JANE DOE, Plaintiff, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Defendant.
No. 19–1402
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
Filed May 22, 2020
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A. Price, District Associate Judge.
The petitioner seeks review of a district court order denying her application for expungement of the record of a dismissed criminal case. WRIT SUSTAINED AND CASE REMANDED.
Andrew Duffelmeyer (until withdrawal) and Robert J. Poggenklass (until withdrawal), and Alexander Vincent Kornya of Iowa Legal Aid, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney General, and John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, for appellee.
In 2011, Jane Doe was charged with one count of unauthorized use of a credit card. The charge was dismissed. In 2019, having satisfied all of her financial obligations in the dismissed case, Doe filed an application to expunge the criminal record pursuant to
Before addressing the merits, we first address a jurisdictional issue. The State contends this court lacks jurisdiction over the case because an order denying an application for expungement is not appealable
Turning to the merits of the case, in questions of statutory interpretation, “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1899). This is necessarily a textual inquiry as only the text of a piece of legislation is enacted into law. Any interpretive inquiry thus begins with the language of the statute at issue. See Doe, 903 N.W.2d at 350. Using traditional interpretive tools, we seek to determine the ordinary and fair meaning of the statutory language at issue. See State v. Davis, 922 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Iowa 2019) (“We give words their ordinary meaning absent legislative definition.“); In re Marshall, 805 N.W.2d 145, 158 (Iowa 2011) (“We should give the language of the statute its fair meaning, but should not extend its reach beyond its express terms.“); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012) [hereinafter Scalia & Garner, Reading Law] (defining “fair reading method” as “determining the application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued“). In determining the ordinary and fair meaning of the statutory language at issue, we take into consideration the language‘s relationship to other provisions of the same statute and other provisions of related statutes. See
We begin our inquiry in this case with the language of the statute as a whole. See State v. Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 2017) (“Interpreting a statute requires us to assess it in its entirety to ensure our interpretation is harmonious with the statute as a whole rather than assessing isolated words or phrases.“); In re Estate of Melby, 841 N.W.2d 867, 879 (Iowa 2014) (“When construing statutes, we assess not just isolated words and phrases, but statutes in their entirety . . . .“); Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 167 (“Perhaps no interpretive fault is more common than the failure to follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.“).
1. a. Except as provided in paragraph ”b“, upon application of a defendant . . . in a criminal case . . . the court shall enter an order expunging the record of such criminal case if the court finds that the defendant has established that all of the following have occurred, as applicable:
(1) The criminal case contains one or more criminal charges in which an acquittal was entered for all criminal charges, or in which all criminal charges were otherwise dismissed.
(2) All court costs, fees, and other financial obligations ordered by the court or assessed by the clerk of the district court have been paid.
(3) A minimum of one hundred eighty days have passed since entry of the judgment of acquittal or of the order dismissing the case relating to all criminal charges, unless the court finds good cause to waive this requirement for reasons including but not limited to the fact that the defendant was the victim of identity theft or mistaken identity.
(4) The case was not dismissed due to the defendant being found not guilty by reason of insanity.
(5) The defendant was not found incompetent to stand trial in the case.
b. The court shall not enter an order expunging the record of a criminal case under paragraph ”a” unless all the parties in the case have had time to object on the grounds that one or more the relevant conditions in paragraph ”a” have not been established.
When the statute is considered as a whole, it is apparent the statute is concerned with only the singular case for which expungement is sought. The application for expungement must be filed in “a criminal case“—singular.
The text of the subsection at issue also relates only to the record of the singular criminal case in which the application for expungement was filed and for which expungement was sought. The text provides the defendant must establish as a prerequisite to expungement that “[a]ll court costs, fees, and other financial obligations ordered by the court or assessed by the
An additional textual consideration shows the provision at issue refers only to the criminal case in which the application for expungement was filed.
In addition to these textual considerations, we must also recognize the statute has the patina of prior judicial interpretation. In Doe, the defendant was charged with several aggravated misdemeanors in one trial information and a simple misdemeanor in a separate complaint with all charges arising out of the same operative facts. See Doe, 903 N.W.2d at 349. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant in that case pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense of one count in the trial information, and the district court dismissed the remainder of the charges, including the separate simple misdemeanor. See id. Doe subsequently sought expungement of the record of the simple misdemeanor charge. See id. “The fighting issue . . . [was] the meaning of ‘case’ as used in
The State resists the conclusion that
We find the State‘s interpretation of the statute unconvincing. First, the State ignores the structure of the statute as whole. “[W]e read statutes as a whole rather than looking at words and phrases in isolation.” Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of Iowa Ass‘n for Justice, 867 N.W.2d 58, 72 (Iowa 2015). When an entire statute relates only to a single specific subject, it seems reasonable to conclude that all provisions in the statute relate to the same subject as a matter of structure and purpose. See Den Hartog v. City of Waterloo, 847 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Iowa 2014) (“We have often explained we construe statutory phrases not by assessing solely words and phrases in isolation, but instead by incorporating considerations of the structure and purpose of the statute in its entirety.“). For example, in Iowa Insurance Institute we concluded a statute that “waive[d] any privilege for the release of . . . information” did not constitute a waiver of work product. Iowa Ins. Inst., 867 N.W.2d at 75. We concluded, instead, the statute related only to a waiver of protection for medical information because when the statute was considered as a whole “all the other subsections relate[d] to health care services.” Id. at 72. Similarly, here, the fact that the statute as a whole relates only to the particular case in which the application for expungement was filed counsels in favor of reading
Second, we disagree with the State‘s purposive interpretation of the statute. It is certainly true one of the critical aspects of statutory interpretation is to determine the purpose of a statute. The purpose of a statute, however, is primarily determined from the language of the statute itself. See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373, 106 S. Ct. 681, 688 (1986) (“The ‘plain purpose’ of legislation, however, is determined in the first instance with reference to the plain language of the statute itself.“). Here, the language of the statute does not support the conclusion that the purpose of the statute is to incent the payment of court-ordered financial obligations to the particular county where the application for expungement was filed. Nowhere does the statute indicate the relevant consideration for expungement is the defendant‘s total court-ordered financial obligations to the particular county in which the application was filed. The statute does not even use the word “county.”
In our view, the State‘s interpretation is actually contrary to the purpose of the statute. “[A] driving concern behind chapter 901C was that a member of the general public—such as an employer doing an informal background check—could access our computerized docket and potentially draw inappropriate inferences from the mere presence of a criminal file relating to an individual, even though the criminal charges were dismissed or the individual was acquitted.” Doe, 903 N.W.2d at 354. To avoid these inappropriate inferences and other “stigma,” the statute was enacted to facilitate the expungement of the record in criminal cases in which the defendant was acquitted or the case was dismissed. Id. Requiring a defendant to satisfy financial
Consider an example.
We do not see how including civil obligations within the meaning of the statute in any way advances or even remotely relates to the expressed statutory purpose of allowing a defendant to expunge the record of a criminal case in which the defendant was accused but not convicted of a crime. We do understand, however, why the statute would require the defendant to satisfy the financial obligation in the particular case at issue—(1) the legislature wanted to ensure a defendant paid his or her obligations in the case at issue before being allowed to exercise the right of expungement; and (2) after expungement, it would be practically impossible to collect the defendant‘s court-ordered financial obligations in the expunged case. The lack of any nexus between the State‘s proposed interpretation of the statutory text and the clear purpose of the statute militates against the State‘s interpretation.
In sum,
For these reasons, the district court erred in concluding
We grant Doe‘s petition for writ of certiorari, sustain the writ, and vacate the order of the district court. We remand this matter for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
WRIT SUSTAINED AND CASE REMANDED.
Doe v. State
#19–1402
APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the result in this case. It seems to me the best interpretation of the statute is that the payment of restitution in the case at hand is all that is required for expungement. I think the State‘s interpretation of “all” in the statute is not entirely unreasonable and therefore gives rise to a degree of ambiguity. But the State‘s position is unpersuasive. I come to this conclusion in part because of the language of the statute, as ably canvassed by the majority, but also in part because the clear legislative purpose of this remedial statute would be substantially undermined by the State‘s interpretation of the statute. Further, there are no persuasive countervailing arguments to the majority‘s interpretation based upon, for example, any germane legislative history or significant linguistic departure from a model statute. So, for me, it is a combination of text, purpose, and absence of meaningful countervailing considerations, that drives the result.
In reaching this result, I do not endorse any sweeping methodological statements about textualism as the proper approach to statutory interpretation. I fully agree that the starting point of analysis of any statute is the language. Analysis of the language matters, and here, the case against the State‘s interpretation is fairly strong.
But textual analysis is often not the be-all and end-all of statutory interpretation and is merely the starting point. Commentators have noted the difficulty in relying solely on textual analysis, or so called “plain meaning.” See, e.g., State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (N.M. 1994) (urging caution in applying the plain-meaning rule, stating that “[i]ts beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute‘s meaning“); 2A Norman Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.1 (7th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2019) (describing issues inherent in the plain-meaning rule in application); see generally Michael R. Merz, The Meaninglessness of the Plain Meaning Rule, 4 U. Dayton L. Rev. 31 (1979) (critiquing the plain meaning rule and proposing alternative methods of statutory interpretation). A quick look at the legal encyclopedia Words and Phrases reveals that many frequently used verbal expressions are ambiguous and have multiple meanings. Ambiguity arises from not only the meaning of particular words, but also “from the general scope and meaning of a statute when all its provisions are examined.” Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1995). Further, statutory terms cannot always be taken literally when considered in context. See Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of Iowa Ass‘n for Justice, 867 N.W.2d 58, 72 (Iowa 2015) (“[E]ven if the meaning of words might seem clear on their face, their context can create ambiguity.“). Sometimes the text pushes us toward absurd results that rightly drive the interpretation away from textual literalism. Mall Real Estate, L.L.C. v. City of Hamburg, 818 N.W.2d 190, 199 (Iowa 2012) (stating that, while the canon of construction noscitur a sociis would ordinarily apply, “we cannot apply this canon if its application thwarts legislative intent or makes the general words meaningless“).
Because of the challenges of statutory interpretation, we have a long history of looking to legislative history and statutory purposes as so-called “extrinsic aids” in determining the proper approach to statutory
I have no objection to the result reached in this case; but for me it is a combination of text, purpose, and absence of countervailing argument that reaches that result. I arrive at that decision in its full statutory context. If we are to do our jobs, we judges must continue to have the full panoply of intrinsic and extrinsic tools available to us when confronted with difficult issues of legislative interpretation. Sometimes the text will control. In those cases, there will rarely be appeals. If such cases are appealed, they are handled crisply. But when difficult questions of statutory interpretation arise, we will need a complete toolbox to make the best choices through the art of legislative interpretation.
Notes
If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the legislature, may consider among other matters:
1. The object sought to be attained.
2. The circumstances under which the statute was enacted.
3. The legislative history.
4. The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects.
5. The consequences of a particular construction.
6. The administrative construction of the statute.
7. The preamble or statement of policy.”