STATE OF OHIO v. JASON KAUFFMAN
No. 109579
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
May 6, 2021
[Cite as State v. Kauffman, 2021-Ohio-1584.]
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-19-640621-A
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 6, 2021
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Tasha L. Forcione and David Elias, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
{1} Appellant Jason Kauffman appeals his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but we issue a limited remand to the trial court for the issuance of a nunc pro tunc entry that deletes the firearm specifications from the sentencing entry.
Background
{2} On June 5, 2019, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery in violation of
{3} The assistant prosecutor set forth the terms of the plea agreement, under which appellant agreed to enter a guilty plea to Count 1 for aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree, as amended to delete the firearm specifications, and Count 2 would be deleted. Additionally, there was an agreed sentence of four years. The trial court engaged in a
{4} Because the original plea did not factor in the Reagan Tokes Law, the trial court resentenced appellant on February 3, 2020. The trial court indicated that appellant would be pleading guilty to “Count 1, amended to a felony of the 3rd degree, under
{5} The judgment entry indicated that appellant entered a plea of guilty to a high tier robbery in violation of
{6} Appellant timely filed this appeal.
Law and Analysis
{7} Appellant raises two assignments of error for our review. Under his first assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court violated
{8} A defendant‘s plea in a criminal case must be made “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” to be constitutional under the United States and Ohio Constitutions. State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 1996-Ohio-179, 660 N.E.2d 450.
{9} Relevant in this matter,
{10} “When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the trial court proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.” Dangler at ¶ 13. The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth two limited exceptions to the traditional rule in the criminal-plea context. Id. at ¶ 14-16. Under these two exceptions, no showing of prejudice is required (1) when a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights set forth in
{11} “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.‘” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Nero at 108. A defendant must establish prejudice “on the face of the record” and not solely by virtue of challenging a plea on appeal. Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Hayward v. Summa Health Sys., 139 Ohio St.3d 238, 2014-Ohio-1913, 11 N.E.3d 243, ¶ 26. Furthermore, “a defendant who has entered a guilty plea without asserting actual innocence is presumed to understand that he has completely admitted his guilt. In such circumstances, a court‘s failure to inform the defendant of the effect of his guilty plea as required by
{12} Thus, when reviewing a trial court‘s compliance with
{13} In this case, appellant was charged with aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree, and a misdemeanor theft offense. After two days of trial at which evidence was introduced implicating appellant in the commission of the crimes, he reached a plea agreement with the state. The state set forth the terms of the plea agreement and specifically stated appellant would be pleading guilty “to a felony of the 3rd degree robbery, under
{14} Although appellant claims that the trial court did not advise him of the charge to which he pled guilty, the record demonstrates otherwise. In addition to the state setting forth the charge to which appellant would be pleading guilty, the trial court informed appellant that the offense was robbery, a felony of the third degree, and the court advised appellant of the possible sentences that could be imposed, including minimum and maximum penalties. Additionally, the record demonstrates, and appellant concedes, that the trial court informed appellant of the constitutional rights he would be waiving. Further, appellant confirmed he understood the rights he was waiving by entering his guilty plea. Appellant also confirmed his understanding of the terms of the plea agreement, his acceptance of the agreement, and the agreed sentence.
{15} Appellant‘s primary argument on appeal is that the trial court failed to inform him that the effect of a plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt. Although the trial court did not specifically state that a plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt, appellant admitted he was guilty of the robbery charge and responded “yes” when asked if he was in fact guilty of the crime. Further, the trial court asked appellant if he understood that the
{16} Our review reflects that the trial court did not completely fail to comply with
{17} Appellant argues that although he never proclaimed his actual innocence, his pro se filings in the case reflected his belief that he is innocent and wanted his day in court. Although appellant claims various pretrial motions were filed that suggest he believed he was innocent and wanted his day in court, the case proceeded to trial and he ultimately entered a plea agreement. Appellant admitted he was guilty of the robbery charge, he did not assert actual innocence at the time of entering his plea, and he fails to show that he was precluded from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering his guilty plea. Further, to the extent the pretrial motions were unrelated to the entry of his plea, appellant is precluded from challenging those motions herein. See State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 117. It is apparent from the record that appellant understood the effect of his guilty plea and that the agreed sentence would be imposed upon the court‘s acceptance of the plea. Furthermore, there is nothing on the face of the record to support a conclusion that appellant would not otherwise have entered his plea. Therefore, appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice.
{18} Although not challenged on appeal, we also recognize that because an agreed sentence was imposed in this case, appellant did not have a right to appeal his sentence. At the plea hearing, appellant confirmed that he agreed to a sentence of four years, that he understood the plea agreement, and that he did not have any questions with reference to it. Although the trial court did not explain that appellant could not appeal the agreed sentence, as this court has previously recognized, ”
{19} The parties agreed that the trial court complied with
{20} Under his second assignment of error, appellant claims the sentencing entry differs from the sentence pronounced at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, he argues that the sentencing entry includes firearm specifications that
{21} Judgment affirmed; case remanded.
It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for issuance of a nunc pro tunc entry consistent with this opinion.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR