Star Merchandise, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher J. Haehn d.b.a. Let Me Ride, LLC, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16AP-39
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
December 6, 2016
[Cite as Star Merchandise, L.L.C. v. Haehn, 2016-Ohio-8018.]
SADLER, J.
(C.P.C. No. 14CVH-8192) (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on December 6, 2016
On brief: Isaac Wiles Burkholder & Teetor, LLC, and Dale D. Cook, for appellee. Argued: Dale D. Cook.
On brief: The Law Offices of Robert C. Wood, and Robert C. Wood, for appellants.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
SADLER, J.
{1} Defendant-appellant, Christopher J. Haehn, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Star Merchandise, LLC. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.1
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{2} On August 6, 2014, appellee filed a complaint against “Christopher J. Haehn DBA Let Me Ride, LLC” alleging breach of a sales contract. (Compl. at 1.) The complaint
{3} On November 24, 2014, appellant filed an answer to the complaint and a counterclaim on behalf of Let Me Ride, LLC. The counterclaim alleges that Let Me Ride, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company and asserts claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. More particularly, the counterclaim alleges that appellee breached the parties’ contract by “fail[ing] to pay the purchase prices required under the Master Agreement.” (Countercl. at ¶ 4.) In the alternative, the counterclaim alleges that appellee promised to pay certain sums for the vehicles and that Let Me Ride, LLC relied on appellee‘s promise to its detriment.
{4} On December 24, 2014, appellee moved the trial court for leave to amend the complaint in order to assert “additional claims which are governed by similar questions of fact and law to those included in the original Complaint.” (Mot. For Leave at 3.) Appellee submitted a proposed amended complaint asserting additional claims for relief sounding in unjust enrichment, fraud, conversion, and an action on an account. Appellant did not oppose the motion for leave. The trial court granted the motion for leave on January 15, 2015.
{5} On January 29, 2015, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, pursuant to
{6} Appellee filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, pursuant to
{7} Appellee submitted a proposed final judgment entry pursuant to Local Rule 25.01 of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. On May 26, 2015, the court signed the “Final Judgment Entry” rendering judgment in favor of appellee and against appellant individually “in the amount of $96,655.00 plus costs and interest at the rate of 3% from January 29, 2013.” (May 26, 2015 Entry at 1.) The judgment entry further provides: “Defendant[‘]s Counterclaim is Dismissed With Prejudice.” (May 26, 2015 Entry at 1.) The trial court‘s May 26, 2015 final judgment entry specifies that the trial court signed the judgment entry over appellant‘s objection.
{8} Appellant did not file an appeal to this court from the May 26, 2015 judgment. Rather, on June 25, 2015, appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
{9} On October 23, 2015, the magistrate issued a decision and recommendation denying appellant‘s motion for relief from judgment. Appellant timely filed an objection to the magistrate‘s decision. On December 17, 2015, the trial court issued a decision and judgment entry overruling appellant‘s objections and denying appellant‘s motion for relief from judgment. Appellant timely appealed to this court from the decision of the trial court.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{10} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:
- In disposing of the Appellee‘s cross-motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court erred in signing a final entry that awards judgment against Christopher J. Haehn, personally, instead of Let Me Ride, LLC, where, as here, Appellants asserted as affirmative defenses that Christopher J. Haehn is not a proper party to the action, and that Let Me Ride, LLC, is a validly formed limited liability company.
- In disposing of the Appellee‘s cross-motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court erred in signing a final entry which dismisses the counterclaims of Appellants where, as here, the
Appellee did not move for Summary Judgment as to the counterclaims pursuant to Civ. R. 56(A) . - In disposing of the Appellee‘s cross-motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court erred in signing a final entry which dismisses the counterclaims of Appellants where, as here, the Appelle [sic] did not submit and the trial court did not consider any
Civ. R. 56(C) evidence regarding the counterclaims. - The trial court erred in adopting the magistrate‘s decision denying the Appellants’ Motion to Vacate the Final Judgment Entry and in overruling the Appellants’ Objections to the magistrate‘s decision.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{11} A court of appeals applies an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court‘s decision to correct clerical mistakes under
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. First, Second, and Third Assignments of Error
{12} In appellant‘s first, second, and third assignments of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment and in dismissing his counterclaim with prejudice. Thus, appellant‘s first three assignments of error pertain exclusively to the merits of the trial court‘s May 26, 2015
{13} “The Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure specify the means for perfecting an appeal from an adverse judgment.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Robledo, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-278, 2014-Ohio-1185, ¶ 11.
{14} The only judgment appealed from in this case is the trial court‘s December 17, 2015 judgment overruling appellant‘s objections to the magistrate‘s decision and denying appellant‘s motion for relief from judgment. Because appellant did not timely appeal to this court from the trial court‘s May 26, 2015 final judgment entry, this court does not have jurisdiction to address appellant‘s first, second, and third assignments of error. Colvin v. Abbey‘s Restaurant, Inc., 85 Ohio St.3d 535 (1999) (court of appeals exceeded its allowable appellate jurisdiction in ruling on assignments of error that were unrelated to the order appealed from and, therefore, not properly before the court).2
{15} For the foregoing reasons, appellant‘s first, second, and third assignments of error are overruled.
B. Fourth Assignment of Error
{16} In appellant‘s fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it overruled his objections to the magistrate‘s decision and denied his motion for relief from judgment brought pursuant to
{17} Appellant moved the trial court for relief from the final judgment entry issued on May 26, 2015 pursuant to
(A) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
{18} ”
{19} In discussing the type of mistake covered by
[T]he basic distinction between clerical mistakes that can be corrected under
Civ.R. 60(A) and substantive mistakes that cannot be corrected is that the former consists of “blunders in execution” whereas the latter consists of instances where the court changes its mind, either because it made a legal or factual mistake in making its original determination, or because, on second thought, it has decided to exercise its discretion in a different manner.
Wardeh v. Altabchi, 158 Ohio App.3d 325, 2004-Ohio-4423, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.), quoting Kuehn v. Kuehn, 55 Ohio App.3d 245, 247 (12th Dist.1988).
{20} Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion for relief from judgment because the final judgment entry issued May 26, 2015 contains a clerical error with regard to the dismissal of the counterclaim with prejudice. More particularly, appellant contends that because the trial court‘s April 14, 2015 decision does not expressly mention the counterclaim, the trial court committed a clerical error when it dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice in the final judgment entry issued May 26, 2015. Appellant also contends that the trial court‘s entry of judgment against him individually was the result of a clerical error inasmuch as he presented evidence that Let Me Ride, LLC is a limited liability company.
{21} In Dokari Invests., LLC v. DFG2, LLC, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-664, 2009-Ohio-1048, Ohio Valley Bank filed a foreclosure action naming as defendants DFG2, LLC, Donald F. Green, and appellant, who had signed a personal guaranty for the debt secured by the mortgage. The trial court granted the bank‘s motion for summary judgment and signed the proposed decree of foreclosure submitted by the bank. The decree included language granting judgment jointly and severally against DFG2, Green, and appellant. The final entry confirming the sale of the property and ordering distribution of the proceeds of the sale also included language granting a deficiency judgment against appellant. Appellant filed a motion seeking relief from judgment, pursuant to
{22} The trial court denied appellant‘s motion for relief from judgment, and appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. This court held that the error alleged by
A clerical error for purposes of
Civ.R. 60(A) means the type of error identified with mistakes in transcription, alteration or omission of any papers and documents which are traditionally or customarily handled or controlled by clerks but which papers or documents may be handled by others.Appellant argues that the trial court‘s signing of a judgment entry granting judgment against him individually when Ohio Valley Bank‘s motion for summary judgment had not sought summary judgment against him constitutes a clerical error of the sort
Civ.R. 60(A) was intended to address. We disagree. The decision whether a submitted entry accurately reflects a decision rendered by the court involves the exercise of discretion by the trial court, and therefore is not subject to correction underCiv.R. 60(A) . Therefore, the trial court did not err when it denied appellant‘s motion for summary judgment pursuant toCiv.R. 60(A) .
(Emphasis added.) (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 15-16.
{23} Here, as was the case in Dokari, appellant argues that the proposed entry signed by the trial court contains a clerical error because appellee did not move for judgment on the counterclaim and because the trial court entered judgment against him individually. The record in this case shows that the trial court was aware of appellant‘s objection to the proposed entry. Under Dokari, the trial court‘s decision whether the judgment entry submitted by appellee accurately reflected the decision rendered on April 14, 2015, involved the exercise of discretion by the trial court. As a result, the May 26, 2015 judgment entry is not subject to correction under
{24} In Scolaro, the Ninth District Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of this court in Dokari in holding that the trial court committed reversible error by making a substantive change to a judgment entry. In that case, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the lender in a foreclosure action. The trial court signed a judgment entry submitted by the bank wherein it was incorrectly stated that the borrower had failed to respond to the bank‘s motion for summary judgment. The record showed that the defendant had filed both a response and a cross-motion for summary judgment. After issuing the judgment entry, the trial court attempted to correct the error by treating it as a
{25} Under Dokari and Scolaro, we find the trial court‘s determination that the proposed final judgment entry submitted by appellee accurately reflected the decision rendered by the court on June 25, 2015 involved the exercise of discretion by the court. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred when it dismissed appellant‘s counterclaim and entered judgment against appellant individually, such an error is substantive in nature and not subject to correction under
{26} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant‘s
2. Civ. R. 60(B)
{27}
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(B) ; (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
{28} To prevail under
a. Civ.R. 60(B)(1)
{29} Appellant argues that he is entitled to relief from the trial court‘s final judgment entry under
{30} This court has consistently held that the “mistake” contemplated by
{31} Here, the mistakes alleged by appellant are errors by the trial court in entering judgment, not mistakes by a party or a party‘s agent. Under the established case law,
{32} ” ’
{33} Relief, pursuant to
{34} Appellant argues the trial court‘s error in sua sponte dismissing his counterclaim and entering judgment against appellant individually are the types of extraordinary circumstances that justify relief under
{35} In this instance, any error on the part of the trial court with regard to the decision to sua sponte dismiss appellant‘s counterclaim and enter judgment against appellant individually could have been raised by appellant and addressed by this court in a timely appeal from the trial court‘s final judgment entry of May 26, 2015. Appellant may not use a motion for relief from judgment as a substitute for a timely appeal to this court. Accordingly, this court is without jurisdiction to address the trial court‘s decision to sua sponte dismiss the counterclaim due to appellant‘s failure to timely appeal to this court from the trial court‘s May 26, 2015 judgment entry.
{36} For the foregoing reasons, appellant‘s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
V. CONCLUSION
{37} Having overruled appellant‘s four assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
BROWN and HORTON, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.