OPINION
delivered the opinion of the court,
We accepted a question certified to this Court from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee to clarify the operation of the statute of limitations for discriminatory pay claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. After considering the arguments of the parties and the applicable authority, we hold that a claim of discriminatory pay may be brought at any time within one year that a plaintiff has received discriminatory pay and that backpаy is available for the duration of the unequal pay.
Background
The facts as stated in the federal district court’s certification order include the following. Plaintiff Paula P. King Booker (“Booker”) went to work for the Boeing *642 Company, d/b/a Boeing-Oak Ridge Company (“Boeing”), as an hourly employee in 1982. In 1989, she was promoted to a salaried managerial position in “Supply Chain Management” and has remained in essentially the same position ever since. In 1997, she discovered that she was being paid less thаn her male peers. On August 10, 1998, Booker filed an internal equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) complaint. Lacking satisfactory resolution, on July 2, 1999, Booker filed a complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). On May 1, 2001, Booker filed this lawsuit in Anderson County Chancery Court seeking relief under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 4-21-101 to -1004 (2005) (“THRA”), including backpay to 1989.
The case was removed to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Among the disputed issues before that court is whether the THRA’s statute of limitations permits Booker to recover backpay to 1989, when she became a manager, or only to 2000, one year prior to the date she filed her lawsuit.
To aid in resolving the dispute, the district court certified the following question to this Court:
Whether a discriminatory salary “ceases” within the plain meaning of the Tennessee Human Rights Act’s statute of limitations when it ends, or whether it “ceases” when the alleged discriminatory act should trigger an emрloyee’s awareness of a duty to assert his or her rights.
We accepted the certified question.
Analysis
The THRA’s statute of limitations provides, “[a] civil cause of action under this section shall be filed in chancery court or circuit court within one (1) year after the alleged discriminatory practice ceases-” Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-311(d) (2005). Booker argues that the “alleged discriminatory practice” in this case, unequal pay based on gender, began in 1989 and had not yet ceased as of the time she filed her lawsuit. Thus, Booker argues that the THRA permits her to recover backpay to 1989. Boeing argues that each unequal paycheck Booker received was a separate and discrete discriminatory act such that Booker may only recover back-pay for paychecks received within one year of the date she filed suit.
We note at the outset that the certified question as articulated by the district court does not capture the full dispute between the parties regarding the THRA’s statute of limitatiоns. The question as certified essentially asks whether a plaintiffs relief may be limited if she fails to file suit upon learning of a discriminatory practice, even though the discriminatory practice may not yet have “ceased.” In other words, must a plaintiff file her suit within one year of her discovery of an allegedly discriminatory practice to recover damages for the entire practice, or does she have until one year after the discriminatory practice ceasеs? In this case, Booker became aware of the pay disparity in 1997 but did not file her suit until 2001. If the discovery rule operates to make her suit for relief to 1989 untimely, she would be limited to seeking relief for only the year prior to the date she filed suit.
The question as certified assumes that pursuant to the “continuing violation” doctrine, unequal pay is a single discriminatory practice under the THRA rather than a series of discrete discriminatory acts. Boeing argues, however, that in light of recent federal сase law this Court should hold that the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable to pay discrimination cases. Therefore, Boeing argues that under no *643 circumstances should Booker be permitted to seek backpay for any period longer than one year prior to the date she filed suit. Booker argues that this Court should modify the continuing violation doctrine, but that it should hold that it is applicable to pay discrimination claims.
Continuing Violation Doctrine
The continuing violation doctrine essentially allоws a plaintiff to bring a claim for discriminatory conduct that occurs outside the limitations period if the discriminatory conduct is sufficiently related to conduct occurring within the limitations period.
Spicer v. Beaman Bottling Co.,
The continuing viоlation doctrine was developed by federal courts interpreting federal anti-discrimination statutes, particularly Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”).
See, e.g., Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U.,
Courts have recognized ... only two narrowly limited instances in which the continuing violation doctrine applies. The first category arises where there is some evidence of present discriminatory activity giving rise to a claim of a continuing violation, for example where an employer continues to presently impose disparate work assignment[s] or pay rates between similarly situated employee groups. Key to establishing this exception is proof that at least one of the forbidden discriminatory acts occurred within the relevant limitations period.
The second category of “continuing violation” arises where there has been a longstanding and demonstrable policy of discrimination such as an established and repeated pattern of paying men more than women. To constitute such an established pattern, the plaintiff must clearly demonstrate some “overarching policy of discrimination,” and not merely the occurrence of an isolated incident of discriminatory conduct.
Spicer at 889-90 (citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
As thesе examples illustrate, perhaps the most important factor supporting use of the continuing violation doctrine in employment discrimination cases is the fact that “many discriminatory acts cannot be viewed as discrete incidents, and often unfold rather than occur, making it difficult to precisely pinpoint the time when they take place.” Id. at 889 (citation omitted). As this statement implicitly recognized, the doctrine does not apply to *644 “discrete incidents” or individual acts of discriminаtion. Rather, the continuing violation doctrine applies when the discriminatory acts take place over time.
Noting that “application of the continuing violation doctrine is not always clear and simple,”
id.
at 889, we adopted the doctrine as articulated by the Fifth Circuit in
Berry. Spicer,
The THRA’s Statute of Limitations
As originally enacted, the THRA did not contain а statute of limitations.
See
1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 748, § 2. Courts applied to THRA claims the one-year statute of limitations for “[cjivil actions for compensatory or punitive damages, or both, brought under the federal civil rights statutes” set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(a)(3).
See Spicer,
We noted in
Spicer
that the THRA’s then-newly-enactеd statute of limitations “apparently incorporates the continuing violation exception....’”
Spicer,
Shortly after our decision in
Spicer,
we addressed the proper framework for analyzing the THRA’s new statute of limitations in
Weber.
In
Weber,
the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his job because he refused to follow his em
*645
ployer’s racially-diseriminatory hiring policy. The plaintiff was orally informed of the termination in early August of 1992, the termination was effective on August 31, 1992, and the plaintiff received written notice of termination оn or after September 1, 1992. The plaintiff filed suit on August 31, 1993.
We held that because the statute of limitations directs that suits be filed within one year of when the “alleged discriminatory practice ceases ... we must first identify the alleged discriminatory practice.” Id. at 390. The Court identified the discriminatory practice in Weber as the decision to terminate the plaintiff, rather than the termination itself. Therefore, the Court stated that the next step was to “determine the date on which the discriminatory practice ended,” or ceased. Id. The plaintiff argued that the discriminatory practice did not cease until he received written notice of his termination, on or after September 1, 1992. The defendant employer argued that the discriminatory practice ended on the date in early August when the plaintiff was orally advised of the decision to terminate his employment.
The Court agreed with the employer and held that the suit was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Looking to analogous cases decided under federal law, we emphasized that “a discriminatory termination ceases and is complete[] when the plaintiff is given unequivocal notice of the employer’s termination decision, even if employment does not cease until a designated date in the future.”
Id.
at 391-92. We explained that, “ ‘the proper focus is on the time of the
discriminatory act
not the point at which the
consequences
of the act become painful/ ”
Id.
at 391 (quoting
Chardon v. Fernandez,
The United States Supreme Court’s Morgan Decision
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court clarified that under federal law, the continuing violation doctrine is likewise not applicable to extend Title VII’s statute of limitations where a plaintiff alleges “discrete incidents” of discrimination. In
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Court did not explicitly approve or disapprove the use of the continuing violation doctrine. Rather, relying on Title VII’s prohibition of unlaw
*646
ful employment “practices,” the Court drew a distinction between hostile environment claims, which are “a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice,’ ” and “discrete acts” of discrimination, which constitute a single, identifiable prohibited “practice.”
Id.
at 114-17,
The Court explained that in the case of hostile environment claims, “[p]ro-vided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing periоd, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.”
Id.
at 117,
A hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one “unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). The timely filing provision only requires that a Title VII plaintiff file а charge within a certain number of days after the unlawful practice happened. It does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time period. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.
Id.
at 117,
In contrast, the Court held that where the alleged discriminatory practice is a “[discrete act[] such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire,” each alleged aсt of discrimination must be evaluated independently to determine whether it occurred within the limitations period.
Id.
at 114,
We have repeatedly interpreted the term “practice” to aрply to a discrete act or single “occurrence,” even when it has a connection to other acts. For example ... in Bazemore v. Friday,478 U.S. 385 ,106 S.Ct. 3000 ,92 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986) (per curiam), a pattern-or-practice case, when considering a discriminatory salary structure, the Court noted that although the salary discrimination began prior to the date that the act was actionable under Title VII, “[e]ach week’s paycheck that delivered] less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII.... ” Id. at 395,106 S.Ct. 3000 .
Id.
at 111-12,
*647
Since
Morgan,
a number of federal courts have held that pay discrimination claims involve “discrete acts” of discrimination such that plaintiffs are limited to recovering damages for only the discriminatory acts occurring within the limitations period.
See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
Because it essentially eliminated the continuing violation doctrine,
Morgan
is of limited use to us in interpreting the THRA, since the THRA’s statute of limitations inсorporates the continuing violation exception. TenmCode Ann. § 4-21-311(d);
Spicer,
Is Discriminatory Pay a Continuing Violation under the THRA?
Boeing argues that because the THRA is meant to conform to Title VII, this Court should adopt the federal courts’ reasoning that discriminatory pay is not a continuing violation. Booker argues that although Tennessee courts use federal civil rights law as a guide, this Court is not bound by federal civil rights law where the language of the THRA compels a different result. Specifically, Booker argues that because the THRA’s statute of limitations provides that suits must be filed within one year of when the “alleged discriminatory practice ceases,” Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-311(d) (emphasis added), we should not adopt the federal courts’ severe restriction of the continuing violation doctrine.
Although Boeing is correct that the purpose of the THRA is to “[pjrovide for execution within Tennessee of the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Acts,” Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-101(a)(l) (2005), as we have discussed, “we are neithеr bound by nor restricted by the federal law when interpreting our own anti-discrimination laws.”
Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
Moreover, the THRA’s statute of limitations is fundamentally different than Title VII’s statute of limitations. Title VII provides that a charge of discrimination must be filed within a set period “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C.2000e-5(e)(l) (emphasis added). The THRA provides that a suit must be filed “within one (1) year after the alleged discriminatory practice ceases.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-311(d) (emphasis added). Boeing argues that the difference between the words “occurred” and “ceases” is immaterial, arguing that any practice that has alreаdy “occurred” must by definition have “ceased.” However, Boeing’s argument ignores the fact that “cease” and “occurred” have entirely different meanings. To “cease” means “to bring or come to an end; stop; discontinue.” Webster’s New World Dictionary (2d ed.1980). “Occurred,” on the other hand, means “to take place; happen.” Id. Thus, “occurred” connotes and contemplates a single instance, whereas “ceases” connotes and contemplates an ongoing course of conduсt. In stating that a claim must be brought within one year of the time a practice “ceases,” as we have explained, the Legislature incorporated the continuing violation exception into the statute of limitations. Therefore, rather than accepting the federal courts’ limitation on the continuing violation doctrine, we must conduct our own analysis.
Boeing argues that pay discrimination is not a continuing violation because each payment is a discrete discriminatory act that “ceased” at the time the payment was made. In our view, however, a discriminatory pay rate is not a discrete act in the same sense that a termination or a denial of promotion is a discrete act. Something is “discrete” if it is “separate and distinct; not attached to others; unrelated.”
Id.
Payments of a salary are not “distinct or unconnected.” Rather, they are part of an ongoing course of conduct. We do not hold that a single discriminatory paycheck does not constitute a discriminatory act. It does. But in our view, a discriminatory pay rate, whether it occurs for two weeks, two years, or more, constitutes precisely the type of continuing violation envisioned by the Legislature in enacting the THRA’s statute of limitations. Indeed, we recognized as much in
Spicer
when we cited as an example of a continuing violation, “an employer [who] continues to presently impose disparate work assignment or
pay rates.”
Under the continuing violation doctrine as adopted in
Spicer,
a plaintiff must bring suit when the discriminatory “ ‘act ha[s] the degree of permanence which should trigger [the] employee’s awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights-’”
Spicer,
*649 We overrule Spicer to the extent that it imposed a “discovery rule” on continuing violation claims. However, we note that employers may still invoke equitable doctrines such as laches and estoppel to limit claims in cases where an employee has slept on his or her rights.
Conclusion
After considering the applicable authority and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that discriminatory pay is a continuing violation under the THRA. We further conclude that a plaintiff may seek backpay for the duration of the practice, until it “ceаses,” although equitable doctrines may bar some or all of the plaintiffs relief. Costs of the appeal shall be assessed to the appellee, the Boeing Company, d/b/a Boeing-Oak Ridge Company.
Notes
. Although we approved the continuing violation doctrine in Spicer, we held that the plaintiff in that case could not invoke it because the evidence did not show that any instances of discrimination had occurred within the one-year limitations period. Id. at 890-91.
. Morgan
did, however, save the question of what effect its holding would have on pattern- and-practice claims, noting that "none are at issue here.”