IN RE: J.W.
C.A. No. 26874
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
October 2, 2013
[Cite as In re J.W., 2013-Ohio-4368.]
HENSAL, Judge.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE Nоs. DN 10-02-0092 DN 10-02-0093 DN 10-02-0094
HENSAL, Judge.
{1} Appellant, April W. (“Mother“), appeals from a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that denied her motion to vacate the November 2011 judgment that terminated her parental rights. This Court affirms.
I.
{2} Mother is the natural mother of three minor children, each with the initials J.W., who now range in age from 10 to 14 years old. Pursuant to dependency and neglect complaints filed by Summit County Children Services Board (“CSB“) on February 22, 2010, the children were removed from Mother‘s custody. The trial court later adjudicated them neglected and dependent children, based on Mother‘s stipulation that she had serious, untreated psychiatric problems and had not been providing for the basic needs of her children. CSB‘s history with this family dates back to 2005, when the children were removed from Mother‘s custody for more
{3} CSB ultimately moved for permanent custody of all three children and the matter proceeded to a hearing on that motion. On November 30, 2011, the trial found that the children had been in the temporary custody of CSB for more than 12 of the prior 22 months and that permanent custody was in their best interests and, consequently, tеrminated Mother‘s parental rights. See
{4} On February 26, 2013, Mother moved to vacate the permanent custody decision under
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED WITHOUT [A] HEARING [MOTHER‘S] TIMELY MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT BECAUSE SHE HAD STANDING TO BRING THE MOTION AND SHE PRESENTED FACTS ESTABLISHING A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
{5} Mother argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant her motion to vacate the 2011 permanent custody judgment. We begin by emphasizing that Mother sought to vacate the judgment pursuant to
Juvenile Court‘s Continuing Jurisdiction
{6} In cases involving disputes over the custody of children, because the state‘s interest in overseeing the best interest of the children does not end when the court designates a custodian for the child, the trial court‘s jurisdiction continues. Post-judgment, continuing jurisdiction exists in other types of juvenile and domestic relations court cases. See, e.g.,
{7} After the juvenile court issues a permanent custody order under
{8} The trial court‘s post-judgment jurisdiction continued solely over the children and the agency to monitor the well-being of the children, the suitability of their placements, and the agency‘s efforts to facilitate their adoption. The trial court is required to review those issues at least every 12 months until the children are adopted or the сourt terminates the custody arrangement.
{9} At the review hearings, all who have retained their ongoing status as parties are summoned to appear and are given the opportunity to testify and present evidence.
{10} In other words, the juvenile сourt‘s continuing jurisdiction in this case pertains solely to the children‘s well-being, custody, and the plan for finding them a permanent home. The ongoing proceedings are separate and distinct from the pre-judgment proceedings involving Mother, because she has been divested of “all parental rights” and CSB has assumed the legal status of the children‘s parent figure until another parent assumes that role. Seе
Mother‘s Standing under Civ.R. 60(B)
{11} Mother was no longer a party in the ongoing, post-judgment proceedings in juvenile court, and lacked standing to participate in the proceedings pertaining to the post-judgment placement and well-being of her children. Based on her lack of standing in the ongoing proceedings, CSB argues that she also lacked standing to seek relief from the judgment pursuant to
{12} The relief provided by
{13} Because
{14} Although this Court has not previously addressed this issue directly, it has repeatedly recognized that a parent whose rights have been terminated has standing to challenge thе permanent custody judgment pursuant to
{15} Although
{16} By the explicit terms of
Civ.R. 60(B) Merits
{17} Next, we turn to the merits of Mother‘s argument that the trial court erred in denying her
{18} To prevail on a
{19}
- mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
- newly discovered evidence * * * ;
- fraud * * * or other misconduct of an adverse party;
- the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged * * * or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
- any other reason justifying relief[.]
{20} Mother alleged that she had grounds for relief under
Civ.R. 60(B)(4)
{21} Mother first asserts that she stated grounds under the last phrase of
{22} Mother alleged that, because the children had not been adopted and she has stabilized her mental health through ongoing counseling, the judgment was no longer equitable in light of those changed circumstances.
{23} Although this Court found no Ohio case law that has directly explained the meaning of thе term “prospective application” in
{24} A judgment that has prospective or continued application is one that is “forward-looking,” such as a long-term injunction or consent decree, both of which “envision the regulation of future conduct.” Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, 560 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2009). Such judgments remain “executory [and/or] leave open for future adjudication any issues regarding the rights of the parties.” Id. As one federal district court summarized, “[p]rospective application * * * means that the judgment a party seeks to render ineffective: 1) compels a party to perform; 2) orders a party not to perform a future act; or 3) mandates court supervision of continuing interaction between the parties.” Villescas v. Abraham, 285 F.Supp.2d 1248, 1253 (D.Colo. 2003), citing Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133 (D.C.Cir. 1988).
{25} Permanent custody, by definition, fully divested Mother “of all parental rights, privileges, and obligations, including all residual rights and obligatiоns.”
{26} Mother further suggests that the 2011 permanent custody judgment had prospective application because she and the children continue to be bound by its terms, but that preclusive effect on the parties is something that is common to all judgments. “Virtually every court order causes at least some reverberations into the future, and has, in that literal sense, some prospective effect[.] That a court‘s action has continuing consequences, however, does not necessarily mean that it has prospective application for the purposes of [Federal] Rule 60(b)(5).” Maraziti v. Thorpe, 52 F.3d 252, 254 (9th Cir. 1995), quoting Twelve John Does, 841 F.2d at 1138. “If this were enough to satisfy [the] threshold requirement, then the Rule‘s requirement of ‘prospective application’ would be meaningless.” Coltec Industries, Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).
{27} Because the trial court‘s permanent сustody judgment left nothing unsettled between the parties or open to future adjudication or enforcement, it had no “prospective application.” Consequently, Mother did not raise a ground for relief under
Civ.R. 60(B)(5)
{28} Alternatively, Mother argues that she set forth grounds to vacate the permanent custody judgment under
{29} Although the language of this so-called catch-all provision is broad, and reflects “the inherent power of a court to relieve a person from the unjust oрeration of a judgment,” the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the grounds for invoking relief under this provision must be
{30} For example, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that “fraud upon the court” falls within the realm of
{31} Mother has not demonstrated that such extraordinary or unusual facts exist in this case. Although the circumstances of the parties have changed in a way that may not have been expected at the time of judgment, those changes have no bearing on the legal soundness of the trial court‘s original decision made under the facts at that time. Facts and circumstаnces of the children and the parents will often change in ways that are not specifically anticipated at the time of permanent custody decision. The purpose of
{32} In an analogous situation, Mother would state no ground for relief under
{33} Because Mother failed to set forth operative facts that she had grounds for relief from the permanent custody judgment under either
III.
{34} Mother‘s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the рarties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J. CONCURS.
BELFANCE, P. J. CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
{35} I agree that Mother‘s assignment of error should be overruled. Mother has suggested that the trial court prematurely ruled on the matter because it issued a decision prior to the submission of Mother‘s reply brief. Mother has not fully developed this argument nor explained how this constitutes prejudicial error. In addition, I agree thаt the trial court did not err in concluding that Mother failed to demonstrate her entitlement to relief under
APPEARANCES:
WILLIAM T. WHITAKER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.