STATE OF NEW MEXICO v. SHANAH CHADWICK-MCNALLY
NO. S-1-SC-36127
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
February 22, 2018
John A. Dean, Jr., District Judge
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
NAKAMURA, Chief Justice
{1} Defendant Shanah Chadwick-McNally is charged with an open count of first-degree murder and faces a potential sentence of life without the possibility of release or parole (LWOP). She argues in this interlocutory appeal that, due to her possible LWOP sentence, she must be afforded the heightened procedural protections that apply when the State seeks the death penalty. See, e.g.,
{2} We hold that death penalty procedures do not apply in this case for the simple reason that “[t]he extraordinary penalty of death” is not implicated. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 2002-NMSC-008, ¶ 8, 132 N.M. 32, 43 P.3d 1042 (“The extraordinary penalty of death demands heightened scrutiny of its imposition.“). Consequently, we agree with the district court that
I. BACKGROUND
{3} The State charged Defendant with an open count of first-degree murder, a “capital felony,” see
{4} The State later sought guidance about whether the procedures that apply in death penalty proceedings would be required in Defendant‘s case, in which the State is seeking an LWOP sentence. The State argued that death penalty procedures are inapplicable because
{5} After the pretrial conference, the district court issued an order holding that death penalty procedures do not apply in Defendant‘s
{6} Defendant filed an application for interlocutory appeal under
II. DISCUSSION
{7} Our analysis proceeds in two parts. We first briefly review the 2009 amendments to the Act and
A. The 2009 Amendments to the Act and Rule 5-704
{8} New Mexico abolished the death penalty in 2009 for crimes committed on or after July 1, 2009. See 2009 N.M. Laws, ch. 11, §§ 5-7. In place of the death penalty, the 2009 law established a new maximum sentence for defendants convicted of a capital felony: “life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole[,]” abbreviated in this opinion as LWOP.
{9} The 2009 legislation also repealed much of the Act as it had existed when the death penalty was in force. See 2009 N.M. Laws, ch. 11, § 5 (repealing Sections 31-20A-1, -2.1 through -4, and -6). The repealed provisions guaranteed certain procedural safeguards for defendants who faced a possible death sentence, including separate, bifurcated guilt and sentencing proceedings; the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment; and automatic appellate review of any case in which the defendant was sentenced to death. See generally
{10} As a result of the 2009 law, the Act now consists of just two provisions.
{11} Death penalty proceedings are also subject to
{12} This Court amended
B. Whether Death Penalty Procedures Apply in This Case
{13} With this context in hand, we turn to the four issues presented. First, whether
1. Rule 5-704 Applicability
{14} Whether
{15} Defendant has not cited, nor are we aware of, any authority that would require applying
2. Comparable Procedures
{16} Next, Defendant argues that if
{17} We held in Ogden that “[a] defendant who has been notified that the State will seek the death penalty may move to dismiss an aggravating circumstance before trial.” 1994-NMSC-029, ¶ 15. To effectuate that right, we authorized district courts to “conduct a limited evidentiary hearing” to determine whether “there is probable cause to believe an aggravating circumstance is present.” Id. ¶¶ 17-18. We later amended
{18} Ogden was premised on “[o]ur view that it is important to curtail unwarranted death-penalty prosecutions . . . [because] they are qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from other
{19} The considerations that we credited in Ogden do not carry the same force when, as in this case, the heightened procedural requirements and complexities of a death penalty proceeding are not present. Put simply, the State‘s decision to seek an LWOP sentence does not invoke the unique complexities and demands of a death penalty case. The district court therefore correctly determined in Defendant‘s case that a hearing is not warranted under Ogden as the State is not seeking the death penalty.
3. Bifurcated Proceedings
{20} Defendant argues that the sentencing scheme under the Act does not expressly prohibit bifurcation. Defendant also argues, as a matter of public policy, that parties should be permitted “to reserve consideration of aggravating factors for a subsequent hearing following the guilt-innocence phase” in LWOP cases.
{21} Unlike when the death penalty was in force, the Act is now otherwise silent about the procedures that must be followed in a case like Defendant‘s, including whether bifurcated guilt and sentencing proceedings are permitted or required. See
{22} Whether bifurcated proceedings are appropriate must be determined on a case-by-case basis, after the issue has been properly raised and argued under the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts. See
4. Evidence of Mitigating Circumstances
{23} Defendant argues that the sentencing scheme under the Act does not prohibit the presentation of mitigating evidence. Defendant also argues that the district court‘s conclusion that the Act does not permit evidence of mitigating circumstances violates the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. We disagree with both arguments.
{24} “‘A trial court‘s power to sentence is derived exclusively from statute.‘” State v. Chavarria, 2009-NMSC-020, ¶ 12, 146 N.M. 251, 208 P.3d 896 (quoting State v. Martinez, 1998-NMSC-023, ¶ 12, 126 N.M. 39, 966 P.2d 747). “This limitation on judicial authority reflects the separation of powers notion that ‘it is solely within the province of the Legislature to establish penalties for criminal behavior.‘” Martinez, 1998-NMSC-023, ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Mabry, 1981-NMSC-067, ¶ 18, 96 N.M. 317, 630 P.2d 269). “This Court must construe statutes, if possible, to give effect to their objective and purpose and to avoid absurd results.” State v. Begay, 2017-NMSC-009, ¶ 9, 390 P.3d 168. “The primary indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute.” State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863.
{25} The plain language of
If a jury finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more aggravating circumstances exist, . . . the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole. If the jury does not make the finding that one or more aggravating circumstances exist, the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.
(Emphasis added.) Under the statute‘s plain language, the determinative factors are the jury‘s findings of guilt and of one or more aggravating circumstances. When both findings are present, an LWOP sentence is mandatory and cannot be mitigated. See State v. Cabezuela, 2015-NMSC-016, ¶ 11, 350 P.3d 1145 (“Mandatory life sentences, with or without the possibility of parole after thirty years, are for capital felonies and are not subject to mitigation.” (citing State v. Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, ¶ 42, 148 N.M. 747, 242 P.3d 314)). Neither the district court nor the jury has discretion to deviate from the statute‘s command. See
{26} Defendant argues that interpreting the Act to preclude the introduction of mitigating evidence would be contrary to an “emerging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment categorical approach” holding mandatory LWOP sentences to be unconstitutional for juvenile offenders. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (“[M]andatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.‘“). Defendant‘s reliance on federal authorities that apply to juvenile offenders is misplaced.
{27} The United States Supreme Court in Harmelin v. Michigan considered whether the imposition of a mandatory LWOP sentence without consideration of “so-called mitigating factors,” was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991). The Court determined that imposition of the mandatory LWOP sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment as the individualized sentencing requirements imposed in death penalty proceedings do not extend to non-death penalty proceedings. Id. at 995-96. Applied to this case, Harmelin establishes that the Act does not violate the Eighth Amendment by imposing a mandatory LWOP sentence without consideration of an adult defendant‘s “individualized” or mitigating circumstances.
{28} Defendant argues that Harmelin‘s continued validity is in doubt because of more recent cases addressing the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles. E.g., Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (holding that a mandatory LWOP sentence for a juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment). These cases are readily distinguishable. They result from the Court‘s determination that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that the death penalty for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment). Nothing in these cases undermines Harmelin‘s holding with regard to LWOP sentences for adults. See Michael M. O‘Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 1087, 1088 (2013) (concluding that Graham and Miller “do not provide much basis for sweeping reversals of adult LWOP sentences“). Defendant‘s federal constitutional rights were not violated by the district court‘s decision to preclude her from presenting evidence of mitigating circumstances.
{29} Defendant argues in the alternative that she is entitled to greater protections under the New Mexico Constitution. We do not reach this issue because Defendant did not cite any authority in the district court to support her general assertion that she is
III. CONCLUSION
{30} We affirm that neither
{31} IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice