THE STATE EX REL. OHIO CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. THE STATE OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES.
No. 2014-0319
Supreme Court of Ohio
February 11, 2016
2016-Ohio-478 | 147 Ohio St.3d 315
FRENCH, J.
{1} This appeal asks whether 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 153 (“H.B. 153“), the budget bill for the 2012–2013 biennium, violates the Ohio Constitution. Specifically, we consider whether H.B. 153 violates the one-subject rule in Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution or the prohibition against state financial involvement with private enterprise in Article VIII, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution. We must also decide whether a court of common pleas, or only the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB“), has jurisdiction to determine whether employees of privately owned or operated prisons are public employees, as defined by R.C. 4117.01(C). We hold that H.B. 153 is constitutional and that SERB has exclusive jurisdiction to determine public-employee status under
Background
{2} In H.B. 153, the General Assembly appropriated operating funds to the state government and its programs for the biennium beginning July 1, 2011, and ending June 30, 2013. The title of the bill states that it provides “authorization and conditions for the operation of programs, including reforms for the efficient and effective operation of state and local government.” We are specifically concerned here with provisions in H.B. 153 that deal with the operation, management, and sale of state correctional facilities.
{4} Two private companies took advantage of the prison-privatization opportunity. Respondent-appellee Management & Training Corporation (“MTC“) signed a contract for the operation and management of North Central Correctional Institution (renamed North Central Correctional Complex). And respondent-appellee Corrections Corporation of America (“Corrections Corporation“) purchased Lake Erie Correctional Facility1 and signed a related operation and management contract.
{5} Appellees and cross-appellants are the Ohio Civil Service Employees Association, the labor union representing Ohio‘s public employees; Progress-Ohio.org; and numerous former employees of North Central Correctional Complex, Lake Erie Correctional Facility, and Marion Correctional Institution.2 We refer to appellees and cross-appellants collectively as “OCSEA.”
{7} OCSEA‘s amended complaint raised several claims. As relevant here, it alleged the following: (1) H.B. 153, in its entirety, violates the one-subject rule contained in
{8} The state respondents filed a motion to dismiss OCSEA‘s amended complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and Civ.R. 12(B)(1), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed OCSEA‘s complaint in its entirety. The trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction to determine individual employee rights, including whether the named employees were public employees under
{9} The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of OCSEA‘s one-subject-rule claim and ordered the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on remand to determine whether H.B. 153 has only one subject and, if not, to sever any offending provisions. 2013-Ohio-4505, 2 N.E.3d 304, ¶ 24. But the
{10} The state respondents and MTC filed discretionary appeals in this court, and OCSEA filed a cross-appeal. We accepted jurisdiction. 139 Ohio St.3d 1428, 2014-Ohio-2725, 11 N.E.3d 284.
{11} The parties assert seven propositions of law, which we distill to the following issues: (1) whether the prison-privatization provisions of H.B. 153 or H.B. 153 in its entirety violate the one-subject rule, (2) whether a provision in the contract for the sale of Lake Erie Correctional Facility that requires the state to pay an annual ownership fee constitutes a subsidy that violates
Analysis
{12} To begin our analysis, we look to the applicable standards of review. We review dismissals pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5. Therefore, in reviewing a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, we presume that the complaint‘s factual allegations are true and make all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party‘s favor. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988). We may affirm a judgment granting the motion only when there is no set of facts under which the nonmoving party could recover. O‘Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), syllabus. Appellate courts similarly apply a de novo standard when reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Civ.R. 12(B)(1). Groza-Vance v. Vance, 162 Ohio App.3d 510, 2005-Ohio-3815, 834 N.E.2d 15, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.). Thus, on that issue, we consider whether the complaint raises any cause of action cognizable by the forum. Id.
{13} Beyond these standards based upon the Civil Rules, OCSEA‘s constitutional claims bring into play additional considerations. When a claim challenges a statute‘s constitutionality, we begin with the presumption that the statute is constitutional. State v. Carswell, 114 Ohio St.3d 210, 2007-Ohio-3723, 871 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 6. We will declare the statute unconstitutional only if we conclude that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 51 Ohio St.3d 46, 47, 554 N.E.2d 97 (1990).
{14} With these standards in mind, we turn to OCSEA‘s specific claims.
{15}
{16} Although this court has described the one-subject rule as mandatory, In re Nowak, 104 Ohio St.3d 466, 2004-Ohio-6777, 820 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 54, our role in its enforcement remains limited. To accord appropriate deference to the General Assembly‘s law-making function, we must liberally construe the term “subject” for purposes of the rule. State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 498, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999).
{17} The one-subject rule does not prohibit a plurality of topics, only a disunity of subjects. State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 62 Ohio St.3d 145, 148, 580 N.E.2d 767 (1991). The mere fact that a bill embraces more than one topic is not fatal as long as a common purpose or relationship exists among the topics. Hoover v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 19 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 482 N.E.2d 575 (1985). And we invalidate statutes as violating the one-subject rule only when they contain “a manifestly gross and fraudulent violation.” (Emphasis deleted.) Dix at 145. That standard recognizes not only the General Assembly‘s great latitude in enacting comprehensive legislation, but also that
there are rational and practical reasons for the combination of topics on certain subjects. It acknowledges that the combination of provisions on a large number of topics, as long as they are germane to a single subject, may not be for purposes of logrolling but for the purposes of bringing greater order and cohesion to the law or of coordinating an improvement of the law‘s substance.
Id. Only when there is no practical, rational or legitimate reason for combining provisions in one act will we find a one-subject-rule violation. Id.
{18} Application of the one-subject rule is more difficult when the challenged provision is part of an appropriations bill. State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn., AFSCME, Local 11, AFL-CIO v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 104 Ohio St.3d 122, 2004-Ohio-6363, 818 N.E.2d 688, ¶ 30. Biennial appropriations bills, which fund the state‘s programs and departments, necessarily address wide-ranging topics and bring unique challenges for judicial review. Id. Appropriations bills can bind many topics to the common thread of appropriations, id., but
{19} OCSEA challenges H.B. 153 on one-subject grounds in two respects—as to the entire bill and, alternatively, as to the prison-privatization provisions. We reject both challenges.
i. OCSEA‘s whole-bill challenge
{20} The Tenth District held that by simply alleging that the several listed provisions of H.B. 153 are unrelated to appropriations, OCSEA‘s amended complaint sufficiently alleged a one-subject challenge to H.B. 153 in its entirety. 2013-Ohio-4505, 2 N.E.3d 304, ¶ 23. It ordered the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on remand “to determine whether the bill in question had only one subject” and, if not, to sever any offending provisions. Id. at ¶ 24. The enormity, if not the impossibility, of that undertaking—a section-by-section review of thousands of pages concerning every state agency and program, followed by an evidentiary hearing on the tedious task of budgeting—suggests the outcome here.
{21} OCSEA‘s conclusory allegation that 28 provisions of H.B. 153 stray from the subject of appropriations does not state a one-subject-rule claim regarding H.B. 153 in its entirety. First, it is not an allegation of fact that a court must accept as true for purposes of Civ.R. 12(B)(6). See Mitchell, 40 Ohio St.3d at 193, 532 N.E.2d 753 (trial court need not accept as true unsupported conclusions in a complaint). Rather, identification of a bill‘s subject is a question of law, which depends “upon the particular language and subject matter of the proposal.” Dix, 11 Ohio St.3d at 145, 464 N.E.2d 153. No fact-finding is necessary.
{22} Second, the appropriate remedy when a legislative act violates the one-subject rule is generally to sever the offending portions of the act “to cure the defect and save the portions” of the act that do relate to a single subject. Hinkle, 62 Ohio St.3d at 149, 580 N.E.2d 767. When an act contains more than one subject, the court may determine which subject is primary and which is an unrelated add-on. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d at 500, 715 N.E.2d 1062. As we discuss below, only in the rare instance when we have been unable to discern a primary subject have we resorted to invalidating an entire bill. That is not the case here.
{23} We can easily discern the primary subject of H.B. 153: balancing state expenditures against state revenues to ensure continued operation of state programs. Twice before, we have refused to find one-subject violations where the provisions of an appropriations bill “relate[] to funding the operations of programs, agencies, and matters described elsewhere in the bill.” ComTech Sys.,
{24} Our opinion in Sheward does not require a different result. In Sheward, we were unable to “carve out a primary subject by identifying and assembling what we believe to be key or core provisions of the bill at issue. Id. at 500. We noted that the bill combined “the wearing of seat belts with employment discrimination claims, class actions arising from the sale of securities with limitations on agency liability in actions against a hospital, recall notification with qualified immunity for athletic coaches, actions by a roller skater with supporting affidavits in a medical claim” all under the purported subject of “tort and other civil actions.” Id. at 499. We held the bill to be unconstitutional in its entirety only because severability was not an option. Id. at 501. Having easily determined the primary subject of H.B. 153, however, we need not consider that harsh result here. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the Tenth District‘s judgment regarding OCSEA‘s whole-bill challenge and its remand for an evidentiary hearing.
{25} We turn now to OCSEA‘s specific challenge to H.B. 153‘s prison-privatization provisions to determine whether we should sever them from the bill.
ii. OCSEA‘s alternative challenge to the prison-privatization provisions
{26} In its amended complaint, OCSEA alleges that the prison-privatization provisions in
{27} To reach this conclusion, we look, first, to the prison-privatization provisions themselves, keeping in mind the primary subject of H.B. 153—balancing state expenditures against state revenues to ensure continued operation of state programs.
{28} H.B. 153 maintained the provision for prison operation and management that allows private companies to contract with public entities to privately operate and manage state-owned prison facilities.
{29} In order to enter into a contract with a public entity to operate and manage a state correctional institution, a private company is subject to a host of requirements. In particular, it must demonstrate that it will save the public entity 5 percent over the projected cost to the public entity of providing the statutorily required services.
{30} Beyond cost savings, the criteria and requirements applicable to contractors ensure the continued operation of the corrections facilities. For example, a contractor must convincingly demonstrate that it can operate the facility with the inmate capacity required by the public entity and provide required services.
{31} As an additional means of addressing budgetary concerns in H.B. 153, the General Assembly offered for sale five of Ohio‘s corrections facilities in connection with contracts for the operation and management of those facilities. H.B. 153, section 753.10(C)(1) and (2), (D)(1) and (2), (E)(1) and (2), (F)(1) and (2), and (G)(1) and (2). The sale provisions encompass the cost savings already noted and also provide for revenue generation. Proceeds from the prison sales must “be deposited into the state treasury to the credit of the Adult and Juvenile Correctional Facilities Bond Retirement Fund and shall be used to redeem or defease bonds in accordance with [
{32} Additionally,
{33} In short, the prison-sale provisions are rationally related to budgeting for the operation of the state government. Like the tax in ComTech Sys., the prison-sale provisions were intended to generate revenue. The General Assembly‘s decision to combine the prison-sale provisions with the other measures in H.B. 153 was reasonable.
{34} That conclusion is consistent with prior cases in which we have rejected one-subject challenges to appropriations bills. See ComTech Sys. (appropriations bill could levy new sales tax on automatic data processing and computer services that would fund other government operations described in the bill); Dix, 11 Ohio St.3d at 146, 464 N.E.2d 153 (no one-subject violation where challenged provision related to funding the operation of programs, agencies, and matters described elsewhere in the bill). The prison-privatization provisions in H.B. 153 provide for decreased expenditures by public entities and provide means for revenue generation that can fund the operation of other programs and matters described in the bill. For these reasons, we conclude that OCSEA‘s complaint failed to state a one-subject-rule claim on which relief could be granted. Nor is there a conceivable set of facts upon which OCSEA could recover. We accordingly reverse the Tenth District‘s contrary judgment.
{35} Having resolved the state respondents’ propositions of law, we turn to the propositions of law OCSEA raises in its cross-appeal.
B. The Constitutional Prohibition against Joinder of Property Rights
{36} OCSEA‘s first proposition of law concerns an aspect of the state‘s sale of the Lake Erie facility to Corrections Corporation in 2011. OCSEA challenges the state‘s agreement in its contract to pay a $3.8 million annual ownership fee (“the fee“) to Corrections Corporation. OCSEA characterizes the fee as a subsidy that compensates Corrections Corporation for its ownership expenses, and it argues that the fee violates
{37}
The credit of the state shall not, in any manner, be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual association or corporation whatever; nor shall the state ever hereafter become a joint owner, or stockholder, in any company or association, in this state, or elsewhere, formed for any purpose whatever.
{38} Our disposition of this issue turns on technical pleading requirements and OCSEA‘s related tactical choices in the courts below. In its amended complaint, OCSEA broadly alleged that the contract for the sale of Lake Erie Correctional Facility made the state “a joint owner, created an ‘individual association’ and/or mixed [the state‘s] property rights with the rights of [Corrections Corporation] to such an extent that the result violates the prohibition in Section 4, Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution.” OCSEA‘s proposition of law in this court, however, whittles its
{39} Exhibit 1 to the amended complaint includes a copy of a document entitled “Attachment Seven Cost Summary Form,” which OCSEA alleged is part of the contract with Corrections Corporation. The cost summary includes in its “Description of Cost” an “Annual Ownership Fee (AOF) per Contract requirements, in annual dollars: $3,800,000.00.” But the bald assertion that the fee—not described in greater detail elsewhere in the complaint—amounts to an unconstitu-
{40} The absence of information in the record regarding the fee stems from OCSEA‘s own litigation strategy. It elected not to attach to its amended complaint a copy of the contract governing Corrections Corporation‘s purchase and subsequent operation and management of Lake Erie Correctional Facility or the request for proposal that was incorporated into the contract. And OCSEA objected when Corrections Corporation attempted to supplement the record in the Tenth District with parts of those documents because they were not part of the record in the trial court. See Morgan v. Eads, 104 Ohio St.3d 142, 2004-Ohio-6110, 818 N.E.2d 1157, ¶ 13 (“a bedrock principle of appellate practice in Ohio is that an appeals court is limited to the record of the proceedings at trial“). OCSEA‘s decision not to attach the contract to its amended complaint precluded both the trial court and the Tenth District from considering the provisions of that contract, including provisions regarding the fee. OCSEA cannot now profit from a hole it left—and fought to maintain—in the record. Although Corrections Corporation and OCSEA cite the materials that Corrections Corporation unsuccessfully attempted to introduce at the court of appeals, we may not consider materials that were not before the trial court and that the Tenth District explicitly declined to consider. Id. at ¶ 13; 2013-Ohio-4505, 2 N.E.3d 304, at ¶ 50.
{41} In an effort to save its claim that the fee is unconstitutional, OCSEA argues that record evidence is always required to evaluate an as-applied constitutional challenge. In support, OCSEA cites the same cases it relied on in the Tenth District: Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E.2d 629 (1944), paragraphs four and six of the syllabus; and Cleveland Gear Co. v. Limbach, 35 Ohio St.3d 229, 232, 520 N.E.2d 188 (1988). Those precedents support the assertion that the merits of an as-applied challenge can be disposed of only with evidence. We reject, however, OCSEA‘s implicit contention that no as-applied challenge is ever subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. With respect to its claim here, the amended complaint alleges only the bare legal conclusion that the fee constitutes a subsidy that violates
{42} In its brief, OCSEA claims that “[t]he State has promised to pay [Corrections Corporation] more in [fee] payments ($3,800,000/yr × 21years =
{43} The amended complaint contains no allegations of fact that, even if presumed to be true, support the conclusion that the fee is a subsidy or that payment of the fee constitutes an as-applied violation of
{44} We now turn to the final issue before us: did the court of common pleas lack jurisdiction to consider OCSEA‘s claim under
C. Common Pleas Jurisdiction over R.C. 4117.01(C) Claim
{45} OCSEA‘s second proposition of law challenges the Tenth District‘s holding that SERB has exclusive jurisdiction over OCSEA‘s alternative claim, premised on
{46} In its brief, OCSEA broadly argues that employees who work in prisons operated by private contractors pursuant to contract with the state are public employees. But in determining the jurisdictional question presented, we first examine the specific declaratory-judgment claim that OCSEA pled in its amended
{47} The alleged impact on and harm to the plaintiffs from the privatization of the North Central Correctional Complex and the Lake Erie Correctional Facility inform the nature of OCSEA‘s declaratory-judgment claim. The amended complaint alleged that the union lost approximately 273 members, along with the dues and fair-share fee payments that they would have been required to contribute, for an annual loss of at least $145,000. It also alleged that the individual employee-plaintiffs who lost their jobs were wrongfully excluded from their employment and incurred losses as a result. Although most of the individual employee-plaintiffs transferred to new positions in other state facilities, those positions were often located at longer distances from their homes, and they lost institutional seniority under the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA“). The loss of seniority affected employees’ jobs, days off, hours, and shifts. Several individuals alleged that they transferred to other state institutions rather than seeking or accepting employment with MTC or Corrections Corporation so that they could continue participation in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System without also having to contribute to social security. Of all the employees named in the complaint, only one ended up working for MTC. As a result, she was no longer classified as a public employee and lost her accumulated sick leave, her right to continued participation in the State Teachers Retirement System, and the job security provided by the CBA.
{48} OCSEA‘s amended complaint first requested a declaration that “individuals currently working in North Central Correctional Complex are public employees as defined in
{49} We first reject OCSEA‘s reliance on
{50} OCSEA‘s remaining argument in support of the trial court‘s jurisdiction challenges the Tenth District‘s reliance on Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn., 59 Ohio St.3d at 169, 572 N.E.2d 87. OCSEA argues that courts, including the Tenth District here, have read Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. too broadly to afford SERB greater exclusive jurisdiction than the General Assembly has prescribed by statute.
{51} SERB is a state agency created by
{52} When the General Assembly intends to vest an administrative agency with exclusive jurisdiction, it does so by appropriate statutory language. State ex rel. Banc One Corp. v. Walker, 86 Ohio St.3d 169, 171–172, 712 N.E.2d 742 (1999). Nowhere in
{53} Consistent with the general rule that agencies created by statute have such jurisdiction as the General Assembly confers, SERB “has exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters committed to it pursuant to
{54} The principles announced in Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. are not so broad as to place all claims that touch on
{55} The state respondents cite a more recent case—Sutula, 127 Ohio St.3d 131, 2010-Ohio-5039, 937 N.E.2d 88—for the proposition that SERB has broad
{56} The central question in Sutula was whether the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the union‘s action for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at ¶ 13–14. We reiterated that SERB “has exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters committed to it pursuant to
{57} In support of their position that SERB has exclusive jurisdiction over
{58} The dispositive question here, therefore, is whether OCSEA‘s claim that individuals employed at North Central Correctional Complex are public employees under
{59} This court considered an issue regarding status as a public employer under
{60} In Ohio Historical Soc. I, we affirmed the Tenth District‘s determination that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the
{61} The plaintiffs in Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. argued that a tentative, partial settlement agreement was invalid under
{62} The determination whether employees working at North Central Corrections Complex are public employees, as defined in
{63} To be clear, we do not suggest that SERB has exclusive, original jurisdiction over every claim touching upon
Conclusion
{64} H.B. 153 does not violate the one-subject rule in its entirety. Nor do the prison-privatization provisions of that bill violate the one-subject rule. Accordingly, we reverse the Tenth District‘s judgment on those claims. Next, because the amended complaint‘s thinly pleaded allegations do not include sufficient facts to state a claim that the fee under the Corrections Corporation contract violates the constitutional ban on the joinder of public and private property rights in
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
O‘NEILL J., dissents, with an opinion joined by PFEIFER, J.
{65} I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority regarding the jurisdiction of the common pleas court to decide whether the employees of the prison are public employees and therefore entitled to all of the rights and privileges afforded to public employees. The Franklin County Common Pleas Court has jurisdiction to decide whether employees of private companies that operate prisons pursuant to contract with the state are public employees as defined under
{66} The majority‘s opinion gives the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB“) greater exclusive jurisdiction than prescribed by statute.
{67} While the majority relies on this court‘s decision in Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9, 59 Ohio St.3d 167, 572 N.E.2d 87 (1991), for the proposition that who is a “public employer” is a question that must be determined under
{68} Under the circumstances presented in this case, a declaratory-judgment action is an appropriate vehicle to determine whether the employees of Management & Training Corporation and Corrections Corporation of America are public employees as defined in
{69} And the use of a declaratory-judgment action in cases like this is consistent with our authority and precedent. We have held that a declaratory judgment is not appropriate when another equally serviceable remedy is available. Swander Ditch Landowners’ Assn. v. Joint Bd. of Huron & Seneca Cty. Commrs., 51 Ohio St.3d 131, 135, 554 N.E.2d 1324 (1990). But an administrative remedy is not as serviceable as a declaratory judgment when administrative practice would involve substantial expense that the declaratory-judgment action would not. Burt Realty Corp. v. Columbus, 21 Ohio St.2d 265, 257 N.E.2d 355 (1970), paragraph one of the syllabus. This is such a case.
{70} Here, a statewide union, the Ohio Civil Service Employees Association (“OCSEA“), is already in place. OCSEA claims that after their status is determined, Management & Training Corporation and Corrections Corporation‘s employees either will or will not be entitled to representation by OCSEA and the benefits of the applicable collective-bargaining agreement. On these bases, OCSEA contends that a declaration that the prison employees either are or are not public employees will resolve the claim in its entirety. Under these circumstances, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction to hear OCSEA‘s declaratory-judgment action to determine whether the individuals employed by Management & Training Corporation and Corrections Corporation are public employees as defined by
{71} Accordingly, I must dissent.
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
James E. Melle, for appellees and cross-appellants, Ohio Civil Service Employees Association, David Combs, Clair Crawford, Lori Leach Douce, Margo Hall, Sheila Herron, Daniel Karcher, Rebecca Sayers, Angela Schuster, Troy Tackett, Kathy Tinker, Lisa Zimmerman, and ProgressOhio.org.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, for appellants and cross-appellees state of Ohio, Governor John R. Kasich, Attorney General Michael DeWine, Secretary of State Jon Husted, Auditor of State David Yost, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and its director, Gary C. Mohr, Ohio Department of Administrative Services and its director, Robert Blair, Treasurer Josh Mandel, and the Office of Budget and Management and its director, Timothy S. Keen.
Sutter O‘Connell, Adam Martin, and Kevin W. Kita, for appellant and cross-appellee Management & Training Corporation.
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL–CIO, and Nicholas A. Serrano, urging affirmance in part and reversal in part for amicus curiae AFSCME International.
Buckley King, L.P.A., Robert J. Walter, Thomas I. Blackburn, and Diem N. Kaelber, urging affirmance in part and reversal in part for amici curiae Ohio Association of Public School Employees/AFSCME Local 4, AFL–CIO, Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio, Inc., and American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Ohio Council 8.