THE STATE EX REL. CITY OF CLEVELAND v. RUSSO, JUDGE.
No. 2019-0251
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
May 1, 2019
2019-Ohio-1595
Submitted March 6, 2019
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Cleveland v. Russo, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-1595.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-1595
Prohibition—Trial court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over claims falling within the State Employment Relations Board‘s exclusive jurisdiction—Writ granted.
IN PROHIBITION.
{¶ 1} In this original action, relator, the city of Cleveland, seeks a peremptory writ of prohibition against respondent, Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Nancy M. Russo. Because Judge Russo patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the controversy, we grant Cleveland‘s request for a peremptory writ of prohibition and order Judge Russo to vacate the orders that she previously entered in Assn. of Cleveland Fire Fighters, Local 93 v. Cleveland, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-19-910679, and to cease exercising jurisdiction over that case.
Background
{¶ 2} Traditionally, Cleveland fire fighters work 24-hour shifts beginning at 8:30 a.m. In December 2018, Cleveland‘s fire chief decided to change the 24-hour shift start times for fire fighters to 7:00 a.m. The chief intended to implement this change on February 11, 2019.
{¶ 3} On December 26, 2018, the president of the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 93 (“the union“), which is the fire fighters’ exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes, e-mailed the fire chief, objecting to the chief‘s decision to modify fire fighters’
{¶ 4} On or about January 31, 2019, the union filed an unfair-labor-practice charge under
{¶ 5} On February 6, 2019, the union filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment, a temporary restraining order (“TRO“), and injunctive relief in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court against the city of Cleveland, the fire chief, and the director of public safety (“the defendants“), alleging that the chief‘s shift-time order was subject to collective bargaining under
{¶ 6} The case was assigned to Judge Russo, who held a hearing on February 7, 2019, regarding the union‘s request for a TRO and a preliminary injunction. On that date, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that SERB had exclusive statutory authority over matters pertaining to
{¶ 7} On February 15, 2019, Cleveland filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition in this court, arguing that Judge Russo patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the union‘s claims due to the General Assembly‘s granting SERB “exclusive jurisdiction over all matters arising from rights created by [R.C.] Chapter 4117.” Judge Russo filed a motion to dismiss.
Judge Russo‘s motion to dismiss
{¶ 8} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Cleveland must establish that (1) Judge Russo is about to exercise or has exercised judicial power, (2) Judge Russo lacks authority to exercise that power, and (3) denying the writ would result in an injury for which Cleveland would lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. If, however, Judge Russo patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction in the underlying case, then Cleveland need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15.
SERB‘s jurisdiction
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} In its complaint, Cleveland states—and Judge Russo does not dispute—that it is a “chartered, home-rule municipal corporation located in Cuyahoga County, Ohio” and “is a ‘public employer’ as defined by [R.C.] 4117.01(B).” And no party disputes that Cleveland fire fighters are “public employees“; they hold positions of employment with a public employer and do not fall under any of the law‘s exceptions. See
{¶ 12} SERB “is an agency of the state of Ohio created by
{¶ 13} A determination whether a public employer‘s unilateral action affects employees’ work hours “is generally a factual question * * * properly determined by SERB, which was designated by the General Assembly to facilitate an amicable, comprehensive, effective labor-management relationship between public employees and employers.” Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 260, 533 N.E.2d 264 (1988). The General Assembly has specified particular issues for SERB to address in the first instance. State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State, 146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 51. Indeed, SERB “has exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters committed to it pursuant to
Whether the union‘s claims fall within SERB‘s exclusive jurisdiction
{¶ 15} Judge Russo contends that she does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction, because the union‘s complaint includes claims that may be independent of the collective-bargaining rights set forth in
{¶ 16} A review of the complaint shows that the union is seeking relief under
{¶ 17} When a party has asserted claims that are independent of
Declaratory judgment
{¶ 18} Judge Russo also contends that she has authority to grant declaratory relief to the union because forcing the union to seek administrative relief would be dilatory. We have previously rejected this argument and held that a trial court‘s basic statutory authority to hear declaratory-judgment actions does not vest the court with jurisdiction to consider
{¶ 19} We deny Judge Russo‘s motion to dismiss.
{¶ 20} As noted above, the only issue presented in this case is whether Judge Russo patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to preside over the union‘s complaint. Cleveland argues that it is entitled to a peremptory writ of prohibition because the material facts of the underlying case are uncontroverted and the legal issues are fully briefed. In support of its position that a peremptory writ of prohibition should issue, Cleveland relies on Sutula at ¶ 8, in which a union claimed that Cleveland committed unfair labor practices by interfering with public employees’ rights under
{¶ 21} Subsequently, we clarified that our decision in Sutula did not expand the scope of SERB‘s jurisdiction under
{¶ 22} Here, the union‘s claims arise out of rights that are set forth in
Writ granted.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur.
Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A., Jon M. Dileno, and George S. Crisci; and William Menzalora, City of Cleveland Chief Assistant Law Director, for relator.
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.