State ex rel. Alphonso Mobley, Jr. v. Franklin County Board of Commissioners
No. 22AP-541
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
April 22, 2025
[Cite as State ex rel. Mobley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2025-Ohio-1422.]
DORRIAN, J.
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on April 22, 2025
On brief: Alphonso Mobley, Jr., pro se.
On brief: [Shayla D. Favor], Prosecuting Attorney, Andrea C. Hofer, and Thomas W. Ellis, for respondent.
IN MANDAMUS
ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE‘S DECISION
DORRIAN, J.
{1} Relator Alphonso Mobley, Jr. who is incarcerated at Southeastern Correctional Institution, has filed this original action in mandamus seeking a writ compelling respondent Franklin County Board of Commissioners (“the Board“) to comply with his public records request made pursuant to
{3} On January 10, 2023, the magistrate issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. The magistrate recommended this court grant Mobley‘s motion for leave to file a reply to the motion to dismiss, deny Mobley‘s motion for default judgment, and grant the Board‘s motion to dismiss.
{4} On January 20, 2023, in an unrelated matter, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas declared Mobley to be a vexatious litigator pursuant to
{5} Mobley appealed the January 26, 2023 dismissal order to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to this court for consideration of Mobley‘s motion for leave. Id. at ¶ 17. Following the remand order, on November 28, 2023,
{6} Mobley‘s first objections were not clearly enumerated, but his memorandum in support appears to set forth the following three objections:
[I.] Magistrate failed as a matter of law when it failed to presume injury, where Respondent did fail to provide any legal authority to support its denial, pursuant to
R.C. 149.43(B)(3) .[II.] Magistrate opines that the two County Offices in the instant case are in sufficient privity with one another as to eliminate the need for both to respond to multiple requests for the same public documents from the same requester. Relying on State еx rel. Cushion v. City of Massillon, 2011-Ohio-4749 [(5th Dist.)].
[III.] Magistrate opines that Respondent reasonably relied on State ex rel. Cushion, to deny Relator public records as a duplicate request. Therefore, Respondent complied with
R.C. 149.43(B)(3)
{7} In his second set of objections, Mobley set forth the following five objections:
[I.] The Magistrate failed to consider that the Franklin County Prosecutor and the Franklin County Board of Commissioners are separate entities established by the laws of this state for the exercise of a function of government, specifically Chapters 309 and 305 of the revised code. Therеfore, both offices meet the statutory definition of “public office,” pursuant to
R.C. 149.011(A) . State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ. Co. v. Bodiker, 134 Ohio App.3d 415, 423 [(10th Dist.)]. Moreover, the General Assembly has apparently rejected such policy-based preferences among public records custodians, in thatR.C. 149.011(A) classifies as a public office “any” entity which otherwise satisfies the statutory definition.[II.] The Magistrate failed to consider that the Franklin County Board of Commissioners may sue and be sued pursuant to
R.C. 305.12 .
[III.] The Magistrate failed to consider that the record requested by Relator is by law received by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners pursuant to R.C. 309.16 , and both meets the definition of record pursuant toR.C. 149.011(G) and is the property of the Franklin County Board of Commissioners once received, pursuant toR.C. 149.351(A) .[IV.] The Magistrate failed to consider that the Franklin County Board of Commissioners and the Franklin County Prosecutor both have their own records retention schedules created by the county records commission pursuant to
R.C. 149.38 .[V.] The magistrate mistakenly invokes privity among the Franklin County Prosecutor‘s Office and the Franklin County Board of Commissioner‘s where neither the law or public policy allows privity. See
149.43(A)(1) “Public record means records kept by any public office.”
(Emphasis in original.)
{8} As explained above and in the magistrate‘s decision, Mobley concedes his mandamus claim is moot with respect to the records sought in his request. Therefore, only his claims for statutory damages and court costs remain.
{9} All of Mobley‘s objections relate to the magistrate‘s conclusion that he was not entitled to statutory damages because the Board‘s initial refusal to provide the requested records was based on reasonable reliance on case law. Therefore, we will address all of Mobley‘s objections together.
{10} The Public Records Act “allows a relator to recover $100 for each business day during which the respondent failed to comply with the Public Records Act, beginning on the date that the relator files a mandamus action to compel production of the public records,” up to a maximum award of $1,000. State ex rel. Sultaana v. Mansfield Corr. Inst., 2023-Ohio-1177, ¶ 47, citing
{11} The Board denied Mobley‘s public records request on grounds it was a duplicate of a request that the Franklin County Prosecutor‘s Office had fulfilled on July 6, 2022. Therefore, for purposes of determining whether Mobley is entitled to statutory damages, the question is whether it was reasonable for the Board to bеlieve it could reject Mobley‘s request of the particular record on that basis.1 The magistrate concluded the Board could have reasonably relied on the decision in State ex rel. Cushion v. Massillon, 2011-Ohio-4749 (5th Dist.), in denying Mobley‘s request.
{12} In Cushion, an individual sent identical public records requests to the law director, auditor, and mayor of the city of Massillon. Cushion at ¶ 2, 13. Initially, the law director and the auditor responded to the request by letter, but the mayor did not respond. Id. at ¶ 14. After the requester filed a mandamus complaint, the law director sent a letter indicating that his prior response was intended to be on behalf of all three offices. Id. at ¶ 16. The trial court concluded the offices had failed to produce certain records and
{13} In addition to the Cushion decision, we also note that the Supreme Court has stated that “public offices are not required to respond to duplicative public-records requests.” State ex rel. Adkins v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. Legal Dept., 2024-Ohio-5154, ¶ 15, citing State ex rel. Laborers Internatl. Union оf N. Am., Local Union No. 500 v. Summerville, 2009-Ohio-4090, ¶ 6.
{14} Mobley‘s request to the Board sought a paper copy of the Franklin County Prosecutor‘s statement to the Board pursuant to
(1) The number of criminal prosecutions pursued to final conviction and sentence under his official care, during the year next preceding the time of making such statement. In such statement the prоsecuting attorney shall name the parties to each prosecution, the amount of fine assessed in each case, the number of recognizances forfeited, and the amount of money collected in each case.
(2) With respect to the offenses set forth in sections 2909.02 and 2909.03 of the Revised Code, such statement shall also include the following information:
(a) The number of fires occurring in the county for which the state fire marshal or an assistant state fire marshal has determined there was evidence sufficient to charge a person with aggrаvated arson or arson;
(b) The number of cases under sections 2909.02 and 2909.03 of the Revised Code presented by the prosecuting attorney to the grand jury for indictment;
(c) The number of indictments under such sections returned by the grand jury;
(d) The number of cases under such sections prosecuted either by indictment or by information by the prosecuting attorney;
(e) The number of cases under such sections resulting in final conviction and sentence and the number of cases resulting in acquittals;
(f) The number of cases under such sections dismissed or terminated without a final adjudication as to guilt or innocеnce.
Former
{15} Thus, the record that Mobley sought from the Board was a report prepared and submitted to the Board by the Franklin County Prosecutor‘s Office. Mobley does not deny that he requested and received the same record from the prosecutor‘s office a month prior to filing his request with the Board. Mobley ultimately received the requested records from the Board after filing this case and does not argue there was any difference between the documents he received from the prosecutor‘s office and those he received from the Bоard.
{16} Under the circumstances in this case, where the Franklin County Prosecutor‘s Office created the records sought and submitted those records to the Board pursuant to a statutory mandate, and where Mobley received a copy of the same records from the prosecutor‘s office only a month before submitting his request to the Board, the magistrate properly concluded that Mobley was not entitled to statutory damages because a well-informed public office could reasonably believe that denying Mobley‘s request did not violate the Publiс Records Act based on existing case law. See Cushion, 2011-Ohio-4749, at ¶ 85-86. See also State ex rel. Brown v. N. Lewisburg, 2013-Ohio-3841, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.) (“Under the totality of the facts and circumstances in this case, we find it would not be unreasonable for Respondents, the custodians of the records requested, to have believed that Brown was not entitled to duplicative, voluminous copies of records to which the testimony in this matter demonstrates she has access at each Village council meeting.“).
{17} Upon review of the magistrate‘s decision, an independent review of the record, and due consideration of Mobley‘s objections, we find the magistrate has properly determined the pertinent facts and applied the appropriate law, except that we substitute our analysis of the facts of this case for the magistrate‘s analysis in paragraph 37 and find that the magistrate need not have relied on the concept of privity in paragraph 38 when concluding that the Board reasonably relied on Cushion to deny Mobley‘s request. We therefore overrule Mobley‘s eight objections to the magistrate‘s decision and adopt the magistrate‘s decision as our own, with the exception of paragraph 37 and the penultimate sentence of paragraph 38, which states “Similarly, the two city offices in Cushion and the two county offices in the present case are in sufficient privity with one another so as to eliminate the need for both to respond to multiple requests for the same public documents from the same requester.” Mobley is not entitled to a writ of mandamus, statutory damages, or cоurt costs. Accordingly, we grant Mobley‘s motion for leave to file a reply to the Board‘s motion to dismiss, grant the board‘s motion to dismiss, and deny Mobley‘s motion for default judgment.
Relator‘s motion for leave to file reply brief granted; respondent‘s motion to dismiss granted; relator‘s motion for default judgment denied.
EDELSTEIN and LELAND, JJ., concur.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State ex rel. Alphonso Mobley Jr., : Relator, : v. : No. 22AP-541 : (REGULAR CALENDAR) Franklin County Board of Commissioners, : Respondent. :
MAGISTRATE‘S DECISION
Rendered on January 10, 2023
Alphonso Mobley Jr., pro se.
G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrea C. Hofer, for respondent.
IN MANDAMUS
ON MOTIONS
{18} Relator, Alphonso Mobley Jr., has filed this original action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Franklin County Board of Commissioners, to comply with his requests for public records made pursuant to
Findings of Fact:
{19} 1. Relator is a prisoner incarcerated at Southeastern Correctional Institution.
{21} 3. In his petition for writ of mandamus, relator alleges that respondent, in bad faith, failed to produce publiс records pursuant to his request for “Prosecutor Statement, pursuant to
{22} 4. In his petition, relator alleges that respondent denied the request in a letter postmarked August 19, 2022, for the reason that it was a duplicate of one that the Franklin County Prosecutor‘s Office already fulfilled for relator on July 6, 2022.
{23} 5. On September 7, 2022, relator filed the present petition for writ of mandamus, in which he claimed ODRC failed to comply with his public-records request pursuant to
{24} 6. On October 5, 2022, respondent provided the requested record to relator.
{25} 7. On October 17, 2022, respondent filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
{26} 8. On October 27, 2022, relator filed a motion for default judgment.
{27} 9. On November 2, 2022, relator filed a motion for leave to file reply to motion to dismiss, which the magistrate hereby grants.
Conclusions of Law:
{28} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus, a relator must ordinarily show a clear legal right to the relief sought, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide such relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). However, relators in public-records mandamus cases need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. ACLU of Ohio v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 128 Ohio St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-625, ¶ 24, citing State ex rel. Morgan v. New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, ¶ 41.
{29} A “public record” is a record “kept by any public office.”
{30} When a public office withholds responsive records, it has the burden of showing that the records are statutorily exempted from disclosure. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, paragraph two of the syllabus. Denial of a public-records request is appropriate if the public record is fully exempt from mandatory disclosure, but if a public record is fully exempt from mandatory disclosure, the public-records custodian must provide the requester with an explanation, including legal authority, setting forth why the request was denied.
{31} A party who beliеves that a request for a public record has been improperly denied may file a mandamus action in order to compel production of the record.
{32} However, a court may reduce or not award statutory damages if it finds (1) that “a well-informed public office * * * reasonably would believe that the conduct * * * that allegedly constitutes a failure to comply with an obligation” imposed by
{33} In the present case, relator has admitted that respondent has now fulfilled his public-records request, and, therefore, that issue is moot. However, relator contends that he is still entitled to statutory damages, pursuant to
{34} Respondent counters that relator is not entitled to statutory damages because it complied with its obligation under
{35} In Cushion, the requester sent identical public-records requests to the law director, auditor, and mayor for the city of Massillon. The law director and auditor responded. The requester filed a mandamus action, alleging the law director and auditor did not fully comply with the request, and the mayor did not respond at all. The law director then sent a letter to the requester clarifying that his original respоnse was on behalf of all three respondents. The mayor sent a letter indicating that he had none of the requested documents in his possession, and the law director‘s and auditor‘s responses were on his behalf. The court denied the writ of mandamus, awarded statutory damages for the respondents’ failure to promptly make certain records available, and denied the request for attorney fees. On appeal, in pertinent part, the requester argued that the law director, auditor, and mayor were each individually and independently required to рrovide him with the documents that he requested. However, the court held that the three public-records requests stated the same thing, there was no need for each office of the city of Massillon to send the exact same documents, and the requester did not experience a “loss of use” because the city officials provided the documents they possessed.
{37} As explained above, respondent in the present case asserts that it complied with its obligation under
{38} The two cases relator relies upon, Horton and Summers, are inapposite to Cushion and the circumstances here. In Horton, the two public offices (the city аnd the city police chief) unsuccessfully argued that the requester did not suffer any delay in receiving the public record because the law firm representing the requester had already received the same public record pursuant to a request the firm sent on behalf of another client/requester. In Summers, the two public offices (county sheriff and county prosecuting attorney) unsuccessfully argued that the requester‘s request for public records was moot
{39} For these reasons, the magistrate finds that relator is not entitled to statutory damages pursuant to
{40} Furthermore, relator‘s motion for default judgment must also be denied because Civ.R. 55(D) prohibits a court from entering default judgment against a political subdivision unless the claimant establishes his right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court, and relator, here, has failed to do so.
{41} Accordingly, it is the magistrate‘s decision that the court grant respondent‘s motion to dismiss relator‘s petition for writ of mandamus pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), deny
/S/ MAGISTRATE
THOMAS W. SCHOLL III
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court‘s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).