STATE OF OHIO, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. KATRON GRAYS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 111600
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
July 20, 2023
[Cite as State v. Grays, 2023-Ohio-2482.]
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 20, 2023
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-21-663463-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Carl M. Felice and Tasha L. Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
The Law Office of Jaye M. Schlachet and Eric M. Levy, for appellant.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} Pursuant to
En Banc Decision
{¶ 2} It is well established that “[a] criminal defendant’s choice to enter a plea of guilty or no contest is a serious decision.” State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 25. Thus, due process requires that a defendant’s plea be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 10 (lead opinion), citing Clark at ¶ 25. “‘Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.’” State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996).
{¶ 3}
{¶ 4} Although the nonconstitutional rights listed in
if a defendant is induced to enter a guilty plea by erroneous representations as to the applicable law, the plea has not been entered knowingly and intelligently, but the defendant must demonstrate prejudice resulting from the erroneous representation, i.e., that but for erroneous information, the plea would not have been made.
State v. Ealom, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91455, 2009-Ohio-1365, ¶ 19. Thus, whether the trial court made an erroneous statement of law during its
{¶ 6} The criminal defendants in Bobo and Grays were each convicted of second-degree felonies that were subject to the Reagan Tokes Law and carried mandatory prison terms pursuant to
{¶ 7} Following sentencing in each case, Bobo and Grays filed direct appeals, arguing, among other things, that their pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made because the trial court inaccurately advised them that they were entitled to a reduction of their mandatory prison terms for exceptional conduct or an adjustment to incarceration. Each defendant maintained that but for the trial court’s erroneous advisement, they would not have entered their guilty pleas.
{¶ 8} Following a careful examination of the record in each case, this court affirmed Bobo’s and Grays’ convictions, generally finding that their pleas were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Significantly, however, the panels reached opposing legal conclusions regarding the novel issue of whether the trial court erroneously advised the defendants that they were eligible for certain sentencing reductions on their mandatory terms of imprisonment. In Bobo, for instance, this court found the trial court erred “when it advised Bobo that he could earn credit for good behavior to reduce his mandatory prison term * * *.” Bobo at ¶ 24. Nevertheless, the Bobo panel concluded that Bobo was not prejudiced by the trial court’s incorrect statement of law under the specific circumstances presented in that case.
{¶ 9} In contrast, the Grays panel concluded that the identical advisement did not constitute a misstatement of law. The panel clarified that a defendant who is subject to an indefinite sentence is eligible for the sentencing reductions
{¶ 10} As previously discussed, the advisement debated in Bobo and Grays has been commonly given to criminal defendants during
Does a trial court err during a Crim.R. 11 colloquy by advising a defendant, who is subject to an indefinite prison term under the Reagan Tokes Law, that he or she may earn a reduction on his or her minimum prison term for exceptional conduct or an adjustment to incarceration when the defendant is required to serve a mandatory prison term pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)?
De novo review applies to questions of statutory interpretatiоn. Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, 938 N.E.2d 342, ¶ 8. A court’s main objective is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent. State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trs., 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 647 N.E.2d 486 (1995). “The question is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. “When the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly has said,” Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12, and apply the statute as written, Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18, citing Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 11.
State v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4485, ¶ 24.
I. Applicable Principles of Felony Sentencing
A. The Reagan Tokes Law
{¶ 12} The Reagan Tokes Law, effective as of March 22, 2019, implemented a system of indefinite sentencing for nonlife felonies of the first- and second-degree committed on or after the effective date.
{¶ 14} As relevant here, the Reagan Tokes Law also includes reformative-based incentives for offenders, including a provision for “earned reduction of minimum prison term” (“ERMPT”). The provision, governed by
do not apply with respect to an offender serving a non-life felony indefinite prison term for a sexually oriented offense, and no offender serving such a prison term for a sexually oriented offense is eligible to be recommended for or granted, or may be recommended for or granted, a reduction under those divisions in the offender’s minimum prison term imposed under that non-life felony indefinite prison term.
{¶ 15} Interpreting the language used in
B. Mandatory Prison Terms
{¶ 16} Whether an offender is required to serve a mandatory term of imprisonment is also expressly set forth under the Ohio Revised Code. In pertinent part, a “mandatory prison term” is defined as “the term in prison that must be imposed for the offenses or circumstances set forth in divisions (F)(1) to (8) or
Notwithstanding divisions (A) to (E) of this section, the court shall impose a prison term or terms under sections 2929.02 to 2929.06, section 2929.14, section 2929.142, or section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and except as specifically provided in section 2929.20, or section 2967.191 of the Revised Code or when рarole is authorized for the offense under section 2967.13 of the Revised Code shall not reduce the term or terms pursuant to section 2929.20, division (A)(2) or (3) of section 2967.193 or 2967.194,3 or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code for any of the following offenses:
* * *
(4) A felony violation of section * * * 2903.08 * * * of the Revised Code if the section requires the imposition of a prison term;
(5) A first, second, or third degree felony drug offense for which section * * * 2925.03 * * * of the Revised Code, whichever is applicable regarding the violation, requires the imposition of a mandatory prison term[.]
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 17} The plain language of
C. Resolution of the Applicable Statutory Provisions
{¶ 18} After careful consideration, we find the broad, exclusory language of
{¶ 19} The eligibility requirements for ERMPT are unambiguous and expressly reflect the legislature’s intent to limit access to the reductions to a limited and very specific group of offenders. Significantly, the language used in
{¶ 20} “‘It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that when an irreconcilable conflict exists between two statutes that address the same subject matter, one general and the other special, the special provision prevails as an exception to the general statute.’” State v. Pribble, 158 Ohio St.3d 490, 2019-Ohio-4808, 145 N.E.3d 259, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Conyers, 87 Ohio St.3d 246, 248, 719 N.E.2d 535 (1999).
[i]f the cоnflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.
Id. As explained by the Ohio Supreme Court:
The rationale behind the general/specific canon is that ‘“the particular provision is established upon a nearer and more exact view of the subject than the general, of which it may be regarded as a correction.’ Or think of it this way: the specific provision comes closer to addressing the very problem posed by the case at hand and is thus more deserving of credence.”
Pribble at ¶ 13, quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 183 (2012), quoting Jeremy Bentham, General View of a Complete Code of Laws, reprinted in 3 The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 210 (John Bowring Ed.1843).
{¶ 21} Applying the foregoing principles to the competing statutes, we are unable to construe
{¶ 22} Moreover, regardless of whether this court were to construe
{¶ 23} Similarly, even if this court were to deem
incentivize[s] socially acceptable conduct by offering inmates a tangible way to reduce their overall sentences through buying into the social contract — a tacit agreement to live together in accordance to the socially established rules of behavior. * * * The Reagan Tokes Law offers inmates the opportunity to demonstrate their willingness to reform and, in the process, to receive lesser sentences based on their behavior, instead of serving definite terms. These changes provide the inmate the opportunity to reduce the overall prison term below what would be served under the pre-S.B. 201 definite sentencing structure. Id. Under
the pre-S.B. 201 definite sentencing law, Ohio focused on the punitive nature of the imprisonment system. The Reagan Tokes Law offers an albeit small, but beginning, step away from that draconian approach.
(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 6. Thus, the Reagan Tokes Law, including the provisions governing an offender’s ability to reduce his or her minimum prison term by 5 to 15 percent, reflects the General Assembly’s goal “to return Ohio to its core sentencing approach [by] implementing the reformative incentive for offenders that was lost to the definite sentencing structure.” Id. at ¶ 12. Given the breadth of felony offenses listed under
{¶ 24} In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that
An incarcerated adult serving a mandatory prison term, as defined under section 2929.01 of the Revised Code, will not be considered for a recommended reduction until all mandatory prison terms have expired.
{¶ 25} The relevance and practical function of
it is the role of the judiciary, not administrative agencies, to make the ultimate determination about what the law means. Thus, the judicial branch is never required to defer to an agency’s interpretation of the law. As we explain, an agency interpretation is simply one consideration a court may sometimes take into account in rendering the court’s own independent judgment as to what the law is.
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27} Based on the foregoing, we find the Reagan Tokes Law only prevents offenders serving a nonlife indefinite prison term for a sexually oriented offense from earning the sentencing reductions contemplated under
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.; FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, LISA B. FORBES, EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, SEAN C. GALLAGHER, KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, MARY EILEEN KILBANE, and MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JJ., CONCUR
MARY J. BOYLE, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
EMANUELLA D. GROVES and MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JJ., CONCUR WITH JUDGE MARY J. BOYLE’S DISSENTING OPINION
{¶ 28} I respectfully dissent. In this en banc decision, we are to resolve the following question of law:
Does a trial court err during a Crim.R. 11 colloquy by advising a defendant, who is subject to an indefinite prison term under the Reagan Tokes Law, that he or she may earn a reduction on his or her minimum prison term for exceptional conduct or an adjustment to incarceration when the defendant is required to serve a mandatory prison term pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)?
The en banc majority resolves this issue by answering the question in the negative. I respectfully disagree and would answer the question in the positive.
{¶ 29} The en banc majority chooses to construe
{¶ 30} The trial court’s misinformation that Bobo is entitled to good-time credit resulted in partial compliance with
{¶ 31} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would not find a conflict between Grays and Bobo.
Merit Panel Decision
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 32} Defendant-appellant, Katron Grays (“Grays”), appeals from his convictions and sentence. He raises the following assignments of error for review:
- The trial court erred when it found Grays’s plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and that he was aware of the maximum penalty involved where at the time of his change of plea he was given inaccurate information about prison reduction where the trial court imposed a mandatory prison sentence.
- Grays’s indefinite sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes sentencing scheme violates Grays’s rights under the United States Constitution applied to the state of Ohio through the Fourteenth Amendment аnd the Ohio constitutions as it denies Grays due process of law; violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial; violates the separation of powers doctrine; does not provide fair warning of the dictates of the statute to ordinary citizens; and the statute conferred too much authority to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.
- Grays’s sentence is contrary to law where the trial court failed to comply with the required notices contained in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) when imposing sentence.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶ 34} On October 15, 2021, Grays was named in a four-count indictment, charging him with aggravated-vehicular assault in violation of
{¶ 35} On March 15, 2022, Grays withdrew his previously entered pleas of not guilty and expressed his desire to accept the terms of a negotiated plea agreement with the state. At the conclusion of a
{¶ 36} At sentencing, the trial court imposed an indefinite prison term of 8 to 12 years on Count 1 in accordance with the Reagan Tokes Law (enacted through S.B. 201). Grays was also sentenced to six months in jail on Count 3, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on Count 1.
{¶ 37} Grays now appeals from his convictions and sentence.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Crim.R. 11
{¶ 38} In the first assignment of error, Grays argues his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made because the trial court inaccurately advised him that he was entitled to good-time credit on a mandatory, minimum prison term. Grays contends that “by misstating the law and advising [him] that his mandatory prison sentence could be reduced, [he] was prejudiced and improperly induced into entering a guilty plea due to the inaccurate statement of law made by the trial court.” Grays suggests that but for the erroneous advisemеnt, he would not have pleaded guilty.
{¶ 39} “Ohio’s
(a) Determin[e] that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Inform[ ] the defendant of and determin[e] that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Inform[ ] the defendant and determin[e] that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶ 40} “When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the trial court proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.” Dangler at ¶ 13. “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). A defendant must establish prejudice “‘on the face of the record’” and not solely by virtue of challenging a plea on appeal. Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Hayward v. Summa Health Sys., 139 Ohio St.3d 238, 2014-Ohio-1913, 11 N.E.3d 243, ¶ 26.
{¶ 41} The traditional rule is subject to two limited exceptions. Id. at ¶ 14-16. Under these two exceptions, no showing of prejudice is required (1) when a trial court fails to еxplain the constitutional rights set forth in
{¶ 42} When reviewing a trial court’s compliance with
(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?
Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286 at ¶ 17.
{¶ 43} In this case, there is no dispute that the trial court prоperly explained the constitutional rights Grays would be waiving by pleading guilty.
(1) The court shall impose a mandatory prison term, as described in division (D)(4) of this section, on an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1) of this section.
* * *
(4) A mandatory prison term required under division (D)(1) or (2) of this section shall be a definite term from the range of prison terms рrovided in division (A)(2)(b) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a felony of the second degree * * * except that if the violation is a felony of the second degree committed on or after the effective date of this amendment, the court shall impose as the minimum prison term for the offense a mandatory prison term that is one of the minimum terms prescribed for a felony of the second degree in division (A)(2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 45} In turn,
For a felony of the second degree committed on or after the effective date of this amendment, the prisоn term shall be an indefinite prison
term with a stated minimum term selected by the court of two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code, except that if the section that criminalizes the conduct constituting the felony specifies a different minimum term or penalty for the offense, the specific language of that section shall control in determining the minimum term or otherwise sentencing the offender but the minimum term or sentence imposed under that specific language shall be considered for purposes of the Revised Code as if it had been imposed under this division.
{¶ 46} A review of the record establishes that the trial court advised Grays of the maximum penalties associated with the second-degree felony offense of aggravated-vehicular assault and the first-degree misdemeanor offense of operating while under the influеnce. Specifically, the trial court advised Grays that he was subject to a mandatory prison term on his second-degree felony offense and could be sentenced to a maximum prison term of 8 to 12 years. The trial court then explained the implications of the indefinite sentencing scheme enacted by the Reagan Tokes Law, including the rebuttable presumption that Grays will be released at the end of the minimum term imposed. Finally, the court notified Grays that he may reduce his minimum prison term under certain circumstances, stating:
Further, you may earn a reduction on the minimum term in increments of five to 15 percent if you demonstrate exceptional conduct or adjustment to incarceration.
(Tr. 8.)
{¶ 47} On appeal, Grays suggests that the trial court’s advisement concerning his eligibility for a sentencing reduction constituted a misstatement of law that
{¶ 48} Consistent with the decision of this court sitting en banc, we find the Reagan Tokes Law provides Grays the ability to earn a reduction on his mandatory-minimum prison term if he demonstrates exceptional conduct while incarcerated or an adjustment to incarceration.
{¶ 49} The first assignment of error is overruled.
B. The Reagan Tokes Law
{¶ 50} In the second assignment of error, Grays argues the trial court erred by imposing an indefinite sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law. He contends the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutionаl because it violates his right to a trial by jury, the separation-of-powers doctrine, and his right to due process5 under the Ohio
{¶ 51} Consistent with the well-establish precedent of this court, we find no merit to the constitutional challenges raised within this assigned error. The question of whether the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional was decided in this court’s en banc opinion in Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.). There, this court found “that the Reagan Tokes Law, as defined under
{¶ 52} Moreover, we are unable to conclude thаt trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to challenge the constitutionality of Grays’s prison term at the time of sentencing.
{¶ 53} A criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the effective assistance of counsel at all “critical stages” of a criminal proceeding, including sentencing. State v. Davis, 159 Ohio St.3d 31, 2020-Ohio-309, 146 N.E.3d 560, ¶ 7 (“sentencing is a critical stage in which a felony offender has a right to counsel“), citing State v. Schleiger, 141 Ohio St.3d 67, 2014-Ohio-3970, 21 N.E.3d 1033, ¶ 15, and Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977).
{¶ 54} As a general matter, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation; and (2) that counsel’s errors prejudiced the defendant, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland at 687-688, 694; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. “Reasonable probability” is “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
{¶ 55} As stated, this court has routinely rejected the constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law that are presented in this appeal. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.). Therefore, even if trial counsel had challenged the constitutional validity of Grays’s indefinite prison term, the objection would have proven to be unsuccessful. Under these circumstances, Grays cannot establish the requisite level of prejudice to warrant a finding of ineffective assistance
{¶ 56} The second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Reagan Tokes Notifications
{¶ 57} In the third assignment of error, Grays argues his sentence is contrary to law because the trial court failed to comply with the notice requirements of
{¶ 58} When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the standard of review set forth in
{¶ 59} Pursuant to
* * *
(c) If the prison term is a non-life felony indefinite prison term, notify the offender of all of the following:
(i) That it is rebuttably presumed that the offender will be released from service of the sentence on the expiration of the minimum prison term imposed as part of the sentence or on the offender’s presumptive earned early release date, as defined in section 2967.271 of the Revised Code, whichever is earlier;
(ii) That the department of rehabilitation and correction may rebut the presumption described in division (B)(2)(c)(i) of this section if, at a hearing held under section 2967.271 of the Revised Code, the department makes specified determinations regarding the offender’s conduct while confined, the offender’s rehabilitation, the offender’s threat to society, the offender’s restrictive housing, if any, while confined, and the offender’s security сlassification;
(iii) That if, as described in division (B)(2)(c)(ii) of this section, the department at the hearing makes the specified determinations and rebuts the presumption, the department may maintain the offender’s incarceration after the expiration of that minimum term or after that presumptive earned early release date for the length of time the department determines to be reasonable, subject to the limitation specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised Code;
(iv) That the department may make the specified determinations and maintain the offender’s incarceration under the provisions described in divisions (B)(2)(c)(i) and (ii) of this section more than one time, subject to the limitation specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised Code;
(v) That if the offender has not been released prior to the expiration of the offender’s maximum prison term imposed as part of the sentence, the offender must be released upon the expiration of that term.
{¶ 60} “No specific language is required, but the court must impart this information to a defendant at the time of sentencing.” State v. Gates, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110615, 2022-Ohio-1666, ¶ 21.
{¶ 61} In this case, the trial court made the following statement at the time of sentencing:
Reagan Tokes does apply to this case. So the minimum sentence in this matter is eight [years], and the maximum sentence is 12 years. There is a presumption that you are released after eight years; however, the ODRC has the legal right under Senate Bill 201 to rebut that presumption and to extend your period of confinement for 50 percent of the term I have imposed.
If ODRC makes that decision, you will be released after the additional time is served. The decision tо extend your term in this county is the sole authority of the ODRC, and they alone made the determination based on such criteria as your conduct while incarcerated, your rehabilitation, the threat they believe you pose to the community, whether any restrictive housing sanctions were imposed on you during your incarceration, as well as your security classification.
(Tr. 30-31.)
{¶ 62} After careful review of the sentencing colloquy in its entirety, we find the trial court partially complied with the requirements of
{¶ 63} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court failed to fully comply with the requirements of
{¶ 64} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellee and appellant share the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issuе out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR
N.B. Judge Eileen T. Gallagher joined the dissent by Judge Lisa B. Forbes in Delvallie and would have found that
Judge Lisa B. Forbes is constrained to apply Delvallie. For a full explanation, see State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.) (Forbes, J., dissenting).