State v. CovingtonState v. Covington
Under the statute (
The defendant was convicted of carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, among other crimes, in connection with an incident in which several gunshots emanated from an automobile that was occupied by the defendant and his friend, R, who owned the vehicle. Two people suffered gunshot wounds as a result of the shooting. Following the shooting, the defendant drove the vehicle to the residence of his girlfriend‘s family, where the sister of the defendant‘s girlfriend, C, observed R remove a handgun from his waistband and hand it to the defendant. At the defendant‘s trial, the state did not present direct, numerical evidence of the length of the barrel of the firearm that it alleged he had used in connection with the shooting, as the firearm was never recovered by the police, and none of the state‘s witnesses specifically described its barrel length. The jury, however, was presented with circumstantial evidence about the firearm, which included testimony from C and from a firearms examiner, W, who testified about his examination of the two bullets retrieved from the body of one of the victims. The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, which rejected the defendant‘s claim that there was insufficient evidence that he was carrying a firearm with a barrel length of less than twelve inches. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant‘s conviction under
MULLINS, J. In this certified appeal, the defendant, Jeffrey Covington, claims that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed his conviction for carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in violation of
The Appellate Court‘s opinion sets forth the following relevant facts, which the jury reasonably could have found at trial. ‘‘At or about 8 p.m., on March 24, 2014, the defendant was operating an automobile that was owned by his friend, Derek Robinson. When the defendant drove Robinson‘s automobile away from the intersection of Whalley Avenue and Ella T. Grasso Boulevard in New Haven, Robinson was in the passenger‘s seat. A short time later, at approximately 8:50 p.m., Robinson‘s automobile was parked along Shelton Avenue in New Haven . . . . At that time, the victims, Trayvon Washington and Taijhon Washington, were walking home from a friend‘s house. They walked past Robinson‘s automobile while someone was getting into it. . . . Approximately two minutes after they had passed the automobile . . . [it] approached them at a high rate of speed. . . . Then, several gunshots emanated from the automobile. Taijhon Washington suffered fatal gunshot injuries to his chest. Trayvon Washington was shot in the head, resulting in a fractured skull. Although he survived the shooting, he endured extensive medical treatment, and a bullet from that incident remained lodged in his head at the time of trial.
‘‘Following the shooting, the defendant drove to the residence of his girlfriend‘s family on Poplar Street in New Haven. He was accompanied by Robinson. The defendant‘s girlfriend along with some of her family members, including her sister, Dajah Crenshaw, were present at the residence. . . . When the defendant entered the residence, he was holding the keys to Robinson‘s automobile. Crenshaw observed Robinson remove a handgun from his waistband and hand it to the defendant. Thereafter, the defendant concealed the handgun in a dresser in his girlfriend‘s bedroom.
‘‘The following day, Crenshaw overheard the defendant having a telephone conversation with Robinson‘s brother. During the conversation, the defendant referred to a gun, and he asked Robinson‘s brother if he had buried it. In the days that followed, the defendant made various statements that reflected his involvement in and responsibility for the shooting. Significantly, the defendant admitted to a longtime acquaintance, Margaret Flynn, that he happened to catch Taijhon Washington off guard and had killed him. The defendant elabo
The defendant was subsequently charged with, inter alia, carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in violation of
The jury was, however, presented with the following relevant circumstantial evidence about the firearm. Earl Williams, a firearms examiner, testified about his examination of the two bullets retrieved from Taijhon Washington‘s body. He testified that both bullets were ‘‘.32 caliber class bullets‘’ and, although mangled, exhibited discernable ‘‘rifling‘’ impressions. Williams explained that rifling impressions are created by firearms that are manufactured with grooves along the inside of the barrel to make the bullets rotate when fired. Williams testified that rifling impressions are typical of ‘‘all rifled firearms‘’ and that ‘‘handguns, such as pistols and revolvers‘’ leave rifling impressions. Williams explained that shotguns, by contrast, ‘‘are a smooth bore‘’ and do not have rifling. Williams further testified that the bullets found in Taijhon Washington‘s body were ‘‘consistent with bullets that would be fired out of a .32 caliber handgun or revolver.‘’3
The state also called Crenshaw as a witness. Crenshaw testified that, while riding in Robinson‘s vehicle a few hours before the shooting occurred, she saw ‘‘a gun‘’ inside the glove compartment. Although Crenshaw did not testify about the size of the glove compartment, the state submitted into evidence a photograph of the interior of Robinson‘s vehicle, which depicted the glove compartment open.
Crenshaw further testified that, when the defendant and Robinson arrived at her residence shortly after the shooting occurred, she saw Robinson carrying ‘‘a handgun.‘’ Specifically, Crenshaw testified that she saw Robinson ‘‘pull [the] gun out of his waistband‘’ and hand it to the defendant, who then hid it inside of a dresser drawer. Crenshaw also testified that she had not seen that firearm before, and that she could not describe
The jury found the defendant guilty of carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in violation of
The defendant appealed from this conviction to the Appellate Court, claiming that there was insufficient evidence that he carried a firearm with a barrel length of less than twelve inches.5 Id., 341. In rejecting this claim, the Appellate Court concluded, first, that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the defendant, rather than Robinson, was the shooter and, therefore, that he had carried a firearm of some type at the time and place of the shooting. Id., 343–44.
Second, the Appellate Court determined that there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the barrel length of the firearm was less than twelve inches. Id., 350. The Appellate Court relied on Williams’ testimony that the rifling impressions on the bullets recovered from Taijhon Washington‘s body were ‘‘consistent‘’ with having been fired from a ‘‘handgun or revolver,‘’ as well as Crenshaw‘s testimony that, shortly after the shooting occurred, she saw Robinson remove ‘‘a handgun‘’ from his ‘‘waistband‘’ and hand it to the defendant. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 345–46. The Appellate Court reasoned that the use of the terms ‘‘revolver‘’ and ‘‘handgun‘’ by these witnesses permitted the jury to infer that the length of the barrel of the firearm used in the shooting was less than twelve inches. Id., 347–49. The Appellate Court further reasoned that Crenshaw‘s testimony that Robinson removed the handgun from his ‘‘waistband‘’ permitted the jury to conclude ‘‘that the barrel of the gun must [have been] less than twelve inches in length.‘’ Id., 349.
On appeal to this court,6 the defendant claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the firearm had a barrel length of less than twelve inches.7 We disagree.
We begin with the general principles governing our review. ‘‘The standard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘We also note that the jury must find every element
‘‘Additionally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [jury‘s] verdict of guilty.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taupier, 330 Conn. 149, 186–87, 193 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied, U.S. , 139 S. Ct. 1188, 203 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2019).
As with any element of a criminal offense, however, the state may prove the length of the barrel with circumstantial evidence. See State v. Williams, 231 Conn. 235, 251–52, 645 A.2d 999 (1994), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Murray, 254 Conn. 472, 487, 757 A.2d 578 (2000). This court has explained that direct, numerical evidence is not required to prove barrel length. Id., 252. In the absence of direct, numerical evidence of barrel length, this element may be satisfied by evidence that is sufficiently indicative of the size of the firearm so as to permit the jury to reasonably and logically infer beyond a reasonable doubt that its barrel is less than twelve inches in length. Id.
In Williams, as in the present case, the state neither introduced the firearm into evidence nor presented any direct evidence of the size of its barrel. See id. The state
Other appellate decisions similarly have upheld convictions under
In the present case, Crenshaw testified that, a few hours before the shooting, she was inside Robinson‘s vehicle and observed ‘‘a gun‘’ inside the glove compartment. Although the state adduced no evidence of the specific dimensions of the glove compartment, the state did introduce into evidence photographs of the vehicle itself—showing that it was a standard sized sedan—as well as a photograph of the interior of the vehicle, which depicted the general size of the glove compartment. Crenshaw further testified that, when Robinson and the defendant arrived at her residence shortly after the shooting occurred, she saw Robinson pull ‘‘a handgun‘’ ‘‘out of his waistband‘’ and hand it to the defendant. The jury reasonably could have inferred from this evidence that the firearm Crenshaw saw on these occasions was the firearm used in the shooting and that, after the shooting, Robinson held it in his waistband until he and the defendant reached Crenshaw‘s residence for the purpose of concealing it from plain view.8
The fact that it is ‘‘theoretically possible‘’ for certain long barreled firearms to have been arranged to fit in these small spaces does not compel a different result. ‘‘On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [jury‘s] verdict of guilty.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taupier, supra, 330 Conn. 187. It certainly would have been preferable for the state to, for example, have asked Crenshaw to compare the length of the barrel of the handgun to a twelve inch ruler; see State v. Williams, supra, 231 Conn. 252; or to provide some other, more definitive description of its size. Nevertheless, we simply cannot say that no rational fact finder could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that a handgun that could fit in Robinson‘s waistband and the glove compartment of his vehicle, a Hyundai Sonata, had a barrel length of less than twelve inches.
Moreover, Williams testified that the bullets recovered from Taijhon Washington‘s body were ‘‘consistent‘’ with the bullets that would be fired out of a .32 caliber ‘’handgun or revolver.‘’ (Emphasis added.)
In arguing that the evidence was insufficient, the defendant relies principally on State v. Perry, 48 Conn. App. 193, 709 A.2d 564, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 931, 711 A.2d 729 (1998). Perry, however, is inapposite. In that case, the sole evidence that the barrel length was less than twelve inches came from a witness who testified that the defendant ‘‘pulled the gun out of his jacket or coat.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 197–98. The Appellate Court concluded that this evidence was insufficient, observing that ‘‘some measure of descriptive evidence from which the jury may properly infer the barrel length is necessary in order for the state to satisfy its burden of proof.‘’ Id., 198.
Unlike Perry, the jury in the present case was provided with sufficient evidence from which it could infer barrel length. The jury was able to assess the size of the glove compartment from the photograph, and there was evidence that the firearm was being carried in a particular area of Robinson‘s clothing that the jury, applying its common sense and experience, could have inferred was highly unlikely to have accommodated a firearm with a barrel of one foot or longer. This is distinguishable from the vague, and relatively innocuous, testimony at issue in Perry.9
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction, as we must, we conclude that the state presented sufficient, circumstantial evidence to permit the jury reasonably to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun had a barrel of less than twelve inches in length. Accordingly, the Appellate Court correctly determined that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant‘s conviction under
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
We therefore presume that the jury credited the pieces of Crenshaw‘s testimony that support its finding that the barrel of the gun was less than twelve inches in length. Further, although ‘‘the jury may not infer the opposite of a witness’ testimony solely from its disbelief of that testimony‘‘; id., 605; Crenshaw‘s testimony that she saw the firearm inside of Robinson‘s vehicle—the vehicle implicated in the shooting—mere hours before the shooting occurred and then saw him remove a gun from his waistband just after the shooting occurred provided sufficient affirmative evidence to permit the jury to draw a reasonable inference that the firearms she saw on these two occasions were one and the same.