Rosmer v. Pfizer IncorporatedRosmer v. Pfizer Incorporated
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Wilkinson, Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Motz
COUNSEL
OPINION
WILKINSON, Chief Judge:
This case turns on one discrete question of statutory interpretation — whether
I.
Louise Rosmer filed an action in state court against Pfizer Inc. on behalf of herself and as class representative for “all persons whose spouses have been injured by the drug Trovan.” She alleged a loss of consortium arising from injuries to her husband caused by Trovan, an antibiotic manufactured by Pfizer. She sought to recover general and special damages resulting from the loss of consortium as well as punitive damages.
Only state-law claims were pled. Rosmer is a resident of South Carolina. Pfizer is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York. The parties agree that Rosmer‘s individual claim exceeded $75,000. The complaint alleged, however, that some class members suffered less than $75,000 in actual and punitive damages.
Pfizer removed this action from state court to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, basing federal subject matter jurisdiction on
II.
In 1973, the Supreme Court held that in a class action, multiple plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims must each satisfy the jurisdictional amount for diversity suits in federal courts. See Zahn v. Int‘l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1973). The Court concluded that “any plaintiff without the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from the case, even though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims.” Id. at 300.
The rule that all plaintiffs in a class action must independently satisfy the amount in controversy requirement went unchallenged until 1990, when Congress created supplemental jurisdiction with the passage of
The supplemental jurisdiction statute was passed in response to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). In Finley, the plaintiff brought a Federal Tort Claims Act action against the United States, alleging negligence on the part of the Federal Aviation Administration. The plaintiff then moved to amend her federal complaint to include state law claims against non-diverse parties. No independent basis for federal jurisdiction existed over the state law claim against the new defendants. See Finley, 490 U.S. at 546. The Court held that the state law claim did not belong in federal court. Id. at 554-55. The Court also invited Congress to act, noting that “[w]hatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can of course be changed by Congress.” Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
The new
Congress did not authorize supplemental jurisdiction in all cases, however.
III.
We must decide whether
A.
The only exceptions to the federal court‘s supplemental jurisdiction authority are those “provided in subsections (b) and (c)” or those “expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute.”
Rosmer nevertheless argues that the text of
We disagree with the Leonhardt court on this issue. Leonhardt relied on two main points to support its holding. First, it stated that the term “original jurisdiction” in
First, the text of
Indeed, the Leonhardt analysis falters because “original jurisdiction” would mean something different in
Second, Rosmer and Leonhardt maintain that “original jurisdiction” over a “civil action” means that the district court must have original jurisdiction over the entire action at the initiation of the complaint. Yet this reading of the statute would render the phrase “over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction” virtually superfluous.
The phrase “other claims” cannot refer only to claims added after the action has already been filed. The Leonhardt court read the “other claims” language narrowly because
The Leonhardt court‘s analysis on this point, however, does not persuade us.
Furthermore, if supplemental jurisdiction is premised on initially obtaining original jurisdiction over the whole action, the statute would not even apply to cases such as United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), and Finley. Gibbs involved an initial complaint containing a federal claim and a pendent state law claim without an independent basis for jurisdiction. Gibbs allowed federal courts to hear a state law claim that stemmed from the same common nucleus of operative facts as a federal law claim. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
Rosmer urges us to read distinction after distinction into the term “original jurisdiction.” But we refuse to squint at
B.
Rosmer argues, however, that
The Supreme Court, however, has consistently stated that when a statute is plain on its face, a court‘s inquiry is at an end. “The legislative intent of Congress is to be derived from the language and structure of the statute itself, if possible, not from the assertions of codifiers directly at odds with clear statutory language.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 268 n.6 (1997). It is “the statute, and not the Committee Report, which is the authoritative expression of the law.” City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994). A buried reference in a Committee report does not supersede the plain statutory structure and text.4 And the statutory
C.
Rosmer maintains, however, that since the statutory text is ambiguous, we may resort to the use of legislative history. She argues that since three other circuits and four Justices of the Supreme Court (by voting to reverse in Abbott) would hold that
We respect the views of those who take a different view of
Rosmer further maintains that
D.
Rosmer finally argues that interpreting
It is not our place to balance these competing policies. For us to say which party makes a superior policy argument would betray a misunderstanding of the role of courts in our federal system. The plain text of
IV.
A word, finally, on the position of our fine dissenting colleague. The debate over federal diversity jurisdiction has been a long-running one, and the dissent makes no secret of which side it embraces. It extols “the century-long congressional practice of narrowing rather than expanding diversity jurisdiction.” Infra at 20. It references the proposition that the “well-established ‘congressional purpose’ to limit diversity jurisdiction served [the] two salutary goals” of “limiting the rising caseload of diversity cases so that the federal courts would not be overwhelmed by state law questions and unable to resolve federal question cases promptly,” and “acceding to the ‘rightful independence of state governments,’ which ‘requires that [federal courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute [§ 1332] defined.‘” Infra at 20 n.1. Repeating the anti-diversity refrain, the dissent asserts that “[i]nstead of acceding to the ‘rightful independence of state governments,’ by ‘scrupulously confin[ing]’ federal diversity jurisdiction, the majority interprets
It is difficult to view the dissent as anything more than an all-out assault on federal diversity jurisdiction. There are, to be sure, legiti- mate arguments to be made for and against the exercise of this form of federal jurisdiction. As a set of policy prescriptions, the dissent is in many ways congenial. However, Article III rather explicitly charges Congress with “ordain[ing] and establish[ing]” the structure of the federal courts, the boundaries of their jurisdiction, and the parameters of
Reduced to its analytical core, the dissent argues that
This is so for two reasons, which we have earlier touched upon. First, one searches in vain for a difference in the way
Second,
The dissent argues that its “reading of
Much of the dissent is a pastiche of legislative history and policy prescription, with quotations from the Federal Courts Study Committee thrown in for good measure. Though we see no reason to examine
[O]n its face, section 1367 does not appear to forbid supplemental jurisdiction over claims of class members that do not satisfy section 1332‘s jurisdictional amount requirement, which would overrule Zahn . . . . [There is] a disclaimer of intent to accomplish this result in the legislative history. . . .
This same observation is sufficient to meet the dissent‘s further objection that the majority is overruling Strawbridge v. Curtiss. See infra at 25-26. The majority, of course, is doing nothing more than interpreting a statute. Rosmer‘s claim satisfies the requirement of Strawbridge. And to say that
It would have been better had the statute dealt explicitly with this problem, and the legislative history was an attempt to correct the oversight.
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank, & Thomas M. Mengler, Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 Emory L.J. 943, 960 n.90 (1991). In reading the clear language of the statute in the same way that the esteemed drafters of
We have no idea whether, as the drafters intimate, Congress made a “mistake” or “oversight” here. It is not implausible to believe that the legislature desired a single class action, even one in diversity, to be resolved in a single judicial setting. Additionally, Congress may have, rightly or wrongly, imputed a bias in state court against certain out-of-state defendants which it sought to counteract by fortifying diversity jurisdiction. The point is that Congress can take such steps. And in exercising its constitutional prerogatives, Congress is even free to incur the displeasure
V.
It seems appropriate in conclusion to repair to the simplicity of the statute. Louise Rosmer is of diverse citizenship and her claim exceeds the amount in controversy requirement of
The straightforward nature of the statutory interpretation here is paralleled by the straightforward route through which Congress can amend the statute. If Congress wishes to exempt diversity class actions from supplemental jurisdiction, it need do nothing more than insert the words “Rule 23” into
AFFIRMED.
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Because
I.
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Just as clearly, however,
Since the earliest years of the Republic, however, the Supreme Court has interpreted the diversity jurisdiction statute to require complete diversity of citizenship of each plaintiff from each defendant. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). Moreover, it has long been the rule that each plaintiff in a diversity suit must independently satisfy the diversity statute‘s jurisdictional amount in controversy. See Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939) (“when several plaintiffs assert separate and distinct demands in a single suit, the amount involved in each separate controversy must be of the requisite amount to be within the jurisdiction of the district court“); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 596 (1916) (same); Troy Bank v. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911) (same). The Court has reasoned that
The Supreme Court has also held that
In Snyder, the Court concluded that where no members of the plaintiff class possessed a claim meeting the “matter in controversy” requirement they could not aggregate their claims; and so a federal court had no jurisdiction over such a class action. Id. at 336. The Court relied on the century-long congressional practice of narrowing rather than expanding diversity jurisdiction. It noted that “since the first judiciary act in 1789” Congress has repeatedly increased the amount necessary to meet the “matter in controversy” requirement and, when doing so, re-enacted the “matter in controversy” rule “against a background of judicial interpretation” that restrictively construed it. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 333-39. Indeed, as the Snyder Court explained, Congress had accepted restrictive judicial interpretation of
In Zahn, the Supreme Court considered whether Snyder applied to diversity-based class actions like the one at issue here, in which only the named plaintiff satisfied the “matter in controversy” requirement. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 292. In
In so concluding, the Court made clear that its holding was premised upon its construction of
In summary, the Supreme Court has definitively interpreted
II.
Nevertheless, Pfizer maintains, and the majority holds, that when, in 1990, Congress enacted the supplemental jurisdiction statute,
To accomplish this incongruous result, the majority must look past the Supreme Court‘s clear and definitive interpretations of
This is not to say that
Nor does retaining the Zahn rule affect the holdings in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), and Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). Cf. ante at 9-10. Gibbs is a federal question case and Finley was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Neither is a diversity case. The distinction between federal question cases (or, for that matter, any case with a federal jurisdictional basis other than
Furthermore, the linchpin of the majority‘s statutory analysis — reliance on the prohibitions listed in
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20 or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of Section 1332.
The majority maintains that because “nowhere in
On the other hand, if the majority were correct and
The majority‘s approach strips
Moreover, under the majority‘s interpretation,
could do precisely this. No longer would plaintiffs need to concern themselves with establishing complete diversity. Rather, the presence of one diverse plaintiff would allow joinder of any related claims by non-diverse plaintiffs. Instead of acceding to the “rightful independence of state governments,” by “scrupulously confin[ing]” federal diversity jurisdiction, the majority interprets
In addition to upsetting long-established precedent, the majority‘s interpretation utterly conflicts with the steadfast Congressional policy of restricting, rather than expanding, diversity jurisdiction. The majority‘s holding would be remarkable even if compelled by the statutory text. But nothing in
Nor does the majority‘s approach find any support in
Although it is clear that Congress did not determine to accept the Study Committee‘s suggestion to curtail diversity jurisdiction, it is equally clear that Congress did not determine to expand diversity jurisdiction by enactment of
The majority‘s interpretation of
going back to Strawbridge. The impact of the majority‘s approach is staggering and totally at odds with a continuous congressional policy — before and after enactment of
III.
In short, the majority today fashions an interpretation of