State ex rel. Murray v. Industrial CommissionState ex rel. Murray v. Industrial Commission
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Brown
Two questions are now before us: (1) Does claimant have an adequate remedy at law, thus precluding mandamus relief? and (2) Can a claimant concurrently receive PPD and PTD for the same injury? For the following reasons, we answer both questions in the negative.
We preliminarily reject the contention of appellee Consolidation Coal Company that an appeal to the court of common pleas under
The former versions of
Claimant Murray’s reliance on State, ex rel. Latino, v. Indus. Comm. (1968),
We turn next to claimant Smiddy’s assertion of an equal protection violation. His contention apparently contemplates comparison of a claimant who is permanently and totally disabled immediately upon injury as against one whose permanent and total disability occurs gradually. While the latter may receive PPD during the time preceding the onset of permanent and total disability, the claimant whose permanent total disability is simultaneous with injury is precluded from receiving PPD.
Claimant’s asserted equal protection violation is unpersuasive. To prevail under the present facts, claimant must demonstrate that the commission, for reasons unrelated to a legitimate state interest, is treating similarly situated claimants differently. McGowan v. Maryland (1961),
In this case, there is neither disparate treatment, nor the requisite group of similarly situated individuals. As to the latter requirement, we do not find that a claimant who was never partially disabled is similarly situated to one who was. It does not violate equal protection to deny benefits to one who does not meet the eligibility criteria, while awarding the same benefits to one who does.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in case No. 90-657, and deny the writ of mandamus in case No. 91-42.
Judgment affirmed in case No. 90-657.
Writ denied in case No. 91-42.