Sheldon Turner v. U.S. Attorney GeneralSheldon Turner v. U.S. Attorney General
[PUBLISH]
Opinion of the Court
We vacate the opinion issued on January 30, 2025, and reported at 127 F.4th 878 (11th Cir. 2025), and substitute this opinion in its place.
This case of first impression requires us to decide a statutory question of derivative citizenship under former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Sheldon Turner petitions for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge‘s (IJ) order of removal. The BIA determined that Turner did not derive citizenship from his mother‘s naturalization. It reasoned that the single parent derivative citizenship subsection on which Turner relied, former
I.
The following facts are undisputed for purposes of this appeal.
Turner was born in Jamaica in 1981 to Desmond and Roslyn Turner, both Jamaican citizens. Desmond and Roslyn were married at the time of Turner‘s birth.1 In 1987, Desmond and Roslyn divorced. About six months after the divorce, Roslyn married a U.S. citizen in Florida named M.C. Anderson. Two years later, in 1990, and at the age of eight, Turner was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident.
Turner‘s mother, Roslyn, remained married to M.C. Anderson until their divorce in 1993. Roughly a year later in 1994, Roslyn remarried Desmond, Turner‘s father and Roslyn‘s former husband. Turner was twelve when his parents remarried.2
In 1999, after Turner‘s parents remarried, Turner‘s mother naturalized as a U.S. citizen. The naturalization certificate indicаtes Roslyn‘s marital status as married.
In 2016, Turner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. That felony conviction—classified without dispute as an aggravated felony under
In August 2020, Turner moved to terminate removal proceedings. Turner argued that he derived U.S. citizenship based on his mother‘s naturalization in 1999, citing the conditions for automatic citizenship in former
The IJ held a final hearing in December 2020.3 In an oral decision reduced to writing, the IJ denied the motion to terminate, sustained the NTA, and ordered Turner‘s removal to Jamaica. After making factual findings not contested in this appeal, the IJ explained that Turner did not derive citizenship from his mother when she naturalized in 1999 because she was married to Turner‘s father at the time of naturalization and hence did not satisfy the continuing legal-separation condition in
Turner appealed unsuccessfully to the BIA, which dismissed his appeal via an unpublished written decision in March 2022. The BIA began its inquiry with the text of the contested phrase: [t]he naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents.
Turner timely filed the instant petition for review. This decision follows.
II.
The BIA issued its own opinion in this case without expressly adopting the IJ‘s decision, but the BIA relied in part on the IJ‘s decision. In this circumstance, we review the IJ‘s opinion, to the extent that
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Edwards v. U.S. Att‘y Gen., 97 F.4th 725, 734 (11th Cir. 2024).
A.
We begin[] where аll such inquiries begin: with the language of the statute itself. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). This requires us to interpret statutory language according to its plain meaning as understood within its statutory context. See, e.g., Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450, 455 (2022); Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 139 (2010) (Ultimately, context determines meaning . . . .); King v. St. Vincent‘s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (noting the cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole, since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context (internal citation omitted)).
All parties agree that the relevant statute governing Turner‘s removal challenge is
That section, entitled Child born outside of United States of alien parents; conditions for automatic citizenship, provided as follows:
(a) A child born outside of the United States of alien parents, or of an alien parent and a citizen parent who has subsequently lost citizenship of the United States, becomes a citizen of the United States upon fulfillment of the following conditions:
- The naturalization of both parents; or
- The naturalization of the surviving parent if one оf the parents is deceased; or
- The naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents or the naturalization of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation; and if
- Such naturalization takes place while such child is under the age of eighteen years; and if
- Such child is residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the parent last naturalized under clause (1) of this subsection, or the parent naturalized under clause (2) or (3) of this subsection, or thereafter begins to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years.
(b) Subsection (a) of this section shall apply to an adopted child only if the child is residing in the United States at the time of naturalization of such adoptive parent or parents, in the custody of his adoptive parеnt or parents, pursuant
to a lawful admission for permanent residence.
As the structure of former section 1432(a) indicates, the statute sets up three first-order categories with built-in conditions under which a child born outside the United States may derive automatic citizenship. Subsection (a)(1) covers the circumstance in which both parents naturalize and requires both parents’ naturalization.
The statute then imposes two additional mandatory conditions. The child must be less than eighteen years old when the naturalization takes place.
This leaves for resolution the narrow issue of statutory interpretation presented by Turner‘s petition. All other necessary conditions being satisfied, does a child derive citizenship from a naturalizing parent through the single-parent subsection, former
Agreeing with the IJ, the BIA answered that query in the negative. The BIA acknowledged that the statute‘s use of the present-perfect tense provided some textual grounding for Turner‘s linguistically possible reading. Ultimately, however, the BIA rejected Turner‘s interpretation, noting that the structure of the statute as a whole assumes that the legal separation of the parents is
a permanent, or at least [a] continuing state of affairs. The BIA also leaned on the implications of accepting Turner‘s reading on the parental rights of the non-citizen, non-naturalizing parent. If adopted, the BIA observed, a child would obtain derivative citizenship automatically through one parent alone, notwithstanding that parent‘s remarriage to the child‘s noncitizen parent prior to the child‘s eighteenth birthday. That outcome, the BIA explained, could extinguish the parental
Exercising our independent review of this statutory question, we agree with the BIA‘s interpretation of former section 1432(a)(3). Although Turner presents a grammatically possible interpretation of the phrase has been a legal separation when viewed in the abstract, the most natural construction of the provision is that it imposes a continuing requirement of separation that must still exist at the time all other conditions are fulfilled, rather than a static act satisfied by the fact of a prior legal separation.
We start with the text of the subsection itself. After referring to two prior scenarios of naturalization in subsections (a)(1) (two-parent naturalization) and (a)(2) (single-parent naturalization with the other parent deceased),
Turner focuses almost еxclusively on the use of has been in the present-perfect tense, arguing that it must be read to encompass the fact of a prior legal separation even if the separation does not continue to the last material condition (here, naturalization). This reading, Turner contends, is compelled by the present-perfect has been phraseology. He also asserts that nothing in the text of the statute supports a requirement of a continuing legal separation.
Congress’ choice of verb tense can be significant in discerning a statute‘s meaning. See Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010). In the case of the present-perfect tense, dictionaries and language manuals begin by describing the tense as referencing an act or a state that is completed at the present time or at the time of speaking. See Present perfect, Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary (2002) (of, relating to, or constituting a verb tense that is traditionally formed in English with have and that expresses action or state completed at the time of speaking); Present perfect, Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) (of, relating to, or constituting a verb tense that is formed in English with have and that expresses action or state completed at the time of speaking); Present perfect, Oxford English Dictionary (2007) (A tense denoting action that is completed at the present time. . . .), https://perma.cc/EH6T-CMV5; id. (They sometimes express it by the first form of their present perfect tense, when the design is to intimate, that a thing has been doing for some time and is not yet finished.); The Chicago Manual of Style 268 (17th ed. 2017) (noting that the present perfect tense denotes an act, state, or condition that is now completed or continues up to the present); Present perfect, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2018) (The verb tense expressing action completed at the present time, formed in English by combining the present tense of have with a past participle).
Those sources then distinguish present-perfect from the past tense, explaining that the present-perfect usage cаn refer[] to (1) a time in the indefinite past or (2) a past action that comes up to and touches
Accepting that the use of the present-perfect tense can, as a matter of pure semantics, refer to a time in the indefinite past or to a past action or state that continues into the present, see Paresky v. United States, 995 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir. 2021), the question becomes which of those meanings applies in this statutory context, see, e.g., Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 133 (2024) (acknowledging a party‘s grammatically possible reading but rejecting it after examining the tеxt in context). Upon full review of the statute as a whole, we agree with the Department and the BIA that former section 1432(a)(3) imposes a continuing requirement of separation that must exist at the time that all other conditions of derivative citizenship are satisfied. We reason as follows.
First, the complete structure of former section 1432(a) reveals that it treats naturalization as the principal event. Starting from the top, [a] child born outside the United States of alien parents . . . becomes a citizen . . . upon fulfillment of the following conditions.
In this manner, former section 1432 ensures that a child does not become vested with derivative citizenship unless all of the requisite status markers are fulfilled at the time the last material condition is met. Importantly, this does not mean that the events that bring about the requisite conditions must all occur simultaneously. But it does require that the conditions relevant to single-parent derivative citizenship—i.e., naturalization of the single parent, custody by the single parent of the minor child, legal separation between the child‘s living parents, lawful permanent residence for the child, and the child‘s minor age—all be in effect at the time the last condition is met, which in the case of Turner is naturalization of his mother. It would be odd for Congress, having zeroed in so clearly on naturalization as the statutory fulcrum, to break from that approach in subsection (a)(3) by splitting naturalization temporally from the state of legal separation. Instead, the more natural construction is that legal separation as used in that manner contemplates
Second, Congress’ use of the present-perfect tense to refer to legal separation naturally aligns with the statute‘s focus on the conditions in existence at the time of naturalization. Recall that the particular language in the contested subsection states: [t]he naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents.
Read holistically, the phrases having legal custody and when there has been a legal separation both connote the state of affairs at the moment of naturalization. In other words, does the naturalizing parent have legal custody of the child, and is that parent legally separated from the noncitizen parent at the moment of naturalization? The answers to these questions in the present tense are what matter for citizenship eligibility—not the expired existence of those conditions at some point in the past.
Third, Turner‘s reading of subsection (a)(3) creates unnecessary and unexplained tension with subsection (a)(1). Subsection (a)(1) applies, as noted, when both parents naturalize, as compared to the single-parent scenario reflected in subsection (a)(3). If Turner‘s parents were married at the time of naturalization—a fact unchallenged for purposes of this аppeal—then the clearly applicable provision between the options of (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) would be subsection (a)(1), not (a)(3). See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.) (internal quotation marks omitted). We are reluctant to adopt an interpretation that weakens the force of a neighboring subsection, namely, subsection (a)(1).
Fourth, if an action is wholly in the past—and the time is relatively definite—the simple past is called for. Bryan Garner, Garner‘s Modern American Usage 802-03 (3d ed. 2009). So too here. Had Congress been comfortable vesting derivative citizenship based on a moment-in-time, expired prior separation as suggested by Turner, it seems the more natural method of conveying that choice would have been to use the simple past tense—for example by referring to naturalization . . . where thеre was a legal separation of the parents.7 But Congress used the phrase has been a legal separation, which we think captures a continuing requirement of a parent‘s legally separated status carrying forward to the moment of naturalization. In addition, elsewhere in the statute, Congress referred to fixed and immutable events using the past tense, for example, by referring to an out-of-wedlock birth or to the death of a parent.
Finally, although we have not previously addressed the narrow question presented
(11th Cir. 2018), and with other circuits’ understanding of the legal-separation requirement in former section 1432(a)(3).
In Levy, we addressed a gender-and-legitimacy based сonstitutional challenge to former section 1432. Id. at 1367. In rejecting the challenger‘s misreading of the statute, we had occasion to describe its requirements. In doing so, we identified the three naturalization-specific subsections,
To be sure, Levy did not present the precise issue of statutory interpretation we confront here. But nothing in Turner‘s arguments or in the text of the statute leads us to question our prior breakdown of the marriage-separation distinction as one implicitly requiring a continuing legal separation touching into the moment of naturalization.
Levy is also instructive in its explanation of the textually drawn rationale underlying the single-parent subsections in (a)(2) and (a)(3). As we stated in Levy, [b]ecause derivative
naturalization automatically changes a child‘s citizenship and can effectively extinguish an alien‘s parental rights, Congress limited single parent derivative citizenship to instances where it is fair to assume the alien parent was out of the picture. Id. at 1368; id. (In both situations, it is fair to assume that the alien parent has a lesser interest in the child‘s citizenship.). Our decision in Levy thus recognizes that Congress in former subsections 1432(a)(2) and (a)(3) limited derivative citizenship to situations in which the interests of the noncitizen parent are decidedly less. That simply is not the case when the naturalizing parent remains married to the noncitizen parent. Indeed, the two-parent naturalization scenario in subsection (a)(1) reveals as much by requiring both parents’ naturalization.
Other circuits have also treated the legal-separation requirement as a condition that must be in place by the time of naturalization.
In Joseph v. Holder, 720 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2013), the Fifth Circuit rejected a claim of derivative citizenship under former section 1432(a)(3) because the petitioner‘s parents—as determined by a vacated divorce order in state court—were not legally separated when the petitioner‘s mother naturalized. Id. at 230-31.
Similarly, in Jaffal v. Dir. Newark New Jersey Field Off. Immigr. & Customs Enf‘t, 23 F.4th 275 (3d Cir. 2022), the Third Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment on the issue of separation,
finding material questions of fact based on the particulars of family law in the petitioner‘s home country. But the court clearly anchored its entire analysis in an understanding that legal separation—and legal custody—had to exist
Finally, the Ninth Circuit in Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2005)—again in the context of former section 1432(a)—observed without difficulty that a child seeking derivative citizenship under that provision must prove that his parents were legally separated at the time of his mother‘s naturalization. Id. at 1076.
Turner has not offered any decision that has adopted his particular understanding of subsection (a)(3) or suggested that legal separation under that provision need not exist at the time of naturalization.8
B.
The dissent reaches a different conclusion, determining that the requirements of the single-parent derivative citizenship pathway can be satisfied by a child whose naturalizing parent is legally married to the child‘s other parent at the time of naturalization. Dissent Op. at 6–9. Respectfully, we disagree with this anomalous interpretation, which is not meaningfully rooted in the text of the statute but relies instead on two prior decisions of the BIA, neither categories of persons from possessing a firearm “which has been shipped or transported in interstate or forеign commerce.”
Under Skidmore, a court can look to an agency‘s interpretation for guidance depending upon the “thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
We fail to see a basis to engage in Skidmore review to resolve Turner‘s appeal. Turner‘s appeal dоes not rest on an agency‘s factbound determination about a statutory term. It does not implicate the BIA‘s “specialized experience.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. And Turner himself does not advocate for Skidmore review. This is unsurprising, as the matter before us presents a pure, narrow question of law prime for judicial resolution using interpretive tools to resolve ambiguity. Loper Bright Enter., 144 S. Ct. at 2266.
In any case, even assuming Skidmore guidance could play some role in Turner‘s appeal, there is no interpretation of the BIA, longstanding or otherwise, that actually governs the disputed statutory question at issue. As the BIA explained, this case concerns whether the statutory phrase “has been a legal separation of the parents” in former section 321(a)(3) is met by a legal separation at a singular point in time in the past or whether it imposes a continuing requirement that must still exist at the time that all other conditions of derivative citizenship are satisfied. On that question of law, the BIA has never spoken—until it decided Turner‘s appeal.
Nor did the BIA resolve the instant statutory issue in Matter of Baires-Larios, 24 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 2008), or Matter of Douglas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 197 (BIA 2013)—the two BIA decisions on which the dissent relies for persuasive weight. In Baires-Larios, thе BIA addressed the following sequence of events: a child‘s foreign-born parents divorced; the child‘s father became a naturalized United States citizen; the child‘s mother relinquished legal custody of the child; and the child (still under the age of eighteen) entered the United States and acquired permanent residency. With that set of facts, the BIA found derivative citizenship because all of the ingredients of derivative citizenship were in effect when the last material condition was met—that is, when the child
Neither Baires-Larios nor Douglas directly presents the situation we have here: a claim for derivative citizenship through the single-parent provision despite the purported “single parent” remaining legally married to the child‘s other parent when the last material condition was fulfilled. Nor does either decision address the meaning of the contested phrase here (“when there has been a legal separation of the parents“) or really engage in statutory analysis at all. Accordingly, whatever interpretive weight is to be accorded to the BIA‘s decisions in Baires-Larios or Douglas—and neither decision is challenged here—we do not agree that they offer a longstanding or persuasive view entitled to weight in resolving the issue raised in Turner‘s appeal. In fact, after expressly requesting and receiving supplemental briefing from the parties concerning Baires-Larios and Douglas, the BIA indicated that both decisions “supported” the IJ‘s view in Turner‘s case. We think it unusual to deploy Skidmore review in this circumstance, where the very agency at issue has already told us in this proceeding that it considered those decisions and does not find them inconsistent with its view on the statutory question presented.9
The dissent also incorrectly characterizes our decision as deviating from textualist principles. According to the dissent, “there is no ‘plain meaning’ (i.e., no linguistically obvious) solution to the statutory question before us.” Dissent Op. at 3. But statutory language can have a “plain meaning“—and a court can discern its plain meaning—even where the text is not susceptible to a “linguistically obvious” solution, and even where, as here, the text presents more than one possible construction. See ECB USA, Inc. v. Chubb Ins. Co. of New Jersey, 113 F.4th 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2024) (discerning the plain meaning of contractual language despite existence of two possible readings) (citing Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at 141–142 (“The two possible readings thus reduce to one . . . .“). Former section 1432(a)(3) presents such a scenario given its use of the present perfect verb tense. Even so, the existence of a linguistically possible interpretation does not mean the language at issue lacks a plain meaning as gleaned following judicial study. Nor is it the case, as the dissent suggests, that former section 1432(a)(3) presents a case of total ambiguity because the statute does not delineate a precise sequence of operations to derive citizenship. Dissent Op. at 4. Courts construe the plain meaning of statutes even where, as here, Congress “‘could have expressed itself more clearly.‘” Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at 138 (quoting Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. 452, 472 (2016)). And in any event, we do not read the dissent as itself grappling with the text of the statute or with the various textual indicators supporting the Department‘s interpretation.
All told, the dissent adopts a reading of the single-parеnt subsection in former section 1432(a)(3) that permits a child to acquire derivative citizenship through a parent who remains married to the child‘s other parent at the time of naturalization. Although semantically possible, we do not believe it best accords with the statute when read in context. Nor does the available circuit precedent interpreting former section 1432(a)(3) align with that reading.
C.
The phrase “has been a legal separation of the parents” in former section 1432(a)(3) refers to a legal separation that must still exist at the time all other conditions of derivative citizenship are satisfied. Because Turner‘s mother was married to Turner‘s living father at the time of the last material condition (here, naturalization) and remained married to Turner‘s father up to and including Turner‘s eighteenth birthday, the BIA correctly dismissed Turner‘s appeal.
PETITION DENIED.
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:
With respect, I dissent. In my view, derivate citizenship under the former
I
A subsection of the immigration statute at issue in this case, the now-repealed
Only the first condition, then, is at issue. Because Mr. Turner‘s parents had remarried at the time the mother was naturalized, the statutory question is the meaning of the phrase “naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents.”
For the majority, the naturalization of the parent having legal custody is the relevant
The majority‘s reading is a plausible one, but it is not the only plausible one. If fact, the opposite of what the majority says about legislative drafting choices is also true. It can just as easily be said that if Congress wanted to require that naturalization and legal separation occur simultaneously, it could have done so expressly. For example, it could have used the phrase “naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child at a time when there is a legal separation of the parents,” or “naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child while there is a legal separation of the parents.” It did not do either.
Contrary to what the majority says, there is no “plain meaning” (i.e., no linguistically obvious) solution to the statutory question before us. Indeed, the mаjority acknowledges that Mr. Turner‘s reading of the statutory language is grammatically reasonable and permissible. See also Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 216 (1976) (concluding that the phrase “has been,” as used in a criminal firearm statute, was a present perfect tense verb which “denot[ed] an act that has been completed“).1
For me the “statutory language itself is perfectly ambiguous,” Picadilly Cafeterias, 554 U.S. at 54 (Breyer, J., dissenting), as the phrase “naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents” can be reasonably read to mean two different things. And, as relevant here,
One of our prior decisions has some language about congressional intent that supports the majority‘s reading. See Levy v. U.S. Att‘y Gen., 882 F. 3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2018). In that case, which addressed a claim that
Despite the language in Levy, I come to a different conclusion than the majority. I explain my reasoning below.
III
Mr. Turner bears the burden of proving his “eligibility for citizenship in every respect.” Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., INS, 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967). And though any “doubts should be resolved in favor of the United States and against the claimant,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), I think Mr. Turner obtained derivative citizenship.
A
The Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024), overruled Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As a result, federal courts no longer defer, as Chevron once required, to permissible agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. But Loper Bright did not affect Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944), which explained that the “interpretations and opinions” of an agency, “made in pursuance of official duty” and “based upon . . . more specialized experience,” can “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,” even on legal questions. See Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2259. Under Skidmore, the “weight of such [an agency] judgment in a particular case” will “depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
Skidmore matters here because the BIA has examined
In Matter of Baires-Larios, 24 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 2008), an individual born in
Despite some Third Circuit cases to the contrary, e.g., Jordon, 424 F.3d at 330, the BIA ruled that the individual derived U.S. citizenship if she could prove she “came into her father‘s legal custody prior to reaching her 18th birthday, even if she was not in his custody on the date of his naturalization.” 24 I. & N. Dec. at 468–69. In so doing, the BIA relied in part on a 2008 Field Manual issued by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services which explained that because “‘the order in which the requirements [of
Five years later, in Matter of Douglas, 26 I. & N. Dec. 197 (BIA 2013), the BIA reaffirmed Baires-Larios in a factual scenario that somewhat mirrors Mr. Turner‘s case. In Douglas, the individual who claimed derivative citizenship under
The parents divorced two years after the mother‘s naturalization, when the individual was 14. The immigration judge rejected the individual‘s claim of derivative citizenship, apparently because the mother obtained custody after she was naturalized. The BIA, however, sustained the individual‘s appeal.
The BIA again rejected the Third Circuit‘s view that the nаturalization of the parent having custody has to take place after the legal separation of the parents. The BIA explained that the word “when” has “various meanings in different contexts” and was ambiguous as used in
Taken together, Baires-Larios and Douglas stand for the proposition that the statutory conditions set out in
Under Baires-Larios and Douglas, which I find persuasive under Skidmore, Mr. Turner arrived derivative citizenship even though his parents were not legally separated at the time of his mother‘s naturalization. All that matters is that those two conditions existed at some point before Mr. Turner was 18.
B
The majority rejects Baires-Larios and Douglas because “they fail to see a basis to engage in Skidmore review to resolve this appeal.” Maj. Op. at 23. The majority explains its position on three grounds. The first is that this case “does not rest on an agency‘s factbound determination about a statutory term.” Id. The second is that this case “does not implicate the BIA‘s ‘specialized experience.‘” Id. (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139). The final one is that this case “presents a pure, narrow question of law[.]” Id.
I disagree. First, Skidmore deference is not limited only to factbound determinations. Indeed, Skidmore deference can be properly applied with respect to even pure questions of law. See, e.g., Ruiz v. U.S. Attorney General, 73 F.4th 852, 858 (11th Cir. 2023) (acknowledging the applicability of Skidmore deference to a question of law relating to the interpretation of a different immigration statute). Second, the question before us directly implicates the BIA‘s “specialized experience” in so far as the answer to the question in this case is informed by the BIA‘s prior decisions issued pursuant to its delegated authority to issue precedential decisions for the purpose of providing “clear and uniform guidance to DHS, the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the Act and its implementing regulations.”
When the BIA decided Baires-Larios and Douglas in an adjudicative capacity, it was acting pursuant to authority properly delegated by the Attorney General. The BIA‘s precedential decisions in those cases are important and informative sources on the issue now before us, and are entitled to Skidmore deference.
IV
Mr. Turner obtained derivative citizenship under