State v. Johnson

Minnesota, STATE

Petitioner, Appellant, JOHNSON, Craig Respondent.

Mark

No. C1-88-2261.

Supreme Court Minnesota. 1, 1989.

Sept. III, Humphrey, Atty.

Hubert H. State Gen., Paul, Hersey, County St. Scott Isanti Emanuel, Atty. E. and Dean Asst. Isanti County appellant. Atty., Cambridge, Munns, Anoka, for respondent. Robert YETKA, Justice.

The in this case is decisive issue whether stop, the arrest which led to and convic- driving tion of after revoca- defendant tion, The district de- justified. court driving termined defendant’s evasive seeing immediately conduct a state trooper gave defendant lim- wrongdoing, thereby justifying brief stop. ap- ited court peals only disagreed, but also “rule” act that “an evasive without activity or other indicia of criminal extreme investigatory stop.” 439 N.W.2d State v. (Minn.App.1989). reverse the deci- Wе appeals and sion of the court of reinstate judgment of conviction. raised the district stop issue was An pretrial motion dismiss. hearing held, evidentiary at which was the 65, onto Highway “very this a short officer, arresting trooper, a state testified. having after time” turned Sys- onto Tower findings of presiding judge The made fact trooper tems Road. The saw that the testimony the of the consistent with offi- by defendant, truck was driven who was Subsequently, cer. defendant waived his Inferring still alone. that defendant had agreed to right jury to a trial submit and off Highway turned purpose the court, guilt the the issue of his to trial a avoiding him, the trooper motiоned defen- judge, stipula- on basis of a different the to stop. so, dant Defendant did identified af- tion to the effect that defendant drove trooper himself told the his license had revocation, stopped ter was he and been verifying revoked. After this infor- stipulation guilt. The that he admitted his mation, trooрer the arrested defendant for incorporated by findings reference driving after revocation. the denial of made connection with denying dismiss, the motion to being to motion dismiss. After found judge trial reasoned: guilty as filed a charged, defendant notice The facts in this reasonably sup- case a aрpeal. Ordinarily, convicted defen- port the inference that the defendant seeking hearing ‍​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍dant review of an omnibus trying was to the Trooper. avoid ruling on a should fourth amendment issue clear inference of his action was avoid- provide appellate court with tran- Trooper. anсe of the While the action hearing. script of the omnibus Instead of explained be as consistent with law- ordering copy transcript, defen- activities, ful that is not the test. There stating dant filed a notice he intended specific using articulable facts [sic] 28.02, proceed to under Minn.R.Crim.P. suspicion a reаsonable of criminal activi- that, says subd. lieu of the ty- record, parties may submit the case on Additionally, stop case; or here, the intrusion basis a statement upon on the defendant in this matter stipulated the basis of the facts. The was oppose relatively request state did not minor. The this. couple not more could have lasted than understanding our Accordingly, of minutes. solely findings facts is based on made judge presided pretrial who at the appeals The court of concluded first that hearing on the motion dismiss. Those trooper’s inference that defendant saw findings indicate at 7:40 a.m. on June trying turning him was him avoid Trooper Sjerven Steve highway necessarily was “not off the irra- preparing crossover High- to turn south on However, tional.” 439 N.W.2d at 402. just way help north of Isanti order to reviewing a number of cases from apparently the driver of an car on disabled jurisdictions, the court what turn, the shoulder. As he waited to hе saw it referred to as “rule” that “an evasive pickup heading High- red truck south on act without other indicia of criminal way 65 and made eye contact with the justi- or extreme defendant, who was the driver and sole fy investigatory stop.” Id. at 403. occupant Immediately, of the truck. opinion, In our the United Statеs right driver turned the truck onto what Supreme do Court’s decisions and, Systems called Tower Road rule. The new United it, put “appeared immediately trial court require Court’s decisions disappear.” pickup truck or seeing Not only “particular that the officer have any might dust or be caused dirt that pаrticu road, having the truck traveled down person stopped activity.” lar trooper that the truck must concluded Cortez, United States v. 417- pulled immediately driveway. into a pulled 66 L.Ed.2d 621 up As the to assist the car shoulder, (1981). pickup emerge on he that the officer saw must to articulate be more than an Systems Tower must Road and turn south “hunch;” the officer must suspicious er circumstances these reac- unarticulated point something objectively stopping able to tions well suspicion. supports his United States v. investigation. Courts held when have so — -, Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. U.S. persons already suspected de- to some (1989); 1 ‍​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍see State 104 L.Ed.2d v. gree kept upon police, turned a watch (Minn.1977). In 257 N.W.2d 308 something police, to conceal from the addition, police is officer entitled a trained po- tried conceal themselves from the inferences on the of “all draw basis of lice, away, or ran away drove or walked * * * inferences and de circumstances upon pace approach off at a fast of might well elude an untrained ductions that police. Cortez, 418,101 449 U.S. at person.” S.Ct. however, difficult, question More is the recently reiterated The Court at 695. may, of whether such actions as these in suspicion is concept of reasonable themselves, justify stopping and a of legal “neat set of rules” reducible to a investigation. Perhaps at least some it the Ninth Circuit’s me rejected when do, for, them ac- Court determining two-part test for rea chanical knowledged York, in Peters v. New [392 suspicion. Unitеd v. sonable Soko- 917 U.S. 20 L.Ed.2d — at-, low, 109 S.Ct. at 1584-86. U.S. (1968)], “deliberately actions and furtive repeatedly It has noted that innocent also flight approach strangers at or of crimi might strong are of mens law officers indicia Accord, at 1586-87. activity. nal Id. State However, may rea.” some actions which (Minn. Combs, N.W.2d 565-66 fairly response be in to an said 1987)(rejecting trial court’s conclusion vicinity are police awareness that in the facts are consistent with if the observed persons type; are not on the of that invalid). activity, then innocent in police engage street watch and similar suggested quite has also The Court po- interеst in activities out of what agree strongly it with the that would are of a avoid doing lice and out desire to example, new rule. For misstep, minor some minor such as a Rodriguez, in Florida v. violation, traffic which involve would (1984), 308, 311, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 unnecessarily police. them with the attempt that the defendant’s Court said Thus, properly it bеen held that the has security they airport officers evade pass police car to cruis- “hesitancy of a suspi- “justifiable looked at him aroused pas- at the glance er and officer analysis is LaFave’s as cion.” Professor sight senger,” look at the a “startled follows: officer,” appearing police nervous when rather common situation is Another away police passed, looking car in are police suspicions based pointing police activity vicinity, in the part upon in the reactions of whole or in police, pace quickening or one’s toward appear- response to the suspect not, standing upon seeing police are vicinity. Police police ance are investiga- sufficient bases for an suspicious of such reac- trained to be contrast, stop. By stops have tive such tions, stops infrequently are not and upheld when the made been individual empirical made them. As one because ‍​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍of contact, repeated police to avoid efforts “A study person who mani- concluded: engaged he in a when combination presence for the fests concern actions, possibly several different furtive police, repeatedly glances at the of- who person engaged and when the a rather ficer, changes his direction who as extreme means of avoidance such apparent attempt confronting to avoid high-speed flight. officer, sight or who flees at 9.3(c) LaFave, W. Search Seizure § commonly an officer detained and will (2d ed.1987) (footnotes omitted). at 448-51 questioned.” It is not doubted that to be it, partly As see issue is such reactions be taken into account we question depending one police together with oth- semantic on what says petitioner that the defendant еd of wrongdoing. means when one The case is On engaged distinguishable in evasive conduct. the one thus from State v. John- hand, appears if merely son, a driver startled at (Minn.1977), where, 257 N.W.2d 308 sight passing police of a officer him although there was some indication in the if then a bit and a reason- slows down record that officer have observed any officer would not infer might what be termed “an evasive maneu- wrongdoing response, from the driver’s driver,1 ver” the officer totally particular then officer unable to at hearing articulate the omnibus the driv- why suspicious he became of the vehicle. stop er of mаy criminal not the case, In the instant the available record hand, driver. On the other if the driver’s indicates that the officer to artic- able reasonably conduct is such that the officer ulate sufficient basis for stopping the deliberately trying infers that the driver is vehicle. if, result, the to evade officer and as decision, course, Our should not be police suspect reasonable officer would the in interpreted any way making as it easier activity, driver of criminal then the officer police justify for to stopping motor ve- words, may In stop the driver. to hicles. simply We reaffirm the standard earlier, repeat stop said in what we all which we have followed in numerous cases: cases, the decision for the trial court at the officer make a brief hearing depends suppression on whether limited if stop has officer is at the officer able articulate the hear- objective pаrticular suspect- basis for ing “particular objective basis for ing person stopped activity. of criminal person suspecting particular stopped Because we conclude that the rule activity.” United v. Cor- by the court of an appeals unjusti- makes 411, 417-18, tez, 690, 449 U.S. 101 S.Ct. fied refinement of this standard and believe 694-95, (1981). 66 L.Ed.2d 621 appeal that the record on indicates that the case, trooper In this did not particular trooper had a stop whim, his base decision on “mere wrongdo- the defendant of caprice, curiosity.” or idle See Marben v. ing, reverse the we decision Dep’t 294 Safety, Minnesota Public appeals judgment and reinstate defendant’s 697, (Minn.1980)(quoting N.W.2d Peo of conviction. 413, 420, ple v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 369 N.Y. judgment Reversed and of conviction 67, 74, 39, (1975)). S.2d 330 N.E.2d reinstated. Moreover, trooper did not his deci base solely stop sion to on the fact that the WAHL, J., opinion dissents and files quick high turn off defendant made C.J., POPOVICH, joined. in which way trooper seconds after he looked the in WAHL, Justice, dissenting. eye. also observed the off secondary respectfully defendant turn I dissent. The street activities driveway into a or side street and ‍​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍then did not defendant instant case driving highway investigative stop on prin resume his within a under the Ohio, ciples turning highway. Terry minute after off the articulated in v. 392 U.S. 1879-80, defendant’s have been 20 L.Ed.2d While behavior (1968). true, majority consistent with innocent it also 889 It notes, suspect reasonably caused the officer fourth amendment of deliberately trying permits that defendant was to United States Constitution officers short, temporarily stop investiga wе on to evade him. the record citizens if appeal troop purposes in this case indicates that the tive the officer has “a reason reasonably suspicion supported by inferred that er defendant was articulable ” deliberately trying activity ‘may to evade him and facts that criminal be afoot.’ — result, Sokolow, -, trooper reasonably suspect- as a U.S. United States J., (Yetka, ing). 1. 257 N.W.2d at 309 dissent-

g28 (1989). 104 L.Ed.2d 1 Rodriguez, ida v. U.S. 105 S.Ct. (1984). 83 L.Ed.2d 165 “suspicious activity” In this con case Rodriguez simply in Court’s decision leaving highway sisted defendant support proposition. While making eye shortly contact with a Rodriguez engage defendants did trooper; trоoper being passing state actions, they stopped evasive any trace of the unable to see defendant’s purpose of the fourth amendment until af- Systems he drove Tower vehicle as they clearly ter had misidentified them- off, defendant had turned Road where the Rodriguez, selves authorities. high re-entering the and the defendant’s 5-6, 105 at S.Ct. at 310-311. The evasive these way shortly thereafter. From rela only in Rodriguez actions were not the tively actions the trial court con innocuous Thus, arousing suspicion. circumstances cluded, majority agrees, that the and the investiga- Rodriguez does not actions еngaged evasive de defendant us. tive in the fact situation before contact signed to avoid with state Ironically, majority quotes Professor Having labeled the trooper. defendant’s LaFave, quite it that ev- who makes clear evasive, majority’s analysis pro acts eryday, garden variety avоidance of ' the defendant’s syllogistically: ceeds acts justify investigative an evasive; acts investi evasive LaFave, stop. See 3 W. Search and Sei- ergo, investigative stop an gative stops; (second ed.1987). 9.3(c), at 448-451 zure § justified here. Neither the fourth authority majority opinion no offers decisions of the United amendment nor the support posi- than its Rodriguez permit this kind Supreme Court of respond to tion nor does it the cases most conclusory analysis where the funda jurisdictions, by our sister cited involved, every rights appeals, citizen’s have held that no reason- mental of for an able basis exists by alоne the state. right left See to be United, standing actions alone. on evasive based States, 277 U.S. Olmstead See State v. 439 N.W.2d 564, 572, (1928) L.Ed. LaFave, (Minn.App.1989); 402-03 see also (the (Brandeis, dissenting) makers of J. 9.3(c), (and cited supra at 450-451 cases § against constitution “conferred as therein). against light authority of the Government, right let alone—the today, right of citi- the court’s decision right rights and the comprehensive most should zens to be let alone the state men.”); most civilized Bowers v. valued reluctant prevail. While we 186, 199, Hardwick, rule that endorse the court (Black (1986) L.Ed.2d 140 standing may never alone evasive actions mun, J., dissenting.) nevertheless, suppоrt investigative stop, give legality of While the the acts which stating accurately rule closer to comes suspicion rise to a that criminal reasonable import existing case law than constitutionally will not is afoot majority. I would affirm opinion of the preclude investigative stop, appеals. the sheer of the court of the decision frequency literally number and with which acts committed millions of similar are POPOVICH, Chief Justice. entirely traveling public innocent WAHL. join I the dissent Justice light on the reasonableness

reasons sheds Therefore, those acts. I majority’s ‍​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍ second exception take to the justify inves-

premise, evasive actions

tigative stops. cites one case in majority legal that evasive actions proposition

its stops, Flor- justify investigative

alone

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Johnson

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Sep 1, 1989

Citation: 444 N.W.2d 824

Docket Number: C1-88-2261

Court Abbreviation: Minn.