STATE OF IOWA v. JESSE LEE MCCOLLAUGH
No. 23-0600
Supreme Court of Iowa
April 19, 2024
Submitted March 20, 2024
Appellee,
vs.
Appellant.
A defendant appeals his conviction for child exploitation. AFFIRMED.
Oxley, J.,
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
OXLEY, Justice.
The crime of child exploitation includes possessing a visual depiction of a minor engaged in a “prohibited sexual act,” which is defined to include the “[n]udity of a minor for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of a person who may view a visual depiction of the nude minor.”
I.
On April 7, 2022, Jesse McCollaugh arrived home from a work trip, and his wife, Raylee McCollaugh, helped him unpack his bags. While unpacking, Raylee discovered three cell phones inside his bag. She found a substantial amount of pornography on one of the phones, which included videos of her mother and younger sister that had been secretly recorded by her husband years prior. There were two videos of Raylee‘s younger sister using the bathroom. The videos were filmed through an outside window and were timestamped July 8, 2017—when her sister would have been only 15 years old. The videos show Raylee‘s sister urinating and then wiping—revealing her genitalia in the process—clearly unaware of the fact that she was being filmed.
After she discovered the videos, Raylee immediately confronted her husband, who admitted to recording the videos of her sister when the couple was living with Raylee‘s mother and sister in Boone, Iowa. He also admitted that he had a sexual problem. Following her husband‘s admission, Raylee contacted law enforcement and turned the phone over to police on April 10, 2022, who secured a search warrant to search its contents. Law enforcement discovered the videos of Raylee‘s sister in the bathroom on the phone, which confirmed the information Raylee provided. As a result of the investigation, McCollaugh was charged on November 17 with one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of
McCollaugh waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to a bench trial on the minutes of testimony, which was held on March 1, 2023. On March 3, the district court filed its verdict finding McCollaugh guilty as charged. The sentencing hearing was held on April 11, and the district court ordered McCollaugh to serve an indeterminate prison term not to exceed two years. The sentencing order also required McCollaugh to register as a sex offender. Now, McCollaugh appeals his conviction, sentence, and judgment.
On appeal, McCollaugh challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, arguing that it fails to establish that the victim had the purpose of engaging in nudity to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of a person who may view the visual depiction, as he argues is required by
II.
Both sufficiency of the evidence challenges and claims involving statutory interpretation are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012); Doe v. State, 943 N.W.2d 608, 609 (Iowa 2020).
A.
The language of the statutory provisions at issue furnishes the necessary starting point for our analysis.
“The first step in our statutory interpretation analysis is to determine whether the statute is ambiguous.” State v. Zacarias, 958 N.W.2d 573, 581 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Ross, 941 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Iowa 2020)). Our inquiry ends if we find no ambiguity because we do not search for the meaning of a statute “beyond the express language of a statute when that language is plain and the meaning is clear.” McGill v. Fish, 790 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Iowa 2010). When the general assembly chooses to act as its own lexicographer, we are normally bound by its definitions, even if they do not coincide with dictionary or common law definitions. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep‘t of Revenue, 789 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2010) (acknowledging the significance of the general assembly‘s choice to define words used within a statute).
Here, it is unnecessary for us to look beyond the statutory language to resolve this case. We agree with the State that a plain reading of the two statutory provisions reveals that the relevant “purpose” that the State must prove is identified after the word “purpose” in the definition, not before. See
Even considering McCollaugh‘s historical account of the statute‘s evolution, we are unconvinced by his argument. The general assembly extended sexual exploitation of a minor to include the mere possession of imagery depicting a child engaged in a sexual act, and it chose to define “prohibited sexual act” to include “[n]udity of a minor for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of a person who may view a visual depiction of the nude minor.”
Reading
For example, paragraph (b) defines “prohibited sexual act” to include “[a]n act of bestiality involving a minor.”
Conversely, in addition to paragraph (g), the phrase “for the purpose of” is also found in paragraphs (e) and (f). See
Giving the identical language addressing purpose operative effect in each of the paragraphs containing the “for the purpose of” condition further refutes McCollaugh‘s argument here. Requiring the State to prove the minor engaged in the identified act for the specific purpose of arousing the viewer‘s sexual desires would lead to absurd results when applied to paragraphs (e) and (f). For example, under McCollaugh‘s interpretation, visual depictions of a person inflicting sadomasochistic abuse upon a minor would only constitute a prohibited sexual act if the state proved that the minor‘s purpose in engaging in the abuse was to arouse the sexual desires of a person who may view the depiction. See
Paragraph (e) solely targets the unilateral conduct of a person other than the minor, and the nature of that conduct—sadomasochistic abuse inflicted on the minor—renders inquiry into the minor‘s purpose nonsensical. See
Our decision today is consistent with our prior caselaw. In State v. Hunter, we considered a constitutional challenge to
McCollaugh attempts to distinguish Hunter by arguing that we did not squarely determine the issue presented in this case because our consideration of the defendant‘s vagueness claim focused solely on whether the statutory language adequately alerted him that his conduct was prohibited, a claim we rejected based on the circumstances surrounding his actions. Id. at 465-66. We are not convinced by McCollaugh‘s argument. The scienter requirement was necessary to our rejection of a vagueness challenge, and the scienter requirement we identified was “for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of a person who may view a depiction of the nude minor.” Id. at 466 (quoting
the purpose phrase identifies the defendant‘s scienter, not the victim‘s purpose for being nude. See 550 N.W.2d at 465-66.
McCollaugh also asserts that we considered the victim‘s purpose in Hunter when we noted that she posed provocatively for the photographs. See id. at 462. McCollaugh mischaracterizes our discussion of the photos in that case. First, there is no indication that the victim posed herself—as opposed to the defendant posing her—for the pictures. Id. at 462, 466. Second, the fact that the victim was in provocative poses was not critical to our holding. To the contrary, we explicitly concluded that the “purpose” language imposed an element of scienter, making clear that the relevant purpose was that of the defendant, not of the victim. See id. at 466. McCollaugh‘s position is inconsistent with our holding in Hunter, and we have no intention of walking back the scienter requirement we identified there.
The out-of-state cases cited by McCollaugh reinforce our interpretation. Each case interpreted statutory language that differed in a material way from
Based on the foregoing discussion, we reject McCollaugh‘s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence because the statute does not require the State to prove the minor‘s purpose as an element of the offense. With this understanding of the statute, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to prove McCollaugh‘s purpose for taking the videos was for his sexual gratification based on the videos being found among other pornography, the secret nature of the filming, and McCollaugh‘s admission that “he had a sexual problem” when confronted by his wife. We affirm his conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor.
B.
The second issue raised on appeal concerns the district court‘s consideration of and reliance on an improper factor in its sentencing order. We review sentences imposed in criminal cases for correction of errors at law. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “A sentencing court‘s decision to impose a specific sentence that falls within the statutory limits ‘is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.‘” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105-06 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724). “We afford sentencing judges a significant amount of latitude because of the ‘discretionary nature of judging and the source of respect afforded by the appellate process.‘” Id. at 106 (quoting Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725).
To establish reversible error based on an improper sentencing factor, the defendant is required to show that the court was not just merely aware of the factor, but that it relied on the factor in determining its sentence. State v. Ashley, 462 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Iowa 1990). When that showing is made, “[w]e cannot speculate about the weight a sentencing court assigned to an improper consideration[,] and the defendant‘s sentences must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.” State v. Gonzalez, 582 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1998) (per curiam). The sentence ordered by the district court in this case was within the statutory limits, so there is a strong presumption in favor of the sentence that can only be overcome by an affirmative showing that the district court relied on improper evidence. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105-06.
Here, McCollaugh argues that the State presented unproven facts during the sentencing hearing when it stated that “[w]e don‘t know how often he viewed [the videos]. It could have been every day.” McCollaugh argues that this amounts to improper evidence because nothing in the record establishes whether he ever viewed the videos at all. Furthermore, he contends that the district court‘s statement that the sentence was “based on all of the things we‘ve talked about here,” and its failure to disavow the prosecutor‘s comments—when taken together—clearly establish that the court actually considered and relied on the unsupported fact in determining its sentence. In response, the
Considering the respective positions, we conclude that McCollaugh cannot make the necessary showing from the record presented. In its sentencing order, the district court explicitly delineated the reasons for the sentence and never mentioned the comment made by the prosecutor during the sentencing hearing. Furthermore, we agree with the State that the district court‘s statement about considering “all of the things” does not support McCollaugh‘s position. In fact, reading that statement within the context in which it was made reveals that the district court did not consider the unproven fact mentioned by the prosecutor. Therefore, we conclude that the district court properly exercised its sentencing discretion.
III.
McCollaugh‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.