State v. MartinezState v. Martinez
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Minzner
OPINION
MINZNER, Justice.
{1} Defendant Escolástico Martinez pleaded guilty to, inter alia, a charge of aggravated driving while intoxicated (DWI), third offense, contrary to
I.
{2} On February 14, 1995, Martinez signed a plea and disposition agreement, pleading guilty to a third offense aggravated DWI, contrary to
{3} The magistrate court later formally sentenced Martinez in accordance with the plea and disposition agreement. In addition, the court imposed a fine of $750 for the DWI charge. The court also finalized its decision to suspend 274 days of the 364 day sentence and imposed, as part of the suspension, the condition that Martinez successfully complete a 90-120 day treatment program at RAP. Finally, the court entered a commitment to jail for 90 days, scheduled to commence on June 16,1995.
{4} RAP discharged Martinez on June 2, 1995, after successfully completing the treatment program in 106 days. Martinez then moved to amend his sentence to reflect presentence credit for the time he spent in treatment. The court granted Martinez’s motion and allowed 106 days of in-patient treatment in lieu of 90 days jail. Although Martinez also was convicted, under
{5} The State then appealed the magistrate court’s grant of confinement credit. The district court concluded that court-ordered, compelled attendance at an in-patient treatment program constitutes official confinement for purposes of presentence confinement credit. As a result, the district court affirmed the amended sentence.
{6} After the State appealed the decision of the district court, the Court of Appeals certified the matter to this Court. The Court of Appeals, unlike the parties and the district court, was unwilling to assume that the magistrate court possessed the power to grant presentenee confinement credit for a misdemeanor DWI. The Court of Appeals noted that statutory authority exists for granting presentence confinement credit for felony convictions,
II.
{7} In this case, we must determine whether trial courts possess authority to grant presentence confinement credit
1
for inpatient
{8} Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. We look first to the words chosen by the Legislature and the plain meaning of the Legislature’s language. See Whitely v. New Mexico State Personnel Bd., 115 N.M. 308, 311, 850 P.2d 1011, 1014 (1993). The Legislature has provided that “[o]n a first conviction under [
{9} Nonetheless, we “must exercise caution in applying the plain meaning rule.” State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994). While we do not ignore the language used by the Legislature, we must ensure that words are not interpreted outside of any relevant legislative context. Thus, we will interpret statutes as a whole and look to other statutes in pari materia in order to determine legislative intent. See Roth v. Thompson, 113 N.M. 331, 334, 825 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1992).
{10} For fourth and subsequent convictions for DWI, the Legislature has provided that “an offender is guilty of a fourth degree felony, as provided in
{11} However, our conclusion that the Legislature intended to provide presentence credit for felony DWI offenders leaves a noticeable void in the statutory scheme. The Legislature expressly has required that credit be given for all offenses other than the second and third, but it has left no indication as to whether credit for the second and third offense should be mandatory, discretionary, or prohibited.
{12} A trial court’s power to sentence is derived exclusively from statute. See State v. Dominguez, 115 N.M. 445, 456, 853 P.2d 147, 158 (Ct.App.1993). This limitation on judicial authority reflects the separation of powers notion that “it is solely within the province of the Legislature to establish penalties for criminal behavior.” State v. Mabry, 96 N.M. 317, 321, 630 P.2d 269, 273 (1981); see
{13} Nonetheless, the judiciary’s role in sentencing criminal defendants is not a purely ministerial task.
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offences against the criminal laws and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be conceded that in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their authority.
Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916) (holding that federal courts, absent Congressional authority, do not have the power to suspend a mandatory sentence); accord Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (“[T]he sentencing function long has been a peculiarly shared responsibility among the Branches of Government and has never been thought of as the exclusive constitutional province of any one Branch.”); cf. State v. Sanchez, 109 N.M. 428, 434, 786 P.2d 42, 48 (1990) (Baca, J., dissenting) (“Sentencing is a function that involves the three bodies of our government, and each branch must be allowed to fulfill its function.”).
{14} The granting of presentence confinement credit, unlike credit for good time served, as in Aqui or the suspension of a mandatory sentence, as in Mabry and Ex parte United States, does not necessarily interfere with the Legislature’s role in establishing appropriate penalties for crimes. Presentence confinement credit represents a court’s recognition that a defendant, in fact, has satisfied a portion of the penalty mandated by the Legislature. See State v. Trudeau, 487 N.W.2d 11, 15 (N.D.1992) (“Time spent in custody that has been credited toward a sentence is effectively the same thing as time served pursuant to a sentence.”). It is the duty of the judiciary, in implementing the directives of the Legislature, to exercise reason and ensure that the ends of justice are met. See State v. Miranda, 108 N.M. 789, 792, 779 P.2d 976, 979 (Ct.App.1989) (stating that the purpose of presentence confinement credit is “to assure equal treatment of all defendants whether or not they are incarcerated prior to conviction”). Thus, as long as any particular confinement credit does not lessen the penalty intended by the Legislature,
{15} As we already indicated,
III.
{16} Nevertheless, we conclude that the magistrate court’s reliance on inpatient alcohol treatment as the basis for confinement credit violated
{17} The magistrate court ordered Martinez to attend an alcohol screening program and, based on the recommendations of the screening agency, determined that alcohol treatment was necessary. This punishment is specifically contemplated by
{18} Our decision that the presentence confinement credit was impermissible applies with equal force to the credit granted for Martinez’s attendance of treatment after the imposition of sentence on May 4, 1995. Again, we believe the Legislature intended to create separate punishment for jail and treatment and to require a specified minimum
{19} Further, with respect to the specific sentence imposed in this case, we conclude that the magistrate court’s attempt to grant credit for postsentence treatment violates an additional legislative directive contained in
{20} Because we conclude that the Legislature created distinct punishments for alcohol treatment and jail, we address neither whether trial courts have discretion, in relation to second and third offenses of DWI, to grant credit for presentence confinement other than jail nor whether any confinement must be preconviction rather than presentence. Compare
IV.
{21} We conclude that the magistrate court erred by granting credit for 90 days of in-patient alcohol treatment in lieu of the 90 days jail mandated by the Legislature for a third offense aggravated DWI. Thus, we reverse the amended judgment and sentence and remand for imposition of the original sentence in accordance with
{22} IT IS SO ORDERED.
FRANCHINI, C.J., and BACA, SERNA and McKINNON, III, JJ., concur.
Notes
. We note that the record is less than clear as to whether the time Martínez spent in treatment was actually presentence. Martinez entered into a plea agreement on February 14 that was signed by the magistrate judge and the prosecutor. The agreement included, under a section entitled “disposition,” the condition that Martinez attend alcohol treatment. Martinez began attending treatment immediately. Additionally, the plea agreement indicated that a substantial portion of Martinez’s sentence would be suspended for 90 days. Further, it appears that the magistrate court never entered a formal judgment and sentence. Instead, it appears that the court formally sentenced Martinez on either April 4 or May 4, 1995. Because Martinez began treatment immediately after his plea, see Sellers v. Broadwater, 176 W.Va. 232, 342 S.E.2d 198, 200-01 (1986) (concluding that a defendant‘s participation in psychological counseling as a condition of probation in a plea agreement constituted the execution of a sentence for purposes of double jeopardy and made the plea binding on the prosecution and the court despite the lack of a final judgment), and because the magistrate court indicated that the sentence was temporarily suspended, see State v. Kenneman, 98 N.M. 794, 796-97, 653 P.2d 170, 172-73 (Ct.App.1982) (distinguishing the imposition and suspension of a sentence from a deferral of sentencing), it would appear that, instead of awaiting sentence while in treatment, Martinez actually began serving his sentence by attending the alcohol treatment program. Nevertheless, the parties, the magistrate court, the district court, and the Court of Appeals deemed the treatment to be presentence confinement. Therefore, because we believe this distinction would not affect our ruling in this case, we assume, without deciding, that the in-patient treatment before May 4, 1995, occurred prior to the imposition of the sentence. Cf. NMSA 1978, § 31 —20—3(C) (1985) (granting authority to delay sentencing, not to exceed sixty days, for diagnostic purposes).
. We note that any legislative prohibition on presentence confinement credit would be subject to constitutional restrictions. Cf. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (“[Tjhe Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of their economic status.”). ■