KAREN HARRISON v. HEALTH NETWORK LABORATORIES LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, AND LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK, INC.
No. 51 MAP 2019
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
DECIDED: June 16, 2020
SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
ARGUED: November 19, 2019
KAREN HARRISON,
Appellee
v.
HEALTH NETWORK LABORATORIES LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, AND LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK, INC.,
Appellants
Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 365 EDA 2018 dated December 12, 2018 Affirming in Part and Vacating in Part the Order of the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, at No. 2016-C-1469 dated December 19, 2017 and Remanding.
JUSTICE DOUGHERTY
We granted discretionary review to consider whether the Superior Court erred in holding the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA),
I. Background
Appellee Karen Harrison (Harrison) held an administrative position for appellants, Health Network Laboratories Limited Partnerships and Lehigh Valley Health Network, Inc. (collectively Health Network), or one of their acquired organizations, for approximately eighteen years.1 Amended Complaint at ¶¶6-9. From 2012 until her discharge, Harrison‘s title was “Manager, Quality,” a position which, according to Harrison, required her to meet with coworkers to ensure they were performing in a satisfactory and safe working environment. Id. at ¶¶10-11. In March of 2015, Harrison received a complaint from a Health Network employee expressing concerns about allegedly abusive, discriminatory, and harassing conduct by an IT department supervisor, which was known to and went unchecked by the supervisor‘s immediate superior. Id. at ¶¶13-14. Harrison initially reported the concerns to Health Network‘s Chief Operating Officer/Chief Compliance Officer, without identifying the complainant or supervisors by name, and requested the appointment of an ombudsman to address the concerns. Id. at ¶¶18-19. No ombudsman was appointed, and the concerns went unaddressed. Id. at ¶¶20-21. In October of 2015, the complainant employee resigned, providing a letter which memorialized her experience with the IT supervisor‘s conduct and identified the offending supervisor by name; she forwarded the letter to Harrison as well as other Health Network employees. Id. at ¶¶21, 23. Harrison shared the letter with her chain of command on October 19, 2015, but no corrective action was taken with the IT supervisor. Id. at ¶¶24-25. On November 19, 2015, Health Network terminated Harrison. Id. at ¶26. Health Network‘s stated reason for firing Harrison was for use of foul language at an after-hours banquet; however, Harrison averred this explanation was pretextual in light of her exemplary personnel record, and her firing was instead retaliation for her attempts to “intervene in and deter the illegal, threatening, abusive and discriminatory conduct” of the IT supervisor. Id. at ¶¶28-30.
prohibiting retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the PHRA; Health Network therefore argued Harrison could only pursue her retaliation claim under the PHRA, which requires claimants to exhaust their administrative remedies first — i.e., file an administrative charge of discrimination with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) and submit to its investigation, conciliation, and adjudication procedures — before advancing a claim in court. Id. at ¶¶43-51, citing, inter alia,
The trial court sustained Health Network‘s preliminary objections, determining Harrison was required to file her complaint with the PHRC and exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking redress under the PHRA in court. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/9/2018, at 3. The court further explained it viewed proceeding on the Whistleblower Law claim as thwarting the intent of the PHRA because it would permit Harrison to skip the mandatory
Harrison appealed, and a three-judge panel of the Superior Court reversed the trial court‘s decision.5 See Harrison v. Health Network Labs. Ltd. P‘ships, No. 365 EDA 2018, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed December 12, 2018). Reasoning that the trial court‘s analysis appeared to conflate a claim for violation of the PHRA (which requires pursuit of administrative remedies) with a Whistleblower Law claim (which does not), the panel concluded Harrison was not required to invoke the PHRA‘s administrative remedies in order to pursue a retaliation claim where the alleged violation of the PHRA was the underlying wrongdoing, rather than a discriminatory act perpetrated against Harrison. Id. at 8-9. The panel further held that, because Harrison had sufficiently pleaded allegations to establish a cognizable claim under the Whistleblower Law, i.e., she made a good faith report of wrongdoing by her employer, the trial court erred when it sustained Health Network‘s preliminary objections. Id. at 9-10.
Health Network sought allowance of appeal, and we granted discretionary review of the following issue:
Whether the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA“), including its requirement for exhaustion of remedial administrative procedures, provides the exclusive remedy for retaliation claims ostensibly brought under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law (“Whistleblower Law“), where the underlying basis for a Whistleblower Law retaliation claim is discrimination deemed to be unlawful under the PHRA.
Harrison v. Health Network Labs. Ltd. P‘ships, 216 A.3d 219 (Pa. 2019) (per curiam). Where the appeal arises from an order sustaining preliminary objections due to legal
insufficiency of the complaint, our well-settled standard of review is de novo. Commonwealth by Shapiro v. UPMC, 208 A.3d 898, 908 (Pa. 2019). For the purpose of evaluating the legal sufficiency of challenged pleading, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded, material, and relevant facts alleged in the complaint and every inference that is fairly deducible from those facts. Id. We must determine whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible; where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it. Id. at 909.
II. Arguments
Health Network recognizes the PHRA prohibits employers who fall within the act from discriminating against their employees because of an employee‘s race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national
Citing Clay, in which this Court held the PHRA‘s statutory remedy for discrimination claims precludes common law tort actions for wrongful discharge based upon discrimination, Health Network asserts the administrative procedures of the PHRA are the mandatory means for enforcing the right the PHRA creates. Appellant‘s Brief at 15, citing Clay, 559 A.2d at 919 (PHRA “bestows a right to be free from discrimination . . . and prescribes procedures whereby the right ‘shall’ be vindicated.“). The Court in Clay recognized the expertise and broad remedial powers of the PHRC, which the legislature provided with the jurisdiction to receive, investigate, conciliate, hear, and decide complaints alleging unlawful discrimination, and determined that allowing a discharged employee to proceed with a common law tort action in court without first exhausting administrative remedies would frustrate the statutory scheme of the PHRA, as well as result in the inefficiencies and expense of litigation that the scheme was designed to avert. Id. at 16, citing Clay, 559 A.2d at 920. Health Network indicates this Court confirmed the exclusivity of the PHRA to remedy unlawful workplace discrimination twenty years later in Weaver wherein, according to Health Network, the Court considered whether the PHRA precludes plaintiffs from bringing employment discrimination claims based upon constitutional rights, and determined that the Equal Rights Amendment did not provide a public policy exception to at-will employment such that an employer not otherwise subject to the PHRA could face a common law action for sexual discrimination. Id. at 16-17, citing Weaver, 975 A.2d at 572. According to Health Network, Weaver additionally underscored the PHRC‘s exclusive authority to remedy discrimination claims due to its administrative structure and particularized expertise and noted, “the legislature has made the PHRA the exclusive state law remedy for unlawful discrimination, preempting the advancement of common law claims for wrongful discharge based on claims of discrimination.” See Weaver, 975 A.2d at 565, 567 n.10.
Health Network also points to various federal decisions rejecting plaintiffs’ attempts to raise discrimination claims under laws other than the PHRA or its federal counterpart, Title VII,
Health Network thus argues, because Harrison claims she was fired for opposing activity made unlawful by the PHRA — which is the basis of a retaliation claim under PHRA Subsection 955(d) — and the PHRA is the exclusive state law remedy for unlawful discrimination, the PHRA precludes her claim under the Whistleblower Law, and was properly dismissed by the trial court. Id. at 23.
Harrison, in response, recognizes both the PHRA and the Whistleblower Law prohibit an employer from taking adverse action against an employee in response to the employee‘s report of conduct made unlawful by statute: the PHRA prohibits retaliation for reporting violation of the PHRA, see
Further, according to Harrison, the statutes do not conflict in a manner that would prevent claims of retaliation for reporting PHRA violations from proceeding under the later-enacted Whistleblower Law. Rather, Harrison asserts, pursuant to Subsection 962(b) of the PHRA, that act allows for an election of remedies between those available under the PHRA, or those available under any other applicable law, such as the Whistleblower Law. Id. at 7-8, 10-11, citing
[N]othing contained in this act shall be deemed to repeal or supersede any of the provisions of any existing or hereafter adopted municipal ordinance, municipal charter or of any law of this Commonwealth relating to discrimination because of race,
color, familial status, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin or handicap or disability, but as to acts declared unlawful by section five of this act [relating to unlawful discriminatory practices] the procedure herein provided shall, when invoked, be exclusive and the final determination therein shall exclude any other action, civil or criminal, based on the same grievance of the complainant concerned. If the complainant institutes any action based on such grievance without resorting to the procedure provided in this act, such complainant may not subsequently resort to the procedure herein.
III. Discussion
The Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law protects employees who come forth with good faith reports of wrongdoing by publicly-funded employers; it does so by prohibiting retaliatory conduct from the employer, and by providing a civil remedy for employees when employers violate the law‘s provisions. Bailets v. Pennsylvania Turnpike, 181 A.3d 324, 333 (Pa. 2018) (Whistleblower Law protects employees fired in retaliation for exposing wrongdoing by public employers and private employers that receive public funds);
(a) Persons not to be discharged.—No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee regarding the employee‘s compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment because the employee . . . makes a good faith report . . . to the employer or appropriate authority [of] an instance of wrongdoing or waste[.]
While the Whistleblower Law broadly prohibits retaliation for reporting violation of any federal or state statute (among other things), the PHRA‘s prohibitions are more specific, targeted squarely on practices that discriminate on the basis of an individual‘s status as a member of a protected class — i.e., based on their race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin, or non-job-related handicap or disability — by making it unlawful for any employer to discharge from employment or otherwise discriminate against an employee on the basis of their protected class status.
Moreover, in addition to bestowing upon individuals the right to be free from protected-class-based discrimination by an employer, the PHRA also prescribes the mandatory procedures whereby that right shall be vindicated when invoked. Clay, 559 A.2d at 919, citing
Notably, however, the Clay Court also discussed Subsection 962(b) of the PHRA, which expressly states ”nothing contained in this act shall be deemed to repeal or supersede any of the provisions of any existing or hereafter adopted municipal ordinance, municipal charter or of any law of this Commonwealth relating to discrimination because of race, color, familial status, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin or handicap or disability, but as to acts declared unlawful by section five of this act the procedure herein provided shall, when invoked, be exclusive . . . .” Id. at 920, quoting
Here, Health Network claims because Harrison alleged retaliatory discharge for reporting conduct made unlawful by the PHRA, she was relegated to bring her claim under Subsection 955(d) of the PHRA and submit to the PHRA‘s administrative procedures. We disagree. Although there are obvious benefits to encouraging retaliation claims based on reports of conduct in violation of the PHRA to proceed under the PHRA before a specialized body endowed by an intricate statutory scheme with broad investigatory and remedial powers, the plain language of the statute itself makes clear that an aggrieved party is not mandated to invoke the PHRA‘s procedures when other laws provide a cognizable remedy based on the harm alleged.6 See
In this regard, the cases relied upon by Health Network are distinguishable. As explained supra, Clay emphasized there are no common law tort remedies for wrongful discharge based on discrimination made unlawful by the PHRA; furthermore, the Clay Court viewed the PHRA‘s enforcement provisions as mandatory for those claimants seeking to vindicate their own civil rights, because only the PHRA provides a state law remedy to enforce an individual‘s civil right to be free from workplace discrimination. Clay, 559 A.2d at 919, 922;
contends, directly consider whether the PHRA precluded plaintiffs from bringing different types of employment discrimination claims based upon constitutional rights. See Appellant‘s Brief at 16. Rather, Weaver addressed, more narrowly, whether the policies underlying either the PHRA or the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment provided exception to the at-will employment doctrine when the PHRA would not otherwise apply, and the Court concluded that neither law provided such an exception. See Weaver, 975 A.2d at 555, 572. Indeed, Subsection 962(b) expressly supports the principle that a cognizable constitutional claim based on unlawful discriminatory conduct may proceed notwithstanding its viability under the PHRA.
Similarly, the federal cases relied upon by Health Network are unpersuasive, as they relate only to cases where the complainants asserted individual rights based on their own protected class status, and further describe cases in which: the PHRA precluded common law tort claims, see, e.g., Mazuka, 730 F. App‘x at 119-20 (disability discrimination claim could not be recast as a common law fraudulent misrepresentation claim); the court interpreted solely federal statutory schemes, see, e.g., Williams, 870 F.3d at 299 (Title VII claim did not establish liability damages pursuant to
In contrast, Harrison asserted a cognizable claim under a law of the Commonwealth, the Whistleblower Law, alleging a violation of the PHRA. Nothing in the PHRA makes its provisions mandatory for the pursuit of such a claim. Certainly, the later-enacted Whistleblower Law‘s provision prohibiting retaliatory conduct for an employee‘s participation in investigations, hearings, or inquiries held by “an appropriate authority” demonstrates the legislature anticipated some overlap between the Whistleblower Law and the administrative procedures for investigating and remedying violations of other statutes or regulations, such as those pronounced by the PHRA. See
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, we hold plaintiffs who are not themselves the victims of discrimination based on their own race, color, familial status, religious creed, ancestry, handicap or disability, age, sex, or national origin, but who report discriminatory conduct made unlawful by the PHRA, may pursue a claim under the Whistleblower Law notwithstanding the viability of a claim under the PHRA for the same harm. The Superior Court correctly determined the trial court erred by sustaining Health Network‘s preliminary objections and dismissing Harrison‘s complaint.
Order affirmed.
Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer and Todd join the opinion.
Chief Justice Saylor files a concurring opinion in which Justice Mundy joins.
Justice Wecht joins the substance of Chief Justice Saylor‘s concurrence but does not join the majority opinion.
Justice
Justice Donohue files a dissenting opinion.
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