courts must take into account the mitigating qualities of youth and its attendant circumstances.
Finally, we have made clear that Miller-fix hearings must be forward looking, not backward looking. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 122. True, we have not prohibited sentencers from taking into account retributive factors. See Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 453 (impliedly permitting sentencer‘s invocation of the penological justifications from Miller, which would include retribution); Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 118 (impliedly permitting sentencer‘s use of the nature of the crime in its evaluations). But “‘[t]he key question is whether the [juvenile] defendant is capable of change.‘” Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 122 (quoting United States v. Briones, 929 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2019)).
Here, the resentencing court improperly placed more emphasis on retribution than on mitigation. The court‘s focus was clearly backward looking, disregarding the forward-looking focus required by our statutes and our case law. Rather than treating the retributive factors as secondary, the resentencing court‘s emphasis on retribution was stark. It noted that “rehabilitation is not the sole measure in sentencing.” 1 VRP (Jan. 19, 2018) at 25. Retribution also matters, the resentencing court declared, and “[u]nder the retributive theory, severity of the punishment is calculated by the gravity of the wrong committed.” Id. With that principle guiding it, the court weighed what it termed “a vile, cowardly, and particularly heinous multi-step strangulation and drowning of a defenseless, sixty-five pound little girl committed by a three hundred pound[,] seventeen-year-old young man” against the mitigating factors. Id. at 27. The resentencing court‘s ultimate explanation of its sentence—set out in full above, see supra pp. 5-6—shows its focus was backward looking, driven by retribution and not mitigation.
Even when the resentencing court considered youth, it primarily focused on the youth of the victim, Rachel Dillard, and not on Haag‘s youth at the time of the offense. See 1 VRP (Jan. 19, 2018) at 17. “Children are our most precious asset, they literally are the future,” the court said, in reference to Rachel Dillard. Id. Rachel was a vessel of hope for the future, but these hopes “were obliterated when Miss Rachel was savagely slain by Mr. Haag.” Id. at 18. In contrast, the resentencing court‘s discussion of Haag‘s youth was cursory at best. It is encapsulated by the court‘s comment that “according to case law Mr. Haag‘s youthfulness does reduce his culpability.” Id. at 20. Thus, Haag‘s youth was not meaningfully considered as we require—only Rachel Dillard‘s was. See Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 434-35 (“At the Miller hearing, the court must meaningfully consider how juveniles are different from adults [and] how those differences apply to the facts of the case.“).
The resentencing court supported its focus on retribution by finding that “there is no analysis that informs the Court that Mr. Haag has addressed and overcome certain factors that led to the violent murder of . . . [a] small child.” Id. at 23. But Haag‘s rehabilitation evidence was voluminous and was uncontroverted by the State. He had only one infraction in prison, in 1997, and no evidence was presented of any poor behavior in the decades since. CP at 88-89. He obtained a high school diploma soon after entering prison. 2 VRP (Jan. 12, 2018) at 159. He worked throughout his incarceration in the prison chapel and the kitchen. Id. He became a Jehovah‘s Witness, and his religious beliefs motivate him to help others. Id. at 162. Both of Haag‘s expert witnesses concluded that he would have been at a low risk of reoffending just after having committed the crime. CP at 77, 92. One expert, Dr. Roesch, provided evidence that Haag is unlikely to reoffend now. Id. at 93. Expert testimony also provided evidence that Haag would have had trouble, as a 17-year-old, making decisions—even more so than the average juvenile. Id. at 73-74.
In contrast, the State produced only victim impact testimony. The only evidence the State presented on Haag‘s present mental state was a reference to a statement made by an unnamed person allegedly incarcerated alongside Haag that was conveyed by a third party via Facebook to Alex Dillard. 2 VRP (Jan. 12, 2018) at 137. In fact, the resentencing court noted that the “State offered nothing to rebut [the] conclusions and assertions” regarding Haag being “a good candidate for rehabilitation.” 1 VRP (Jan. 19, 2018) at 23. There was thus not “‘a sufficient quantity of evidence in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person‘” that Haag was not rehabilitated. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 116 (quoting Hill, 123 Wn.2d at 644); see also id. at 124 (Miller-fix statute does not allocate the burden of proof to either the defendant or the State at a resentencing hearing). The resentencing court‘s finding of fact to the contrary therefore lacked substantial evidence, amounting to an abuse of discretion. See Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 116 (trial court abuses its discretion when a finding of fact lacks substantial evidence).
Overall, in the face of the substantial and uncontroverted mitigating evidence presented by Haag, the resentencing court favored retributive factors over an abundance of mitigation factors. We agree with Haag that “the uncontroverted evidence of change and maturity produced by Haag was impermissibly discounted by the [resentencing] court in its focus on the crime and the role of retribution.” Suppl. Mem. in Supp. for Pet. for Review (Jul. 20, 2020) at 16. We hold that in a Miller-fix hearing conducted under
Taking a different approach, the Court of Appeals reasoned that trial courts have “‘complete discretion‘” to weigh the factors however they see fit in a Miller-fix sentencing. Haag, No. 51409-5-II, slip op. at 14 (emphasis added) (quoting Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21). But Houston-Sconiers held “that sentencing courts must have complete discretion to consider mitigating circumstances associated with the youth of any juvenile defendant, even in the adult criminal justice system, regardless of whether the juvenile is there following a decline hearing or not.” 188 Wn.2d at 21. This does not mean that a sentencing court‘s application of mitigating factors is unreviewable on appeal.
To reject Haag‘s argument, the Court of Appeals also relied on our statement in Ramos that “‘we cannot reweigh the evidence [from a sentencing decision] on review.‘” Haag, No. 51409-5-II, slip op. at 12 (quoting Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 453). But in Ramos, our overall concern was whether the resentencing court reasonably considered the appropriate factors and correctly applied Miller. Id. at 14. Reversing does not run afoul of Ramos, as here we are analogously concerned with whether the resentencing court correctly applied our statutes and our precedent. Our statutes and precedent require that mitigation factors count for more than retributive factors. Reversing on the ground that the resentencing court here did not adhere to that rule does not result in impermissible reweighing of the evidence but, instead, follows the requirements set forth in the analogous scenario presented in Ramos.
The State argues that “[t]he Petitioner‘s claim [regarding the sentence] comes down to a simple disagreement with the sentence and with the outcome of the trial court‘s evaluation.” Resp. to Pet. for Review at 7. But Haag‘s claim amounts to more than a simple disagreement about the sentence. It shows how the resentencing court erroneously applied our precedent and our statutory scheme, thereby committing reversible error.
III. Haag‘s sentence amounts to an unconstitutional de facto life sentence
Haag also argues that his 46-year minimum sentence amounts to an unconstitutional de facto life sentence. We agree.
A sentence of 46 years to life amounts to a de facto life sentence for a juvenile offender because it leaves the incarcerated individual without a meaningful life outside of prison. As our sister states have persuasively reasoned, “[t]he United ”
States Supreme Court viewed the concept of “life” in Miller and Graham more broadly than biological survival; it implicitly endorsed the notion that an individual is effectively incarcerated for “life” if he will have no opportunity to truly reenter society or have any meaningful life outside of prison.” Casiano v. Comm‘r of Corr., 317 Conn. 52, 78, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015) (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). “A juvenile offender,” like Haag, “is typically put behind bars before he [or she] has had the chance to exercise the rights and responsibilities of adulthood, such as establishing a career, marrying, raising a family, or voting.” Id. at 77. A 46-year sentence for Haag results in his losing meaningful opportunities to reenter society and to have a meaningful life.
A 46-year sentence for a 17-year-old offender means they will miss out on the developments of the world. They will inevitably fall behind. Technological advancements will have occurred during their decades in prison that will make readjustment to life on the outside difficult. The very way people interface with each other, and the world, will have dramatically changed. Such changes have already occurred since Haag‘s conviction in 1995. The Internet was a nascent thing; cell phones were, for the few who had them, only phones. Now, the Internet is ubiquitous: it is how many apply for jobs, how many (especially in a time of national crisis) are able to do their jobs at all.
As Casiano shows, we are not the first court to come to such conclusions. See 317 Conn. at 54, 76-80 (holding that a 50-year minimum term “may be deemed a life sentence for purposes of Miller“). Several of our sister states, faced with this same issue, have come to the same or a similar result for much the same reasons. See State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 448, 152 A.3d 197 (2017) (55-year minimum sentence for juvenile is the “practical equivalent of life without parole“); Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶¶ 11, 33, 334 P.3d 132, 136, 141-42 (2014) (Miller applied to what was effectively
These cases from our sister states are instructive. In light of them, and the foregoing principles, we hold that a juvenile offender sentenced to a 46-year minimum term simply has little chance to meaningfully engage with society as an adult. A juvenile sentenced to be released at the age of 63 has lost incalculably more than an adult in the same circumstances, the ability to work, to vote, or even to operate a motor vehicle. Moreover, a crime committed by a juvenile is inherently different from a crime committed by an adult, due to juveniles’ decreased culpability. See, e.g., Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 81 (discussing how children are different for sentencing purposes). Haag, having committed a terrible crime at the age of 17, deserved and received punishment—but given the shortened life expectancy and compromised health associated with life in prison, releasing Haag from confinement at the age of 63 deprives him of a meaningful opportunity to return to society, depriving him of a meaningful life. See Evelyn J. Patterson, The Dose-Response of Time Served in Prison on Mortality: New York State, 1989-2003, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 523, 523 (Mar. 2013) (discussing shorter life expectancy for incarcerated persons). Haag‘s sentence is therefore a de facto life sentence.
The State disagrees, asserting that Haag‘s sentence cannot be a de facto life sentence because the age at he which he will be eligible for release, 63, is shorter than the average human life-span. The State relies on Ramos for this conclusion. But Ramos did not hold that a sentence must exceed the average human life-span to amount to a de facto life sentence; it indicated only that such a sentence was a de facto life sentence. 187 Wn.2d at 434. Any confusion on this matter was cleared up in Delbosque, where we clarified that Ramos “did not define ‘de facto life sentence’ as a ‘total prison term exceeding the average human life-span.‘” 195 Wn.2d at 122 (quoting Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 434).
Today we determine that Haag‘s 46-year sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence; therefore his sentence is unconstitutional under the
CONCLUSION
The resentencing court clearly misapplied the law because it placed far more emphasis on retributive factors than on mitigation factors when determining Haag‘s new sentence. It also abused its discretion because its finding lacked substantial evidence that Haag had not overcome the factors that led to the murder. In addition, we hold that Haag‘s sentence amounts to an unconstitutional
WE CONCUR.
Whitener, J.
González, C.J.
Gordon McCloud, J.
Yu, J.
Owens, J.
Montoya-Lewis, J.
State v. Haag (Timothy)
No. 97766-6
Johnson, J., concurring
JOHNSON, J. (concurrence)—I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that the resentencing court abused its discretion and committed reversible error. I agree that the proper remedy is to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. Based on this, it is not necessary to go further and analyze whether the now vacated sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence.
Johnson, J.
Madsen, J.
State v. Haag (Timothy)
No. 97766-6
Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part
STEPHENS, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part)—When Timothy Haag was 17 years old, he killed his 7 year old neighbor. Haag was convicted of aggravated first degree murder in 1995, and the sentencing court imposed the only punishment then allowed by Washington law: life in prison without the possibility of parole. See
Seventeen years after Haag‘s conviction, the United States Supreme Court decided the
Haag was resentenced in 2018 and received a minimum term of 46 years in prison. He appealed, arguing the resentencing court did not meaningfully weigh his extensive—and uncontested—evidence of diminished culpability. Haag also argues his 46-year minimum term constitutes a de facto LWOP sentence in violation of the federal and state constitutions. The Court of Appeals rejected Haag‘s claims, and we granted review.
I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that Washington‘s Miller-fix statutes require courts to emphasize the mitigating qualities of youth over retributive factors when sentencing an offender who committed aggravated first degree murder as a child. Because Haag‘s resentencing court failed to do so, I agree the proper remedy is to vacate Haag‘s sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with
While I join Justice Johnson‘s concurrence, I write separately to explain why Haag‘s argument that a 46-year minimum sentence is unconstitutional is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Jones v. Mississippi.3 Because this court‘s interpretation of the
ANALYSIS
The
The Supreme Court seemed to retreat from Miller‘s announcement that it did not categorically bar LWOP sentences for any class of juvenile offenders in Montgomery v. Louisiana.4 There, the Court held that ”Miller drew a line between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209. Drawing that line, the Court explained, “rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for . . . juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.” Id. at 208 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989)); see also id. (“Even if a court considers a child‘s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the
So courts across the country, including this court, understood and applied the
I. Haag‘s Sentence is Not Unconstitutional under Jones v. Mississippi‘s Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
While Haag‘s case was pending before us, the United States Supreme Court again revisited its
Haag‘s argument, accepted by today‘s majority, is premised on Montgomery‘s now-rejected view that “states are not ‘free to sentence a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without parole‘” under “the
The majority admits “Justice Sotomayor‘s dissent . . . suggested that the Jones majority called this rule into question, if not outright abandoned it,” but it nevertheless concludes that “the Jones majority does not, in fact, disturb this rule.” Majority at 10 n.3. I acknowledge a dissent‘s view is not binding precedent. But when a dissent, a concurrence, and the majority opinion all agree on what a Supreme Court decision means, this court is not free to disregard that meaning. And here, every published opinion in Jones makes clear that the majority‘s holding means the
Justice Sotomayor‘s dissent makes that point in its opening paragraph:
[T]he majority claims that the
Eighth Amendment permits juvenile offenders convicted of homicide to be sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) as long as “the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencer therefore has discretion to impose a lesser punishment.” In the Court‘s view, a sentencer never need determine, even implicitly, whether a juvenile convicted of homicide is one of “those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.” Even if the juvenile‘s crime reflects “unfortunate yet transient immaturity,” he can be sentenced to die in prison.
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1328 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing id. at 1311; Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209; Miller, 567 U.S. at 479).
Justice Thomas‘s concurrence similarly explains the majority‘s holding:
The [majority] opinion candidly admits both that Miller‘s rule was “procedural” and that Montgomery “ma[de] the rule retroactive.” The only way to reconcile these statements with the bottom-line judgment in this case—that Jones is not entitled to a determination whether he falls within a constitutionally protected category of offenders—is to reject Montgomery. And sure enough, the majority does just that, albeit in a footnote.
Id. at 1327 (Thomas, J., concurring) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting and citing id. at 1315-16, 1316-18, 1317 n.4 (explaining Montgomery is “in tension” with many other decisions)).
And the Jones majority itself explains that “permanent incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion” or “a factual prerequisite” which “a sentencer [must] find . . . before
Though I might prefer Montgomery‘s interpretation of Miller to Jones‘s as a matter of policy, I cannot ignore that Jones‘s interpretation is controlling as a matter of
II. The Decisions of Other State Supreme Courts Do Not Support Categorically Barring a 46-Year Minimum Sentence
In my view, the majority unnecessarily decides that a 46-year minimum term “amounts to a de facto life sentence for a juvenile offender because it leaves the incarcerated individual without a meaningful life outside of prison.” Majority at 20. In support of this broad holding, the majority cites four decisions from other state supreme courts. Majority at 21-22 (citing Casiano v. Comm‘r of Corr., 317 Conn. 52, 54, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015) (holding 50-year minimum term for juvenile implicates Miller); State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 448, 152 A.3d 197 (2017) (55-year minimum sentence for juvenile implicates Miller); Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶¶ 11, 33, 334 P.3d 132 (2014) (Miller applied to what was effectively a 45-year minimum sentence, which was the “functional equivalent of life without parole“); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 70-71 (Iowa 2013) (52.5-year minimum term implicates Miller)). The majority effectively suggests we would join our sister states by recognizing a minimum term of 46 years constitutes a de facto life sentence for juvenile offenders. Majority at 22.
I respectfully disagree. We have already joined our sister states in recognizing that a de facto life sentence implicates the protections of Miller. See Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 437 (“We now join the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the question and hold that Miller does apply to juvenile homicide offenders facing de facto life-without-parole sentences.“). In reaching that conclusion, Ramos cited three of the four out-of-state cases the majority
Like Ramos, these four out-of-state cases considered whether a lengthy term of years triggers Miller‘s requirement that sentencing courts “consider[] the specific nature of the crimes and the individual‘s culpability before sentencing a juvenile homicide offender to die in prison.” Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 438-39; see also Casiano, 317 Conn. at 73 (“Our inquiry in the present case, therefore, focuses on whether the imposition of a fifty year sentence without the possibility of parole is subject to the sentencing procedures set forth in Miller.“); Zuber, 227 N.J. at 448 (“[W]e find that the lengthy term-of-years sentences imposed on the juveniles in these cases are sufficient to trigger the protections of Miller.“); Bear Cloud, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 32 (“We next turn to the question of whether a lengthy aggregate sentence . . . whose practical effect is that the juvenile offender will spend his lifetime in prison triggers the
However, none of these cases hold that the
The majority attempts to buttress its holding that a 46-year sentence is categorically unconstitutional with a single reference to a case interpreting Washington‘s constitution as more protective than the
We have never announced that a term of years less than life is categorically equivalent to an LWOP sentence for juvenile offenders. See Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 439 n.6 (“We reserve ruling on that question until we have a case in which it is squarely presented.“); State v. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 122, 456 P.3d 806 (2020) (“Although the trial court clearly intended to impose a life sentence when setting Delbosque‘s 48-year minimum term, the question of whether this amounts to a de facto life sentence is not squarely presented here, either. We therefore decline to address the issue.“). Bassett alone cannot support such a holding, as it did not involve a term of years sentence with the possibility of release. Yet the majority provides no other reasoning or authority under Washington‘s constitution.
The majority‘s de facto LWOP holding is all the more puzzling because it is unnecessary to resolve the case before us. This court unanimously agrees that Haag must be resentenced in light of the evidence of his rehabilitation, with the appropriate focus on the mitigating qualities of youth under
CONCLUSION
Under
Stephens, J.