THE STATE EX REL. MOBLEY, APPELLANT, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, APPELLEE.
No. 2025-0608
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Decided July 10, 2026
Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2589
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 22AP-541, 2025-Ohio-1422. Submitted September 16, 2025.
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-2589
THE STATE EX REL. MOBLEY, APPELLANT, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, APPELLEE.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Mobley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2589.]
Mandamus—Public-records requests—
DEWINE, J.
{¶ 1} This is a mandamus case involving a request for public records. Alphonso Mobley Jr. sought records from the Franklin County Board of Commissioners, which denied his request on the basis that it was duplicative of an earlier public-records request from Mobley that had already been fulfilled by the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office. Adopting a magistrate’s recommendation, the Tenth District Court of Appeals granted the board’s motion to dismiss because the board provided Mobley with the requested record after his lawsuit was filed. The Tenth District denied Mobley’s request for statutory damages, concluding that the board’s initial denial of the duplicative request was made in reasonable reliance on case law. Mobley appealed the denial of statutory damages. Because the Tenth District did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the board reasonably would have believed its denial was not a failure to comply with its obligation under Ohio’s Public Records Act,
BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} Mobley sent a public-records request to the board seeking a paper copy of the statement prepared by the Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney for the
{¶ 3} The board then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Mobley’s mandamus claim was moot because he had received the requested record and that statutory damages were not appropriate, because it had initially denied Mobley’s request based on a good-faith belief that it was not required to send Mobley a document he had already received. The magistrate issued a decision recommending that the court of appeals grant the board’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Mobley’s claim was moot. 2025-Ohio-1422, ¶ 33, 41 (10th Dist.). The magistrate also recommended that the court of appeals deny Mobley’s request for statutory damages because even if the board had violated an obligation to produce the requested record, the denial of the request was made in reasonable reliance on case law. See id. at ¶ 34-39.
{¶ 4} Mobley filed three objections to the magistrate’s decision pursuant to
[I.] Magistrate failed as a matter of law when it failed to presume injury, where [the board] did fail to provide any legal authority to support its denial, pursuant to
R.C. 149.43(B)(3) .[II.] Magistrate opines that the two County Offices in the instant case are in sufficient privity with one another as to eliminate the need for both to respond to multiple requests for the same public documents from the same requester. Relying on State ex rel. Cushion v. City of Massillon, 2011-Ohio-4749 [(5th Dist.)].
[III.] Magistrate opines that [the board] reasonably relied on State ex rel. Cushion, to deny [Mobley] public records as a duplicate request. Therefore, [the board] complied with
R.C. 149.43(B)(3) and [Mobley] isn’t entitled to full statutory damages.
The court of appeals initially dismissed the case on the ground that after he initiated his lawsuit, Mobley was named a vexatious litigator in a different case, but we reversed on appeal and remanded for the court of appeals to consider the merits of Mobley’s appeal. State ex rel. Mobley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2023-Ohio-3993, ¶ 17.
{¶ 5} On remand, Mobley filed a second set of objections, stating:
[I.] The Magistrate failed to consider that the Franklin County Prosecutor and the Franklin County Board of Commissioners are separate entities established by the laws of this state for the exercise of a function of government, specifically Chapters 309 and 305 of the revised code. Therefore, both offices meet the statutory definition of “public office,” pursuant to
R.C. 149.011(A) . State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ. Co. v. Bodiker, 134 Ohio App.3d 415, 423 [(10th Dist.)]. (Moreover, the GeneralAssembly has apparently rejected such policy-based preferences among public records custodians, in that R.C. 149.011(A) classifies as a public office “any” entity which otherwise satisfies the statutory definition.)[II.] The Magistrate failed to consider that the Franklin County Board of Commissioners may sue and be sued pursuant to
R.C. 305.12 .[III.] The Magistrate failed to consider that the record requested by [Mobley] is by law received by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners pursuant to
R.C. 309.16 , and both meets the definition of record pursuant toR.C. 149.011(G) and is the property of the Franklin County Board of Commissioners once received, pursuant toR.C. 149.351(A) .[IV.] The Magistrate failed to consider that the Franklin County Board of Commissioners and the Franklin County Prosecutor both have their own records retention schedules created by the county records commission pursuant to
R.C. 149.38 .[V.] The magistrate mistakenly invokes privity among the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office and the Franklin County Board of Commissioner’s where neither the law or public policy allows privity. See [
R.C. ] 149.43(A)(1) “Public record means records kept by any public office.”
(Boldface and underlining in original.) The Tenth District overruled both sets of Mobley’s objections, adopted all but one paragraph and one sentence of the magistrate’s decision, and granted the board’s motion to dismiss. 2025-Ohio-1422 at ¶ 17 (10th Dist.). Mobley appealed to this court.
{¶ 6} Mobley has not challenged on appeal the Tenth District’s determination that his mandamus claim was rendered moot when he received the requested record from the board, so we consider only his argument about statutory damages. A public-records requester is entitled to statutory damages under the Public Records Act if “(1) he transmitted a written public-records request by hand delivery, electronic submission, or certified mail, (2) he made the request to the public office or person responsible for the requested records, (3) he fairly described the records sought, and (4) the public office failed to comply with an obligation under
{¶ 7} Even when a party demonstrates an entitlement to statutory damages, a court may reduce or decline to award statutory damages if it determines that “based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law” at the time of the conduct of the public office, “a well-informed public office . . . reasonably would believe that the conduct . . . of the public office . . . did not constitute a failure to comply with an obligation in accordance with [
{¶ 8} So, the Public Records Act envisions a two-step process for determining whether a requester is entitled to statutory damages: a court first determines whether the requester has established the four elements of
{¶ 9} Rather than follow this two-step process, the magistrate below compressed the question whether Mobley was entitled to statutory damages in the first instance with whether those damages should be reduced or not awarded at all. See 2025-Ohio-1422 at ¶ 34-39 (10th Dist.). Mobley, however, did not object on this basis; rather, he objected only to the magistrate’s recommendation that the board’s refusal to provide the requested records was based on reasonable reliance on case law. See id. at ¶ 9 (“All of Mobley’s objections relate to the magistrate’s conclusion that he was not entitled to statutory damages because the Board’s initial refusal to provide the requested records was based on reasonable reliance on case law.”).
{¶ 10} A party, except for a claim of plain error, waives an argument by failing to raise it in his objections to a magistrate’s recommendation. See
{¶ 11} The board asserts that it reasonably believed its denial of Mobley’s request was not a failure to comply with its obligation under the Public Records Act, because legal authority provides that a public office has no obligation to respond to a duplicative public-records request. In determining whether that belief would have been reasonable, the Tenth District relied on State ex rel. Cushion v. City of Massillon, 2011-Ohio-4749 (5th Dist.), to support the view that a public office need not respond to a duplicative request that was already made to a different public office. See 2025-Ohio-1422 at ¶ 12-17, 34-36, 38-39 (10th Dist.). In Cushion, a
{¶ 12} The Tenth District also noted that our decision in State ex rel. Adkins v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. Legal Dept. held that “public offices are not required to respond to duplicative public-records requests,” 2024-Ohio-5154, ¶ 15, citing State ex rel. Laborers Internatl. Union of N. Am., Local Union No. 500 v. Summerville, 2009-Ohio-4090, ¶ 6. See 2025-Ohio-1422 at ¶ 13 (10th Dist.). While Adkins was decided after the board denied Mobley’s request, the Tenth District correctly noted that Adkins relied on Summerville, a 2009 decision that supported our holding in Adkins. See Summerville at ¶ 6 (public official does not need to respond to a reiteration of an earlier request for the same record); accord State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 2016-Ohio-8394, ¶ 49 (“This court has held that a reiterated request for the same records does not require an additional response.”), citing Summerville at ¶ 6. And while Mobley argues that this principle is limited to when the duplicative requests “were made to the same public office,” the Tenth District found that the board reasonably would have believed that Cushion and Brown supported the view that a public office need not respond to a duplicative request that was already made to a different public office in the same county. See 2025-Ohio-1422 at ¶ 12-17, 34-39 (10th Dist.). We find no abuse of discretion in the Tenth District’s reliance on
{¶ 13} Mobley’s remaining arguments that the board would not reasonably believe that its denial of Mobley’s request was not a failure to comply with its obligation under
{¶ 14} The concurring-and-dissenting opinion goes to great lengths to dissect each case cited herein (and in the Tenth District’s decision) in an attempt to show that the board should have reasonably believed it had a duty to respond to Mobley’s duplicative public-records request made to another Franklin County public office. See concurring-and-dissenting opinion, ¶ 37-47. But that opinion overlooks that our task in this direct appeal is to determine whether the Tenth District’s decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. And, despite the opinion’s
{¶ 15} Thus, the Tenth District did not abuse its discretion in finding that based on existing case law, the board reasonably would have believed its denial of Mobley’s request was not a failure to comply with its obligation under the Public Records Act.
CONCLUSION
{¶ 16} We affirm the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ judgment dismissing Mobley’s claim for a writ of mandamus as moot and dismissing Mobley’s claim for an award of statutory damages.
Judgment affirmed.
KENNEDY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 17} “The separation-of-powers doctrine implicitly arises from our tripartite democratic form of government and recognizes that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government have their own unique powers and duties that are separate and apart from the others.” State v. Thompson, 2001-Ohio-1288, ¶ 6. “‘In the preservation of these distinctions is seen, by many able jurists, the preservation of all the rights, civil and political, of the individual, secured by our free form of government . . . .’” State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 2000-Ohio-116, ¶ 13, quoting Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., 63 Ohio St. 442, 451 (1900). That is, “[t]he reason the legislative, executive, and judicial powers are separate and balanced is to protect the people, not to protect the various branches of government.” Id.
{¶ 19} These principles do not vanish when the public’s right to access government records under the Public Records Act,
{¶ 20} But in yet another one of a thousand cuts eviscerating the Public Records Act, the majority once again undermines the act by denying an award of statutory damages when a public office failed to comply with an obligation under the act. This particular case presents the question whether a public office could reasonably believe that it had no duty to respond to a public-records request because the requester had already received a copy of the requested record from a different public office. Based on the state of the law at the time appellee, the Franklin County Board of Commissioners, denied the request, the answer is no. I would affirm the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals to the extent it dismissed appellant Alphonso Mobley Jr.’s claim for a writ of mandamus as moot and reverse the court of appeals’ judgment denying an award of statutory damages. I would award
Background
{¶ 21} Initially, it is important to note that “[i]n reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint.” Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-4193, ¶ 22. In his complaint, Mobley alleged that he had requested from the board the “Prosecutor Statement, pursuant to [former]
{¶ 22} After Mobley brought a mandamus action, the board fulfilled his public-records request for the prosecutor’s statement. It then moved to dismiss the action, attaching a letter to show that it had fulfilled the records request and that the request for a writ was moot. See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Dupuis, 2002-Ohio-7041, ¶ 8 (a court may consider evidence outside the record to determine whether a cause is moot). Mobley later moved for a default judgment and admitted in that motion that he had received the requested record from the board.
{¶ 23} In its motion to dismiss, the board made two arguments: either it was not required to respond to a duplicate request or it reasonably believed that it was not required to respond to a duplicate request. A magistrate of the Tenth District recommended dismissing the action as moot and denying an award of statutory damages, stating that “even if [the board] failed to comply with its obligation under
{¶ 24} Mobley objected to the magistrate’s decision, asserting that the board could not reasonably rely on Cushion in denying his public-records request when decisions from this court had established that a public office is still required to provide a public record even if the requester has already received it from a third party. He also maintained that nothing prevented him from requesting the same public record from two separate public offices.
{¶ 25} The Tenth District overruled Mobley’s objections, holding that “the magistrate properly concluded that Mobley was not entitled to statutory damages because a well-informed public office could reasonably believe that denying Mobley’s request did not violate the Public Records Act based on existing case law.” 2025-Ohio-1422 at ¶ 16 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 26} Mobley appealed as of right.
Law and Analysis
Standard of Review
{¶ 27} In an original public-records mandamus action, a court of appeals has discretion in deciding the ultimate question whether to reduce or deny an award of statutory damages under
{¶ 28} Nonetheless, it is well established that “[w]e review a court of appeals’ judgment in a mandamus action filed in that court as if the action had been brought originally in this court.” State ex rel. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Bellbrook-Sugarcreek Local Schools, 2020-Ohio-5149, ¶ 7; accord State ex rel. Fair Hous. Opportunities of Northwest Ohio v. Ohio Fair Plan, 2023-Ohio-2667, ¶ 12. This court is therefore not required to defer to the court of appeals’ decision to deny Mobley an award of statutory damages under
{¶ 29} In addition, the Tenth District in this case granted the board’s motion to dismiss, and “[w]e review de novo a decision granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” State ex rel. Wright v. Madison Cty. Clerk of Courts, 2026-Ohio-598, ¶ 7; see also Furr v. Ruehlman, 2023-Ohio-481, ¶ 8 (“We review de novo an order dismissing a mandamus complaint.”). De novo review necessarily includes the court of appeals’ decision to dismiss Mobley’s request for an award of statutory damages.
{¶ 30} Both prongs under
{¶ 31} Consequently, contrary to the majority, I would apply a de novo standard of review in this direct appeal.
{¶ 32} Subject to an exception not relevant here, “upon request by any person, a public office or person responsible for public records shall make copies of the requested public record available to the requester at cost and within a reasonable period of time.”
{¶ 33} Statutory damages are available if “a court determines that the public office or the person responsible for public records failed to comply with an obligation in accordance with [
{¶ 34} The Public Records Act provides only one circumstance in which “[t]he court may reduce an award of statutory damages or not award statutory damages.” (Emphasis added.) Id. To reduce or not award statutory damages, the court must decide that “a well-informed” public-records custodian would reasonably believe that the conduct of the public office or person responsible for the public records (1) “did not constitute a failure to comply with an obligation in accordance with [
{¶ 35} In my view, the board violated an obligation imposed under
{¶ 36} Initially, nothing in the text of the Public Records Act expressly excuses a public-records custodian from fulfilling a public-records request that has been fulfilled by another public office. The statute contains an extensive and comprehensive list of exceptions precluding the release of records, see
Cushion and Brown
{¶ 37} Next, remember that in Cushion, the public-records requester sent the same public-records request to the City of Massillon’s mayor, law director, and auditor. Cushion, 2011-Ohio-4749, at ¶ 2-13 (5th Dist.). However, the Fifth District noted that the city law director had written a letter to the requester saying that he had responded to the request on behalf of himself, the auditor, and the mayor; the court then said that each city office did not need to respond to the request. Id. at ¶ 85. The court’s analysis for rejecting the requester’s argument that he was entitled to have the same record provided by each office was that “he cite[d] no cases for such proposition” and that the court was not “aware of any such case law or other legal authority.” Id. at ¶ 86. That is, the Fifth District was largely
{¶ 38} That is a pretty slender reed to grasp. But more importantly, when the board denied Mobley’s public-records request, a well-informed public-records custodian would have known that the Cushion decision runs counter to clearly established precedent. For example, in State ex rel. Summers v. Fox, we stated plainly: “Nothing in the text of the Public Records Act excuses a public office from its duty to supply records upon a showing that the requester has obtained the record from a third party.” 2020-Ohio-5585, ¶ 39. A separate public office is a third party.
{¶ 39} The Tenth District and the majority cite the Second District Court of Appeals’ decision in State ex rel. Brown v. N. Lewisburg, 2013-Ohio-3841 (2d Dist.), in support of the view that the board acted reasonably. However, that decision does not support a reasonable belief that a public-records request made to one public office precludes a request for the same record from a second public office from being fulfilled, because Brown involved a single request, not multiple requests to separate public offices.
{¶ 40} In Brown, a member of a village council—Brown—requested copies of the village’s invoices, purchase orders, and certain checks for a certain period. Id. at ¶ 2. The village mayor refused to provide the requested records because Brown had received some of the information in those records in registers provided in monthly packets prepared for council members and because the invoices were available to review at council meetings. Id. at ¶ 3. In addition, Brown had been permitted to view a detailed payment register that contained information in the records sought in her public-records request. Id. at ¶ 4. Brown did not receive the records requested until after she filed her mandamus action. Id. at ¶ 5, 7. The Second District denied the writ as moot, id. at ¶ 11, and denied an award of statutory damages on the basis that “it [was] not . . . unreasonable for . . . the custodians of the records requested . . . to have believed that Brown was not entitled to
{¶ 41} A well-informed public-records custodian could not have reasonably relied on Brown for the proposition that a public-records request made to one public office precludes a request for the same record from a separate public office from being fulfilled. Again, Brown involved only a single request to a single public office that was not fulfilled before the mandamus action was filed.
{¶ 42} What the Second District said was that it was reasonable for the village and its officials to believe that “Brown was not entitled to duplicative, voluminous copies of records to which . . . she [had] access at each Village council meeting.” Id., 2013-Ohio-3841, at ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). But at the time Brown was decided, this court had already rejected the proposition that allowing a public-records requester to see or hear a requested record absolved the public-records custodian of the duty to make a copy of the record upon request. See State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Morrow Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 2005-Ohio-685, ¶ 12, 14-15 (newspaper requested copy of a 9-1-1 audio tape but public office responded by allowing a newspaper employee to listen to it and by offering to transcribe it; the public office’s response violated the Public Records Act). A well-informed public-records custodian would have known this court’s public-records precedent (especially if it is assumed that the custodian knew about two obscure court-of-appeals public-records decisions like Cushion and Brown).
Adkins, Summerville, and Caster
{¶ 43} The Tenth District and the majority also point to State ex rel. Adkins v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. Legal Dept., 2024-Ohio-5154, and State ex rel. Laborers Internatl. Union of N. Am., Local Union No. 500 v. Summerville, 2009-Ohio-4090. See 2025-Ohio-1422 at ¶ 13 (10th Dist.); majority opinion at ¶ 12. The majority adds State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 2016-Ohio-8394, to the analysis. Majority opinion at ¶ 12.
{¶ 45} In contrast, Summerville involved a “follow-up letter” that the public-records requester sent after its public-records request had been denied. Summerville at ¶ 5-6. This court determined that the follow-up letter was not a separate public-records request, and the court indicated that it would be absurd to allow public-records requesters to “inundate public officials with myriad identical records requests.” Id. at ¶ 6. That statement sounds more like a policy decision—a judicially created good-sense rule—than a wholehearted stab at statutory interpretation, but for what it’s worth, the follow-up letter was sent to the same public office, not a separate one.
{¶ 46} Lastly, the duplicative public-records requests at issue in Caster were not sent to separate public offices; all the requests were sent to the Columbus Division of Police. Caster, 2016-Ohio-8394, at ¶ 3, 6-9, 49.
{¶ 47} So where does that leave us? We have a statute that provides no exception for duplicative public-records requests made to separate public offices, notwithstanding a myriad of other exceptions. We have several cases that do not
{¶ 48} Based on an ordinary application of case law, a reasonable, well-informed public-records custodian would have fulfilled Mobley’s public-records request. Because the board fails to establish that it reasonably believed that denying the request “did not constitute a failure to comply with an obligation in accordance with [
{¶ 49} The majority finds otherwise, but it then fails to complete its analysis. To reduce or not award statutory damages, the court must find that both
{¶ 50} The majority skips a step and never addresses the public-policy prong of the statute. It attempts to justify this shortcoming by suggesting that Mobley failed to object to the magistrate’s decision related to the second prong under
{¶ 51} The magistrate’s analysis of the second prong, however, is limited to a conclusory statement that denying a duplicative record request “would serve the public policy that underlies the authority that is asserted as permitting that conduct,” 2025-Ohio-1422 at ¶ 37 (10th Dist.). The magistrate further explained that the prosecutor’s office and the board were in sufficient privity with each other to eliminate the need for both public offices to respond to a duplicative public-records request. Id. at ¶ 38. In response, Mobley presented this objection: “The magistrate mistakenly invokes privity among the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office and the Franklin County Board of Commissioner’s where neither the law or public policy allows privity.”
{¶ 52} Mobley sufficiently raised the question of public policy in this objection. But notably, the board did not respond to Mobley’s objections to the magistrate’s decision, and the Tenth District never addressed whether his objections were sufficient—in fact, it simply refused to adopt the magistrate’s conclusory analysis of the public-policy prong, id. at ¶ 17. And in this court, the board has not asserted that Mobley’s objections were insufficient but instead argues the merits of the public-policy prong. In these circumstances,
{¶ 53} To close the loop, I will address
{¶ 54} Nor does a person’s requesting the same record from separate public offices necessarily mean that the person has nefarious motives—simply put, a citizen might want to compare the record received from each office to make sure that they are identical. In this case, Mobley could have requested a copy of the prosecutor’s statement from the prosecutor and from the board to make sure that the statements matched, proving that the statement that the prosecutor sent Mobley was actually the statement that had been filed with the board. But in the end, the reason Mobley sent two public-records requests does not matter, because a public-records requester does not have to explain why he or she wants the records, see
{¶ 55} And even if precluding separate public-records requests sent to different public offices from being fulfilled advanced a public policy of discouraging persons with questionable motives from inundating public officials with multiple identical requests, the overarching policy of the Public Records Act outweighs it. “It has long been the policy of this state, as reflected in the Public Records Act and as acknowledged by this court, that open government serves the public interest and our democratic system,” State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 2006-Ohio-1825, ¶ 20, therefore “reinforc[ing] the understanding that open access to government papers is an integral entitlement of the people, to be preserved with vigilance and vigor,” Kish v. Akron, 2006-Ohio-1244, ¶ 17. Preserving our
{¶ 56} For these reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part.
Alphonso Mobley Jr., pro se.
Shayla D. Favor, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas W. Ellis and John A. Zervas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.