Kentucky v. Hamilton

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KENTUCKY v. HAMILTON

No. 83-1212

Supreme Court of Kentucky

467 U.S. 1217

No. 82-6230. ARNAU v. NEW YORK. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-70. PENNSYLVANIA v. SANTNER. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-681. DENTICO ET AL. v. UNITED STATES;

No. 83-690. MUSTO ET AL. v. UNITED STATES; and

No. 83-806. D‘AGOSTINO v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: Nos. 83-681 and 83-690,

715 F. 2d 822; No. 83-806,

722 F. 2d 735.

No. 83-979. CRONN v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-5063. TRANOWSKI v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-5504. WILKINS v. WHITAKER ET AL. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-5689. TYDINGS v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ET AL. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-5861. PEREZ ET AL. v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-5911. GOODAY v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-768. FAULKNER ET AL. v. WELLMAN ET AL. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondents Dwight Walker and Billie R. Adams for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-1212. KENTUCKY v. HAMILTON. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE O‘CONNOR joins, dissenting.

Respondent Hamilton was tried for the crimes of rape and incest, in which he was charged with having had sexual intercourse with his 10-year-old daughter. He was found guilty on both counts and was sentenced to life imprisonment on the rape charge and 10 years on the incest charge, the sentences to be served concurrently. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his conviction for rape and his sentence of life imprisonment, but reversed his conviction for incest.

659 S. W. 2d 201 (1983). That court was of the view that sentencing respondent for two different crimes based on the single act of intercourse with his daughter violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky believed that the closest analogy to the present case was our decision in

Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U. S. 682 (1977), in which we held that petitioner Harris, who had earlier been tried and convicted of the felony murder of a grocery clerk, could not be later tried for the armed robbery of the store which was the predicate offense for the felony-murder prosecution. In the present case, however, it is undisputed that the State defines rape as sexual intercourse with one who is less than 12 years old, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.040(1)(b)(2) (1975), and defines incest as sexual intercourse with a member of one‘s family, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 530.020 (1975). Thus while both offenses require the element of sexual intercourse, each requires an additional element which the other does not. Although the Kentucky Supreme Court purported to rely on our decision in

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932), its ruling is directly contrary to this language from

Blockburger:

“The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. . . .”

Id., at 304.

Earlier this Term, we reiterated the traditional definition of the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment:

““It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.“”

Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 165 (1977), quoting

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 717 (1969).”

Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U. S. 493, 498 (1984).

In the present case, respondent Hamilton has neither been acquitted and subjected to a second prosecution, nor convicted and subjected to a second prosecution. The only conceivable double jeopardy protection which he can invoke is that against multiple punishments for the same offense. But we held in

Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U. S. 359, 368 (1983), that the question whether punishments are “multiple” under the Double Jeopardy Clause is essentially one of legislative intent, a principle we reaffirmed in

Ohio v. Johnson, supra, at 499, and n. 8. Here the Kentucky Legislature has given no indication that it wishes something less than the statutorily provided penalty imposed for each offense when a defendant is convicted of both rape and incest. There was, therefore, no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, entailed in the sentences imposed by the Kentucky trial court.

I believe that the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky is so obviously mistaken that it should be summarily reversed on the authority of

Ohio v. Johnson, supra, and

Missouri v. Hunter, supra, but at the very least I would grant the State‘s petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand this case to the Supreme Court of Kentucky for reconsideration in the light of those cases.

No. 83-1318. GARRISON, WARDEN, ET AL. v. ALSTON. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-1321. CALIFORNIA ET AL. v. TENNECO OIL CO. ET AL.;

No. 83-1432. PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONER OF OREGON ET AL. v. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. ET AL.;

No. 83-1433. NORTHWEST PIPELINE CORP. ET AL. v. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. ET AL.;

No. 83-1442. EL PASO NATURAL GAS CO. v. TENNECO OIL CO. ET AL.;

No. 83-1443. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. ET AL. v. TENNECO OIL CO. ET AL.; and

No. 83-1618. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION v. TENNECO OIL CO. ET AL. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN would grant certiorari. JUSTICE POWELL and JUSTICE O‘CONNOR took no part in the

Case Details

Case Name: Kentucky v. Hamilton

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Jul 5, 1984

Citation: 468 U.S. 1217

Docket Number: 83-1212

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS