State v. Farish, 499 P.3d 622

Background

In April 2012 Deputy Martinez stopped John Farish after observing the left tail lamp’s large upper bulb was not illuminated while the right tail lamp was working. Farish was charged with defective equipment (§ 66-3-801(A)) and DUI.
Metro court convicted Farish on both counts. On appeal, the district court and the Court of Appeals reviewed the equipment claims and reasonable-suspicion basis for the stop.
The district court concluded § 66-3-805(A) (tail lamps must emit red light plainly visible from 500 feet) did not support a per se stop because the lamp was visible within 500 feet; it found reasonable suspicion under § 66-3-805(C).
A split Court of Appeals: the majority held Farish violated § 66-3-901 (equipment must be "in good working order"), reasoning a non-illuminated bulb meant the equipment was not in good working order; the dissent applied the general/specific rule and read § 66-3-805 as controlling for tail lamps.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether § 66-3-901 can independently prohibit tail lamp conditions that otherwise meet specific equipment statutes (notably § 66-3-805(A)).
The Supreme Court held § 66-3-901 does not create an independent violation when specific Motor Vehicle Code provisions (here § 66-3-805(A)) prescribe the equipment’s required function and those requirements are met; remanded for disposition consistent with that holding.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 66-3-901 can be violated when tail lamps meet § 66-3-805(A) visibility requirements	§ 66-3-901 imposes an independent operational/safety duty; a non-illuminated bulb means equipment is not in "good working order," giving reasonable suspicion	§ 66-3-901 incorporates the Motor Vehicle Code’s specific requirements; if § 66-3-805(A) is satisfied, § 66-3-901 is not violated	Court: No. When specific statute prescribes intended function (e.g., 500-ft visibility), compliance means § 66-3-901 is not independently violated
Meaning of "good working order" in § 66-3-901	(State implied) requires full operational condition; a burned-out bulb shows not "good"	"Good working order" means suitable/functioning for intended use, not perfection	Court: "Good working order" = functioning for intended use; does not require perfect condition
Applicability of the general/specific rule between § 66-3-901 and § 66-3-805	§ 66-3-901 serves independent, catch-all safety purpose and applies regardless of specific provisions	Specific statutes (e.g., § 66-3-805) define intended function and prevail for that equipment; general/specific rule applies	Court: Apply general/specific rule; specific statute prevails when elements are identical or define the equipment’s function
Remedy / disposition	Uphold convictions under § 66-3-901	Reverse where § 66-3-901 was used independently despite compliance with § 66-3-805(A)	Court: Reverse Court of Appeals to the extent it created independent § 66-3-901 liability for compliant tail lamps; remand to district court

Key Cases Cited

Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014) (a reasonable mistake of law can support reasonable suspicion)
State v. Brown, 850 N.W.2d 66 (Wis. 2014) ("good working order" means functioning for intended use; one bulb out did not defeat tail-lamp compliance)
State v. Santillanes, 27 P.3d 456 (N.M. 2001) (general/specific statute rule and test for legislative intent regarding multiple punishments)
State v. Cleve, 980 P.2d 23 (N.M. 1999) (considerations of lenity and prosecutorial discretion when applying general/specific rule)
State v. McClendon, 28 P.3d 1092 (N.M. 2001) (statutory construction reviewed de novo and legislative-intent approach)
Noice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 383 P.3d 761 (N.M. 2016) (statutes with overlapping safety purposes can coexist and be given effect)
State v. Farish, 410 P.3d 239 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018) (Court of Appeals majority holding § 66-3-901 independently violated by a non-illuminated bulb; reversed in part by the Supreme Court)