THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DANGLER, APPELLEE.
Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2765
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Decided May 5, 2020
No. 2017-1703—Submitted February 20, 2019
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Williams County, No. WM-16-010, 2017-Ohio-7981.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Dangler, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2765.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Criminal law—
{¶ 1} Brad Dangler pleaded no contest to sexual battery and then sought to vacate his plea on appeal. He contends that his plea was invalid because the trial court failed to comply fully with
{¶ 2} We disagree. When a trial court has told a defendant that he is subject to the sex-offender-registration scheme, that defendant is entitled to have his conviction vacated for lack of a more complete explanation only if he demonstrates prejudice—that is, that he would not have entered the plea but for the incomplete explanation. Because Dangler has not demonstrated prejudice, he is not entitled to withdraw his plea.
A Plea and an Appeal
{¶ 3} Dangler was indicted on one count of rape of a substantially impaired person in violation of
{¶ 4} Before accepting the plea, the trial court engaged Dangler in a plea colloquy. The court instructed Dangler at the outset, “If I ask you a question that you do not understand, please stop me and I will rephrase it.” The court told Dangler the maximum possible prison term and fine
{¶ 5} The trial court proceeded with sentencing a month later. At the hearing, the court designated Dangler a Tier III sex offender, detailed his obligations with respect to registration and in-person verification, and informed him of the possibility of criminal prosecution for noncompliance. Dangler clarified the date of his initial registration and indicated that he had no other questions about the terms of his sex-offender status. The court then imposed the agreed-upon 36-month prison term and a mandatory five-year period of postrelease control.
{¶ 6} Dangler appealed, raising two assignments of error. First, he sought to have his plea vacated on the grounds that the trial court had not complied with
{¶ 7} The state defended the plea, arguing that the trial court had substantially complied with
{¶ 8} Relying on this court‘s decision in State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, the Sixth District Court of Appeals concluded that the registration and in-person verification requirements, community-notification provisions, and residency restrictions are punitive sanctions. Under the Sixth District‘s view, each of these requirements constitutes a separate penalty and therefore a trial court must go over each requirement in order to comply with
{¶ 9} The Sixth District certified that its decision was in conflict with decisions from the Second District Court of Appeals in State v. Young, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013-CA-22, 2014-Ohio-2213, and the Eighth District
During a plea hearing, does the failure of the sentencing court to inform a defendant of all of the penalties associated with a sex offender classification imposed by
R.C. Chapter 2950 constitute a complete failure to comply withCrim.R. 11 and render the plea void without the need to show prejudice resulted?
152 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2018-Ohio-723, 92 N.E.3d 876.
Compliance with Crim.R. 11
{¶ 10} Because a no-contest or guilty plea involves a waiver of constitutional rights, a defendant‘s decision to enter a plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 25; see State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). If the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional. Id.
{¶ 11} Ohio‘s
{¶ 12} Ever since the rule‘s adoption in 1973, we have been grappling with how best to review a trial court‘s colloquy to ensure that a defendant‘s plea is knowing and voluntary. See State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). In keeping with that objective, our focus in reviewing pleas has not been on whether the trial judge has “[incanted] the precise verbiage” of the rule, State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977), but on whether the dialogue between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his plea, State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008- Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 15-16; Clark at ¶ 26; State v. Miller, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-1420, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 19.
{¶ 13} When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the trial-court proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error. See State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 14-15; Stewart at 93;
{¶ 14} We have made a limited exception to the prejudice component of that rule in the criminal-plea context. When a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, we presume that the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is required. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, at ¶ 31; Veney at syllabus. We have identified these constitutional rights as those set forth in
{¶ 15} We have created one additional exception to the prejudice requirement: a trial court‘s complete failure to comply with a portion of
{¶ 16} Aside from these two exceptions, the traditional rule continues to apply: a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of
{¶ 17} Unfortunately, our caselaw has muddled that analysis by suggesting different tiers of compliance with the rule. The court has, in some instances, said that “partial” compliance is sufficient absent a showing of prejudice from the failure to “substantially” comply, see, e.g., Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, at ¶ 32. Elsewhere, the court has indicated that when a trial court has “substantially” complied, the defendant must show prejudice from the failure to “strictly” or “literally” adhere to the rule, see, e.g., Nero at 107-108; see also Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d at 93, 364 N.E.2d 1163. But those formulations have served only to unduly complicate what should be a fairly straightforward inquiry. Properly understood, the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?
The “Maximum Penalty”
{¶ 18} At issue here is compliance with
{¶ 19} In concluding that the sex-offender-registration scheme constitutes a penalty for the purposes of
{¶ 20} Williams did not address whether the sex-offender-registration scheme constitutes a penalty for purposes of
{¶ 21} The Sixth District held that it was not enough for the trial court to inform Dangler that he was subject to the sex-offender-registration scheme; the trial court was also required to separately go over the registration and in-person verification requirements, community-notification provisions, and residency restrictions imposed by
{¶ 22} We disagree. Contrary to the view of the Sixth District, the Williams court did not decide that any specific element of the statutory scheme constitutes a criminal penalty. Rather, we explicitly stated that “[n]o one change compels our conclusion that S.B. 10 is punitive.” Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, at ¶ 21. It was the changes to the statutes “in aggregate” that rendered the retroactive application of the statutory requirements punitive. Id. Thus, although
Dangler Cannot Demonstrate Prejudice
{¶ 23} The next question—must Dangler demonstrate prejudice?—is easily answered. The trial court did not completely fail to comply with
{¶ 24} Both parties have addressed the prejudice issue in their briefs to this court, and we have the full record before us, so we may resolve that issue now. Prejudice must be established “‘on the face of the record.‘” Hayward v. Summa Health Sys./Akron City Hosp., 139 Ohio St.3d 238, 2014-Ohio-1913, 11 N.E.3d 243, ¶ 26, quoting Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 462, 709 N.E.2d 162 (1999). There is nothing in the record indicating that Dangler would not have entered his plea had he been more thoroughly
Conclusion
{¶ 25} The trial court could have gone further than it did and reviewed with Dangler the entirety of his obligations and burdens under the sex-offender-classification scheme. And we encourage trial courts to be thorough in reviewing consequences of a defendant‘s decision to enter a plea, including those stemming from classification as a sex offender: the duty to register and provide in-person verification, the community-notification provisions, and the residency restrictions.
{¶ 26} But the trial court did not completely fail to comply with
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur.
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only.
DONNELLY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by STEWART, J.
DONNELLY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 27} At the time that appellee, Brad J. Dangler, filed the notice of his appeal to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, the consistent law of the Sixth District was to conclusively presume prejudice in the circumstances of cases like Dangler‘s. See, e.g., State v. McMahon, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-14-036, 2015-Ohio-3300, ¶ 19. Dangler was not on notice of a need to assert that he was in fact prejudiced by the trial court‘s failure to inform him of the community-notification requirements, periodic in-person-verification requirements, or residency restrictions contained in the statutory scheme governing sex offenders,
{¶ 28} That being said, I agree as a general matter that reversal is appropriate in this case and that the certified-conflict question should be answered in the negative. A trial court‘s failure to explain any one detail among the specific registration requirements, community-notification provisions, address-verification requirements, and residential restrictions associated with sex-offender classification does not constitute a “complete failure” to comply with
{¶ 29} When a trial court imposes a prison term, the commonplace understanding of imprisonment obviates the court‘s need to explain its meaning in detail. But merely reciting the word “prison” does not technically explain the nature of the penalty or describe the aspects that a defendant might find to be particularly burdensome or punitive. The trial court need not explain that prison involves the basic loss of liberty through physical confinement in a facility, as well as the loss of privacy and personal physical integrity on a number of levels. See, e.g.,
{¶ 30} Each way in which prison might curtail a defendant‘s liberty interests does not need to be explained in order to adequately notify a criminal defendant of the “maximum penalty involved” pursuant to
{¶ 31} But, of course, sex-offender classification is not as commonly understood as prison. By contrast, it is a relatively new concept. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). Over time, we can expect that the requirements and consequences involved in sex-offender classification will eventually become common knowledge. Currently, though, identifying the duration of sex-offender classification alone would satisfy only the minimum that would be needed to avoid a finding of complete noncompliance with
{¶ 32} The Sixth District has been correct in repeatedly emphasizing in its opinions that a trial court should be thorough in explaining the import of the new and still-evolving consequences of sex-offender classification. The best practices of a trial court would be to explain the registration requirements, community-notification requirements, address-verification details, and residential restrictions as described by the Sixth District in its opinion in this case and its opinions in other cases. In light of
{¶ 33} Ohio‘s trial courts need guidance on best practices regarding sex offenders’ pleas more than they need a re-explanation of basic concepts already established in Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224. I do not see why this court continues to review cases contesting the validity of guilty and no-contest pleas when this court ends up merely repeating already-existing standards in narrower and narrower terms. We could keep on accepting these cases, or we could do something useful; we could use our power to promulgate rules of procedure that incorporate standardized guilty and no-contest plea forms for sex offenses.
{¶ 34} The advantage of using a standard sex-offense plea form is that the defendant would receive notice of all significant aspects of sex-offender classification before the plea hearing even takes place, rather than receiving notice of registration requirements as an afterthought at the sentencing stage pursuant to
{¶ 35} Standard plea forms for sex offenses—and for that matter, all categories of criminal offenses—would enhance the efficiency of the judicial process and, more importantly, would bring us closer to achieving the goal of protecting all criminal defendants’ due-process rights. We should keep in mind that the defendants’ due-process rights are paramount in the plea process. Rather than putting our energy into ensuring the narrowness of appellate review for criminal defendants, our goal should be to help Ohio‘s trial courts ensure that guilty and no-contest pleas are knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.
STEWART, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
David T. Harold and Thomas A. Matuszak, Assistant Wood County Prosecuting Attorneys, as special prosecuting attorneys, for appellant.
Karin L. Coble, for appellee.