STATE OF NEW MEXICO v. JOHN FARISH
No. S-1-SC-36638
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
September 13, 2021
Opinion Number: 2021-NMSC-030
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI, Christina P. Argyres, District Judge. Released for Publication December 14, 2021.
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Steven James Forsberg, Assistant Appellate Defender Albuquerque, NM for Petitioner
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Respondent
BACON, Justice.
{1} This case reminds us that not all vehicles on New Mexico‘s roads and highways are in perfect condition. Specifically, this case asks whether a tail lamp with multiple bulbs violates
{2} Instead, we hold that tail lamps do not violate
I. BACKGROUND
{3} Bernalillo County Sheriff‘s Deputy Peter Martinez stopped Defendant John Farish in April 2012 on the basis that Defendant‘s tail lamp was defective. Deputy Martinez testified that, at the time of the stop, Defendant‘s right tail lamp was “working properly” but the large upper bulb in the left tail lamp was not illuminated. Deputy Martinez
{4} At each level of these proceedings, Defendant has argued that Deputy Martinez did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him because the facts and circumstances of this case do not support a conclusion that he was breaking the law or had broken the law at the time he was stopped, rendering the stop unconstitutional and the resulting evidence inadmissible. See State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 18, 21, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (holding that reasonable suspicion requires “particularized suspicion, based on all the circumstances that a particular individual, the one detained, is breaking, or has broken, the law“); State v. Santiago, 2010-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 148 N.M. 144, 231 P.3d 600 (noting that the federal and state constitutions generally require suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evidence).
{5} Following a bench trial, the metropolitan court rejected Defendant‘s argument and determined that Defendant violated
{6} In a split decision, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court and held that Defendant did not violate
No person shall drive or move on any highway any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer or pole trailer or any combination thereof unless the equipment upon every vehicle is in good working order and adjustment as required in the Motor Vehicle Code and the vehicle is in such safe mechanical condition as not to endanger the driver or other occupant or any person upon the highway.
{7} The Court of Appeals majority, quoting the record, concluded that because the tail lamp was “not working properly” and “was not working at 100 percent” and was “‘not working perfectly,” it “was not in good working order,” giving Deputy Martinez reasonable suspicion of a violation to support stopping Defendant under
{8} The Court of Appeals dissent disagreed, concluding that
{9} Defendant petitioned this Court for certiorari on a narrow question: “Can a person violate [Section] 66-3-901 . . . for having tail [lamps] that comply with the specific requirements set out in [Sections] 66-3-801 to -887?” Defendant argues that the answer is no. Specifically, Defendant argues that
{10} The State contends that the Court of Appeals majority is correct. The State argues that Deputy Martinez had a reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant under each statute proposed by the courts below—
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
{11} We review issues of statutory construction de novo. State v. McClendon, 2001-NMSC-023, ¶ 2, 130 N.M. 551, 28 P.3d 1092. “When this Court construes statutes, our guiding principle is that we should determine and effectuate the Legislature‘s intent when it enacted the statute.” State ex rel. Brandenburg v. Sanchez, 2014-NMSC-022, ¶ 4, 329 P.3d 654. We first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language. State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 9, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. If “the language is doubtful [or] ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity or contradiction,” then the Court will construe the statute in accordance with “its obvious spirit or reason.” State v. Tafoya, 2010-NMSC-019, ¶ 10, 148 N.M. 391, 237 P.3d 693 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, “we read the provisions at issue ‘in the context of the statute as a
B. Meaning of “Good Working Order” in Section 66-3-901
{12} As we consider the general scope of
{13} “Working order” is defined as “a condition of a machine in which it functions according to its nature and purpose.” Webster‘s Third New Int‘l Dictionary 2635 (1993). “Good” means “adapted to the end designed or proposed: satisfactory in performance: free from flaws or defects . . . not impaired.” Id. at 978. “Good working order” is an idiom that means “working properly.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, “in (good) working order,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/good%20working%20order?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld (last visited Aug. 24, 2021). Thus, the plain meaning of “good working order,” as provided by dictionary definitions, suggests that
{14} We are not the first court to construe “good working order.” In State v. Brown, 2014 WI 69, ¶¶ 9, 18, 28-29, 38, 850 N.W.2d 66, overruled on other grounds by State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶¶ 48-52, 868 N.W.2d 143, law enforcement stopped a defendant solely because one out of the four bulbs forming the defendant‘s left rear light panel, which included the tail lamp, was not illuminated. In determining whether law enforcement had probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the stop, the Wisconsin Supreme Court directly addressed the meaning of “good working order” to consider whether the defendant‘s tail lamp complied with the requirements of the statute. Id. ¶¶ 17, 26-29, 38.
{15} The Wisconsin Supreme Court held, based on dictionary definitions, that “‘good working order’ means suitable or functioning for the intended use.” Id. ¶¶ 28-29. The Wisconsin Supreme Court focused on function to determine whether a tail lamp is in good working order, noting that its approach aligned with other jurisdictions. Id. ¶ 32 (citing Kroft v. State, 992 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), then citing Vicknair v. State, 751 S.W.2d 180, 189-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)); see Spurlin v. Nardo, 114 S.E.2d 913, 918 (W. Va. 1960) (determining that brakes were not in good working order when they did not adequately control the movement and stopping of a vehicle, as required by the statute setting out standards for braking equipment), modified on other grounds by Moran v. Atha Trucking, Inc., 540 S.E.2d 903, 908-10 (W. Va. 1997). The Wisconsin Supreme Court then determined that a tail lamp‘s intended use and function are provided by the statutory definition of a tail lamp and by the parameters of the statute governing tail lamp requirements. Brown, 2014 WI 69, ¶ 33 (noting that “[t]he statutory definition of ‘tail lamp’ describes a tail lamp as a ‘warning light,’ and the tail lamp statute requires tail lamps to serve as warning lights ‘by emitting during hours of darkness a red light
{16} We too conclude that the plain meaning of “good working order” means suitable or functioning for the intended use. See id. ¶ 29. Under the more exacting requirement that equipment must be “free from flaws or defects” and “not impaired,” see “good,” Webster‘s, supra at 978, to be in “good working order” under
{17} Interpreting “good working order” to mean that equipment on a vehicle is functioning for its intended use supports the public safety interests that are among the stated purposes of and are prevalent throughout the Motor Vehicle Code. See State v. Saiz, 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365 (quoting the statutory requirement that mopeds “comply with those motor vehicle safety standards deemed necessary and prescribed by the director of motor vehicles” under
{18} Accordingly, “good working order” does not require equipment to function one hundred percent perfectly if it is suitable or functioning for its intended use. We reverse the Court of Appeals opinion to the extent that it requires “all equipment” in New Mexico vehicles to be working perfectly for it to be in “good working order” under
1. General/specific rule of statutory construction
{19} Having determined the meaning of “good working order” as it is used in
{20} The Court of Appeals majority held that “Section 66-3-901 . . . impose[d] an additional requirement . . . above and beyond those specifically provided for in Sections 66-3-801 to -887.” Farish, 2018-NMCA-003, ¶ 18. By concluding that Section 66-3-901 and Sections 66-3-801 to -887 “reflect different purposes, do not overlap, operate independently from one another, and neither conflict with nor render a nullity the requirements of the other,” the majority declined to apply the general/specific rule of statutory construction. Farish, 2018-NMCA-003, ¶ 18. Meanwhile, the dissent recognized that “[t]he critical language in Section 66-3-901 is very general and broadly worded” while “numerous vehicle equipment provisions set forth in the Motor Vehicle Code . . . address the specific conditions and functionality of various equipment on a vehicle.” Farish, 2018-NMCA-003, ¶ 27 (Garcia, J., dissenting).
{21} “If statutes appear to conflict, they must be construed, if possible, to give effect to each . . . . However, an earlier-enacted specific, special or local statute prevails over a later-enacted general statute unless the context of the later enacted statute indicates otherwise.”
{22} The general/specific rule of statutory construction applies to conflicting statutes dealing with the same subject matter. Id. ¶ 17. We apply the general/specific rule because we presume that the Legislature did not intend “a conflict between two of its statutes and because the Legislature‘s attention is more particularly directed to the relevant subject matter in deliberating upon the special law.” Id. “[T]he more specific statute will prevail over the more general statute” because we treat the specific statute as an exception to the general statute when there is no “clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary.” Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, ¶ 7.
{23} To determine whether the general/specific rule applies to criminal statutes, we first analyze the two statutes to “ascertain[] whether the Legislature intended to create multiple punishments for the two relevant crimes.” Id. ¶ 13. If we determine “that the Legislature did not intend to create separately punishable offenses for the same conduct, then we proceed to the narrower question of whether the Legislature intended to limit the charging discretion of the prosecutor.” Id. ¶ 16. For both analyses, we “compar[e] the elements of the crimes and, if necessary, resort[] to other indicia of legislative intent.” Id. ¶ 11. When comparing the elements of the crimes, “we assess whether each provision required proof of an additional fact that the other does not in accordance with the test established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303-04 (1932).” Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
{24} “If the elements of the two crimes are the same, the general/specific statute rule applies, and the prosecution must charge the defendant under the special law absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary.” Id. (quoting Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, ¶ 26 (internal quotation marks omitted)). That the two crimes represent an identity in elements “demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to punish separately under the two statutes for the same conduct and intended to limit prosecutorial discretion, absent evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” Id.; see State v. Blevins, 1936-NMSC-052, ¶ 7, 40 N.M. 367, 60 P.2d 208 (“It is a fundamental rule that where the general statute, if standing alone, would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment.“). “If the elements differ, however, there is a presumption that the Legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses and, concomitantly, intended to leave prosecutorial charging discretion intact; further inquiry is then necessary to determine whether the presumption stands.” Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, ¶ 16 (citing Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, ¶ 27).
{25} While Defendant presents the issue more broadly, it is only necessary for us to consider whether a person can violate
{26} Furthermore, there is no evidence the Legislature intended to create an independent basis for a criminal violation under
{27} Notwithstanding our conclusion here, it is possible that equipment may still violate
2. Acceptable redundancy
{28} We recognize that the application of the general/specific rule of statutory construction creates some redundancy with the Court of Appeals interpretation of
{29}
III. CONCLUSION
{30} The relationship between
{31} We reject the Court of Appeals majority‘s determination that
{32} IT IS SO ORDERED.
C. SHANNON BACON, Justice
WE CONCUR:
DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice
JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice
GERALD E. BACA, Judge Sitting by designation