State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Larry Dale Taylor, Appellant.
A20-0425
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
October 13, 2021
Chutich, J. Dissenting, Thissen, J. Dissenting in part, Anderson, J.
Court of Appeals. Filed: October 13, 2021 Office of Appellate Courts
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Jacob P. Fauchald, Assistant Clay County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota, for respondent.
Luke T. Heck and Drew J. Hushka, Vogel Law Firm, Fargo, North Dakota, for appellant.
S Y L L A B U S
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
CHUTICH, Justice.
The issue in this case is whether a deputy sheriff had reasonable, articulable suspicion during a traffic stop to believe that appellant Larry Dale Taylor may have been driving while impaired when the deputy learned that Taylor‘s license had been canceled as inimical to public safety and the deputy saw an open case of beer with missing cans in the backseat of Taylor‘s truck. Taylor challenges his convictions for first-degree driving while impaired (DWI)
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Taylor with (1) first-degree DWI for driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher,
The deputy sheriff testified that on February 17, 2019, at about 7:15 p.m., he noticed a truck driving in Clay County without a front license plate and a back license plate covered in snow even though it had not snowed for some time. The deputy pulled the truck over and dusted off the back license plate. He noticed that the registration sticker read “2017“; when he ran the license plate number through the database, he learned that the vehicle had not been registered since then.
The deputy then approached Taylor, who was the driver of the truck and sole occupant. He asked Taylor for identification, which Taylor claimed not to have. The deputy noticed a case of beer in the backseat of the truck, with the flap open, that was missing some cans. It was, as the deputy testified, an “extremely cold” and “unbearable” night; so cold, in fact, that even in his brief interaction with Taylor, he was losing dexterity in his fingers. The deputy escorted Taylor to his squad car and ran the truck‘s registration through the database. In so doing, he learned that Taylor‘s license had been canceled as inimical to public safety, which, in his experience, often means that a driver is a “repeat offender” for driving while impaired. The deputy asked Taylor if he knew his driver‘s license was canceled as inimical to public safety; Taylor confirmed that he was aware of this status. Based on the license status and the open case of beer, the deputy asked Taylor if he had consumed any of the beer, to which Taylor replied that he had drunk two cans. Later, Taylor admitted to having drunk six cans. After the truck was eventually impounded, the deputy found two empty cans of beer near the passenger seat.
Driving with a license canceled as inimical to public safety, the deputy testified, is a gross misdemeanor, for which he decided to arrest Taylor. Because of the extreme
After the omnibus hearing, the district court denied Taylor‘s motion to suppress the statements and the results of the field sobriety and breath tests. The court concluded that the deputy expanded the scope of the traffic stop to investigate a possible driving while impaired violation when he asked Taylor if he had been drinking. The court further concluded that “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances,” the deputy “had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to expand the scope of the stop based on the open case of beer and [Taylor‘s] license status.”
Taylor then waived his right to a jury trial and other trial rights and stipulated to the prosecution‘s evidence in a court trial, under
In an unpublished decision, a divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed Taylor‘s convictions. The court of appeals reasoned that the combination of both the open case of beer within reach of the driver and the canceled license amounted to reasonable, articulable suspicion. State v. Taylor, No. A20-0425, 2020 WL 7491283, at *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 21, 2020). The court emphasized that the deputy‘s training and experience as an officer caused him to believe that drivers whose licenses have been canceled as inimical to public safety are often repeat offenders for driving while impaired. Id. It concluded that this knowledge, in combination with the open case of beer within Taylor‘s reach, gave the officer more than a “mere hunch” that Taylor may have been driving while impaired. Id. The court of appeals rejected Taylor‘s argument that the deputy could not have had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of driving while impaired when he did not observe any physical indicia of intoxication. Id. at *4.
The dissent concluded that “[w]ithout the presence of any indicia of intoxication, the license status together with the observation of a legally-located open case of beer did not provide a reasonable basis to believe the driver was intoxicated.” Id. at *6 (Slieter, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge recognized that an officer may have a reasonable suspicion that a driver is intoxicated even without observing the tell-tale signs of intoxication but concluded that the totality of the circumstances here allowed the deputy to form only a “hunch.” Id.
We granted Taylor‘s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
The question before us today is whether the deputy lawfully expanded the
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. See
Reasonable suspicion must be “particularized” and based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). In determining whether the reasonable suspicion standard is met, we consider the totality of the circumstances. State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007). We have emphasized that an analysis of reasonable suspicion is a ” ‘common-sense’ ” and ” ‘nontechnical’ ” approach that considers “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life“; this standard is ” ‘not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1998) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996)). Under this standard, trained police officers may “draw inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 487 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere “hunch” but “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the Minnesota Constitution, “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must be] tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004). Generally, if evidence is seized in violation of the constitution, it must be suppressed. See State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).
Applying these precedents, we analyze the stop and the ensuing actions of the deputy. First, the deputy pulled Taylor over because his truck was missing a front license plate and the back plate was covered with snow. See
a “repeat offender” for driving while impaired. On cross-examination, the deputy acknowledged that there are other reasons that a person‘s license could be canceled as inimical to public safety, but he explained, “[o]ff the top of my head I‘m not aware of which.”2
Only then, after the deputy observed the open case of beer with the missing cans and learned that Taylor was driving with a license canceled as inimical to public safety, a gross-misdemeanor offense, did he ask Taylor if he had been drinking. This single question is the expansion of the stop challenged here. Because the question is unrelated to the original purpose for the stop and neither party contends that the deputy had or needed to have probable cause, the inquiry must be justified by the reasonableness standard set forth in Terry.
The test for reasonableness depends upon “the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). We look closely at “the facts available to the officer,” and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them and evaluate whether they establish sufficient reasonable suspicion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22.
Notably, we need not determine whether either the open case of beer with some missing cans in the truck or the canceled license status would be sufficient by itself. We focus only on whether the combination of the objective, particularized facts and any resulting rational inferences warranted a reasonable, articulable suspicion that justified expansion of the stop.
Taylor focuses on each fact separately and claims that, even if considered in combination, they do not add up to reasonable, articulable suspicion. First, he contends that it was lawful for him to possess the open case of beer in his truck. Borrowing language from the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Reid v. Georgia,3 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980), Taylor cautions that “a very large category of presumably innocent travelers [] would be subject to virtually random expanded seizures if” we determine the expanded seizure was justified based on “as little foundation as there was in this case.” He claims, and the dissent emphasizes, that many drivers lawfully transport sealed containers of alcohol in their vehicles, and so to conclude that this fact creates reasonable suspicion to investigate possible impaired driving would subject many Minnesota motorists to
impermissible discretionary intrusions on their liberty. Our holding today, however, does not cast such a wide net. We need not determine whether an open case of beer inside of a truck establishes reasonable, articulable suspicion, and our holding should not be read to suggest that this fact itself does.
Moreover, as Taylor conceded at oral argument, even lawful activity can serve as the basis for reasonable suspicion. See State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 1989) (stating that “innocent activity might justify the suspicion of criminal activity“). We emphasize that on the specific facts here, although lawful, it is relevant to the determination of reasonable suspicion that the case of beer was open, it was within arm‘s reach of the driver, and cans were missing from the case. Because the case was open and cans were missing, someone had likely drunk the missing beer. Drivers can also easily discard cans and bottles of beer from car windows, and, here, the deputy testified that he saw the open case “behind the driver‘s spot.”
B.
We next evaluate the impact of the fact, known to the deputy, that Taylor‘s license was canceled as inimical to public safety. Minnesota law requires the Commissioner of Public Safety to cancel a license as inimical to public safety when a person is convicted of DWI and has two or more “qualified prior impaired driving incidents.”4
subdivision 10, when the qualifying prior DWI incidents exist); see
The deputy testified that based on his training and experience, licenses are often canceled as inimical to public safety because a driver has multiple DWI convictions.5 See State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499, 502–03 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that when determining
if a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity exists, we give “deference . . . to officers regarding inferences and deductions made based on their training“). Our review of Minnesota law supports the deputy‘s testimony. Not only does Minnesota law require the Commissioner to cancel a license as inimical to public safety when a person has repeatedly driven while impaired, see
The dissent contends that it is unreasonable to infer that a person whose license has been canceled as inimical to public safety has a history of repeatedly driving while impaired because the Commissioner may cancel a license as inimical to public safety for reasons other than a history of impaired driving.8 See
road).10 That a driver‘s license is not always canceled as inimical to public safety because of a history of impaired driving incidents “does not negate the reasonableness of [the deputy‘s] inference. Such is the case with all reasonable inferences.” Kansas v. Glover, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1188 (2020) (holding investigative stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
Further, Taylor‘s reliance on, and the dissent‘s analogy to, State v. Henning, 666 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2003), is not persuasive. In Henning, we announced that stops on the basis of special series registration plates, issued when other plates are impounded when the vehicle operator
In this case, Taylor‘s license canceled as inimical to public safety, in conjunction with the open case of beer in his truck, its placement in the truck, and the missing cans, clear the low hurdle of reasonable suspicion. Accord Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 385–86 (stating that while special series plates may not provide the sole justification for a stop, “special series plates may be a factor for law enforcement to consider and would provide a basis for closer scrutiny of [a] vehicle[]“). The combination of these facts establishes more than a “unarticulated hunch” that Taylor was driving while impaired. See Davis, 732 N.W.2d. at 182 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, they provide a ” ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting’ ” that Taylor was driving while impaired. State v. Poehler, 935 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. 2019) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)).
C.
Taylor next claims that Holtz v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 340 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. App. 1983), requires an officer to observe at least one objective indicia of impairment for reasonable suspicion to exist, which was lacking here. While Taylor‘s reliance on Holtz is misplaced for a number of reasons, this assertion misstates the holding of the case.11 See Holtz, 340 N.W.2d at 365 (holding the officer complied with the
requirements of the applicable implied consent law when he asked the appellant to take a chemical test for the presence of alcohol after observing several physical signs of intoxication). Further, in State v. Lee, we said that “[t]he court of appeals’ requirement that the officer observe at least one of the commonly known physical indicia of intoxication is inconsistent with decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of this court both with respect to probable cause and . . . the lesser reasonable suspicion standard.” 585 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1998).
Taylor insists that the facts of Lee are wholly distinguishable from this case and that Lee represents a narrow carve out in an exceptional situation, rather than an iteration of the general rule. We do not agree.
In Lee, officers arrived at the scene of a motorcycle crash where the driver, Lee, was severely injured, and his passenger admitted that she had been drinking and that they had been coming home from a
As stated above, reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard for law enforcement to meet, Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843, and therefore, Holtz is distinguishable.
We upheld the involuntary blood draw as constitutional, explicitly stating that no physical indicia of intoxication are required for the higher probable cause standard. Id. at 382. We reasoned that ” ‘ingestion of alcohol in amounts less than those needed to cause gross outward symptoms of intoxication can have a substantial adverse effect on a driver‘s judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Speak, 339 N.W.2d 741, 745 (Minn. 1983)). Thus, Lee unequivocally stands for the proposition that no bright line rule requires an officer to observe one of the physical indicia of intoxication to establish either probable cause or the lower standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion that is at issue here.12
No one silver bullet exists to determine reasonable, articulable suspicion of intoxication; we have repeatedly emphasized that we evaluate each case on a totality of the circumstances and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those particular facts. See, e.g., Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182. Although we consider the lack of physical indicia of impairment as one circumstance within the totality of the circumstances analysis, for the reasons stated above, we do not find this absence—although unusual—to outweigh the other factors contributing to the existence of reasonable, articulable suspicion that Taylor was driving while impaired. The totality of the circumstances here, even without outward signs of intoxication, weighs in favor of the conclusion that reasonable, articulable suspicion existed to expand the stop.
In sum, we reiterate that the bar for reasonable suspicion is low. See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843 (“[T]he reasonable-suspicion standard is not high.“). Applying this standard to the totality of the circumstances here, we conclude that the State presented sufficient articulable facts, and inferences that could be drawn from those facts, to establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Taylor was driving while impaired. The deputy‘s observation of the open case of beer, its location within arm‘s reach of the driver, and the missing cans, combined with his knowledge that Taylor‘s license had been canceled as inimical to public safety and his past experience with such drivers, estаblish that the deputy had sufficient reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the valid traffic stop by one question. Consequently, the district court properly denied Taylor‘s motion to suppress evidence that was obtained after the deputy expanded the scope of the underlying traffic stop.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Larry Dale Taylor, Appellant.
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
D I S S E N T
THISSEN, Justice (dissenting).
The court‘s holding today permits respondent State of Minnesota to intrude on the privacy of any driver who has previous convictions for driving while impaired to ask whether the driver has been drinking simply because the driver has an open case of beer in his back seat (a perfectly legal act), even when there is no indication that the driver has consumed alcohol. In so holding, the court places too little value on the right of Minnesotans to be free from unreasonable State intrusion into their lives; a right enshrined in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution.
Worse yet, in this case, the deputy who asked the question about alcohol consumption had no knowledge that the driver had previous convictions for driving while impaired. Rather, based on his misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the law, the deputy conjectured that the driver had such previous convictions because the driver‘s license had been revoked as inimical to public safety. While we do not set a high bar for a police officer‘s reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of a traffic stop, see State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008), that bar is not nonexistent. And because the court today sets that bar too low, I respectfully dissent.
A.
Appellant Larry Dale Taylor sought to suppress evidence obtained after a deputy sheriff expanded a traffic stop. Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the State.
We use a totality of the circumstances analysis when assessing whether a police officer had a reasonable suspicion, looking at all facts surrounding the traffic stop. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 487. “Our task is not to decide whether [a] particular officer‘s suspicion was genuine[;] . . . rather, we examine whether the suspicion was objectively reasonable” based on the facts available to the police officer and any rational inferences the officer may have derived from those facts. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 2000) (emphasis omitted). The State bears the burden of justifying the expansion of a stop. State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 256 (Minn. 2007).
Further, Taylor brings his claim under
each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must] be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in [the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)]. Furthermore, the basis for the intrusion must be individualized to the person toward whom the intrusion is directed.
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365. Absent independent probable cause, when a police officer expands the scope of a traffic stop beyond the initial justification for the stop, the officer must have reasonable suspicion of “additional illegal activity.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012).
B.
I now turn to the facts of this case. The deputy sheriff originally pulled Taylor over because his truck was missing a front license plate and the rear plate was obscured by snow. In other words, the initial justification for the stop was the deputy‘s reasonable suspicion that Taylor had violated traffic laws related to the proper displaying of license plates. See, e.g.,
Taylor had no driver‘s license. The deputy instructed Taylor to sit in the back seat of his squad car while he searched for Taylor‘s name in his squad cаr computer. The search revealed that Taylor‘s license had been canceled as inimical to public safety. The deputy did not conduct any follow-up to ascertain why Taylor‘s license had been canceled. Rather, the deputy immediately asked Taylor whether he had consumed any of the beers from the case in his truck. Taylor responded that he had. Taylor was eventually convicted of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more as well as an open container violation.
The State acknowledges that the deputy expanded the scope of the traffic stop by asking Taylor whether he had consumed alcohol. The State also concedes that this expansion was related to neither the original legitimate purpose of the stop nor independent probable cause. So the question here is, at the time the deputy asked Taylor whether he had consumed any of the beer from the open case in his truck, did the deputy have a reasonable suspicion that Taylor had committed some other illegal activity? I conclude that the State did not carry its burden of proving both that such objectively reasonable suspicion existed and that the extension of the stop was sufficiently limited in scope. See Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 252.
The only suspected illegal activity that could have justified the deputy‘s question about the beer was Taylor possibly driving while impaired. The question was unnecessary to support arresting Taylor for driving without a valid driver‘s license. After the deputy determined that Taylor‘s license
The State relies on the combination of two facts to support the district court‘s finding that the deputy had reasonable suspicion that Taylor was driving while impaired: (1) the deputy‘s observation of the open case of beer behind the driver‘s seat, and (2) the deputy‘s inference that Taylor had a prior record of driving while impaired; an inference based solely on his knowledge that Taylor‘s driver‘s license had been canceled as inimical to public safety.
1.
I first turn to the deputy‘s knowledge that Taylor‘s driver‘s license was canceled as inimical to public safety. The only relevance of Taylor‘s license status to the deputy‘s question about Taylor‘s consumption of beer was to support a conjecture that Taylor had a prior record of driving while impaired. It is Taylor‘s presumed prior criminal record (not his license status), combined with the open case of beer, that forms the basis for the State‘s argument that, when the deputy asked about the open case of beer, the deputy had a reasonable suspicion that Taylor was driving while impaired.
It is undisputed that the deputy had no dirеct knowledge that Taylor had prior driving while impaired violations when he asked Taylor whether he had consumed any beer from the open case. Accordingly, the State‘s case turns on whether the inference that Taylor had prior driving while impaired violations based on his driver‘s license status is reasonable and permissible. I now turn to that inquiry.
The record shows that the deputy knew only that Taylor‘s driver‘s license had been canceled as inimical to public safety. The record is clear that the deputy did not know why Taylor‘s license was canceled. Indeed, the deputy never even testified that he assumed that Taylor had a record of driving while impaired because of Taylor‘s license status.2 That is a supposition proffered by the State after the fact.
The State and the court suggest that because a history of alcohol-related driving violations is one reason for canceling a person‘s driver‘s license as inimical to public safety, the deputy reasonably inferred that Taylor was driving under the influence on the night in question. That inference is not something a reasonable and prudent layperson would make. Instead, to make that leap, the State and the court must rely—and exclusively do rely—on the deputy‘s experience. See Smith, 814 N.W.2d at 353 (relying on a police officer‘s training and experience when assessing whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of a traffic stop). The deputy testified that he had encountered other drivers who had licenses canceled as inimical to public safety and that it was his “understanding” that such drivers are “repeat offenders for driving while impaired.” Indeed, when pressed, the deputy continued to testify that he was not aware of reasons other than multiple driving while impaired violations for which a person could have his license canceled as inimical to public safety, despite this incorrect understanding.3
The State‘s position is flawed. First, “training and experience” is not a talismanic phrase that provides an automatic blessing to a police officer‘s actions. Rather, the State must prove why and how the police officer‘s particular training and experience is meaningful to support a reasonable suspicion in a way that would not
There is no evidence that the deputy had been trained on or reviewed any information about the percentage of inimical to public safety cancellations that are due to multiple impaired driving violations. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record whatsoever that the deputy‘s speculation is true.4 Further, there was no evidence adduced concerning the extent of the deputy‘s experience or how many drivers the deputy had encountered whose licenses were canceled as inimical to public safety prior to questioning Taylor. Accordingly, we have no solid basis upon which to do our job and assess whether the deputy‘s inferences were reasonable. The court just accepts the deputy‘s assertion at face value. Consequently, the court decides today that an inference based solely on an isolated experience of a particular police officer that may not be consistent with reality is reasonable. The court turns what we have long held to be an objective standard into a subjective one in which a police officer can simply justify a stop based on his belief, even if that belief may be entirely inconsistent with the objective reality.5
In sum, the deputy had no reasonable basis for believing that Taylor had a prior record of driving while impaired, had no knowledge of whether Taylor had a criminal record, and did not know why Taylor‘s license had been canceled as inimical to public safety. And the deputy‘s understanding that drivers with licenses canceled as inimical to public safety are always repeat driving while impaired offenders was based on both unspecified experience and incorrect. To the extent the deputy speculated that Taylor had a history of driving while impaired based on Taylor‘s license status (and it bears repeating that the deputy never testified that he, in fact, ever made such a speculative leap), any such speculation can be characterized as nothing more than a hunch. Accordingly, one of the two reasons the State relies on to support its position that the deputy had a reasonable suspicion that Taylor was driving while impaired is invalid. The State is left with the deputy‘s observation that there was an open case of beer behind the driver‘s seat in Taylor‘s vehicle—a fact, the State concedes is insufficient on its own to justify the expansion of the stop.
2.
Even if we concluded that the deputy had a reasonable basis to infer that Taylor had a record of alcohol-related driving violations, his expansion of the stop still was not justified. I have found no precedent to support the conclusion that Taylor‘s record of driving while impaired on its own is enough to support the expansion of the stop. Cf. State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 2005) (citing State v. Conaway, 319 N.W.2d 35, 41 (Minn. 1982) (stating that “a criminal record, even a “long” one, is best used as “corroborative information” and not as the sole basis for probable cause“)). Indeed, it would be a surprising conclusion that the constitution allows police officers to stop a person on a suspicion that the person is impaired solely because he has a prior driving-under-the-influence conviction without any other particularized and objective basis for such a suspicion. That would dramatically expand the power of police officers to stop Minnesota drivers. Consequently, both the State and the court stress that Taylor‘s common, lawful activity of transporting an open, partially full case of beer in a truck weighs strongly in favor of a finding that the deputy acted with reasonable suspicion.
The State properly concedes that the transportation of an open case of beer, even one that is partially full, in a vehicle
It is true that even observing a lawful activity can serve as the basis for a reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct or expand the scope of a traffic stop. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 89 (“It is . . . true that wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.“); see also Martinson, 581 N.W.2d at 852 (concluding that multiple lawful acts, when viewed together, supported a finding of a reasonable suspicion sufficient for police officers to conduct an investigatory stop in an airport terminal). But under the reasonable suspicion standard, such lawful activity must consist of “specific, articulable facts” to support a police officer‘s “particularized and objective basis” that a person is breaking the law. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842–43 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, something about the lawful activity must raise a reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged in illegal activity.
Unlike some lawful activities we have held could serve as a basis for a reasonable suspicion, the act of transporting an open case of beer is not inherently suspicious—there certainly is no evidence in the record that it is. See, e.g., Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 86 (police officer testified that a vehicle with a broken window was a common indicator that the vehicle was stolen); Martinson, 581 N.W.2d at 851 (police officers noted that the suspect was acting in a manner “consistent with that of other drug couriers they had arrested“). Accordingly, we should exercise caution when considering the State‘s argument that such a common, nonsuspicious, and lawful activity could function, even in part, as the basis for a reasonable suspicion in this case. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (holding that police officers “could not, as a matter of law, have reasonably suspected the petitioner of criminal activity on the basis of . . . circumstances [that] describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers“). The location of the case of beer in Taylor‘s truck—directly behind the driver‘s seat, a location not conducive to access while driving—further strengthens the need for caution here.
The default rule is that police officers should not intrude into the lives and privacy of Minnesotans who are objectively engaged in lawful behavior. The court, however, opens the door for any police officer to do just that to thousands of Minnesotans. Unfortunately, it is neither rare, nor unlawful, nor suspicious for a person to have multiple prior driving while impaired convictions. Similarly, it is neither rare, nor unlawful, nor suspicious for a person to drive with unopened beer cans in the back seat. And people in both of those categories drive every day without consuming alcohol. Therefore, I conclude that it is not reasonable for a police officer to suspect that a person with a prior record of driving while impaired is currently driving while impaired based solely on the existence of a mostly full case of beer with its flap open behind the driver‘s seat—a perfectly lawful activity. That is particularly true when, as here, there were no physical or other indicia of impairment whatsoever. It is to that issue that I now turn.
In considering the totality of the circumstances here, it is also important that the deputy observed no erratic driving nor physical indicia of impairment before expanding the stop. Physical indicia of impairment are not a prerequisite to a reasonable suspicion that a suspect has driven under the influence of alcohol. See State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1998) (concluding that a police officer need not observe any physical indicia of impairment to have probable cause or reasonable suspicion of driving while impaired). Nevertheless, many cases involving driving while impaired or other alcohol-related driving violations understandably contain evidence of such indicia, such as an odor of alcohol, slurred speech, or bloodshot or glassy eyes. See, e.g., State v. Poehler, 935 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Minn. 2019); Burbach, 706 N.W.2d at 486; Kennedy v. Comm‘r of Pub. Safety, No. A15-1279, 2016 WL 3222850, at *1 (Minn. App. June 13, 2016); Flynn v. Comm‘r of Pub. Safety, No. A06-1136, 2007 WL 1747008, at *1 (Minn. App. June 19, 2007); State v. Rogus, Nos. A05-1490, A05-1840, 2006 WL 2347802, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 15, 2006); State v. Lopez, 631 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2001). Consequently, when the record reflects no physical indicia of impairment at all prior to the expansion of the traffic stop, as here, such an absence should factor in our totality of the circumstances analysis.
The court acknowledges that this absence of physical indicia is “unusual” in a case where a police officer suspects a person is driving while impaired. The court, however, dismisses that absence of physical indicia of alcohol use based on the deputy‘s conjecture that Taylor had a history of driving while impaired—a conjecture based on the deputy‘s misunderstanding of Minnesota law on cancellations as inimical to public safety—coupled with the observation of Taylor‘s legal activity of driving with a case of beer with an open flap behind the driver‘s seat. The court dismisses the absence of opened cans of beer on the further speculation unsupported in the record that Taylor tossed them out the window. The court‘s cherry-picking of certain facts, and its dismissiveness of the lack of any indication of alcohol use or evidence of erratic driving as a factor which should be considered, fails to take seriously our totality of the circumstances analysis. Importantly, it also ignores that the State bears the burden of proving that a reasonable suspicion existed. The court strongly credits the weak reasons of the deputy while ignoring the common-sense inference that a person driving under the influence would generally exhibit some signs of impairment, either through his manner of driving and/or common physical signs of intoxication.
The court relies heavily on State v. Lee, where we found probable cause that a nearly unconscious motorcyclist was driving under the influence even though the record did not demonstrate that the police officers investigating a crash observed any physical indicia of impairment. But Lee is a much different case and serves as a useful factual counterexample to this case.
In Lee, we held that a police officer had probable cause to order a warrantless blood draw from a motorcyclist following a single-vehicle crash despite no evidence of physical indicia of impairment. 585 N.W.2d at 383. Significantly, unlike this case, the motorcyclist could not respond to the police officer‘s questions because he was severely injured and “incoherent.” Id. at 380. On the other hand, there was evidence of aberrant driving behavior commonly associated with impaired driving. Skid marks off the road suggested that the motorcyclist
C.
As should be clear by now, I do not believe that the expansion of the stop in this case is allowed under our current standard for stop expansions. I also believe that it is important to be transparent about my full thought process concerning the conclusion that the court reaches in this case. I believe that our decision today is also wrong because it creates too much space for future pretextual and potentially racially motivated stops and will contribute to Minnesota‘s racial disparities in who is stopped and who is searched following a minor traffic stop.
Each decision we reach in individual cases on what constitutes a reasonable suspicion for a stop or the expansion of a stop impacts the behavior of other state actors in the criminal justice system. It affects how police officers do their jobs, including the extent to which officers use stops for minor traffic violations as a tool to justify a broader police investigation. It affects whether prosecutors will continue to charge felonies when the evidence is the product of an initial stop for a minor traffic violation. Of course, it affects how district courts will review challenges to traffic stops or expansions of stops. Our decision today about what constitutes a reasonable suspicion to expand a search helps set the background rule that drives the behavior of all those other actors. Consequently, the rule we adopt in cases like this directly impacts the liberty interests of all Minnesotans and the structural fairness, and perceived fairness, of our criminal justice system.
The evidence is abundant that the police practice of using stops for minor traffic violations as a tool to justify broader investigations is widespread and common. For several decades, police officers have been trained in how to turn stops for minor traffic violations into investigations for other potential criminal behavior and they are encouraged to adopt the practice. See, e.g., Brett A. Lacey, An Examination of the Evolution of Racially Biased Pretextual Investigatory Stops and their Legitimacy in Policing 37–69 (Mar. 22, 2017) (M.S. thesis, Illinois State University) (Proquest) (providing history of police officer training to expand routine stops as an investigatory tool); Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness 70 (2012) (describing how police officers are trained in how to expand stops for minor violations into broader criminal investigations); Charles Remsberg, Tactics for Criminal Patrol: Vehicle Stops, Drug Discovery & Officer Survival (1995); Lt. Kirk Simone, Kansas Highway Patrol, Epic Operation Pipeline, Passenger Vehicle Drug Interdiction Manual, Kansas Highway Patrol (unpublished). As a leading police officer trainer stated, “the core concept of Criminal Patrol [is] that vehicle stops are golden opportunities for unique field investigations which, with the right volume of contacts, the right knowledge and creativity, and the right approach, can lead to major felony arrests.” Remsberg, Tactics for Criminal Patrol, supra, at 25 (emphasis omitted). And as long as the limits we establish for such police tactics are sufficiently rigorous and protective of Minnesota‘s individual constitutional rights, such police behavior may legitimately help keep us safe. But therein lies the rub—whether our standard is sufficiently rigorous and protective.
We note first that very few drivers can traverse any appreciable distance without violating some traffic regulation. Second is our concern that police, who have enormous discretion in enforcing traffic laws, may take advantage of their right to stop motorists for routine traffic violations in order to target members of groups identified by factors that are totally impermissible as a basis for law enforcement activity.
Id. at 579–80 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The same concerns are reflected in our holdings that the
Those same structural issues continue to plague us today. The racial disparities in Minnesota‘s criminal justice system are well documented. For instance, in 2018, people in Minnesota age 15 and older who were Black were an estimated six percent of the total state population, yet they comprised 27 percent of the population of individuals convicted of felony offenses, and 36 percent of the prison population. Demographic Impact Statement for House File 2013-1CE, Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (May 12, 2020) (providing current demographic information in Table 3). Similar disparities in felony convictions and imprisonment exist for American Indians in Minnesota. Id.
There are of course many reasons for such disparities. But one likely reason is that police expand stops of black individuals and individuals of other racial and ethnic subgroups more and disproportionately often. For instance, a national recent study found:
After stopping a driver, officers may search both driver and vehicle . . . . Aggregating across all states for which we have search data, white drivers are searched in 2.0% of stops, compared to 3.5% of stops for black motorists and 3.8% for Hispanic motorists. Across jurisdiction, . . . black and Hispanic motorists are consistently searched at higher rates than white drivers. After controlling for stop location, date and time, and driver age and gender—via logistic regression, as above—we find that black and Hispanic drivers have approximately twice the odds of being searched relative to white drivers . . . .
Emma Pierson, et al., A Large-scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States 6 (June 18, 2017);8 see also Mary F. Moriarty, Opinion, Traffic Stops as Criminal Investigations: Pretext Stops Should be Disallowed in Minnesota, Minnpost, June 6, 2019 (noting that 54.8 percent of the drivers stopped by the Minneapolis police in 2018 were black, although the black population in Minneapolis is 18.8 percent of the total population, and that nearly three-quarters of equipment stops that resulted in searches
In the face of such information, we cannot ignore the broader impact that our reasonable-suspicion jurisprudence has on police practices that use traffic stops as an excuse to conduct broader investigations, and the disproportionate effect those practices have on black Minnesotans, American Indian Minnesotans, and other communities of color. This is true both for cases where there is no observed traffic violation10 and cases where a traffic stop for a minor traffic violation is expanded into a larger investigation. Certainly, I believe that most police officers in our state are motivated by an interest in keeping their fellow Minnesotans safe and they work hard and risk their lives to do so. But the practical impact of, and practical incentives created by, our decisions that set an extremely low, nearly-anything-goes bar for what constitutes a reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop and the expansion of a traffic stop is that pretextual stops are both easier and deemed more acceptable. See Remsberg, Tactics for Criminal Patrol, supra, at 63 (training police officers to push the edge of established legal limits when appropriate). Those decisions also create the space for police officers, some of whom may have racially biased beliefs and others who (like most of us11) carry implicit or unconscious racial biases into their jobs, to treat members of certain racial groups differently than others. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 579–80.
Without question, the easy, nearly unlimited ability accepted by the court in this case to expand traffic stops for minor violations into broader searches and investigations may result in the discovery of more criminal activity, although that may not deter crime or make our communities any safer, see generally John MacDonald, et al., The Effects of Local Police Surges on Crime and Arrests in New York City, PLOS ONE 11, no. 6 (June 2016). But crime prevention is not our sole concern, especially where Minnesotans’ liberty is at stake. What constitutes reasonable police intrusion under our state and federal constitutions is ultimately a balancing of different values we hold as a society, including the interest of the public in crime prevention and detection and interest of individuals in privacy and security relative to thе scope of the intrusion. See 4 Wayne LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 9.1(d) at
The important societal interest in eliminating racial injustice in our criminal justice system should be part of the mix of societal values in assessing what is a reasonable intrusion. Twenty years ago, our court was issued a challenge:
Unless and until the justices of the Minnesota Supreme Court elevate their concern for racial equality in the courtroom above concerns for finality, judicial economy, and crime prevention, Minnesotans will continue to read in the papers about racial injustices in our court system, and persons of color in Minnesota will continue to feel the imposition of racism in the legal system. Judicial economy, crime prevention, and protection of the adversary system are important values. In the context of the history of racial injustice in the court system, however, they operate to perpetuate and encourage unequal treatment of persons of color. The baseline for our justice system must be that all people, including persons of color, resident aliens, new citizens, and those with difficulty speaking English, receive equal justice under the law.
William E. Martin & Peter N. Thompson, Judicial Toleration of Racial Bias in the Minnesota Justice System, 25 Hamline L. Rev. 235, 239–40 (2002). The authors identified traffic stops as an area of law ripe for improvement. Id. at 249–53. Our standard for establishing a reasonable suspicion to justify a stop or expanded search—including the standard we adopt today—should account for the systemic racial imbalances and inequities that we observe in this corner of our criminal justice system and our societal interest in treating all Minnesotans the same when it comes to fundamental liberty interests like the right to be free of unreasonable searches. While the court‘s decision in this case does not reject the adoption of such an idea in a future case, it also does not take those considerations into account.
D.
Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, I conclude that the State has not met its burden to establish that the deputy acted with reasonable suspicion when asking Taylor whether he had consumed any beers out of the open case in his truck. The deputy‘s reliance on the presence of the case of beer as well as Taylor‘s canceled license status, even when considered together, do not amount to a reasonable, objective suspicion that Taylor was breaking the law at the time the deputy expanded the traffic stop. And even assuming those two facts together came close to supporting reasonable suspicion, the lack of any observed physical indicia of impairment weighs against such a finding. If the facts of this case are enough for reasonable suspicion, it is frankly hard to imagine what is not enough.
While the State need not prove much to clear the low bar for reasonable suspicion, it must still prove that a police officer had a “particularized and objective basis” to expand the scope of a traffic stop beyond
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent.
ANDERSON, Justice (dissenting in part).
I join in parts A through B-3 and D of Justice Thissen‘s dissent.
Notes
As the record shows and the dissent recognizes, this case does not involve a pretextual traffic stop. The appellate record shows that Taylor is white. Taylor did not claim that the initial stop was pretextual or challenge the deputy‘s decision to search for Taylor‘s license status in the State‘s computerized records after learning that the truck did not have current registration tabs and Taylor was unable to produce any form of identification. Accordingly, while we share the dissent‘s concern over racial disparity in traffic stops, this is not a case of a pretextual traffic stop, and Taylor has never raised the issue of race or argued that any of the deputy‘s actions were pretext for an underlying ulterior motive such as racial bias.
In addition, Taylor does not challenge the legal standard that is used to determine if an incremental expansion of a traffic stop violates the Minnesota Constitution. Taylor agrees that if there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was driving while impaired, the deputy‘s expansion of the stop to ask him if he had drunk any of the beer in his truck was lawful. See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365. Simply put, Taylor has not asked us to change the law and apply a new standard for evaluating the expansion of a traffic stop that accounts for racial imbalances in our criminal justice system. Contrary to the dissent‘s claim, we do not lower the bar for the expansion of traffic stops. Instead, we apply well settled law to the specific factual circumstances of this case based on the arguments made.
A person who has had his license canceled as inimical to public safety typically must abstain from any alcohol consumption to have his license reinstated. SeeOn cross-examination of the deputy, the following exchange occurred:
Q. Now, there‘s other reasons why individuals’ licenses are canceled as being inimical to public safety other than just DWI convictions, correct?
A. Off the top of my head I‘m not aware of which.
Q. So you‘re not saying that there aren‘t other reasons, you just aren‘t aware of any other reasons.
A. Correct.
This testimony shows that the deputy did not contend, as the dissent claims, that drivers whose licenses are canceled an inimical to public safety are always repeat driving while impaired offenders.
The deputy testified that he asked Taylor the question about the beer—thereby expanding the scope of the traffic stop—based only on his observation of the open case of beer. The deputy mentioned no other reason. Specifically, the deputy never stated that his question was also prompted by Taylor‘s driver‘s license being canceled as inimical to public safety. The court notes the deputy‘s testimony that a license is often canceled as inimical to public safety beсause a driver has multiple DWI convictions. But that testimony was not given as a reason for expanding the stop to ask whether Taylor had consumed beer. The deputy cited Taylor‘s canceled license status as only partial support for his decision to ask Taylor to submit to field sobriety tests after his arrest and transport to the Clay County jail. And both the State and this court agree that, on its own, observing the case of beer with a flap open is not enough to support a finding of reasonable suspicion to expand a stop.Reid involved a stop of two airline passengers in an airport who law enforcement identified as suspicious because they had no luggage besides matching shoulder bags, and walked a few paces apart, with one looking back at the other a few times as they left the terminal. 448 U.S. at 439. The passengers then met outside the airport, where a DEA agent approached and asked to see their airline tickets before requesting that they return to the terminal for a search of their persons and shoulder bags. Id. The Supreme Court held that the agent‘s observations about how appellants were walking through the airport, without more, were insufficient to justify the stop. Id. at 441. The Court reasoned that if it accepted the agent‘s justification here, then large swaths of the population would be subject to nearly random seizures simply for walking through an airport. Id.
In response to questioning on cross-examination, the deputy admitted that there may be reasons other than multiple driving while impaired violations for which a person could have his driver‘s license canceled as inimical to public safety, but he was not aware of any. The testimony quoted by the court plainly shows that the deputy knew of no other reason for a cancellation as inimical to public safety. And, as noted above, the deputy never testified in any event that, when he expanded the stop, he relied on Taylor‘s license being canceled as inimical to public safety. Further, it is not a meaningful response to say (as the court does in footnote 5) that we can ignore the deputy‘s misunderstanding of the law because it is merely the deputy‘s subjective belief on the ground that the test is objective. As set forth below, the deputy‘s understanding of the law was incorrect and objectively unreasonable.