STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MELVIN JOHN BILLEY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. A-1-CA-41478
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
October 31, 2025
Opinion Number: 2026-NMCA-027
IVES, Judge.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, Daylene A. Marsh, District Court Judge
Santa Fe, NM
Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Solicitor General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant
Bennet J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
OPINION
IVES, Judge.
{1} The State appeals the district court’s order suppressing evidence that was seized as a result of the investigative detention of Defendant Melvin John Billey for a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code,
BACKGROUND
{2} Officer Jarame Gordon observed a person who he believed was riding a bicycle on a sidewalk at night without a rear reflector, and the cyclist then turned into the Farmington Inn parking lot. The officer entered the parking lot and eventually found a bicycle flipped upside down outside of one of the motel rooms. Officer Gordon observed that the bicycle did not have a rear reflector. Defendant then exited a nearby room, at which point the officer confronted him, explaining that Defendant was required to have a rear reflector on his bicycle. Defendant responded that he had only been riding in the parking lot. When asked to provide identification, Defendant provided a fake name, and Officer Gordon arrested him for concealing his identity. During a search incident to arrest, officers found a fentanyl pill and a metal pipe. The State charged Defendant with concealing his identity, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia, as well as operating a bicycle without lamps or other equipment in violation of
{3} Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop, arguing that he was biking on a sidewalk, not “on a roadway,” and therefore was not required to have a rear reflector. Because Defendant maintained that he was not in violation of any law, he argued that Officer Gordon had no reasonable suspicion to stop him. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Defendant’s motion on two grounds. First, it concluded that
DISCUSSION
{5} Under the
{6} We divide our analysis into three parts. First, we explain why we decline to affirm the suppression order under the right for any reason doctrine. Second, we explain why we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that Officer Gordon lacked reasonable suspicion because
I. We Will Not Affirm the District Court’s Decision as Right for Any Reason
{7} Defendant argues that we should affirm the district court as right for any reason because: (1) there was an “insufficient factual basis to infer” that the cyclist seen by Officer Gordon was Defendant; and (2) Officer Gordon improperly detained Defendant for a penalty assessment misdemeanor,
{8} The doctrine permits affirmance on a basis not relied upon by the district court if the result reached by the district court “was right for any reason, as long as the arguments in favor of affirmance are not fact based such that it would be unfair to entertain them for the first time on appeal without notice to the appellant.” See State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 12, 140 N.M. 345, 142 P.3d 933.
{9} These limitations on the applicability of the doctrine preclude us from affirming based on either of Defendant’s arguments. See id. ¶¶ 32, 35. As to Defendant’s first argument—that the evidence did not establish that Defendant was the cyclist observed by Officer Gordon—Defendant acknowledges that “the parties all appeared to take for granted that [Defendant] was the original cyclist.” Because Defendant never argued in the district court that Officer Gordon lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was the person riding the bicycle, the State had no notice of any need to present evidence on that topic. Cf. State v. Goss, 1991-NMCA-003, ¶ 13, 111 N.M. 530, 807 P.2d 228 (“Generally, motions to suppress must set out with particularity the grounds relied on for the relief sought.“); State v. Ponce, 2004-NMCA-137, ¶ 7, 136 N.M. 614, 103 P.3d 54 (recognizing that if the defendant carries the burden of “com[ing] forward with evidence to raise an issue as to an illegal search and seizure,” then the state bears the burden of rebutting the defendant’s prima facie case). It would therefore be unfair to the State for us to affirm the suppression order on the basis that the State did not present evidence to establish reasonable suspicion that Defendant was the cyclist, see Marquez, 2023-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 32, 35, and we decline to do so.
{10} For similar reasons, we decline to affirm the suppression order based on Defendant’s argument—made for the first time on appeal—that Officer Gordon ran afoul of Wright by detaining Defendant to investigate a possible traffic offense after losing sight of Defendant. Defendant appears to assume that Wright applies to investigative detentions as well as arrests. We need not determine whether this assumption is correct because even if Wright does apply here, the right for any reason doctrine does not. Because the defense chose not to make any argument based on Wright in the district court, the State lacked notice of the need to present evidence pertinent to the fact-driven question about whether the intrusion on Defendant’s privacy interest was outweighed by the State’s need to detain Defendant to promote a legitimate government interest. See Wright, 2022-NMSC-009, ¶¶ 27-34. Affirming based on Wright would be unfair to the State, and we will not do so.
II. Section 66-3-707(A) Applies to Bicycles Ridden on Sidewalks
{11} Whether
{12} In this case, all of the relevant statutes are in the Code, and the key statute at issue,
Every bicycle when in use at nighttime shall be equipped with a lamp on the front which shall emit a white light visible from a distance of at least five hundred feet to the front and with a red reflector on the rear of a type approved by the division which shall be visible from all distances from fifty feet to three hundred feet to the rear when directly in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps on a motor vehicle.
In order to determine whether these requirements apply to bicycles used on sidewalks, we must first figure out whether the requirements are governed by the general rule in
{13} We disagree. For reasons we will explain, we believe the State’s reading would mute the general rule that our Legislature chose when it wrote
{14} We are able to observe that this is how the statutory scheme works only by stepping back and looking at all of the relevant bicycle statutes together. Baca, 2005-NMCA-001, ¶ 9. This allows us to notice that each and every relevant statutory section falls into one of two categories. In the first category are the statutes that say nothing about where they apply. See
{15} This brings us to the statute at issue in Defendant’s case, which says nothing about where it applies and is therefore governed by the general rule in
{16} We start with the text, which includes definitions that reveal our Legislature’s intent. See State v. Tsosie, 2011-NMCA-115, ¶ 19, 150 N.M. 754, 266 P.3d 34. The Code defines “highway” and “street” interchangeably, in relevant part, as “every way or place generally open to the use of the public as a matter of right for the purpose of vehicular travel.”
{17} The district court reached the opposite conclusion, reasoning that “highway” does not encompass “sidewalk” because the definition of “highway” includes the phrase “for the purpose of vehicular travel,”
{18} Consistent with that choice, and contrary to the district court’s rationale, other provisions of the Code indicate that our Legislature intended for vehicles and pedestrians to share the use of highways, including sidewalks, and that it did not intend to completely exclude vehicles from sidewalks. Although the definition of sidewalk includes the phrase “intended for the use of pedestrians,”
{20} We therefore hold that the sidewalk, where Officer Gordon believed he observed Defendant riding a bicycle at night, is part of the highway and that
III. Reasonable Suspicion to Investigate a Possible Rear Reflector Violation
{21} The district court concluded that the State could not establish reasonable suspicion because “Officer Gordon was never directly behind” Defendant and therefore could not “determine whether . . . Defendant was in violation of the statute.” The State argues that an officer does not necessarily need to be directly behind a bicycle in order to develop reasonable suspicion. We agree. In our view, the district court applied the language of
{22} The district court relied on the statute’s requirement that bicycles ridden at night must have “a red reflector on the rear of a type approved by the division which shall be visible from all distances from fifty feet to three hundred feet to the rear when directly in
{23} To justify an investigatory stop, the State was not required to prove a violation of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1990), and the State was not even required to establish probable cause that the statute was violated, see State v. Yazzie, 2016-NMSC-026, ¶ 18, 376 P.3d 858. Indeed, “[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” White, 496 U.S. at 330. Importantly, reasonable suspicion may exist even if “ambiguous circumstances could reasonably be construed as involving either lawful or unlawful activity,” which means that the law did not require Officer Gordon’s observations to “rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” See Yazzie, 2016-NMSC-026, ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{24} We do not believe that these Fourth Amendment principles can be reconciled with the rigid manner in which the district court applied the statute’s reflectivity requirement in the context of Defendant’s suppression motion. It is, of course, true that if Defendant were on trial for violating the statute, and if the evidence were that his bike had a red reflector, the State would have been required to prove that the reflector was not reflective enough to meet the specific statutory requirements—that is, it was not visible from distances of between 50 and 300 feet “when directly in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps on a motor vehicle.”
{25} For these reasons, we hold that the alternative rationale offered by the district court does not support its suppression ruling.5 To be clear, this holding and our holding regarding the interpretation of the statute address only the rationales for suppression included in the district court’s order. Whether Officer Gordon had reasonable suspicion when the investigative detention of Defendant began is a determination that we have not made and cannot make because it involves factual questions answerable only by the district court. See State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964 (recognizing that appellate courts do not resolve factual questions).
CONCLUSION
{26} We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{27} IT IS SO ORDERED.
ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge
WE CONCUR:
SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge
JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge