THE STATE EX REL. OHIO PRESBYTERIAN RETIREMENT SERVICES, INC., APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 2015-1074
Supreme Court of Ohio
September 14, 2017
2017-Ohio-7577
KENNEDY, J.
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7577.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-7577
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7577.]
Workers’ compensation—Industrial Commission does not have authority to award permanent-partial-disability compensation under
(No. 2015-1074—Submitted June 7, 2017—Decided September 14, 2017.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 14AP-624, 2015-Ohio-2122.
{¶ 1} In State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 150 Ohio St.3d 102, 2016-Ohio-8024, 79 N.E.3d 522 (“Ohio Presbyterian I”), we held that the Industrial Commission does not have authority to award an injured employee permanent-partial-disability compensation under
{¶ 2} This court has the authority to grant motions for reconsideration filed under
{¶ 3} We granted Redwine‘s motion, reopened the case for further consideration, and sua sponte ordered oral argument with no additional briefing. 147 Ohio St.3d 1480, 2016-Ohio-8492, 66 N.E.3d 766. Having heard oral argument and reconsidered the parties’ arguments, we conclude that our holding in Ohio Presbyterian I was not made in error, and we adhere to it. When an injured employee is receiving permanent-total-disability compensation pursuant to
I. Case Background
{¶ 4} On August 13, 2003, Redwine was injured at work. She filed a workers’ compensation claim that was allowed for the following conditions: lumbosacral strain, radiculopathy right lower extremity, aggravation of pre-existing degenerative disc disease, depression, and ruptured disc at L4-5 with free disc fragment.
{¶ 6} In August 2013, Redwine applied for permanent-partial-disability compensation. She conceded that she was not entitled to permanent-partial-disability benefits for her psychological condition (for which she had been granted permanent-total-disability compensation), but she maintained that she was entitled to this award based on the physical conditions allowed in her claim.
{¶ 7} A district hearing officer denied her application based on a lack of statutory authority for concurrent awards under
{¶ 8} On reconsideration, a staff hearing officer concluded that a claimant is not barred from concurrent compensation for permanent partial disability if it is based on conditions that were not the basis for the prior finding of permanent total disability in the same claim. The hearing officer relied in part on the commission‘s analysis of the same issue in claim No. 02-354357 involving a different injured employee. In that case, the commission determined that the analysis of concurrent awards focuses on an injured employee‘s allowed medical conditions, not the injury or claim, citing State ex rel. Missik v. Youngstown, 65 Ohio St.3d 189, 602 N.E.2d 633 (1992), and State ex rel. Hoskins v. Indus. Comm., 87 Ohio St.3d 560, 722 N.E.2d 66 (2000).
{¶ 9} Redwine‘s employer, Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Services, Inc. (“OPRS“), filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that there was no statutory authority for the commission‘s order and therefore it was not supported by some evidence. A magistrate determined that the writ should be denied. The magistrate relied on State ex rel. Mosley v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-127, 2014-Ohio-1710, and concluded that because the psychological condition formed the basis for the permanent-total-disability award, Redwine‘s physical conditions could be the basis of permanent-partial-disability compensation. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate‘s decision and denied the writ.
{¶ 10} OPRS filed a direct appeal in this court. We reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and granted the request for a writ of mandamus in Ohio Presbyterian I. Having granted reconsideration of that decision, we now turn to
{¶ 11} In response, Redwine, asserts that “[t]he Industrial Commission does not abuse its discretion when finding that an injured worker is entitled to receive compensation for her percentage of permanent partial impairment under
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 12} It is well settled that the commission is responsible for making factual findings. State ex rel. Cordell v. Pallet Cos., Inc., 149 Ohio St.3d 483, 2016-Ohio-8446, 75 N.E.3d 1230, ¶ 19. Such findings will be disturbed only if the commission abuses its discretion, which occurs only if there is not “some” evidence to support the finding. Id. However, in this case we are not concerned with factual findings, but rather with the commission‘s interpretation of the workers’ compensation statutes.
{¶ 13} If the commission misinterprets a statute, this court may issue a writ of mandamus to compel the commission to correct its erroneous interpretation. See State ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio St.2d 64, 65, 322 N.E.2d 660 (1975) (“A mandatory writ may issue against the Industrial Commission if the commission has incorrectly interpreted Ohio law”), citing State ex rel. Breidigan v. Indus. Comm., 43 N.E.2d 114 (2d Dist.1942) (mandamus may issue against the commission in situations other than those involving an abuse of discretion, such as when the commission failed to follow the law or incorrectly interpreted the law).
B. Statutes at Issue
{¶ 14} There are two types of workers’ compensation benefits at issue in this case: (1) permanent-partial-disability compensation under
1. R.C. 4123.57–Permanent-Partial-Disability Compensation
{¶ 15}
{¶ 16} There are two types of permanent-partial-disability compensation: compensation for a scheduled loss pursuant to
2. R.C. 4123.58—Permanent-Total-Disability Compensation
{¶ 17} Permanent-total-disability compensation is also calculated based on the employee‘s weekly wages.
{¶ 18} Like permanent-partial-disability compensation, permanent-total-disability compensation is also broken down into two categories: compensation for a loss of two body parts,
C. Law
{¶ 19} In construing a statute, a court‘s main objective is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent. State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen‘s Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees, 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 647 N.E.2d 486 (1995). The intent of the General Assembly must be determined primarily from the language of the statute itself. Stewart v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 296 N.E.2d 676 (1973). When a statute is unambiguous, we apply it as written. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 2006-Ohio-954, 846 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 52, citing State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996).
{¶ 20} Along with these rules of statutory construction, we are mindful of the General Assembly‘s mandate that the workers’ compensation laws be liberally construed in favor of employees.
A liberal construction has been defined as giving “generously all that the statute authorizes,” and “adopting the most comprehensive meaning of the statutory terms in order to accomplish the aims of the Act and to advance its purpose, with all reasonable doubts resolved in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case. Interpretation and construction should not result in a decision so technical or narrow as to defeat the compensatory objective of the Act.”
Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 741 N.E.2d 121 (2001), quoting Fulton, Ohio Workers’ Compensation Law, Section 1.7, 9 (2d Ed.1998). That mandate does not, however, give a reviewing court authority to rewrite the statute, Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co., 136 Ohio St.3d 58, 2013-Ohio-2237, 990 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 13, citing Kilgore v. Chrysler Corp., 92 Ohio St.3d 184, 189, 749 N.E.2d 267 (2001) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
{¶ 21} With these principles in mind, we turn to OPRS‘s propositions of law. We agree with its first proposition of law that
{¶ 22} OPRS‘s remaining proposition of law is the crux of the controversy, and after construing the statutes in favor of Redwine, we must decide whether the commission has authority to grant in the same claim concurrent awards of permanent-partial-disability compensation under
{¶ 23} The language of
{¶ 24}
{¶ 25} Although not at issue here,
{¶ 27} Here, the General Assembly expressly authorized permanent-total-disability compensation to be paid concurrently with other benefits only in the limited circumstances outlined in
{¶ 28} The commission argues that the silence of the statutes on the issue of concurrent payments under
In determining rights arising by force and out of Workmen‘s Compensation Law it is well to remember that the duties of the Industrial Commission and its obligation to injured employees * * * are only such duties and obligations as are imposed by statute; that the rights of injured employees * * * to recover from or participate in the state insurance fund are neither constitutional rights, inherent rights, nor common law rights, but are wholly statutory; * * * that if the right to participate in the fund be not found in the Workmen‘s Compensation Law itself, the right does not exist. * * *
* * *
[And t]he power of a court upon appeal is not different from the power of the administrators of the fund * * *. The statutory law in force upon the date the cause of action accrues is the measure of the right, and is not subject to enlargement or diminishment by the Industrial Commission or the courts at any time * * *.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 29} When an injured employee has previously been determined to be entitled to permanent-total-disability compensation pursuant to
Judgment reversed and writ granted.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and O‘DONNELL, FRENCH, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur.
O‘NEILL, J., dissents.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Rosemary D. Welsh, for appellant.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Andrew Alatis, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission.
Robert A. Muehleisen, for appellee Sherry L. Redwine.
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton, and Chelsea Fulton Rubin, urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Association of Claimants’ Counsel and Ohio Association for Justice.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Self-Insurers Association.
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce.