321 F.3d 365 | 3rd Cir. | 2003
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.(cid:13) This appeal requires us to decide whether a dispute(cid:13) resolution under the Internet Corporation for Assigned(cid:13) Names and Numbers’ Uniform Domain Name Dispute(cid:13) Resolution Policy ("UDRP") is entitled to the extremely(cid:13) deferential standard of judicial review set forth in the(cid:13) Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C.S 10(a)(2)-10(a)(3).(cid:13) After Appellant Eric Dluhos registered the domain name(cid:13) <www.leestrasberg.com> invoking the name of the(cid:13) renowned acting coach, representatives of Lee Strasberg’s(cid:13) widow, his eponymous acting institute and his estate(cid:13) instituted administrative proceedings culminating in a(cid:13) National Arbitration Foundation dispute resolution that(cid:13) shifted the domain name from Dluhos to the Strasberg(cid:13) 2(cid:13) parties. Dluhos simultaneously sought relief in the district(cid:13) court, which applied the FAA standards to the NAF panel’s(cid:13) order and dismissed the complaint. Dluhos appealed, and(cid:13) we now reverse.(cid:13) Among Appellant’s various contentions, he appeals from(cid:13) the district court’s refusal to vacate an order under the(cid:13) UDRP. Constitutional issues are presented, but we must(cid:13) first decide whether the district court properly chose to(cid:13) review the NAF panel’s decision under the Federal(cid:13) Arbitration Act’s deferential standards for judicial review of(cid:13) arbitration decisions and a separate "manifest disregard for(cid:13) the law" standard, or whether a UDRP dispute resolution(cid:13) proceeding does not qualify as "arbitration" under the FAA(cid:13) and instead falls under broader category of review.(cid:13) I.(cid:13) In the district court, Dluhos had filed a complaint against(cid:13) Anna Strasberg, the Estate of Lee Strasberg and the Lee(cid:13) Strasberg Theatre Institute (the "Strasberg defendants");(cid:13) Mark Roesler and CMG Worldwide Inc. (the "CMG(cid:13) defendants"); and Network Solutions, Inc. The court ruled(cid:13) that he failed to state a claim for which relief may be(cid:13) granted. Rule 12(b)(6) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.(cid:13) The United States District Court for the District of New(cid:13) Jersey had jurisdiction of the underlying action pursuant to(cid:13) 28 U.S.C. S 1331 based on Appellant’s constitutional claims(cid:13) and his challenge to the constitutionality of the arbitration(cid:13) process1 brought under 42 U.S.C.S 1983, and his sundry(cid:13) state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367(a). As will(cid:13) become clear, the court also had jurisdiction under the(cid:13) Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"), 15(cid:13) U.S.C. S 1114(2)(D)(v). We have appellate jurisdiction(cid:13) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291.(cid:13) Pursuant to a Cooperative Agreement with the federal(cid:13) National Science Foundation (NSF), one of the Appellees,(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. The Federal Arbitration Act itself does not create federal question(cid:13) jurisdiction. Roadway Package Sys. v. Kaiser, 257 F.3d 287, 291 n.1 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 2001) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,(cid:13) 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)).(cid:13) 3(cid:13) Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), a private entity, is the(cid:13) exclusive provider of Internet domain name registration(cid:13) services to the public.2 On June 25, 1999, pro se plaintiff(cid:13) Eric Dluhos entered into a domain-name registration(cid:13) agreement with NSI to register the domain name(cid:13) <www.leestrasberg.com>. The registration agreement(cid:13) required Dluhos to abide by NSI’s ever-evolving dispute(cid:13) resolution policy, which incorporated the Internet(cid:13) Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers’ Uniform(cid:13) Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy as it developed.(cid:13) The UDRP -- and thus Dluhos’ agreement with NSI--(cid:13) requires a domain-name registrant to submit to a(cid:13) "mandatory administrative proceeding" before an approved(cid:13) dispute resolution service provider to resolve a third party’s(cid:13) complaint concerning the registration and use of a(cid:13) particular registered domain name. Uniform Domain Name(cid:13) Dispute Resolution Policy 4(a) (Oct. 24, 1999), available at(cid:13) http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm. The National(cid:13) Arbitration Forum is one such approved provider. See(cid:13) Approved Providers for Uniform Domain Name Dispute(cid:13) Resolution Policy, available at http://www.icann.org/(cid:13) dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm (listing the National(cid:13) Arbitration Foundation as an approved resolution provider).(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. In 1990, the Department of Defense handed over its administration of(cid:13) the Advanced Research Projects Agency Net (ARPANET), the predecessor(cid:13) to the modern Internet, to the National Science Foundation -- an agency(cid:13) created by Congress in 1950 for the purpose of promoting science and(cid:13) engineering through programs in research and education projects. See(cid:13) 42 U.S.C. S 1861 et seq. (authorizing the establishment of the NSF); NSF(cid:13) and Domain Names, available at http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/news/(cid:13) media/fsdomnames.htm (providing an "Early History" of the NSF ’s(cid:13) involvement with the registration of domain names). In 1993,(cid:13) telecommunications-services provider NSI -- a wholly owned subsidiary(cid:13) of VeriSign, Inc. -- won a competitively awarded Cooperative Agreement(cid:13) from the NSF to register second-level domain-names on the Internet. Id.(cid:13) The domain-name registration process is largely automated and(cid:13) involves the registrant’s transmission of a registration application to NSI.(cid:13) If accepted by NSI, the application becomes the Registration Agreement,(cid:13) and the domain name is simply entered into a registry database.(cid:13) Following entry, NSI has no knowledge or input as to how or if the(cid:13) domain name will be used. Appellee Network Solutions, Inc.’s Brief at 1;(cid:13) NSI-NSF Cooperation Agreement (Jan. 1, 1993), available at http://(cid:13) www.icann.org/nsi/coopagmt-01jan93.htm.(cid:13) 4(cid:13) Anna Strasberg -- the widow of actor and acting coach(cid:13) Lee Strasberg -- owns and directs the Lee Strasberg(cid:13) Theatre Institute and serves as the executrix of the Estate(cid:13) of Lee Strasberg. As executrix, she is responsible for Estate-(cid:13) owned trademarks and service marks, which include"The(cid:13) Lee Strasberg Institute" and "Actor by Lee Strasberg." CMG(cid:13) Worldwide, Inc. represents and manages Internet sites for(cid:13) the Estate, the Institute and Anna Strasberg. CMG(cid:13) maintains an official Web sites for the Institute, the Estate(cid:13) and Anna Strasberg at <www.strasberg.com>.(cid:13) Dluhos’ registration of <www.leestrasberg.com> came(cid:13) to the attention of Mark Roesler, CMG’s chief executive(cid:13) officer. In May 2000, Roesler sent four letters to Dluhos,(cid:13) informing him that his use of the domain name(cid:13) <www.leestrasberg.com> violated the Strasberg trademarks(cid:13) and that CMG would take action to have the domain name(cid:13) transferred, potentially through UDRP dispute resolution, if(cid:13) Dluhos would not rescind it.(cid:13) Having heard nothing from Dluhos, CMG submitted a(cid:13) complaint to the National Arbitration Foundation on June(cid:13) 2, 2000. The complaint requested a UDRP dispute(cid:13) resolution proceeding and formally disputed Dluhos’ right(cid:13) to use the domain name, alleging that the domain name(cid:13) was "identical or confusingly similar to" a trademark owned(cid:13) by the Estate; that Dluhos had "no rights or legitimate(cid:13) interests" in the name; and that he had registered and used(cid:13) the name "in bad faith." Dluhos had until June 26, 2000 to(cid:13) respond. Rather than participating in the dispute resolution(cid:13) process to which he had agreed when he registered the(cid:13) domain name with NSI a year earlier, Dluhos submitted a(cid:13) letter of limited appearance to the NAF to explain that he(cid:13) would not submit to dispute resolution because he(cid:13) contested the NAF ’s jurisdiction over the matter. He added(cid:13) that he would instead file a complaint in federal court. On(cid:13) June 27, 2000, he did just that. He filed a complaint(cid:13) against the Strasberg defendants and the CMG defendants(cid:13) with the district court challenging the constitutionality of(cid:13) the dispute resolution process.(cid:13) Three days later on June 30, 2000, a one-member NAF(cid:13) panel issued an order suspending the NAF/UDRP(cid:13) proceeding in light of the pending federal lawsuit. See(cid:13) 5(cid:13) UDRP S 18 (giving panel "the discretion to decide whether to(cid:13) suspend or terminate the administrative proceeding, or to(cid:13) proceed to a decision" while a lawsuit is pending). Because(cid:13) Dluhos failed to serve properly either the Strasberg(cid:13) defendants or the CMG defendants, CMG formally(cid:13) requested in August 2000 that the NAF lift the suspension(cid:13) order and proceed with UDRP dispute resolution. NAF lifted(cid:13) the order when CMG served notice of its request on Dluhos(cid:13) and paid a $150 fee to remove the suspension order.(cid:13) On October 26, 2000, the NAF panel issued a decision(cid:13) against Dluhos -- without his participation -- and directed(cid:13) that the domain name <www.leestrasberg.com> be(cid:13) transferred to the Estate. See UDRP S 5(e) (mandating that(cid:13) the panel "decide the dispute based upon the complaint" if(cid:13) a registrant declines to participate in the UDRP(cid:13) proceedings).(cid:13) Dluhos filed an amended complaint in the district court(cid:13) on October 31, 2000, alleging harassment, breach of(cid:13) contract, and violations of his First, Fifth and Fourteenth(cid:13) Amendment rights. Essentially, he challenged the(cid:13) constitutionality of the dispute resolution process, raised(cid:13) First Amendment arguments against enforcement of(cid:13) NSI’s dispute resolution policy and asked the district(cid:13) court to restore his right in the domain name(cid:13) <www.leestrasberg.com>. All defendants promptly filed(cid:13) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and in an(cid:13) August 31, 2001 memorandum and order, the district court(cid:13) granted the defendants’ motions. After dismissing all(cid:13) constitutional and S 1983 claims against the defendants for(cid:13) want of state action, the district court dismissed the(cid:13) various state law claims against all parties for failure to(cid:13) state a claim for which relief may be granted.(cid:13) The court then proceeded to review the NAF ’s decision in(cid:13) favor of the Strasberg and CMG defendants under: 1) 9(cid:13) U.S.C S 10(a)(2)-10(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act,(cid:13) which authorizes a district court to vacate an arbitration(cid:13) decision if there is "evident partiality or corruption in the(cid:13) arbitrator[ ]," or if "the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct(cid:13) . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to(cid:13) the controversy"; and 2) the judicially created"manifest(cid:13) disregard of the law" standard, which allows a district court(cid:13) 6(cid:13) to vacate an arbitration award that "evidences manifest(cid:13) disregard of the law rather than an erroneous(cid:13) interpretation." See Local 863 Int’l Brotherhood of(cid:13) Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of(cid:13) America v. Jersey Coast Egg Producers, Inc., 773 F.2d 530,(cid:13) 533 (3d Cir. 1985) (trotting out the standard but holding(cid:13) that a union arbitration judgment did not rise to the level(cid:13) of "manifest disregard"). The district court reviewed and(cid:13) upheld the NAF ’s decision under both deferential(cid:13) standards.(cid:13) Dluhos filed a timely Notice of Appeal.(cid:13) II.(cid:13) We review a district court’s denial of a motion to vacate(cid:13) a commercial arbitration award de novo. Kaplan v. First(cid:13) Options, 19 F.3d 1503, 1509 (3d Cir. 1994). We also note(cid:13) that because Dluhos has filed his complaint pro se, we(cid:13) must liberally construe his pleadings, and we will apply the(cid:13) applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant(cid:13) has mentioned it by name. Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683,(cid:13) 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).(cid:13) III.(cid:13) The Federal Arbitration Act explicitly permits the use of(cid:13) arbitration and specifically authorizes individuals in(cid:13) commercial transactions to contract for arbitration. 9(cid:13) U.S.C. SS 1-10. Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to offset(cid:13) the "hostility of American courts to the enforcement of(cid:13) arbitration agreements." Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,(cid:13) 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001). As the FAA evinces the"liberal(cid:13) federal policy favoring arbitration," Moses H. Cone Mem’l(cid:13) Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), the(cid:13) legislation "compels judicial enforcement of a wide range of(cid:13) written arbitration agreements." Circuit City , 532 U.S. at(cid:13) 111.(cid:13) Federal courts primarily invoke the FAA to give effect to(cid:13) contracting parties’ expectations for resolving disputes.(cid:13) Accordingly, the FAA revolves around contract(cid:13) interpretation. See Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d(cid:13) 7(cid:13) 343, 350 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[A]rbitration is creature of(cid:13) contract, a device of the parties rather than the judicial(cid:13) process. If the parties have agreed to submit a dispute for(cid:13) a decision by a third party, they have agreed to(cid:13) arbitration.") (quoting AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F.(cid:13) Supp. 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Weinstein, J.)). Because(cid:13) the FAA does not define the term "arbitration," "courts and(cid:13) commentators have struggled to do so." Harrison, 111 F.3d(cid:13) at 350. Broadly, this Court has essentially concluded that(cid:13) "the essence of arbitration . . . is that, when the parties(cid:13) agree to submit their disputes to it, they have agreed to(cid:13) arbitrate these disputes through to completion, i.e. to an(cid:13) award made by a third-party arbitrator. Arbitration does(cid:13) not occur until the process is completed and the arbitrator(cid:13) makes a decision." Id. at 350.(cid:13) Admittedly, this definition does little to assist us in(cid:13) determining which types of dispute resolution fall under the(cid:13) FAA and which do not. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth(cid:13) Circuit has distinguished "mandatory arbitration, as a(cid:13) prerequisite to litigation" from "binding arbitration, where(cid:13) the parties must accept an award or decision of the(cid:13) arbitrator." United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315,(cid:13) 322 (4th Cir. 2001). But the real debate has occurred "in(cid:13) the context of whether the FAA applies to nonbinding(cid:13) arbitration[.]" Harrison, 111 F.3d at 350. Although the(cid:13) precise identity of nonbinding arbitration is itself perhaps(cid:13) no less murky than the definition of "arbitration" under the(cid:13) FAA, we have previously looked to Judge Weinstein’s(cid:13) discourse in AMF, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 620 F. Supp.(cid:13) 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), for guidance. Judge Weinstein did not(cid:13) contend that the FAA applies to all forms on nonbinding(cid:13) arbitration, but he looked to S 2 of the FAA, which states(cid:13) that the FAA applies to "contracts . . . to settle disputes by(cid:13) arbitration." 9 U.S.C. S 2. Accordingly, Judge Weinstein(cid:13) centered the inquiry for a classification of nonbinding(cid:13) arbitration on "whether the arbitration at issue . . . might(cid:13) realistically settle the dispute." Harrison , 111 F.3d at 349.(cid:13) In his eyes, then, a dispute-resolution mechanism would(cid:13) fall under the FAA if "viewed in light of the reasonable(cid:13) commercial expectations the dispute will be settled by this(cid:13) arbitration." Id. (quoting AMF, 620 F. Supp. at 461)). By(cid:13) way of an example, a lawsuit that halts in a "stay . . . so(cid:13) 8(cid:13) that arbitration can be had" before litigation may proceed(cid:13) means that a dispute-resolution proceeding constitutes(cid:13) "arbitration." 9 U.S.C. S 3; see also Parisi v. Netlearning,(cid:13) Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 751 (E.D. Va. 2001) ("[T]here is(cid:13) no reason to ‘stay’ litigation under S 3[where a proceeding](cid:13) contemplates parallel litigation.").(cid:13) If a dispute-resolution mechanism indeed constitutes(cid:13) arbitration under the FAA, then a district court may vacate(cid:13) it only under exceedingly narrow circumstances. 9 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 10. It may vacate it where there is "evident partiality or(cid:13) corruption in the arbitrator[ ]," or because "the arbitrators(cid:13) were guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence(cid:13) pertinent and material to the controversy." 9 U.S.C.(cid:13) SS 10(a)(2)-10(a)(3). A district court may also vacate an(cid:13) arbitrator’s decision where the arbitrator’s decision(cid:13) "evidence[s] a manifest disregard for the law rather than an(cid:13) erroneous interpretation of the law." Local 863 Int’l(cid:13) Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and(cid:13) Helpers of America v. Jersey Coast Egg Producers, Inc., 773(cid:13) F.2d 530, 534 (3d Cir. 1985). The net result of a court’s(cid:13) application of this standard is generally to affirm easily the(cid:13) arbitration award under this extremely deferential standard(cid:13) -- a result that is squarely in line with the purpose behind(cid:13) the FAA where courts are tasked with reviewing an(cid:13) arbitration decision.(cid:13) If, however, a dispute-resolution mechanism does not(cid:13) constitute arbitration under the FAA, then a district court(cid:13) has no jurisdiction to review the result absent an(cid:13) independent jurisdictional hook. See Roadway Package(cid:13) Sys. v. Kaiser, 257 F.3d 287, 291 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing(cid:13) Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460(cid:13) U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983) (explaining that the FAA does not(cid:13) independently provide federal jurisdiction); Harrison, 111(cid:13) F.3d at 352 (dismissing a request for lack of appellate(cid:13) jurisdiction, where the dispute resolution proceeding did(cid:13) not constitute arbitration under the FAA).(cid:13) At issue before us then is whether the nonbinding(cid:13) domain name resolution policy (UDRP) proceeding that(cid:13) shifted Appellant’s registered domain name to the Strasberg(cid:13) defendants constitutes arbitration under the FAA. If this(cid:13) proceeding qualifies as arbitration under the FAA, then the(cid:13) 9(cid:13) dispute resolution is subject to extremely limited review. If(cid:13) it does not fall under the FAA umbrella, then the district(cid:13) court lacked jurisdiction to examine -- and thus to affirm(cid:13) -- the result under the lax FAA review standards.(cid:13) IV.(cid:13) We begin our analysis of the FAA’s applicability by(cid:13) examining the specific arbitration agreement at issue, a(cid:13) contract-based arrangement for handling disputes between(cid:13) domain name registrants and third parties who challenge(cid:13) the registration and use of their trademarks. In our view,(cid:13) the UDRP’s unique contractual arrangement renders the(cid:13) FAA’s provisions for judicial review inapplicable.(cid:13) A.(cid:13) First, the UDRP obviously contemplates the possibility of(cid:13) judicial intervention, as no provision of the policy prevents(cid:13) a party from filing suit before, after or during the(cid:13) administrative proceedings. See UDRP S 4(k) (stating that(cid:13) domain-name resolution proceedings shall not stop either(cid:13) party from "submitting the dispute to a court of competent(cid:13) jurisdiction for independent resolution"); Sallen v.(cid:13) Corinthians Licenciamentos Ltda., 273 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir.(cid:13) 2001) (discussing the likelihood that the "judicial outcome(cid:13) will override the UDRP one"). In that sense, this mechanism(cid:13) would not fall under the FAA because "the dispute will [not(cid:13) necessarily] be settled by this arbitration." Harrison, 111(cid:13) F.3d at 349. (quoting AMF, 620 F. Supp. at 461)).(cid:13) The UDRP was intended to ensure that the parties could(cid:13) seek independent judicial resolution of domain name(cid:13) disputes, regardless of whether its proceeding reached a(cid:13) conclusion. See World Intellectual Property Organization,(cid:13) The Management of Internet Names and Addresses:(cid:13) Intellectual Property Issues: Final Reporter of the WIPO(cid:13) Internet Domain Name Process 139, 150(iv), at http://(cid:13) wipo2.wipo.int/process1/report/finalreport .html (Apr. 30,(cid:13) 1999) (remarking that the parties should be permitted to(cid:13) seek "de novo review" of a UDRP-based dispute resolution);(cid:13) see also Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (affording independent(cid:13) complete review of a UDRP proceeding rather than(cid:13) 10(cid:13) addressing it under the FAA); Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v.(cid:13) Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist(cid:13) LEXIS 6335 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2000) (concluding that the(cid:13) UDRP takes account of the possibility of parallel litigation(cid:13) in federal court, and that federal courts are "not bound by(cid:13) the outcome of the administrative proceedings").(cid:13) Indeed, unlike methods of dispute resolution covered by(cid:13) the FAA, UDRP proceedings were never intended to replace(cid:13) formal litigation. See Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (citing(cid:13) the FAA’s requirement that parties to arbitration"agree[ ](cid:13) that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the(cid:13) award made pursuant to the arbitration," 9 U.S.C.S 9, and(cid:13) noting the absence of such an agreement in the UDRP);(cid:13) David E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name(cid:13) Dispute Decisions, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGHTECH L.J.(cid:13) 35, 51-52 (2001) ("Unlike conventional arbitration, the(cid:13) UDRP is not meant to replace litigation, but merely to(cid:13) provide an additional forum for dispute resolution, with an(cid:13) explicit right of appeal to the courts."). Rather, the UDRP(cid:13) contemplates truncated proceedings. It "is fashioned as an(cid:13) ‘online’ procedure administered via the Internet," Parisi,(cid:13) 139 F. Supp. 2d at 747, which does not permit discovery,(cid:13) the presentation of live testimony (absent exceptional(cid:13) circumstances), or any remedy other than the transfer or(cid:13) cancellation of the domain name in question. See UDRP(cid:13) S 4(i); David H. Bernstein, The Alphabet Soup of Domain(cid:13) Name Dispute Resolution: The UDRP and ACPA, 716 PLI/Pat(cid:13) 251, 299-300 (2002).(cid:13) To shove Dluhos’ square-peg UDRP proceeding into the(cid:13) round hole of the FAA would be to frustrate this aim, as(cid:13) judicial review of FAA-styled arbitration proceedings could(cid:13) be generously described only as extremely deferential.(cid:13) B.(cid:13) Second, because the trademark holder or the trademark(cid:13) holder’s representative is not required to avail itself of the(cid:13) dispute resolution policy before moving ahead in the district(cid:13) court, these proceedings do not qualify as the type that(cid:13) would entail a court’s compelling party participation prior(cid:13) to independent judicial review -- thus removing the(cid:13) 11(cid:13) proceeding from the warmth of the FAA blanket. UnderS 4(cid:13) of the FAA, a district court may "stay the trial of the action(cid:13) until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the(cid:13) terms of the agreement." 9 U.S.C. S 4. Although "[s]ome(cid:13) courts, relying in part on their inherent equitable powers,(cid:13) have stayed litigation and compelled participation in non-(cid:13) binding procedures so long as there are ‘reasonable(cid:13) commercial expectations’ that the procedures would‘settle’(cid:13) disputed issues," Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 750 n.10(cid:13) (quoting AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 460-461), a UDRP(cid:13) proceeding settles a disputed proceeding only to the extent(cid:13) that a season-finale cliffhanger resolves a sitcom’s storyline(cid:13) -- that is, it doesn’t. It is true that the language of the(cid:13) resolution policy describes the dispute-resolution process(cid:13) as "mandatory," but "the process is not‘mandatory’ in the(cid:13) sense that either disputant’s legal claims accrue only after(cid:13) a panel’s decision." Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 751 (quoting(cid:13) Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d at 319). Only the domain-name(cid:13) registrant is contractually obligated to participate in the(cid:13) proceeding if a complaint is filed. Even then, the panel may(cid:13) "decide the dispute based on the complaint" if the(cid:13) registrant declines to participate. UDRP S 5(e). That Dluhos(cid:13) could do precisely that by eschewing the NAF proceeding(cid:13) and filing suit in district court only demonstrates the(cid:13) dispute resolution policy’s outcome’s relative hollowness.(cid:13) Indeed, it is not the district court litigation that could be(cid:13) stayed pending dispute resolution, but rather the dispute-(cid:13) resolution mechanism itself. See UDRP S 18 (giving(cid:13) arbitration panel "the discretion to decide whether to(cid:13) suspend or terminate the administrative proceeding, or to(cid:13) proceed to a decision" while a lawsuit is pending). And that(cid:13) is exactly what the NAF panel did.(cid:13) C.(cid:13) The bottom line is that a registrant who loses a domain(cid:13) name to a trademark holder "can effectively suspend [a](cid:13) panel’s decision by filing a lawsuit in the specified(cid:13) jurisdiction and notifying the registrar in accordance with(cid:13) [UDRP S 4(k)]." Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 752. From that(cid:13) provision, it is evident that the UDRP provides" ‘parity of(cid:13) appeal,’ affording a ‘clear mechanism’ for ‘seeking judicial(cid:13) 12(cid:13) review of a decision of an administrative panel canceling or(cid:13) transferring the domain name.’ " Id. (quoting ICANN, Staff(cid:13) Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform(cid:13) Dispute Resolution Policy (Sept. 29, 1999)).(cid:13) Accordingly, we hold that UDRP proceedings do not fall(cid:13) under the Federal Arbitration Act. More specifically, judicial(cid:13) review of those decisions is not restricted to a motion to(cid:13) vacate arbitration award under S 10 of the FAA, which(cid:13) applies only to binding proceedings likely to "realistically(cid:13) settle the dispute." The district court erred in reviewing the(cid:13) domain name proceeding under limitations of FAA(cid:13) standards.(cid:13) V.(cid:13) Because the UDRP -- a private covenant -- cannot confer(cid:13) federal jurisdiction where none independently exists, the(cid:13) remaining question is whether the Congress has provided a(cid:13) cause of action to challenge its decisions. In the(cid:13) Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, we hold that(cid:13) it has.(cid:13) The ACPA, 15 U.S.C. S 1114(2)(D)(v), "provide[s](cid:13) registrants . . . with an affirmative cause of action to(cid:13) recover domain names lost in UDRP proceedings." Sallen,(cid:13) 273 F.3d at 27. Under this modern amendment to the(cid:13) Lanham Act, a registrant whose domain name has been(cid:13) "suspended, disabled, or transferred" may sue for a(cid:13) declaration that the registrant is not in violation of the Act,(cid:13) as well as for an injunction returning the domain name. 15(cid:13) U.S.C. S 1114(2)(D)(v). Congress’ authorization of the federal(cid:13) courts to "grant injunctive relief to the domain name(cid:13) registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or(cid:13) transfer of the domain name to the domain name(cid:13) registrant" gives the registrant an explicit cause of action(cid:13) through which to redress the loss of a domain name under(cid:13) the UDRP. Id.(cid:13) Once again, we must liberally construe the pro se(cid:13) litigant’s pleadings, and we will apply the applicable law,(cid:13) irrespective of whether he has mentioned it by name.(cid:13) Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal(cid:13) quotations omitted). Although Dluhos did not expressly(cid:13) 13(cid:13) invoke the ACPA, his allegations and demand for the return(cid:13) of the domain name can reasonably be construed as such(cid:13) a request; Dluhos’ end goal is the return of(cid:13) <www.leestrasberg.com> to him, bringing his cause of(cid:13) action squarely under the ACPA. Dluhos is a registrant,(cid:13) and the domain name has been transferred to the Strasberg(cid:13) defendants via a complaint by the CMG defendants and(cid:13) resulting arbitration.(cid:13) Accordingly, as to the CMG and Strasberg defendants, we(cid:13) will reverse and remand the case for further proceedings(cid:13) consistent with this opinion. This decision in no way(cid:13) reflects an intimation that the NAF panel erred in its(cid:13) judgment, but merely that UDRP resolutions do not fall(cid:13) under the limited judicial review of arbitrators of the FAA.(cid:13) VI.(cid:13) As to the remaining claims, this Court will affirm the(cid:13) dismissal of the constitutional claims against all parties --(cid:13) including, inter alia, Appellee Network Solutions, Inc. -- for(cid:13) want of state action and for failure to state a claim for(cid:13) which relief may be granted, as well as the state law claims(cid:13) against all parties. We adopt the reasoning of the district(cid:13) court in this regard. Appendix at 7-23. We need not(cid:13) address Dluhos’ claims of antitrust and federal labor law(cid:13) violations, as he has raised them for the first time on this(cid:13) appeal. See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845(cid:13) (3d Cir. 1994) ("This court has consistently held that it will(cid:13) not consider issues that are raised for the first time on(cid:13) appeal.").(cid:13) VII.(cid:13) We have considered all contentions presented by the(cid:13) parties and conclude that no further discussion is(cid:13) necessary.(cid:13) We will reverse that portion of the district court’s(cid:13) judgment against the Strasberg and CMG defendants that(cid:13) affirms the NAF-driven UDRP proceeding under FAA(cid:13) standards, and remand with a direction that the court(cid:13) review the dispute-resolution award de novo under the(cid:13) 14(cid:13) Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. We will affirm(cid:13) that portion of the district court’s judgment that dismissed(cid:13) all remaining claims against all parties.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 15