STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES BAKER
AC 37441
Appellate Court of Connecticut
September 6, 2016
Alvord, Mullins and Pellegrino, Js.
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Argued April 14—officially released September 6, 2016
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Deborah G. Stevenson, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Jacob L. McChesney, special deputy assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Stephen J. Sedensky III, state‘s attorney, and Sean P. McGuinness, assistant state‘s attorney, for
Opinion
MULLINS, J. The defendant, James Baker, appeals from the judgment of the trial cоurt denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22.1 After pleading guilty under the Alford doctrine2 to possessing a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution in violation of
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On February 16, 1999, the defendant, who was an inmate at the Garner Correctional Institution, was involved in a physical altercation with other inmates. At the time of the altercation, the defendant was serving a thirty-two year sentence of imprisonment for two 1994 murder convictions. Department of Correction (department) officers observed the defendant attempt to assault another inmate by charging at the inmate
On the same day of the incident, department investigators interviewed the defendant, who pleaded guilty in a department administrative proceeding to three violations of prison policy: (1) impeding order; (2) contraband (dangerous instrument); and (3) fighting. Department officials then imposed the following disciplinary sanctions on the defendant: (1) three disciplinary reports; (2) loss of 120 days of statutory good time credit; (3) loss of commissary privileges for ninety days; (4) loss of visits for sixty days; (5) confinement to quarters for thirty days; (6) punitive segregation for seven days; (7) loss of telephone privileges for forty days; and (8) loss of mail privileges for sixty days. Furthermore, sometime in March or April of 1999, after determining that the defendant was a security risk, the department transferred him to the maximum security prison at Northern Correctional Institution (Northern). The defendant was incarcerated at Northern for approximately one year.
On April 28, 1999, the state charged the defendant with one count of possessing a weapon or dangerousinstrument in a correctional institution in violation of
On August 9, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which was amended on August 29, 2013 (amended motion). In the amended motion, the defendant asserted that the eighteen month sentence of incarceratiоn violated the double jeopardy protections of the state and federal constitutions because the sentence and department sanctions constituted multiple punishments for the same offense. The defendant listed fourteen items that he alleged the department had imposed as administrative sanctions for his conduct in the 1999 prison incident. The first eight items were set forth previously in this opinion. The remaining six items related to (1) the defendant‘s transfer to Northern and (2) the effect of the eighteen month sentence on the defendant‘s ability to enter a halfway house.
Following an evidentiary hearing on the аmended motion, the trial court, Roraback, J., denied the defendant‘s motion. The court concluded that the eighteen month sentence was not imposed in violation of the defendant‘s protections against double jeopardy. In particular, the court ruled that the department sanctions were not “grossly disproportionate to the government‘s interest in maintaining prison order and discipline.” Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to reargue the matter, which the court granted. The court, however, affirmed its original ruling and denied the relief requested by the defendant. The court reiterated that the department sanctions did not violate the double jeopardy clause because they were not grossly disproportionate to the government‘s remedial interest in maintaining order and discipline. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
I
In his first claim, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying the
We begin with the standard of review and relevant legal principles. “Ordinarily, a claim that the trial court improperly denied a defendant‘s motion to correct an illegal sentence is reviewed pursuant tо the abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Tabone, 279 Conn. 527, 534, 902 A.2d 1058 (2006). A double jeopardy claim, however, “presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary.” State v. Burnell, 290 Conn. 634, 642, 966 A.2d 168 (2009). “[C]laims of double jeopardy involving multiple punishments present a question of law to which we afford plenary review.” State v. Tabone, 292 Conn. 417, 439, 973 A.2d 74 (2009). “Because the issue of whether an administrative sanction constitutes punishment for purposes of double jeopardy is a question of law, [our] review [is] de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Duke, 48 Conn. App. 71, 74, 708 A.2d 583, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 911, 713 A.2d 829 (1998).
Practice Book § 43-22 provides that “[t]he judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal dispositiоn, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an illegal manner.” Accordingly, “the trial court and this court, on appeal, have the power, at any time, to correct a sentence that is illegal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Constantopolous, 68 Conn. App. 879, 882, 793 A.2d 278, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 927, 798 A.2d 971 (2002). “An illegal sentence is essentially one which either exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant‘s right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 443-44, 546 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809, 548 A.2d 441 (1988).
The double jeopardy clause of the
The multiple punishments protection, however, does not “prohibit the imposition of all additional sanctions that could, in common parlance, be described as punishment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98-99, 118 S. Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed. 2d 450 (1997). “The Clause protects only
The United States Supreme Court has prescribed a two-pronged test for determining whether a sanction constitutes criminal punishment. Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. 99-100; see State v. Jimenez-Jaramillo, 134 Conn. App. 346, 368-73, 38 A.3d 239, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 913, 45 A.3d 100 (2012) (applying Hudson‘s two-pronged test in determining that infraction for public disturbance was not criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes). The first prong is statutory construction. Hudson v. United States, supra, 99. “Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction. . . . A court must first ask whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The fact that the power to issue sanctions “was conferred upon administrative agencies is prima facie evidence that [the legislature] intended to provide for a civil sanction.” Id., 103.
Under the second prong, the court must ask “whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect . . . as to transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 99. The court should make this inquiry even if it determines under the first prong that the legislature “indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In making the second determination, the United States Supreme Court has articulated seven “useful guideposts” that a court should consider. Id. These factors include: “(1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it аppears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 99-100 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 [1963]). These factors are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive.” United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742 (1980).
“It is particularly appropriate to apply the factors flexibly in the context of prison discipline cases, which do not fit neatly into the matrix of double jeopardy doctrine . . . because in the prison context, virtually any form of sanction seems criminal and punitive as we commonly understand those terms.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Porter v. Coughlin, 421 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2005). “It is important to note . . . that these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on
Turning to the present case, Hudson first requires us to ask whether our legislature designated the statutory mechanism by which the department imposes sanctions as criminal or civil. We conclude that the legislature intended for the statutory mechanism to be civil in nature.
Moreover, the sanction mechanism is not locatedwithin our state‘s penal code, as it instead relates to the “remedial purpose of allowing . . . prison officials to maintain order and discipline.” State v. Santiago, 240 Conn. 97, 102, 689 A.2d 1108 (1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 779-80, 778 A.2d 947 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1138, 122 S. Ct. 1086, 151 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2002). Indeed, our state Supreme Court рreviously observed that prison sanctions do not generally give rise to double jeopardy violations because they are “administrative sanctions . . . [that] serve the purpose of maintaining institutional order and security. . . .” Id., 101.
Having determined that our legislature intended to designate prison sanctions as civil penalties, we turn to Hudson‘s second prong. The second prong requires us to determine whether the statutory scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect . . . as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. 99. We note at the outset that only the ”clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 100. We conclude that the defendant has not provided the clearest proof that the department sanctions are so punitive in effect or purpose that they
The seven factors that the United States Supreme Court has identified as helpful in making this second inquiry are only “useful guideposts“; id., 99; and “we need not apply them rigidly.” Porter v. Coughlin, supra, 421 F.3d 147. The factors are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive“; United States v. Ward, supra, 448 U.S. 249; and they “are to be applied flexibly.” Porter v. Coughlin, supra, 148.
In the present case, the defendant received several department sanctions after the department found that he had engaged in fighting, the possession of a dangerous weapon, and the impediment of order. In particular, the department imposed the following sanctions: (1) three disciplinary reports; (2) loss of 120 days of statutory good time credit; (3) loss of commissary privileges for ninety days; (4) loss of visits for sixty days; (5) confinement to quarters for thirty days; (6) punitive segregation for seven days; (7) loss of telephone privileges for forty days; (8) loss of mail privileges for sixty days; and (9) transfer to the maximum security facility at Northern.
Although the defendant has not provided a substantive analysis of the relevant factors, a few of the factors appear to support the defendant‘s contention that some of the sanctions are criminal in nature. In particular, the first, fourth, and fifth factors weigh in the defendant‘sfavor.7 Because the defendant already was incarcerated, most of the sanctions involve an “affirmative disability or restraint.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. 99. All of the sanctions seem to “promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence,” and the “behavior to which [they] apply is already a crime . . . .” Id.
The defendant relies mainly on the fourth factor, arguing that the sanctions “only [serve] to promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence.” We note, however, that the “mere presence of [deterrence] is insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as deterrence may serve civil as well as criminal goals.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. 105. “To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions ‘criminal’ for double jeopardy purposes would severely undermine the Government‘s ability to engage in effective regulation of institutions . . . .” Id. “[A] civil or administrative sanction that serves a legitimate remedial purpose . . . does not give rise to a double jeopardy violation even if the sanction has some deterrent effect.” State v. Hickam, 235 Conn. 614, 623, 668 A.2d 1321 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221, 116 S. Ct. 1858, 134 L. Ed. 2d 951 (1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 779-80, 778 A.2d 947 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1138, 122 S. Ct. 1086, 151 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2002). We conclude that the defendant‘s reliance on the fourth factor is unavailing because any deterrence resulting from the sanctions permissibly furthers the “remedial purpose of allowing prison officials to maintain order and discipline.” State v. Santiago, supra, 240 Conn. 102.
The sixth and seventh factors weigh heavily against a finding that the sanctions are criminal. Courts that have applied the factors to prison sanctions generally have afforded greater weight to the last two
Regarding the sixth factor, the department sanctions clearly have “an alternative purpose to which [they] may rationally be connected . . . .” Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. 99. Indeed, our Supreme Court expressly has recognized that prison sanctions serve the “remedial purpose of allowing the prison officials to maintain order and discipline.” State v. Santiago, supra, 240 Conn. 102. “The institutional consideration of internal security in the correction facilities themselves is essential to all other correction goals.” State v. Walker, 35 Conn. App. 431, 435, 646 A.2d 209, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 916, 648 A.2d 159 (1994). “Correction authorities must be allowed to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of inmates and correction employees; they must be permitted promptly to sanction misconduct within the institution so as to preserve order and discipline.” Id., 436-37. Therefore, “[e]nsuring security and order at the institution is a permissible nonpunitive objective . . . .” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979). “The need to maintain order . . . is a legitimate nonpunitive interest, even if it sometimes requires that prison officials take action of a punitive character.” Porter v. Coughlin, supra, 421 F.3d 148. Accordingly, we conclude that the sixth factor militates against a conclusion that the department sanctions are criminal because they are rаtionally connected to the nonpunitive purpose of maintaining safety, order, and discipline within the prison.
Regarding the seventh factor, the department sanctions are not “excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. 100. The types of sanctions the department may impose are not excessive in light of how inmate misconduct, like the defendant‘s violent behavior in this case, seriously undermines discipline, safety, and order within the prison. See, e.g., State v. Walker, supra, 35 Conn. App. 436-37 (reasonable to segregate inmate for “the serious offense” of assaulting correction emрloyee because “violent behavior could be detrimental to maintaining control throughout the correction facility . . . [and] [c]orrection authorities must be allowed to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of inmates and correction employees“). “Because the realities of running a correctional institution are complex and difficult, the courts give wide-ranging deference to the decisions of prison administrators in considering
Our courts regularly have held that sanctions similar to those imposed on the defendant, for misconduct similar to the defendant‘s actions, are not disproportionate to the department‘s remedial interests. See State v. Santiago, supra, 240 Conn. 99-102 (ten days of puni-tive segregation, thirty days loss of telephone and mail privileges, and loss of forty-five days of good time credit for possessing shank); State v. Walker, supra, 35 Conn. App. 432, 435-37 (placement in administrative isolation, fifteen days of punitive segregation, and thirty days confinement to quarters for punching correction officer in head and jaw); State v. King, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CR-01-89268-S (May 15, 2003) (thirty days of punitive segregation, ninety days loss of phone privileges, ninety days loss of commissary privileges, sixty days loss of visits, and transfer to administrative segregation at Northern for assaulting correction officer).8
In sum, under Hudson‘s first prong, we conclude that the legislature intended the department sanctions to be civil in nature, not criminal. Under Hudson‘s second prong, a careful weighing of the relevant factors demonstrates that the clearest proof that the department sanctions are so punitive in purpose or effect as to override the legislature‘s intent does not exist in this case. We conclude that the department sanctions were not criminal in nature and that they therefore did not cоnstitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
Accordingly, because we conclude that the department sanctions do not constitute criminal punishment, the trial court properly found that the eighteen month prison sentence did not violate the double jeopardy clause‘s prohibition on imposing multiple punishments for the same offense, and, therefore, properly denied the motion to correct an illegal sentence.
II
The defendant‘s second claim on appeal is that the trial court improperly excluded evidence regarding the collateral consequenсes of the eighteen month prison sentence. Specifically, he argues that evidence suggesting that the eighteen month sentence had the consequence of delaying his release to a halfway house was relevant to the double jeopardy analysis. We do not reach the merits of this claim because the defendant has not briefed how he was harmed by the allegedly improper evidentiary ruling. Accordingly, we decline to review it.
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. At two points in the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel attempted to admit evidence relating to how the eighteen month sentence affected the defendant‘s ability to
Subsequently, with the defendant on the witness stand, defense counsel attempted the following examination:
“Q. [T]his eighteen months, that‘s consecutive to the current sentence?”
“A. Yes.
“Q. Okay. Now does that affect your time that you‘re now serving—I mean, in a halfway house—can you gеt out to a halfway house?
“A. No.”
After the state objected, the court sustained the objection and stated: “Okay. And again, the court believes the inquiry goes not to the severity of any sentence that might be imposed, but as to the question of whether any sentence could lawfully have been imposed. So I‘m going to sustain the objection.”
“The trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence and [e]very reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court‘s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 23, 1 A.3d 76 (2010). “[I]n order to establish reversible error on an evidentiary impropriety, the defendant must prove both an abuse of discretion and a harm that resulted from such abuse. . . . This requires that the defendant demonstrate that it is more probable than not that the erroneous action of the court affected the result.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kirsch, 263 Conn. 390, 412, 820 A.2d 236 (2003).
“It is well settled that, absent structural error, the mere fact that a trial court rendered an improper ruling does not entitle the party challenging that ruling to obtain a new trial. An improper ruling must also be harmful to justify such relief. . . . The harmfulness of an improper ruling is material irrespеctive of whether the ruling is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard or a plenary review standard. . . . When the ruling at issue is not of constitutional dimensions, the party challenging the ruling bears the burden of proving harm.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re James O., 160 Conn. App. 506, 527, 127 A.3d 375 (2015), aff‘d, 322 Conn. 636, 142 A.3d 1147 (2016).
In the present case, the defendant has briefed a claimthat the court erred in precluding evidence regarding the potential collateral consequences of his eighteen month sentence and has failed to address how the evidentiary ruling was harmful. Accordingly, we decline to review the claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
MULLINS, J.
JUDGE OF THE APPELLATE COURT
Notes
“(b) Possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a сorrectional institution is a class B felony.”