DR. BONNIE SPEARMAN, Plaintiff v. MARCEL LAKE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION; FRANK CAROZZA; GIL CLARK; RICHARD HANEL; TOM SCHWENZER; JOAN SCULLIN; and NICKIE TOLERICO, Defendants
No. 3:24cv1825
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(Judge Munley) (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
JUL 11 2025
FILED SCRANTON PER JKC DEPUTY CLERK
Before the court is the report and recommendation (“R&R“) of Chief Magistrate Judge Daryl F. Bloom recommending that Plaintiff Bonnie Spearman‘s pro se second amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 22). Spearman has filed objections to the R&R, (Doc. 23), and those objections are ripe for disposition.
Background
Marcel Lake Estates is a private, gated community located in Dingmans Ferry, Pike County, Pennsylvania.1 (Doc. 13-1, Second Am. Compl. ¶ 16).
As alleged in her second amended complaint, Spearman was elected to the Association board of directors for a two-year term in September 2020. Id. ¶¶ 4, 16. Upon her election, Spearman entered into agreements with the Association, including a confidentiality agreement, a fiduciary responsibilities agreement, and a board meeting conduct agreement, in addition to any other agreements, regulations, or bylaws that governed her property ownership subject to the Association. See id. ¶ 58.
Spearman‘s tenure on the Association board did not go well. She asserts claims in this action against the Association and the six other Association board members for race discrimination and retaliation pursuant to
The other individual defendants possessed certain titles. For example, during the relevant time, Defendant Scullin was the director of environmental aesthetics. Id. ¶ 20. Defendant Nickie Tolerico was the pool director. Id. ¶ 22.
1. Issues with Spearman‘s Initial Assignment
Spearman alleges that she took a seat on the Association board while balancing a full-time work schedule. Id. ¶¶ 106, 162, 204. She soon ran into issues with the other board members. Arriving early to her first meeting, on October 20, 2020, she observed Defendant Tolerico complain to Defendant Carozza about the Association‘s pool construction project, which had become burdensome. Id. ¶¶ 81, 98-99. Defendant Carozza allegedly assured Tolerico that he would relieve Tolerico of her pool director responsibilities that evening. Id. ¶ 100.
Ultimately, however, Defendant Scullin agreed to allow Spearman to assist her with environmental aesthetics. Id. ¶ 111. “Environmental aesthetics” ostensibly means inspecting homes subject to the Association and determining whether their maintenance and/or appearance meets Association regulations. See id. ¶¶ 162-71. Nonetheless, before Spearman could ever assist the director of this department with property inspections, Defendant Scullin terminated the plaintiff from this position. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. Spearman alleges that Scullin terminated
2. Issues with Spearman‘s Subsequent Assignments
Defendant Tolerico apparently remained Association pool director despite expressing misgivings about that role. Id. ¶ 22. In January 2021, Spearman sent an email to the entire board, offering administrative assistance to Tolerico. Id. ¶ 22. Following the email, the assistant pool director at the time, Defendant Gil Clark, agreed to allow Spearman to serve in his place. Id. ¶ 23a. Defendant Carozza officially appointed plaintiff to the assistant pool director position at the following board meeting on January 19, 2021. Id. ¶ 23b.
Additionally, after the meeting, Defendant Richard Hanel approached Spearman in the parking lot, requesting assistance with obtaining ownership information for Marcel Lake. Id. ¶ 24. Spearman construed this request as a “casual favor” and not a formal request from the Association board vice-president. ¶ 27f. As alleged Hanel later stated that he approached Spearman because
In February 2021, Spearman failed to attend the board meeting due to a work emergency. Id. ¶¶ 26, 323. Spearman alleges that she advised Defendant Clark of her issue and Clark advised that he would let the rest of the Association board know about the emergency. Id. ¶ 27.
The following week, however, Defendant Carozza sent an email to Spearman accusing her of not accepting the positions that were offered to her. Id. ¶ 27. It is alleged that he also accused her of not completing the project given to her by Defendant Hanel. Id. ¶ 27c. Spearman responded, expressing to Carozza that she had been assigned the role of assistant pool director at the January board meeting and provided evidence that she had, in fact, finished Hanel‘s assignment that was requested of her as a “favor.” Id. ¶¶ 27a-d.
Per Spearman‘s second amended complaint, the March 2021 Association meeting was not pleasant. Defendant Carozza, preempted the meeting agenda to “mockingly” ask Spearman when she had been appointed to assistant pool director. Id. ¶¶ 28, 28a. Spearman alleges that she reminded Carozza a second time that he appointed her to the assistant pool director position at the January board meeting though the defendant denied that the conversation happened. Id. ¶ 28b.
Additionally, at the March meeting, Defendant Carozza again accused Spearman of not completing the assignment given to her by Defendant Hanel. Id. ¶ 28c. Spearman responded that she believed the assignment from Hanel to be more of a favor due to the nature and location of the request. Id. ¶ 28f. Spearman advised that she would not accept any further off-the-record requests. Id. ¶ 28j. Carozza allegedly retorted: “Fine! No one will say anything to you!” Id. ¶ 28k.
Spearman also alleges that, at the March 2021 meeting, Defendants Carozza and Hanel took turns insulting the plaintiff and accosted her “with stereotypical innuendos of not wanting to work or do anything,” which plaintiff believed implied that she “was lazy and had nefarious reasons for joining the board.” Id. ¶ 28l. Per Spearman, these comments perpetuated racial stereotypes. Id. ¶¶ 11, 36, 208. Spearman further alleges that the March 2021 meeting minutes were drafted as though no discord occurred at the meeting. Id. ¶ 28p-q. When Spearman attempted to correct these meeting minutes, Carozza rejected the plaintiff‘s corrections. Id. ¶ 28s.
According to Spearman, Defendant Carozza also reappointed the plaintiff to the position of assistant pool director at the March 2021 board meeting. Id. ¶ 28n.
Tolerico, however, requested that Spearman conduct in-person interviews for an open lifeguard position. Id. ¶ 31. Spearman agreed but requested to conduct the interviews virtually due to COVID-19 concerns and public health orders. Id. ¶ 31a. The office secretary, Kim Carozza, informed Spearman that the Association did not have a Zoom account and asked the plaintiff if she could use her personal phone to conduct the interviews. Id. ¶ 31b. Spearman believed that using her personal phone for Association interviews was improper and requested that the board create a Zoom account. Id. ¶ 31c. Tolerico denied this request and advised that she would prefer that in-person interviews be conducted. Id. ¶ 31d. Spearman then expressed her COVID-19 concerns surrounding in-person interviews. Id. ¶ 31e. Tolerico stated that she would conduct the interviews and asked Spearman to tend to pool issues during the day. Id. Spearman reminded Tolerico that she only offered “administrative assistance” due to her full-time work schedule and could not tend to board-related tasks during daytime hours. Id. ¶ 31f. By email, Tolerico then terminated Spearman from her position as assistant pool director without speaking to the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 32b. Tolerico‘s communication allegedly disparaged the plaintiff and “repeated...stereotypical innuendos about [p]laintiff not wanting to help[.]” Id. ¶ 32d.
3. The April 2021 Association Board Meeting
The next Association meeting occurred on April 15, 2021. Id. ¶ 32. Prior to the meeting, Spearman sent an email distributing COVID-19 mandates and requested to make a presentation on this issue when the board was called to order. Id. ¶ 32a. She also requested that copies of the mandates be made for distribution at the meeting. Id. Defendant Carozza denied these requests. Id.
Based on the tenor of the March 2021 Association board meeting, Spearman brought an escort to the April meeting, allegedly fearing violent actions from Defendant Carozza. Id. ¶ 28m. Plaintiff also wore a face covering to the meeting to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Id. ¶ 33a. At that meeting, however, the other board members refused to wear masks. Id. ¶¶ 33a, 33d. When Spearman expressed her concerns, Carozza told the plaintiff to leave if she was uncomfortable and shouted that he would not wear a mask. Id. ¶ 33b. Spearman then left the meeting. Id. ¶ 33d.
When the office secretary, Kim Carozza, distributed the minutes of the April board meeting in May 2021, they reflected that the Association board marked Spearman absent from that meeting. Id. ¶ 34a. Defendant Frank Carozza denied Spearman‘s request to be counted as present for the length of time that she attended
According to the second amended complaint, on July 24, 2021, Spearman filed a racial discrimination complaint against the Association with the Civil Rights Division of the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (“OAG“).3 Id. ¶ 41. On July 29, 2021, the OAG confirmed receipt and forwarded the complaint to the Association for voluntary mediation. Id. On August 9, 2021, the OAG closed the case, stating that it could not compel the Association to agree to voluntary mediation. Id. ¶ 44. On the same day, defendants removed Spearman from her position on the board. Id. ¶ 45. Per the termination letter from Defendant Carozza, the Association board determined that Spearman had violated Association bylaws. (Doc. 13-3, Exh. 4, ECF p. 4). Those bylaws declare that any Association board member who is absent “without good cause or reason” from
On September 9, 2021, Spearman filed a Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC“) complaint against the Association. Id. ¶ 46. The PHRC closed the case on September 29, 2022, after the agency concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. (Doc. 13-3, Second Am. Compl. Ex. 6 at ECF p. 7).
On October 4, 2024, Spearman filed a complaint in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas against the Association, raising claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII“) and the PHRA. (Doc. 1-2). The Association removed the case to federal court. (Doc. 1). Spearman then filed two amended complaints in response to motions to dismiss. Plaintiff‘s operative pleading replaces her initial Title VII claims with claims asserted under Section 1981. (Doc. 13-1). The second amended complaint advances seventeen (17) counts
Thereafter, the defendants again moved to dismiss pursuant to
On April 14, 2025, Magistrate Judge Bloom issued the instant R&R recommending that the defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted. (Doc. 22). On May 1, 2025, Spearman timely filed objections to the R&R. (Doc. 23). Defendants subsequently filed a brief in opposition to the objections on May 14, 2025, (Doc. 24), which brings this case to its present posture.
Jurisdiction
As Spearman asserts claims pursuant to Section 1981, the court has federal question jurisdiction. See
Standards of Review
1. Objections to the R&R
Spearman‘s objections concern an R&R recommending that defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted. In disposing of objections to a magistrate judge‘s report and recommendation, the district court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report against which objections are made.
If a plaintiff has not objected to certain portions of the R&R, then in deciding whether to adopt those portions, the court must determine if a review of the record evidences plain error or manifest injustice.
2. Motions to Dismiss
The R&R is premised upon defendants’ motion to dismiss filed pursuant to
The facts alleged must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. This requirement “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” necessary elements of the non-moving party‘s cause of action. Id. Furthermore, to satisfy federal pleading requirements, the non-moving party must “provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
Moreover, when presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). Such pro se complaints “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Discussion
Defendants move to dismiss Spearman‘s Section 1981 and PHRA claims, which relate to plaintiff‘s interactions with the other members of the Association‘s board of directors in 2020 and 2021. The R&R concludes that Spearman‘s Section 1981 claims fail as a matter of law because the plaintiff does not allege facts supporting her conclusions that the defendants intentionally discriminated against her based on race. (Doc. 22 at 11-12). As reasoned by Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom, the second amended complaint documents “a number of unprofessional interactions,” but does not articulate facts a court can use to reasonably infer that the defendants violated the law. Id. As for Spearman‘s PHRA claims, the R&R concludes that the plaintiff‘s allegations fail to state a claim due to the lack of an employer-employee relationship, analogizing the parties’ roles on the Association board as those of unpaid volunteers. Id. at 15-16. Finally, Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom concludes that further amendment
Following the issuance of the R&R, Spearman timely filed objections. As construed, Spearman asserts four (4) separate objections. She objects to the chief magistrate judge‘s distillation of her Section 1981 claims and conclusion that her second amended complaint fails to allege facts setting forth intentional race discrimination. (Doc. 23 at 8-9). Spearman also objects to the R&R‘s assessment that the PHRA applies to employer-employee relationships and not to persons. Id. at 7. Additionally, Spearman objects to the recommendation that amendment is futile. Id. at 2. Finally, she objects to the R&R‘s characterization of the defendants’ conduct as mere “unprofessional interactions.” Id. at 10. The court begins with consideration of the Spearman‘s federal claims.
1. Section 1981
Spearman asserts claims under Section 1981, alleging that she was subjected to racial discrimination from other Association board members. Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, including employment-related decisions. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 455 (2008).
Regarding Spearman‘s Section 1981 claims, the R&R concludes that, assuming a contractual relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendants, plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support claims that the defendants intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of race. (Doc. 22 at 11-12). The R&R notes deficiencies in the plaintiff‘s second amended complaint
After review, however, the court agrees with Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom. Spearman has not pled facts supporting this element of her Section 1981 claim. Rather, her second amended complaint asserts only conclusory statements and subjective beliefs that race played a role in the interactions she details. Such allegations are insufficient to state a claim. See Tucker v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 484 F. App‘x 710, 712 (3d Cir. 2012)(citing Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 414 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Fiorentini v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 665 F. App‘x 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2016); Groeber v. Friedman & Schuman, P.C., 555 F. App‘x 133, 135 (3d Cir. 2014)(citing Jones); Gross v. R.T. Reynolds, Inc., 487 F. App‘x 711, 716 (3d Cir. 2012)(affirming dismissal of a Section 1981 action on a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged a series of unfortunate events and then stated, in conclusory fashion, that the reason for those events was that the defendant harbored discriminatory animus).
Assuming for the sake of argument that: 1) Defendant Carozza, as Association board president, was Spearman‘s supervisor; 2) Defendant Schwenzer was subject to the same standards as the plaintiff as a new board member; and 3) the plaintiff and Schwenzer performed similar job duties, the second amended complaint does not allege any racial disparity. Schwenzer was able to choose his first assignment at his first board meeting. (Doc. 13-1, Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 101, 108). As alleged, Spearman was also able to choose her first assignment at her first board meeting. Id. ¶¶ 103 (alleging that plaintiff expressed an interest in assisting with environmental aesthetics during her first board meeting), 20, 111 (alleging that the plaintiff‘s first assignment after this board meeting was assisting the director of environmental aesthetics, Defendant Scullin). Thus, Spearman‘s attempts to plead race discrimination through allegations about a comparator fall short.
Furthermore, even if some differential treatment occurred because Defendant Schwenzer obtained his first assignment from Defendant Carozza more easily than Spearman, there is nothing alleged indicating that Carozza or the other individual defendants treated the plaintiff differently because of her race. Carozza allegedly became “increasingly angry” and “yell[ed] repeatedly about his authority,” id. ¶ 106, but no other details are provided by the plaintiff to demonstrate that such conduct was because of her race. The court cannot reasonably infer race discrimination from Spearman‘s allegations about the tone and tenor of the Association board meetings.
Spearman also alleges that Defendant Scullin discriminated against her on the basis of race after the board appointed plaintiff to assist with environmental aesthetics. As alleged, Scullin insisted that the two ride together in the same car for 2-3 hours while they conducted property inspections. Id. ¶ 164. Spearman avers that she then spoke up and disagreed with Scullin. Id. ¶ 37. In response, Scullin terminated the plaintiff from doing these inspections. Id. ¶ 21. Spearman‘s details about these interactions do not focus on race, however. They focus on COVID-19 and plaintiff‘s work schedule. Id. ¶¶ 162-65, 170, 174.
Similarly, Spearman alleges that she experienced race discrimination in her interactions with Defendant Tolerico when the plaintiff was tasked with the role of assistant pool director. Likewise, Spearman objected to Tolerico‘s directives that the plaintiff conduct lifeguard interviews in person due to the plaintiff‘s views on COVID-19 mitigation. Id. ¶¶ 31a-f, 37, 204-217. The plaintiff also expressed that she could not complete pool-related tasks during the day due to her work schedule. Tolerico, like Scullin, then did not want Spearman to assist in that department any longer. Id. ¶ 32b. Nonetheless, just as with her allegations about Scullin, nothing in Spearman‘s allegations about Tolerico connect the issues between the parties to race.
Finally, based on what followed from the above allegations, Spearman contends that Defendant Carozza and others expressed that the plaintiff “did not want to work or do anything.” Id. ¶ 36. While plaintiff asserts that such words reflect stereotypical innuendos about race, plaintiff also alleges that she was
Spearman‘s failure to connect her views on COVID-19 to race are manifest throughout the rest of her second amended complaint. See id. ¶¶ 33a-d, 34a-b (detailing the April 2021 board meeting where the other board members refused to wear a mask and Defendant Carozza told the plaintiff to leave if she felt uncomfortable). There are no allegations permitting an inference that the defendants’ references to COVID-19 or divergent positions on COVID-19 mitigation were about race.
Spearman also asserts a claim for retaliation under Section 1981, alleging that defendants terminated her from the Association board in response to her filing a complaint about race discrimination with the OAG. Id. ¶¶ 45, 130. Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom concluded that Spearman‘s retaliation claim could not proceed because she did not allege an underlying violation of Section 1981. (Doc. 22 at 13 (citing Estate of Oliva ex rel. McHugh v. New Jersey, 604 F.3d 788, 798 & n. 14 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Oliva“)). Plaintiff‘s objections may be construed to challenge this conclusion.
For the reasons set forth above, Spearman‘s underlying Section 1981 claims are deficient. Thus, Spearman cannot advance her Section 1981 retaliation claims as a matter of law. Consequently, Spearman‘s objections to the R&R regarding her Section 1981 claims will be overruled. The defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff‘s Section 1981 claims will be granted.
Spearman also objects to the R&R‘s characterization of the alleged conduct as “unprofessional interactions,” arguing that such language minimizes the discriminatory nature of the alleged actions and introduces ambiguity into the assessment of plaintiff‘s claims. (Doc. 23 at 10). According to Spearman, this language risks diminishing the seriousness of the alleged misconduct and obscures the discriminatory intent behind the defendants’ actions. Id.
However, this objection is general in nature and fails to identify any specific legal or factual error in the R&R. A quarrel with phrasing, standing alone, does not constitute a valid basis to reject the R&R. As discussed above, the second amended complaint sets forth facts documenting cold, unprofessional, unkind, unfriendly, and unneighborly conduct by her fellow Association board members. Moreover, Spearman has pled facts suggesting that fellow board members did not consider COVID-19 to be a serious public health threat in 2020 and 2021 and did not respect her full-time work schedule. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged intentional race discrimination in violation of Section 1981. Accordingly, this objection is overruled.
3. Request to Amend
In her brief in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, Spearman requested leave to file a third amended complaint if her claims were determined
Pursuant to
After review, the court will adopt part of this recommendation regarding the plaintiff‘s Section 1981 claims. The second amended complaint, which followed two previous motions to dismiss, is 126-pages long and contains extensive factual details about Spearman‘s interactions with her fellow Association board members. (Doc. 13-1). Given these sprawling allegations, if Spearman possessed facts which set forth plausible Section 1981 claims, she would have alleged them by now. Further leave to amend would thus be futile in this case. See Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transportation Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019)(determining it would be futile to permit amendment where a
4. PHRA Claims
Turning to the state law claims in this case, Spearman asserts that the defendants violated the PHRA, specifically the provisions of
Here, the R&R recommends dismissal of the plaintiffs’ PHRA claims, focusing its analysis on a lack of an employer-employee relationship between the parties. (Doc. 22 at 13-17). Spearman objects to this recommendation, citing the text of the PHRA as detailed above. (Doc. 23 at 3-8).
After careful consideration, the court will not adopt the R&R regarding disposition of Spearman‘s PHRA claims. Rather, because Spearman‘s federal claims are not viable, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff‘s PHRA claims in her second amended complaint and dismiss those state law claims without prejudice. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see also
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Spearman‘s objections to the R&R will be overruled, except for her objection to the recommendations regarding her PHRA
The R&R will not be adopted regarding its recommended disposition of Spearman‘s PHRA claims. Rather, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice.
Date: 7/11/25
JUDGE JULIA K. MUNLEY
United States District Court