STATE оf Minnesota, Respondent, v. Todd Jeffrey ASKEROOTH, Appellant.
No. C6-02-318.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
June 17, 2004.
681 N.W.2d 353
Mike Hatch, Minnesota Attorney General, Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for Respondent.
PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice.
Shortly after midnight on April 21, 2001, a Saint Paul police officer stopped Todd Jeffrey Askerooth for failing to obey a
Askerooth was charged with fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the methamphetamine on the ground that it was disсovered as the result of an unreasonable seizure. The Ramsey County District Court denied this motion, finding that the placement of Askerooth in the back of the squad car was temporary and done so the officer could investigate Askerooth‘s identity. The court then convicted Askerooth in a bench trial. Askerooth appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. We reverse.
At approximately 12:40 a.m. on April 21, 2001, Saint Paul police officer Thaddus Schmidt was traveling south on Farrington Avenue in Saint Paul‘s North End neighborhood. As Schmidt stopped at the stop sign at the intersection with Stinson Street, he saw a van traveling west on Burgess Street a block to the south. The van went through the intersection at or below the posted speed limit, but did not stop for a stop sign. The van‘s failure to stop prompted Schmidt to pursue it. Schmidt turned onto Burgess, followed the van, and caught up with it at the next intersection where the van turned south. Schmidt then activated his emergency lights. Shortly thereafter, the van pulled over to the curb and stopped.
Schmidt parked behind the van and left his headlights on. He observed that the driver appeared to be the van‘s sole occupant. He then approached the van and asked the driver for his driver‘s license. When the driver said he did not have a license, Schmidt ordered him to step out of the van, which he did. Schmidt then had the driver put his hands behind his head while Schmidt did a pat-down search for weapons. Schmidt then ordered the driver to walk to the squad car where he confined him in the back seat. It is undisputed that the driver was not free to leave the scene without Schmidt‘s permission and, once in the squad car, he could not open either door. A few minutes after Schmidt confined the driver in the back seat, two other Saint Paul police officers arrived at the scene, but remained outside Schmidt‘s squad car.
While the driver was in the back seat, Schmidt asked him if he had any identification. The driver again said he did not have a driver‘s license, but he identified himself as the appellant, “Todd Askerooth,” and provided his date of birth and address. Schmidt entered this information into his computer and received a matching physical description. The computer search also showed that Askerooth‘s driver‘s license had been revoked.
Schmidt then asked Askerooth if he knew why he was stopped. Askerooth said he did not. Schmidt explained it was for failure to obey the stop sign at Burgess and Farrington. Schmidt informed Askerooth he would be issuing citations for failing to obey a stop sign and for driving after revocation, but Schmidt did not immediately issue the citations. At some point while Askerooth was still in the back seat, Sсhmidt asked him for consent to search the van. Askerooth orally consent
After the search, Schmidt issued citations to Askerooth for failing to obey a stop sign and for driving after revocation. Because Askerooth did not have photo identification, Schmidt had him place a fingerprint of his right index finger on the citation form. Schmidt advised Askerooth to lock the van, leave it where it was legally parked, and walk to his home which was approximately three blocks away. Askerooth then locked the van and Schmidt allowed him to leave. Once Schmidt released Askerooth, he immediately searched the squad car‘s back seat. During this search, Schmidt found a black film canister “tucked” under the back seat on the passenger side of the squad car. Opening the canister, he found two small bags containing what appeared to him to be methamphetamine or a “drug of that sort.”
It is not clear what happened next, but the record reflects that later that same day Askerooth was in custody at the Ramsey County Adult Detention Center where he was interviewed by the police. During this interview, Askerooth admitted that he placed the canister in the back seat and he did it because he was scared. The record is silent as to when Askerooth placed the canister in the back seat. Askerooth also admitted that the substance in the canister was methamphetamine and that he uses the drug. A subsequent test confirmed that the substance was methamphetamine with a gross weight of 2.5 grams. Based on this information, the county attorney charged Askerooth with fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance in violation of
Askerooth moved to suppress the methamphetamine on the ground that it was discovered as a result of an unreasonable seizure. Schmidt testified at an omnibus hearing on the motion that, while he was following the van, he did not observe any traffic violations other than the initial failure to obey the stop sign. He acknowledged that he did not run a license plate check when following the van. He also testified that Askerooth was cooperative and did not do anything to arouse his suspicion or lead him to believe that Askerooth was dangerous. In addition, Schmidt testified that he did not recognize Askerooth from any рrior incidents. Schmidt acknowledged that it is his standard procedure to put individuals driving without a license in the back seat of his squad car in order to facilitate obtaining information about their identity without having to go back and forth between the vehicles.1
With regard to the van search, Schmidt testified that he did not have Askerooth sign a written consent form nor did he tell Askerooth that he was free to withhold consent. The sole reason Schmidt gave for why he asked to search the van was to ensure that Askerooth did not have access to any weapons when he returned to it. Schmidt further testified that he searches the back seat of his squad car each day when his shift begins and each time he removes anyone from the back seat.
Askerooth appealed the denial of his suppression motion аnd the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Askerooth, No. C6-02-318, 2003 WL 230673, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 4, 2003). The court of appeals held that placing Askerooth in the back seat was reasonable because the stop occurred at 12:40 a.m., the officer was alone, and it was a practical way for the officer to accomplish the lawful task of verifying Askerooth‘s identity, the status of his license, and to issue the citations. Id. at *2.
I.
We are asked to determine whether Schmidt‘s confinement of Askerooth in the back seat of his squad car was an unreasonable seizure warranting suppression of the methamphetamine. Both the
It is undisputed that Askerooth was seized; therefore, our focus is on whether his seizure was reasonable. When determining the reasonableness of a seizure during a traffic stop, courts have been guided by the United States Supreme Court‘s statement that a traffic stop is more analogous to an invеstigative stop, as discussed in Terry v. Ohio,2 than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). While Berkemer is perhaps the most explicit statement connecting Terry principles to police stops for minor traffic violations, the connection has been implicitly stated elsewhere. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-12, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (applying Terry principles to a traffic stop supported by
While courts have been guided by the Supreme Court‘s analogy to a Terry stop in Berkemer, this analogy was qualified by the Court in a footnote explaining that
[n]o more is implied by this analogy than that most traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry. We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.
468 U.S. at 439 n. 29. Despite this qualification, a number of courts have applied Terry principles to traffic stops even when those stops were supported by probable cause. For example, both the Illinois Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals have explicitly held that the Terry analysis applies irrespective of whether a stop for a minor traffic offense is based on reasonable suspicion or supported by probable cause. Gonzalez, 273 Ill. Dec. 360, 789 N.E.2d at 266; United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc); cf. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 135-36 (Minn. 1999) (stating that “even if a search is supported by probable cause, the scope of the search and any detention of the suspect must still be reasonable.“).
Whether Terry can still be applied to traffic stops supported by probable cause is uncertain in light of the United States Supreme Court‘s 5-4 decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001). In Atwater, a woman arrested for a seatbelt violation in Texas filed a civil suit alleging her arrest violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. Id. at 325. The seatbelt violation was a misdemeanor punishable by a fine from $25 to $50. Id. at 323. The Court reviewed legal history from before and after the framing of the Fourth Amendment to determine whether the amendment incorporated a prohibition on arrests not amounting to a breach of the peace. Id. at 326-45. Because this historical analysis yielded no clear answer, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless arrest of a person who has committed a misdemeanor not amounting to or involving a breach of the peace. Id. at 340, 345. The Court held that the existence of probable cause applies to all arrests and makes it unnecessary for a court to balance individual and governmental interests. Id. at 354. Specifiсally, “[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Id.4
But Askerooth asserts that his seizure was unreasonable not only under the Fourth Amendment, but also under
It is axiomatic that we are free to interpret the Minnesota Constitution as affording greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the United States Constitution. State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985) (citing PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1980)). Here, we note that since Atwater, the highest courts of two other states have, in the context of minor criminal offenses, interpreted their constitutions as embodying reasonableness protections independent of and greater than Fourth Amendment protections. State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St. 3d 323, 792 N.E.2d 175, 178 (2003); State v. Bauer, 307 Mont. 105, 36 P.3d 892, 897 (2001). It is our responsibility as Minnesota‘s highest court to independently safeguard for the people of Minnesota the protections embodied in our constitution. State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn. 1999); O‘Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979). But, in independently safeguarding these protections “we will [not] cavalierly construe our constitution more expansively than the United States Supreme Court has construed the federal constitution.” Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 726-27; accord Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 98.
We begin our analysis of whether to look to our constitution by noting that in two recent cases, we have concluded that there was a principled basis for interpreting
In Ascher, for similar reasons, we declined to follow the Supreme Court‘s holding in Michigan Dep‘t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990). In Sitz, the Supreme Court held that a police roadblock where all drivers were stopped in order to investigate for drunk driving did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 455. The Court determined that the state interest in preventing drunk driving outweighed the intrusion of the stop upon individual motorists. Id. We concluded in Ascher that Sitz was a radical departure from how a Terry-style balancing test had previously been applied and how the state and individual interests should have been weighed in the context of such roadblocks. 519 N.W.2d at 186. Consequently, we held that
Atwater‘s sharp departure from our traditional understanding of the protections from unreasonable seizure provides a similar principled basis5 for us to look to our own constitution. See id. at 186. Specifically, Atwater‘s apparent removal of any consideration of a balancing of individual interests with governmental interests troubles us because this removal is in tension with a broad range of our precedent applying the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Minn. 2001) (applying Terry principles to traffic stop when erratic driving indicated violation of “any number of Minnesota statutes“). It is also difficult to reconcile Atwater with our interpretation of
We conclude that, in the context of traffic stops, following Atwater‘s proposition that the existence of probable cause of a minor traffic violation eliminates the need for balancing individual and governmental interests would threaten the integrity and coherence of our interpretation of
Having concluded that
The second Terry prong constrains the scope and methods of a search or seizure. An initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes “intolerable” in its “intensity or scope.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18. Thus, eaсh incremental intrusion during a stop must be ” ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered [the initiation of the stop] permissible.” Id. at 19 (citations omitted); accord State v. Gilchrist, 299 N.W.2d 913, 917 (Minn. 1980). An intrusion not closely related to the initial justification for the search or seizure is invalid under
In addition, we have recognized that
The basis for intrusion must be reasonable so as to comply with
In essence,
Here, Askerooth challenges Schmidt‘s escalation of the seizure from (1) questioning him as he sat in his van to (2) confining him in the back seat of the squad car. Because the confinement of Askerooth cannot be justified by the original purpose of the stop or independent probable cause, we must consider whether this escalation was reasonable. Thus, the focus of our analysis is whether Schmidt‘s intensifying the intrusive nature of the seizure by confining Askerooth in the squad car was justified by some governmental interest that outweighed Askerooth‘s interest in being free from “arbitrary interference by law officers.”7
Schmidt‘s decision to confine Askerooth in the squad car‘s back seat appears to have been based on Askerooth‘s statement that he did not have a driver‘s license. Schmidt testified that, when a driver does not have a license, it is his standard procedure to place the driver in his squad car. Schmidt, with praiseworthy candor, said he does this so that “we can talk to them there while they are in the squad car with us so we don‘t have to go back and forth between the two vehicles.” Thus, on the record before us, the only expressed basis for confining Askerooth in the squad car is officer convenience.
The facts suggest that, to verify Askerooth‘s identity and license status, there was only a minimal need for Schmidt to confine him in the squad car. We acknowledge that an investigation verifying the identity of a driver who does not have a license in his possession is more extensive and inconvenient than the effort required by a stop when a driver has a license in his possession. Nevertheless, we conclude that the lack of a driver‘s license, by itself, is not a reasonable basis for confining a driver in a squad car‘s locked back seat when the driver is stopped for a minor traffic offense. See State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn. 1998) (holding that “the inability of a minor traffic violator to produce a driv-
The state makes no suggestion that confining Askerooth in the back seat of the squad car was the only means reasonably available to accomplish the legitimate governmental interests of identifying Askerooth and verifying his license status. Neither interest mandated Schmidt‘s confinement of Askerooth as a method for obtaining this information. Confining Askerooth in the back of the squad car, while serving Schmidt‘s own interest in convenience, at most only tangentially served a governmental interest. Also, confining a driver in a squad car for officer convenience lacks any consideration for a driver‘s interest in being free from unnecessary intrusions. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that most drivers expect during a traffic stop to be detained briefly, asked a few questions, and then be allowed to leave after an officer either issues a citation or concludes that issuance of a citation is not warranted. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437. In contrast, Askerooth was ordered out of his van, subjected to a pat-down search, held in the back of a police squad car, and then had his van searched before finally being released. We conclude that Askerooth‘s interest in being free from unreasonable seizure in these circumstances outweighed Schmidt‘s need for convenience because obtaining Askerooth‘s name, date of birth, and address did not require confinement in Schmidt‘s squad car. Our conclusion is buttressed by the reasoning of decisions of other courts that have addressed facts similar to those here.8 We also note that the
An alternative argument for the state is that Schmidt‘s ordering Askerooth out of the van was permissible without having to give a reason. Thus, Askerooth‘s consequential presence outside of the van created a risk to Schmidt‘s safety, which necessitated confinement in the squad car. It is correct that a police officer may order a driver out of a lawfully stopped vehicle without an articulated reason. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111. But, even under Mimms there must be an additional basis, independent of an officer‘s command for a driver to exit a vehicle, before a more serious intrusion is permitted. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111-12 (holding that the Terry test controls when determining the validity of a pat-down search after a driver has been ordered out of a vehicle); cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117, 119, 119 S. Ct. 484, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998) (stating that a general concern for officer safety during a traffic stop does not by itself justify the intrusion of a “full field-type search.“). Moreover, we are not presented with a Mimms kind of intrusion. Schmidt did not first order Askerooth out of the van and then decide to confine him in the squad car; rather, Schmidt ordered Askerooth out of the van in the first place so he could confine him in the squad car.
If we affirm Schmidt‘s actions on the basis suggested by the state, we would be establishing a rule that allows a police officer to confine a driver in a squаd car simply because the driver has been ordered out of a vehicle. Such a rule would permit the same circumvention of reasonableness that we eschewed in Varnado. See 582 N.W.2d at 891 (holding that the Fourth Amendment is circumvented and undermined when an officer first decides to place a driver in the back seat of a squad car and then uses the placement as the basis for a pat-down search). Therefore, we conclude that it was unreasonable to place Askerooth in the squad car for convenience purposes and, though it would have been permissible to order Askerooth out of the van, the act of ordering Askerooth out of the van, standing alone, did not justify confining him in the squad car.
The state also argues that the objective circumstances of this stop made it reasonable for Schmidt, in the interest of officer safety, to confine Askerooth in the squad car. Although Schmidt articulated no specific safety concerns during his testimony, we address this argument because the reasonableness test is an objective test. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 223. The circumstances that the state asserts to support its argument are that the stop took place at 12:40 a.m., Askerooth did not have identification, and Schmidt was working without a partner.
We recognize the very real safety concerns associated with traffic stops in the early morning by officers working without a partner. We explicitly acknowledged the importance of officer safety in Varnado. 582 N.W.2d at 891 (stating “we agree that officer safety is a paramount interest“). The Supreme Court has similarly acknowledged the dangers confronted by the police during traffic stops. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110; Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983).11 The risks faced by police officers on a daily basis, however, do not mandate a decision for or against reasonableness in the specific encounter between Schmidt and Askerooth. Our examination of reasonableness is a fact-sensitive inquiry not susceptible to applying generalizations to a particular person or situation. For example, we have held that the absence of any individualized suspicion that a particular driver was violating any law made the temporary seizure of that driver at a DWI checkpoint unreasonable even though the checkpoint was set up in a “high accident area” where there was a “high incidence of DWI violations.” Ascher, 519 N.W.2d at 184.
The fact that the stop occurred at 12:40 a.m. does not make the confinement reasonable. The state provides no explanation how this circumstance justifies the reasonableness of the seizure. Our review of decisions from other jurisdictions concerning the reasonableness of nighttime confinement in a police squad car indicates that such an action usually requires something more than the hours of darkness to be considered reasonable. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 555 Pa. 86, 723 A.2d 143, 149 (1998) (noting that placement of detainee in the back of a squad car by lone officer during nighttime stop was reasonable because the officer believed the detainee intended to flee and the stop took place in a high-crime area); see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(d) at 39-40 (3rd ed. 1996 & 2004 Supp.) (noting that locking a suspect in the back of a squad car during an investigation would not ordinarily be permissible except where there are “unique circumstances“).
Similarly, the fact that Schmidt did not know the identity of Askerooth fails to provide a basis for concluding that the confinement was reasonable. Cf. Curtis, 290 Minn. at 437, 190 N.W.2d at 636 (listing reasons why a search prior to placing a minor traffic violator in a squad car may be justified, including if the “motorist is known by the police to be habitually armed or to have a record of assaultive behavior“). The state does not adequately explain how Schmidt‘s not knowing precisely with whom he was dealing constituted a danger or necessitated the confinement. Police officers interact with complete strangers on a daily basis without resorting to such intrusions.
The state also suggests that Askerooth‘s failure to have a driver‘s license with him could have meant that he had stolen the van. We fail to see how such an inference can be made without any additional facts to support it. Schmidt testified that he observed no suspicious movement by Askerooth and that Askerooth was cooperative. Except for asking for Askerooth‘s license, Schmidt did not conduct any questioning until after Askerooth was in the squad car. We conclude there is no basis to believe that lack of identification, without more, can lead to the conclusion that confining Askerooth in the back seat of the squad car was reasonable.
The fact that Schmidt was working without a partner when he decided to confine Askerooth also fails to support the state‘s argument. Perhaps greater deference might be given to precautions taken by Schmidt because he was working alone if he had articulated a reasonable suspicion that Askerooth was armed or presented an imminent danger, but he did not.12 Moreover, we allow that the special training of police officers may lead them to arrive at “inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418). However, the facts known to Schmidt at the time he ordered Askerooth into the squad car do not support such a reasonable inference here.
Even when we take into consideration all three of the circumstances advanced by the state—the 12:40 a.m. stop, lack of identification, and working without a partner—these circumstances fail to sufficiently supplement one another to make the sum any greater than the parts. Here, the parts do not add up to a conclusion that the confinement was reasonable. In the past when presented with circumstances that were arguably more favorable to the state‘s argument, we have refused to consider it to be reasonable for police officers to confine a driver in the back seat of a squad car when the driver was stopped for a minor traffic violation. See Varnado, 582 N.W.2d at 890 (rejecting the argument that the stop at night of a driver of a car belonging to a suspected drug-dealer in an area where police suspected the presence of drug trafficking provided a reasonable basis to believe the driver was armed and dangerous).
In sum, under
IV.
Our conclusion that confining Askerooth was unreasonable does not end our inquiry. We must next determine whether the methamphetamine Askerooth discarded in the squad car should be excluded on the ground that it was abandoned. We have held that evidence discovered as a result of a violation of
The record is silent as to exactly when Askerooth placed the methamphetamine under the seat of the squad car. But we do know from the complaint and from the district court‘s findings of fact in the bench trial that Askerooth abandoned it because he was scared that the police would find it and thus the abandonment was not accidental. There appears to be no feasible way the methamphetamine would have been discovered but for the illegal seizure. Because Askerooth‘s abandoning of the methamphetamine is the result of an illegal seizure, we conclude that the methamphetamine must be suppressed. Therefore, we hold that the district court erred when it denied Askerooth‘s motion to suppress the methamphetamine discovered in the back seat of Schmidt‘s squad car.
V.
Our conclusion that Schmidt‘s confinement of Askerooth was unreasonable resolves this case. Nevertheless, we deem it necessary to conduct a constitutional analysis whether Schmidt‘s subsequent consent inquiry imprоperly expanded the scope of the stop and whether the extension of Askerooth‘s confinement during the van search improperly prolonged the stop. We conduct this analysis to provide further guidance to law enforcement when seeking consent for searches and when continuing to confine persons following the completion of the original purpose for a seizure.
The consent inquiry and van search following Schmidt‘s confinement of Askerooth improperly infringed on the protections of
In Wiegand, we concluded that
Reversed.
RUSSELL A. ANDERSON and HANSON, JJ., Concurring specially.
RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice (concurring specially).
Although I concur in the result the court reaches today, I disagree with the majority‘s reasoning with respect to the temporary detention of the traffic violator in this case. Inasmuch as our criminal rules place strict limitations on custodial arrests for minor crimes, I see no principled basis for resort to our state constitution to make a break from the Atwater majority. The criminal rules require a reasonable and proportional response to the circumstances of the offense; and we have long held that a temporary detention in a squad car is not a de facto arrest. In my view, the placement of an unlicensed driver in a squad car in the early morning hours for purposes of ascertaining and verifying the driver‘s identity and to abate criminal con
The relevant facts, briefly stated, are these. At about 12:40 a.m. on April 21, 2001, while on routine patrol and working alone, St. Paul Police Officer Thaddus Schmidt observed a van run a stop sign at Burgess and Farrington. The officer activated the squad car‘s emergency lights and followed the van for a block and a half before the vehicle pulled over. The officer approached the van and asked the driver, the only occupant in the van, for his driver‘s license. The driver said he did not have one. The officer asked the driver to step out of the vehicle, did a quick pat-down for weapons and placed the driver in the back seat of the squad car. The driver identified himself as Todd Askerooth and provided his date of birth and address. A records check verified that Askerooth‘s driver‘s license had been revoked. While Officer Schmidt was talking to Askerooth in the squad car, two other officers arrived.
Officer Schmidt told Askerooth that he was going to issue a ticket for driving after revocation and running the stop sign. While still in the squad car, the officer asked for and obtained Askerooth‘s consent to search the van. As Askerooth sat in the back of the squad car, the officers searched the van. After the search, Officer Schmidt issued a citation for the traffic violations and advised Askerooth to lock the van and walk home. As Askerooth walked away, the officer found the methamphetamine that Askerooth later admitted he had “dumped” in the back seat.
Askerooth moved to suppress the methamphetamine, arguing that while the initial detention in the squad car was permissible, the continued detention for the consent inquiry and search of the van was unreasonable. The district court found that Askerooth was temporarily placed in the squad car for purposes of ascertaining identity and that beyond that point, it was an issue of abandonment and denied the motion to suppress. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that on the facts of this case, the temporary detention in the squad car was not unreasonable. State v. Askerooth, No. C6-02-318, 2003 WL 230673, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 4, 2003).
The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures * * *.”
Minnesota has had the “limiting proviso” referred to in Atwater for nearly 30 years. Since their inception in 1975, the criminal procedural rules have required law enforcement officers to issue citations in misdemeanor cases “unless it reason-
During the course of a lawful Terry stop for a traffic offense, a police officer may direct a person to provide identification. State v. White, 489 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Minn. 1992) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985)). An officer may also order the dial arrest for the minor offense not reached because
driver and passengers out of the vehicle. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n. 6, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (per curiam). And the placement of a lawfully stopped motorist in a police car for a short period of time does not automatically “take the situation beyond the realm of the ordinary traffic stop.” State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 120 (Minn. 1990) (quoting State v. Herem, 384 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. 1986) (lone deputy‘s separation of occupants of motorcycle, placing one in a police cаr, was prudent under the circumstances)); but see State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn. 1998) (officers could not circumvent the reasonableness requirement for a Terry-type frisk by requiring a minor traffic violator to sit in the squad car).5 In evaluating the reasonable-
Here, Askerooth, who said he had no driver‘s license, was detained in the back seat of the squad car in the early morning hours in mid-April while the lone officer verified his identity and checked his driving record. The check came back that Askerooth‘s driver‘s license had been revoked, and the officer issued a citation for driving after revocation and running the stop sign. It seems to me that the temporary detention under these circumstances was prudent and permissible. See
The scope and duration of a traffic stop investigation, however, “must be limited to the justification for the stop.” State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn. 2003) (citing State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002)). In Fort, the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that had been stopped for a routine traffic violation; but the police proceeded with a drug investigation without any reasonable articulable suspicion. We reinstated the district court‘s suppression order, holding that the police expansion of the routine traffic stop beyond the underlying justification for the stop violated the state constitution. Id. at 419.
Here, after concluding the traffic violation investigation, the officer asked for consent to search the van; and while Aske- checks on the status of the license and registration and issues a citation as these acts are within the purposes of the initial stop. See, e.g., United States v. White, 81 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1011 (1996) (stating that officer may ask for license and registration, request driver to sit in patrol car, and check for outstanding warrants); United States v. Bradshaw, 102 F.3d 204, 212 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1178 (1997) (detention in patrol car during radio checks and issuance of citation); United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1994) (detention in patrol car during computer check of identification card to verify that driver‘s license had been suspended); United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 1988) (defendant‘s failure to produce a valid driver‘s license “justified the request that he get out of his car and sit in the police car while a
The state bears the burden of establishing the validity of a warrantless search or seizure. See State v. Fitzgerald, 562 N.W.2d 288, 288 (Minn. 1997) (state bears the burden of establishing the existence of an emergency justifying a warrantless entry under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Mastrian, 285 Minn. 51, 56, 171 N.W.2d 695, 699 (1969) (upon challenge to a warrantless arrest, state has the burden of proving that the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment). On the record before us, I agree with the majority that it cannot be said the state sustained its burden of showing that the methamphetamine was discarded during the lawful portion of the detention, thus requiring reversal of the conviction and suppression of the evidence.
Notes
Law enforcement officers acting without a warrant, who have decided to proceed with prosecution, shall issue citations to persons subject to lawful arrest for misdemeanors, unless it reasonably appears to the officer that arrest or detention is necessary to prevent bodily harm to the accused or another or further criminal conduct, or that there is a substantial likelihood that the accused will fail to respond to a citation. The citation may be issued in lieu of an arrest, or if an arrest has been made, in lieu of continued detention. If the defendant is detained, the officer shall report to the court the reasons for the detention. Ordinarily, for misdemeanors not punishable by incarceration, a citation shall be issued.
When a law enforcement officer acting without a warrant is entitled to make an arrest for a felony or gross misdemeanor or a person arrested without a warrant for a felony or gross misdemeanor is brought to a police station or county jail, the officer in charge of the police station or the county sheriff in charge of the jail or an officer designated by the sheriff may issue a citation in lieu of arrest or in lieu of continued detention if an arrest has been made; unless it reasonably appears to the officer that arrest or detention is necessary to prevent bodily harm to the accused or another or further criminal conduct or that the accused may fail to appear in response to the citation.