Silviа R. Cianzio, Appellant, vs. Iowa State University, State of Iowa, and Board of Regents, State of Iowa, Appellees.
No. 23-1371
In The Iowa Supreme Court
Submitted October 9, 2024—Filed December 13, 2024
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Heather Lauber, judge.
Interlocutory appeal from an order limiting a plaintiff‘s damages in a statutory wage discrimination claim. Reversed and Case Remanded.
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all participating justiсes joined. May, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Ann E. Brown (argued) of Ann Brown Legal, PC, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General; Eric Wessan, Solicitor General; Breanne A. Stoltze (argued) and Tessa M. Register (until withdrawal), Assistant Solicitors General; and Christopher J. Deist, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Silvia Cianzio was a рrofessor at Iowa State University. After her retirement, she filed this suit against Iowa State University, the Iowa Board of Regents, and the State of Iowa (collectively, “the University“). As relevant here, she alleged the University discriminated against her in the payment of wages, in violation of
I.
In reviewing the district court‘s ruling on the motion to dismiss, we take the factual allegations in the petition as true. See White v. Harkrider, 990 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Iowa 2023). Takеn as true, the petition establishes the following. Cianzio earned her Ph.D. from Iowa State University in 1978 and obtained a postdoctoral position with the school. In 1979, she was hired as an assistant professor by the Department of Agronomy. In 1984, Cianzio was promoted to associate professor. In 1995, she was promoted to professor. She held this position until she retired in December 2020. Throughout her career, Cianzio maintained a specialty in plant breeding with a focus on soybean genetics.
In 2020, prior to her retirement, Cianzio was selected to serve as the chairperson of the department‘s committee on diversity, inclusion, and equity. The dean of the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences tasked the committee with conducting an employee survey on the “climate” of the department. As part of the survey, the committee reviewed the salaries of the department‘s professors. The survey revealed that, on average, the male professors in the department were paid more than the female professors. As it related to Cianzio specifically, the survey showed her annual pay was $11,276 to $46,049 lеss than male professors in her specialty. Cianzio reported her findings to the department chair, the dean and associate dean of the college, and the Iowa State University human resources department. These officials countered that the salary differences were insignificant and that there was no need for further action.
The University filed a motion to dismiss, in part, Cianzio‘s claim arising under
Cianzio resisted the motion. She argued that the statute of limitations was not relevant here and that the 300-day limitation period in
(9) For an unfair or discriminatory practice relating to wage discrimination pursuant to section 216.6A, payment to the complainant of damages for an injury caused by the discriminatory or unfair practice which damages shall include but are not limited to court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and either of the following:
(a) An amount equal to two times the wage differential paid to another employee compared to the complainant for the period of time for which the complainant has been discriminated against.
(b) In instances of willful violation, an amount equal to three times the wage differential paid to another employee as compared to the complainant for the period of time for which the complainant has been discriminated against.
The district court granted the University‘s motion in part, but it did so on a ground not raised or briefed by the parties. The district court reasoned that
II.
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation and construction, and “our review is for the correction of errors at law.” Doe v. State, 943 N.W.2d 608, 609 (Iowa 2020). Our task is “to determine the ordinary and fair meaning” of the statutes at issue. Id. at 610; see also State v. Davis, 922 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Iowa 2019) (“We give words their ordinary meaning absent legislative definition.“); Marshall v. State (In re Marshall), 805 N.W.2d 145, 158 (Iowa 2011) (“We should give the language of the statute its fair meaning, but should not extend its reach beyond its express terms.“); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012) (defining “fair reading method” as “determining the application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued“). We consider the relevant statutes as a whole and in context, “not just isolated words and phrases.” Doe, 943 N.W.2d at 610 (quoting Iowa Dep‘t of Hum. Servs. v. Lohman (In re Est. of Melby), 841 N.W.2d 867, 879 (Iowa 2014)). In conducting our analysis, “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1899)).
III.
The question presented in this interlocutory appeal is for what period can Cianzio seek damages for the University‘s allegedly discriminatory pay practices in violation of
The answer tо the question presented becomes clear once a point of confusion is clarified.
Consider, for example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII has its own statute of limitations. See
(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment prаctice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this subchapter, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.
The same is true under Iowa law. Within months after Congress passed the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Iowa passed its own equal pay law. See 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 96, § 2 (codified at
b. For purposes of this subsection, an unfair or discriminatory practice occurs when a discriminatory pay decision or
other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory pay decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory pay decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.
With that clarification regarding the distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes governing damages, the answer to the question presented becomes clear. The statute рroviding the remedies for violations of
Engrafting a temporal limitation on the statutory damages provision is particularly inappropriate here because the legislature largely adopted the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act but omitted the language limiting damages for backpay awards to two years. Generally, we can infer such an omission was intеntional and signals the statutory provision, as modified, means something different. Cf. Roberts v. Roberts, 6 N.W.3d 730, 737 (Iowa 2024) (“[W]hen our legislature has varied our statute from portions of a model act, the statute cannot be interpreted consistently with the model act in its entirety.” (quoting State v. Olsen, 618 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Iowa 2000) (en banc))); Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Sols., LLC, 897 N.W.2d 553, 610 (Iowa 2017) (Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“When there are textual differences between the ICRA and federal civil rights statutes, . . . . the modeled-aftеr or mirror declarations have no application, and indeed an opposite conclusion may be more appropriate, namely, that differences in text are deliberate and substantive.“); Homan v. Branstad, 887 N.W.2d 153, 172 (Iowa 2016) (“The general assembly can express its intent by omission, and we cannot ‘enlarge or otherwise change the terms of a statute as the legislature adopted it.’ ” (quoting Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa 1995))).
Generally, when we conclude the express language of the statute is plain and the meaning is clear, we need not proceed any further with our analysis. State v. McCollaugh, 5 N.W.3d 620, 623 (Iowa 2024) (“Our inquiry ends if we find no ambiguity because we do not search for the meaning of a statute ‘beyond the express language of a statute when that language
Our interpretation of the damages statute is also consistent with what other courts have done in similar circumstances. Federal district courts in Iowa have reached the same conclusion we do today regarding claims for wage discrimination under Iowa law. See Order Granting in Part & Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 14, Rife v. Allsteel, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-00023-RGE-CFB (S.D. Iowa July 15, 2020), ECF No. 70 (“The Iowa Supreme Court‘s interpretation and the plain language of
In sum, we hold the district court erred in concluding thаt Cianzio‘s damages for any alleged violations of
For these reasons, we reverse the district court‘s order granting the University‘s motion to dismiss in part and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and Case Remanded.
All justices concur except May, J., who takes no part.