COLVIN ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. ABBEY‘S RESTAURANT, INC.; HARTVILLE PANTRY, INC., APPELLEE.
No. 98-469
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Decided June 2, 1999
85 Ohio St.3d 535 | 1999-Ohio-286
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
Submitted March 9, 1999. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, Nos. 18196 and 18197.
- When a jury‘s answers to interrogatories are inconsistent with a general verdict reached by the jury, the trial court must choose among the three options set forth in
Civ.R. 49(B) : (1) enter judgment in accordance with the interrogatory answers, (2) return the jury for further consideration of the interrogatories and the general verdict, or (3) order a new trial. The choice of one of the three options lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. - Pursuant to
Civ.R. 49(B) andR.C. 2505.02 , when a trial court sua sponte orders a new trial because a jury‘s answers to interrogatories are inconsistent with the jury‘s general verdict, the reviewing court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider only the propriety of the trial court‘s new-trial order.
Scanlon & Gearinger Co., L.P.A., Timothy F. Scanlon and Michael J. O‘Neil, for appellants Georgiana M. Colvin et al.
Scanlon & Co., L.P.A., Lawrence J. Scanlon and Richard Steinle, for Sarah Romano
Day, Ketterer, Raley, Wright & Rybolt, Ltd., John A. Murphy, Jr., and W. Bradford Longbrake, for appellee Hartville Pantry, Inc.
{¶ 3} When the case was submitted to the jury after the presentation of evidence, the jury was given several general verdict forms to specify its determination of the liability of each defendant vis-à-vis each plaintiff, and its determination of damages, if liability was found. The jury was also given interrogatories to answer to clarify the verdict forms. Several of the interrogatories concerned the question of whether Perkovich was acting within the scope of his employment with Hartville Pantry at the time of the accident.
{¶ 4} The parties agree that the jury found, inter alia, that Perkovich was liable for a total of more than $2,000,000 in compensatory damages, and for punitive damages and attorney fees. Included in that amount were damages to be paid to some plaintiffs who are not parties to this appeal. Based on the jury‘s damage awards against Perkovich, the trial court filed a partial judgment entry to enter judgment on all verdicts against Perkovich.
{¶ 5} However, although the jury also returned general verdicts finding Hartville Pantry liable for a total of $11,000 in compensatory damages and for punitive damages, the trial court declined to enter judgment on those jury verdicts. The trial court found that the jury‘s general verdicts regarding the liability of
{¶ 6} In addition, the trial court reasoned that, because the asserted liability of Hartville Pantry was vicarious in nature, the jury verdicts finding Hartville Pantry liable should have been in the same amount as the verdicts finding Perkovich liable to comply with the principles of vicarious liability, if the jury had meant to hold Hartville Pantry liable. The trial court found that the jury lost its way, due in part to erroneous jury instructions that had confused the jury, and ordered a new trial between the plaintiffs and Hartville Pantry.
{¶ 7} Hartville Pantry appealed the order of a new trial to the Court of Appeals for Summit County, raising assignments of error challenging various trial court rulings throughout the course of the trial as well as other alleged errors. Some of Hartville Pantry‘s contentions were that the trial court erred in not granting Hartville Pantry‘s motion for summary judgment and two motions for a directed verdict. Plaintiffs argued as a threshold matter that the sole issue to be properly decided by the court of appeals at that time was whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial, and that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider any other issue because there was no final judgment from which to take an appeal.
{¶ 8} The court of appeals first held that its jurisdiction was not limited to considering only whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. The court of appeals proceeded to focus on the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying Hartville Pantry‘s two motions for a directed verdict, and specifically concluded that the denials of the motions were final appealable orders in the situation before it. After determining that Perkovich was not acting within the course and scope of his employment as a matter of law based upon the facts
{¶ 9} The dissenter at the court of appeals believed that only the trial court‘s decision to grant a new trial was a final appealable order, and therefore would have held that the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to address the various other assignments of error unrelated to the new-trial decision. Moreover, the dissenter would have upheld the trial court decision to grant a new trial between the plaintiffs and Hartville Pantry.
{¶ 10} This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
{¶ 11} The principal issue presented is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to address Hartville Pantry‘s assignments of error that were unrelated to the trial court‘s decision to grant a new trial. In other words, when a trial court orders a new trial pursuant to the specific terms of
{¶ 12} For the reasons that follow, we determine that the court of appeals exceeded its allowable appellate jurisdiction in ruling on Hartville Pantry‘s additional assignments of error that were unrelated to the new-trial order. We further determine that the sole issue properly before the court of appeals was whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the new trial pursuant to
{¶ 13}
“When the general verdict and the answers are consistent, the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to
Rule 58 . When one or more of the answers is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant toRule 58 in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial.”
{¶ 14} The parties agree with the trial judge‘s conclusion that the answers to the relevant interrogatories are inconsistent with the general verdicts reached by the jury against Hartville Pantry. In Tasin v. SIFCO Industries, Inc. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 102, 553 N.E.2d 257, paragraph one of the syllabus, this court held, “Where a jury‘s answers to one or more special interrogatories are irreconcilable with the general verdict, the choice of whether to enter judgment in accord with the
{¶ 15} The specific issue raised by this case concerns the jurisdiction of the court of appeals to review alleged errors that occurred during the course of the trial when a trial court has ordered a new trial pursuant to
{¶ 16} It is now well settled, although the issue was in dispute at one time, that the granting of a motion for a new trial is a final appealable order under
{¶ 18} However, the way that the trial court ordered a new trial is a very significant factor when we consider the extent of the court of appeals’ jurisdiction under
{¶ 19} Because the trial court never entered a final judgment on the jury‘s verdict (or on the interrogatory answers) before ordering a new trial pursuant to
{¶ 21} In light of the foregoing specific considerations, we hold that pursuant to
{¶ 22} Based upon the consideration that this case specifically involves a new-trial order pursuant to
{¶ 23} Having determined that the only inquiry to be undertaken on appeal from the trial court‘s new-trial order is the propriety of the order itself, we must ask whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial pursuant to
{¶ 24} Prior to ordering the new trial, the trial court first considered whether to enter judgment on the interrogatory answers, the first option detailed in
{¶ 25} Based on what transpired in this case, the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion. The court weighed the options presented by
{¶ 26} For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and vacate the conclusions reached by a majority of that court. We reinstate the trial court‘s order of a new trial pursuant to
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.