STATE OF NEW MEXICO v. BRIAN ADAMS
No. S-1-SC-37722
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
December 16, 2021
2022-NMSC-008
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI, Daylene Marsh, District Judge. Released for Publication March 1, 2022.
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Caitlin C.M. Smith, Assistant Appellate Defender
John Charles Bennett, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Petitioner
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Respondent
VIGIL, Chief Justice.
{1} This case is one of six cases arising under very similar fact patterns.1 In each case, an “emergency department technician,” also licensed as an emergency medical technician (EMT), performed a blood draw test at San Juan Regional Medical Center in Farmington for the purpose of a DWI investigation. The defendants in these cases argue that “emergency department technicians” are not qualified to draw blood under the Implied Consent Act,
I. BACKGROUND
{2} After receiving a report of a drunk driver, a Farmington police officer was dispatched to a local gas station. Upon arriving at the gas station, the police officer found Defendant inflating his car tires. The officer noticed that Defendant‘s legs were shaking, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was slurred. The officer conducted a number of field sobriety tests with Defendant. In performing the tests, Defendant failed to follow directions, swayed back and forth, and struggled to maintain balance. Defendant told the officer that he drank whiskey and took Xanax and Suboxone pills earlier that day.
{3} The officer arrested Defendant for DWI. Pursuant to the Implied Consent Act,3
everything that is needed for a blood draw to ensure continuity and standardization, and to avoid compromising the accuracy and integrity of blood samples. [It] contain[s] instructions, paperwork, an iodine cleaning pad, a needle with attached tube, and two gray-topped, sterile vacuum tubes containing sodium fluoride—a white powder preservative.
State v. Garcia, 2016-NMCA-044, ¶ 4, 370 P.3d 791. Defendant then signed the proper paperwork consenting to the procedure, and Atwood drew two vials of blood. The officer placed the vials into the SLD blood draw kit and sealed it in front of Atwood. The officer then submitted Defendant‘s blood samples for testing by the SLD of the New Mexico Department of Health. The test results revealed that Defendant‘s blood was negative for alcohol but positive for marijuana-related metabolites, benzodiazepines, and synthetic opioids.
{4} The State charged Defendant with one count of DWI contrary to
{5} Defendant then appealed to the district court, which held an evidentiary hearing to determine the issue. After the hearing, the district court granted Defendant‘s motion to suppress the blood test results because it concluded that Atwood was not qualified to draw blood under the statute. The district court explained that it was bound by the New Mexico Court of Appeals holding in Garcia, 2016-NMCA-044, ¶ 20, “that a person‘s ‘license as an EMT does not qualify her to draw blood to determine its alcohol or drug content under the Implied Consent Act.‘”
{6} Following the district court‘s ruling, the State appealed the issue to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court‘s order and held that the blood test should not have been excluded. State v. Adams, 2019-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 1, 29, 447 P.3d 1142. The Court of Appeals explained that Garcia stands for the proposition that an EMT license alone does not qualify an employee like Atwood to draw blood for legal blood tests. Id. ¶ 20. Here, however, the Court of Appeals clarified that Atwood was qualified as a laboratory technician under
{7} Defendant appealed the Court of Appeals ruling, and we granted certiorari to resolve the issue of which medical professionals qualify to draw blood as a “laboratory technician” under
II. DISCUSSION
{8} We begin by addressing the statutory construction issue and then turn to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in suppressing the blood test results.
A. Statutory Construction
{9} We must first determine the statutory interpretation of the words “laboratory technician” in
{10} In conducting a statutory construction analysis, we begin by considering the plain meaning of the statute. We “look to the plain language of the statute to determine if the statute can be enforced as written.” State v. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 7, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299. When words are not otherwise defined in a statute, we “giv[e] those words their ordinary meaning absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary.” State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To do so, we consult common dictionary definitions. See State v. Boyse, 2013-NMSC-024, ¶ 9, 303 P.3d 830. “A statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous.” Katz v. N.M. Dep‘t of Hum. Servs., 1981-NMSC-012, ¶ 18, 95 N.M. 530, 624 P.2d 39. “Unless ambiguity exists, this Court must adhere to the plain meaning of the language.” State v. Maestas, 2007-NMSC-001, ¶ 14, 140 N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933. “A statute is ambiguous when it can be understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.” Maestas v. Zager, 2007-NMSC-003, ¶ 9, 141 N.M. 154, 152 P.3d 141 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{11}
1. The plain meaning of Section 66-8-103 is ambiguous
{12} Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals should have adhered more closely to the plain meaning of the statute before consulting other sources of statutory interpretation. According to Defendant, the Court of Appeals improperly strayed from the plain meaning of the statute by holding that medical professionals without laboratory experience can be “laboratory technicians” under the statute. See id. ¶ 29. Citing to a number of sources defining “laboratory technician,” Defendant insists that the ordinary definition of the term “laboratory technician” requires actual laboratory experience, a background in laboratory science, or laboratory skills beyond the skill of drawing blood itself. Defendant asserts that the use of the term “laboratory technician” in the statute means that the Legislature intended the employee drawing blood to have had laboratory experience. To hold otherwise, Defendant argues, would be to render the word “laboratory” superfluous.
{13} The State, quoting City of Eunice v. N.M. Tax‘n & Revenue Dept., 2014-NMCA-085, ¶ 14, 331 P.3d 986, agrees with Defendant that “[i]n the absence of a statutory definition, [the Court] rel[ies] on a dictionary definition to determine the meaning of the language used.” However, the State focuses on the word “technician,” rather than “laboratory,” emphasizing that, in order to be a technician, a person must have acquired a certain technique around an area of specialization. Specifically, the State cites literature from the Department of Labor, which says, “technicians and technologists perform tests and procedures that physicians and surgeons or other healthcare personnel order.”
{14} The State argues that Atwood meets this definition of a “technician” because she was trained and employed to perform specialized tasks for which she utilized technical processes and methods that involved the practical application of specified knowledge. For that reason, the State concludes Atwood was qualified to draw blood under the statute as a phlebotomist, a laboratory technician, or a technologist employed by a hospital. We note that Atwood herself refuted the contention that she was a phlebotomist and that the evidence does not support an inference that she was a technologist employed by the hospital. We therefore limit our analysis to the plain meaning of “laboratory technician.”
{15} We agree with the State that the term “laboratory technician” is ambiguous on its face. This term can be reasonably understood to have more than one meaning, as is evident from the parties’ conflicting but reasonable interpretations of the word “technician.” Because the Court of Appeals proceeded to address the legislative purpose of the statute, it must have similarly concluded that the plain language does not answer the question presented. Like the Court of Appeals, we turn to address the legislative purpose of the statute‘s requirement that a person qualified to perform a legal blood draw must be a “laboratory technician.”
2. Allowing EMTs with adequate training and experience in drawing blood to perform legal blood draws is consistent with the legislative purpose of the statute
{16} Though looking at the plain language of the statute is the first step in statutory construction analysis, this Court has made clear that we “will not be bound by a literal interpretation of the words if such strict interpretation would defeat the intended object of the [L]egislature.” Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If statutory language “is doubtful, ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity, or contradiction, the court should reject the plain meaning rule in favor of construing the statute according to its obvious spirit or reason.” Id. ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[L]egislative intent is [this Court‘s] touchstone when interpreting a statute.” Id. ¶ 10.
{17} Defendant argues that, by allowing EMTs with training and experience in drawing blood to perform legal blood draws, the Court of Appeals violated the Legislature‘s intent to authorize blood draws by only limited categories of qualified medical professionals. Defendant says that under
{18} In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated, “an individual qualifies as a laboratory technician... if she has sufficient skills, training, and experience to assure a hospital or physician that she is qualified to perform blood draws in accordance with approved medical practice.” Adams, 2019-NMCA-043, ¶ 28. Because the Legislature specifically listed which medical professionals are permitted to draw blood under the statute, Defendant challenges the deference of the Court of Appeals to the opinion of doctors and hospitals to determine who is qualified as a laboratory technician. Defendant asserts that such an interpretation results in the term “laboratory technician” no longer meaning a skilled analyst working in a laboratory, as the plain language indicates, but rather any person who draws blood in a hospital.
{20} Defendant further argues, quoting Garcia, that the plain language of the statute reveals the legislative intent of the statute, which is “to insure the safety and protection of the person whose blood is drawn.” See Garcia, 2016-NMCA-044, ¶ 24. Defendant asserts that the Legislature meant to protect patients from having blood drawn by people with inadequate training. Defendant argues that the distinction the Legislature drew to protect the safety of patients is one of credentials, not individual skill level.
{21} In response, the State asks us to extend our analysis beyond the plain meaning of the statutory language to interpret the statute in light of its legislative purpose. Quoting State v. Wiberg, 1988-NMCA-022, ¶ 13, 107 N.M. 152, 154 P.2d 529, the State argues that rather than focusing on the lack of an exact match between Atwood‘s job title and the categories listed in the statute, we should interpret the statute in a way that better “accomplish[es] the legislative purpose of deterring drunk drivers and aid[s] in discovering and removing the intoxicated driver from the highways.”
{22} We agree with the State that a strict plain language interpretation is not appropriate in this case. We must analyze the statute through the lens of the Legislature‘s intended purpose, which we conclude encompasses two goals: (1) to protect patients subject to a blood draw and (2) to ensure the collection of a reliable blood sample for use in DWI prosecutions. Contrary to Defendant‘s argument, requiring a laboratory technician to have explicit laboratory experience does not achieve these purposes. See Wiberg, 1988-NMCA-022, ¶ 14 (listing the purpose of
{23} We must construe
{24} In State v. Trujillo, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue whether a medical professional, trained and experienced in drawing blood but lacking a license, was authorized to draw blood as a “technologist” under the statute. 1973-NMCA-076, ¶ 15, 85 N.M. 208, 510 P.2d 1079. The Court of Appeals held that “the statute [wa]s ambiguous” as to whether “the Legislature intend[ed] that a technologist be licensed[.]” Id. ¶¶ 17-18. The Court then pursued “the legislative intent by applying rules of construction.” Id. ¶ 17. Reasoning that because (1) the Court presumes that the Legislature knows the existing law, (2) the Court should not adopt
{25} In reaching this conclusion, the Court declared the public policy underlying the statute. “One purpose is to deter driving while intoxicated. Another purpose is to aid in discovering and removing from the highways the intoxicated driver. . . . To hold that a technologist must be licensed when there are no provisions for a license, would defeat the purpose of discovering . . . the intoxicated driver.” Id. ¶ 21 (omissions in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{26} In Wiberg, the Court of Appeals considered whether a nurse who was not employed by a hospital or physician but by an Albuquerque Police Department contractor was qualified to draw blood for a blood-alcohol test under
provides that relative and qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding, and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote. Here, the qualifying words are “employed by a hospital or physician.” We apply that phrase to the preceding term “technologist” but not to the more remote terms.
Id. ¶ 11 (citation omitted).
{27} The Court of Appeals recognized that its interpretation of this statute should not “significantly and unnecessarily limit the classes of individuals who could assist in furthering the statute‘s legislative purpose” so as to not “needlessly impose burdens on the discovery and removal of the intoxicated driver and, thus, thwart the legislative policy.” Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. The Court stated that its holding was consistent with the “purpose of
{28} The Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in Garcia. The issue in Garcia was “whether an [EMT was] authorized to draw blood for the purpose of determining its alcohol or drug content under the Implied Consent Act.” 2016-NMCA-044, ¶ 1. The facts were as follows. While in an ambulance on the way to the hospital, a police officer handed the on-duty EMT an SLD blood draw kit and asked her to draw a blood sample from the defendant. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. The EMT agreed and drew blood from the defendant; however, she did not perform the blood draw according to the SLD blood draw procedures because she used the wrong needle to extract the blood sample. Id. ¶ 5. The district court suppressed the results of the blood test because the blood draw was improperly performed and the EMT was not qualified. Id. ¶¶ 7, 25.
{29} The Court of Appeals reasoned that
[b]lood draws to determine the content of alcohol or drugs in blood under the Implied Consent Act [did] not fall under the scope [of the EMT‘s] license. . . . Moreover, her training . . . [did] not include the protocols for performing blood draws that comply with the Scientific Laboratory Division regulations of the Department of Health under the Implied Consent Act.
Id. ¶ 22. The Court of Appeals concluded:
[The d]efendant‘s blood was drawn by a person who was not qualified to do so, and in accordance with our analysis, the district court properly suppressed the test results on this basis.
Section 66-8-103 has a two-fold purpose: to insure the safety and protection of the person whose blood is drawn; and to insure the reliability of the sample. Compliance withSection 66-8-103 advances both of these purposes.
Id. ¶ 24 (citation omitted).
{30} In Garcia, the Court of Appeals stated that neither the EMT‘s training nor her “certification . . . authorize[d] her to draw blood for the purpose of determining its alcohol or drug content.” Id. ¶ 22. In contrast, here, it was Atwood‘s EMT certification in addition to her training and experience that qualified her to draw Defendant‘s blood.
{32} Atwood further testified that she had worked for San Juan Regional Medical Center for over a year and during that time had performed “hundreds or thousands” of blood draws. She said that during her most recent hospital shift, she performed twenty-five blood draws. Atwood explained that most of the blood samples she takes from patients are sent to the hospital laboratory and a few go to the police for testing. She then explained the difference between conducting a blood draw for the hospital laboratory versus for the police. She was able to describe the differences between the two processes in detail. At the close of the hearing, Defendant‘s attorney agreed that, in Defendant‘s case, Atwood did everything in accordance with the instructions from the sealed blood draw kit and the training that she had received.
{33} Atwood stated during the hearing that she had never worked in a laboratory and did not have any laboratory experience. However, based on what happened in this case, it is clear that her lack of laboratory experience did not prevent her from learning how to properly administer a legal blood draw test under the SLD procedures. Through her training and actual experience in conducting blood draws at the hospital, she developed and practiced the proper technique to perform this procedure.
{34} Prohibiting medical professionals who possess such training in this area from administering blood draws would “needlessly impose burdens on the discovery and removal of the intoxicated driver and, thus, thwart the legislative policy.” Wiberg, 1988-NMCA-022, ¶¶ 13, 15. Allowing EMTs who, along with their certification, have the training and experience in the skill of drawing blood to perform legal blood draw tests and who are employed by a hospital or physician to do so, furthers the purpose of the statute to ensure the safety of the patient and the reliability of the blood sample. See Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. Rogers, 1978-NMSC-049, ¶ 6, 91 N.M. 768, 581 P.2d 456 (concluding the purpose of
B. Abuse of Discretion
{35} Next, we turn to the question of whether the district court abused its discretion by suppressing Defendant‘s blood test results. “[A] court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect standard, incorrect substantive law, or its discretionary decision is premised on a misapprehension of the law.” State v. Sena, 2020-NMSC-011, ¶ 15, 470 P.3d 227 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The standard of review for suppression rulings is whether the law was correctly applied to the facts, viewing them in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party.” State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{36} As we discussed above, Defendant argues that the district court properly interpreted Garcia, 2016-NMCA-044, and correctly applied the law to the facts. The State, on the other hand, argues that the district court misinterpreted Garcia and misapplied
III. CONCLUSION
{38} We affirm the Court of Appeals.
{39} IT IS SO ORDERED.
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
C. SHANNON BACON, Justice
DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice
JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice
Notes
[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle within this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of the Implied Consent Act . . to chemical tests of his breath or blood or both . . as determined by a law enforcement officer, or for the purpose of determining the drug or alcohol content of his blood if arrested for any offense arising out of the acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or drug.