*1 ZAHN v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO. et al. No. Argued 72-888. October 1973 Decided December J., opinion White, delivered the Court, in which Burger, J.,C. and JJ., Stewart, and Blacicmtjn, Powell, Rehnqtjist, joined. BrennaN, J., filed a Douglas opinion, dissenting in which JJ., joined, post, p. 302. Marshall, Peter Langrock F. argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Taggart Whipple argued respondent. the cause for With him on the brief Nolan, were Richard E. William Levit, Jr., H. Nicholas R. Weiskopf, George W. Jr.* Ray, delivered the opinion
Mr. Justice White Court.
Petitioners, asserting that
they were owners of prop-
erty fronting on Lake Champlain in Orwell, Vermont,
Stanley
*Norman Redlich and
Buchsbawm
filed
brief
city of New York as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
behalf of
action
brought
prop-
200 lakefront
of themselves
consisting
a class
*2
from
damages
They sought
lessees.
and
erty owners
for
corporation,
York
a New
Co.,
Paper
International
pulp
from its
discharges
permitted
having
allegedly
into
to flow
York,
New
in
located
plant,
paper-making
into
by that stream
carried
and to be
Creek
Ticonderoga
lake
the waters
thereby polluting
Champlain,
Lake
surrounding
utility of the
the value
damaging
diversity
as a
brought
action,
The suit was
properties.
(a) (1).
1332
on 28 U. S. C.
assertedly resting
jurisdiction
to
found
plaintiffs was
of the named
claim of each
The
but the
jurisdictional amount,
satisfy
$10,000
every
certainty”
a
legal
“to
was convinced
dam-
pollution
had
suffered
owner
the class
individual
Harris, 394
Snyder v.
Reading
$10,000.
in excess of
ages
action
maintenance of
precluding
332
as
U. S.
and distinct
separate
of the class whose
by any member
individually
satisfy
claim did not
not be feasible
concluding that
it would
amount and
had more
a
owners each of whom
property
define
class of
then refused
$10,000 claim,
than a
the District Court
D.
action. 53 F. R.
permit
proceed
the suit to
(Vt. 1971).
Appeals affirmed,
A divided Court of
(CA2 1972), principally
authority
The Court of held that this case is governed by prior rationale this Court’s cases construing defining the statutes of the District Court. We therefore affirm its judgment. outset, Congress
From the has provided that suits between citizens of different States are maintainable only if in the district courts in controversy” “matter statutory exceeds the now minimum, $10,000. set at U. S. C. (a).1 § same requirement applied has general when the federal-ques- tion jurisdiction of the district courts, 28 C. § U. S. is sought to be A (a), invoked.2 classic statement of the dichotomy developed in construing and applying provides
1 The pertinent section part that: “(a) The district original shall have courts of all civil actions controversy where the matter exceeds the sum or $10,000, value of costs, exclusive interest and and is between-— “(1) citizens of different . States . . .” Section Judiciary First Act- of 1789 set the diversity $500. suits at Congress Stat. 78. In requirement lowered the $400 in Midnight Judges Act, 2 Stat. *3 92, 89, it quickly but was $500 restored following year. the 2 jurisdictional-amount Stat. 132. requirement The remained at fixed this level the Act 3, until 1887, Mar. 552, 24 Stat. when it $2,000. was raised to figure The subsequently by was increased by $1,000 the 3, 1911, Act Mar. §24, 36 Rep. Stat. See 1091. S. 388, No. Cong., Sess., 61st pt-. 2, 2d pp. (1910); 30-32 Rep. H. R. 818, No. 61st Cong., 2d (1910); Sess. Report, Conference S. Doc. 848, Cong., No. 61st 3d (1911); Cong. Sess. 45 Rec. 3596-3599 (1910); Cong. 46 4002, 4003, Rec. (1911). 4004 $10,000 The current jurisdictional amount, in 28 codified U. C. S. (a), 1332 was enacted July 25, 1958, Act 72 Stat. 415. legislative The history discloses change was made “on the premise that the amount should be fixed at a money sum of that will make available in all substantial controversies where other elements of Federal present. juris are The dictional amount should high so as to convert the Federal courts into of big courts business nor low as away so to fritter their time in petty the trial of Rep. 1830, controversies.” S. No. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1958); id., see also 21; at Rep. H. 1706, R. No. Cong., Sess., 85th 2d (1958). 3 2 (a) Section provides: 1331 “(a) The district courts shall original have jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of and costs, interest and arises under Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 294 White- G. A. v. Bank Troy found is sections
these
(1911):
40-41
39,
Co., 222 U. S.
&
head
separate
having
plaintiffs,
more
or
two
“When
economy-
convenience
unite for
demands,
distinct
demand
essential
it is
suit,
single
in a
but
amount;
requisite
each be
title
single
enforce
unite to
several
when
and undivided
common
have a
they
in which
right,
collectively
interests
if their
enough
it is
interest,
amount.”
equal
multiple plaintiffs
and rule that
This distinction
satisfy the
each
claims must
distinct
separate and
federal
for suit
requirement
from
dating
cases
prior
firmly rooted
were
courts
accepted
construction
to be
continued
1832,3and have
3
confirming
eases
following
representative of innumerable
are
(1910); Waite v.
Beckham,
117
v.
S.U.
principle: Woodside
Louis,
St.
(1902);
v.
302,
Wheless
Cruz,
328-329
184 U. S.
Santa
Stebbins,
S.
Township v.
109 U.
(1901); Bernards
180 U. S.
(1891);
v.
Russell
Clay
Field,
(1883).
v.
138 U. S.
Cf.
Bigelows,
v.
5 Wall.
Seaver
Stansell,
(1882);
“Is the
entitled to
his
plaintiff
[all
actions]
of the controlling statutes, now 1331 and 1332.4 The
§§
rule has
applied
been
aggregation
forbid
where none
jurisdictional
claimants satisfies the
amount, Frazier,
was the
in Scott
case
v.
253 U. S.
243,
example,
where
Court
stated
rule to be that “the amount
in controversy
equal
must
sum as to
complainant.”
each
It also
requires dismissal of those litigants whose claims
do
satisfy
though
even
other liti
amount,
gants assert claims sufficient to
jurisdiction
invoke the
the federal
Clark v.
Inc.,
court.
Paul Gray,
306 U. S.
583 (1939);
Dunham,
Stewart v.
115 U.
64-65
61,
S.
(1885); Bernards
v.
Township
Stebbins,
In Clark v.
Gray, Inc.,
Paul
decided
the effective
after
date
the Federal
Rules
Civil
in 1938,
Procedure
applied
the familiar rule that
plain-
“when several
tiffs
separate
assert
and distinct
in a single
demands
suit, the amount
involved in each separate controversy
must be of the requisite
.
. . ,
. . .
those
amounts cannot be
together
added
to satisfy jurisdic-
tional requirements.”
306 U. S., at
Upon
589.
ascer-
taining on its own motion that only one of
in the District Court
presented
had
a claim
satisfying
in a
court,
Federal
and sustain the
by reason of the fact
that the total amount
$2,000?
involved exceeds
think
We
not.
It
is well settled in this court that when two or more plaintiffs, having
several interests, unite for the convenience of litigation in
single
suit, it can only be sustained in the court of original jurisdiction,
appeal
court,
as to those whose
juris-
claims exceed the
amount;
dictional
and that when two or more defendants are sued
by the
plaintiff
same
in one suit
the test of
joint
is
or several character of
liability
plaintiff.”
to the
4 Rogers Hennepin
County,
The class spurious The Proc. 23. Civ. Rule by Fed. plated to prior it stood as (a) (3), Rule by authorized action writing Frank, Judge by viewed was 1966,5 amendment as, Hand, Augustus Learned Judges himself for each so separate suits of effect, congeries a but “in meet the claim, own to his as must, claimant Y., N. Trust Co. Guaranty Steele requirements.” precedent direct 1947).6 The (CA2 F. 2d (a)(3) provided: Rule make it as to numerous are so constituting class a persons “If them, court, such bring all before them to impracticable adequate representation more, fairly insure will or one sued, the character all, be when or sue may, on behalf all class is against the for or be enforced right sought to fact affect- or question of law several, is common there a “(3) sought.” is common relief rights and a ing several . . device. . joinder permissive a class suit was spurious “The class; relationship the members jural between was no “There association, unincorporated of an example, the members unlike, among them- relationship legal a steps to create they taken no had right by agreement. They not fellow travelers were selves. by solely formed was The class liability was of each distinct. or a suit question fact. When of law or a presence of common merely an invitation class, it a was brought against such was litigation, traveler fellow joinder invitation become —an invitation and accepted. It was an might not might or which Moore, Federal Practice performance.” 3B J. a command (2d 1969). [1], ed. pp. 2601-2603 23¶ recognized thus Professor Moore joinder separate and distinct claims governing the requirements spurious applied class suits: action, equal since applied force principles
“These original 23 were but Rule under the class actions as constituted
297
Steele
expressed
a 1941
Circuit
for
was
decision
same
in an
as a
opinion
by
Clark, who,
written
Judge Charles
Reporter
of and
was
Advisory Committee,
member
a
of
Proce
principal architect of the
Rules
Civil
Federal
Y.,
Trust Co. N.
Guaranty
case, Hackner
dure. That
v.
of
117
(CA2
brought
F. 2d 95
a
action
1941), involved
class
on behalf
plaintiffs
of
claims.
separate and distinct
Judge Clark
in
long
authority
invoked a
line óf
this
Court, and
other courts,
among parties
to hold that
related only
a common question of law and fact,
“aggregation is improper”
and that
cannot
be supplied for
without
requisite
those
claims in the
“by
amount
plaintiff
a
who can
adding
juris
show
Id.,
diction.”
(Citations
at 98.
omitted.)
This was
the accepted view in the federal
respect
courts with
n
class actions.7 I consequence, district courts were to
procedural
permit
devices to
prosecute
some to
or defend
action
an
necessity
without
appearing
plaintiffs
of all
or defendants.”
Id.,
23.13, p.
¶
2957.
7
Hillsborough
County
v.
Authority,
Aviation
F. 2d
Alfonso
308
(CA5
724
1962); Troup McCart,
(CA5
v.
1956);
2d
238 F.
289
Hughes
Encyclopaedia
v.
Britannica,
(CA7 1952) ;
“The doctrine separate and distinct claims could not be aggregated was never, and is not now, *8 based upon the categories of old Rule or of any rule procedure. That doctrine is based upon rather this Court’s interpretation of the statutory phrase ‘matter in controversy.’ The interpretation of this phrase as precluding aggregation substantially pre- dates the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Proce- dure. . . . Nothing in the amended Rule 23 changes this doctrine. . . . The fact that judgments under class actions formerly classified as spurious may now have the same effect as claims brought under the joinder provisions is certainly no reason to treat jurisdictional-amount the requirement. The Court of Appeals affirmed. purposes for joined from differently
them 336-337. at S.,U. aggregation.” con- prior its reconsider refused also con- phrase, controversy” “matter the structions Congress, where so do not should it that cluding construed had courts the howof understanding complete and language governing the changed not statute, had the specify continued had years the through down amount the increased progessively had courts. federal the suit in instituting necessary alleged v. Harris Snyder plaintiffs None that no doubt is there but $10,000, exceeding claim previously As one. controls case of that rationale that rule well-established indicated, Snyder invoked distinct separate asserting plaintiffs of several each require- satisfy must claims to dismiss. a motion to survive is his claim if ment be may there not mandates plainly rule This be dis- case must entire aggregation no than more plaintiffs none missed where without any plaintiff requires but also $10,000 case, from dismissed must sufficient jurisdictionally allege others though even claims. reli- heavy Court’s from the inescapably follows
This only one Inc., supra, Gray, where Clark v. Paul ance and all claim sufficiently large had a plaintiffs of several Moreover, the suit.9 from dismissed were other any requires the dismissal that Clark recognizes The dissent satisfy juris case does whose an action plaintiff in named members apparently unnamed But dictional amount. plaintiffs since named not shared advantages enjoy would *9 juris exempted from would be cases distinct separate and their ease Why requirement. this should dictional-amount Snyder are left unex- v. Harris or with squares with Clark how approval cited with in Alvarez the Court decision v. Co., American Insurance Pan 375 F. 2d Life denied, cert. 827 U. S. which was (CA5), decided after the 1966 amendments Rule 23 and which involved a with class action member of the one a claim having satisfy class sufficient to 1332. § Only that claim was held within the Court.
We conclude, we Appeals as Court of must, in accurately the case before read applied Snyder us v. Harris:10 plaintiff Each in a 23(b)(3) Rule satisfy jurisdictional action must amount, any plaintiff who does must be dismissed from the case — plaintiff “one may not ride on another's coattails.” 469 F. at 2d, 1035.
Neither are we inclined Snyder v. Harris overrule nor to change the Court’s' longstanding construction of the “matter in controversy” requirement of 1332. The Court declined a like in Snyder invitation v. Harris after all surveying relevant considerations and concluding that to do so would undermine the purpose and intent Con- gress providing diversity must cases present claims in specified excess amount. At this time, we have no good reason to dis- agree Snyder v. Harris or with the historic construc- tion of left statutes, undisturbed by Congress over many years. these plained. simply apply We the rule governing plaintiffs join- named ing in an action to the unnamed class, Snyder members of a v. surely Harris contemplated. inevitability of this suggested was conclusion the dissent Snyder Harris, S., (Fortas, U. at 343 J., dissenting). The same result City was Inglewood reached in City Angeles, Los F. 2d (1971), by 952-954 Appeals Court of for the Ninth Circuit. *10 jurisdic- of the application us that also seems
It plainly was so requirement tional-amount had there that to 1966 prior courts federal in the etched and, decisions these from departing thought of any been approach accepted question into calling doing, in so with plaintiffs ordinary joinder involving to cases statement express claims, some and distinct separate either appeared, surely have would intention commentaries. in the official or themselves amendments As the Court effect. this trace to not a find But we there, rest must the matter Harris, Snyder v. in thought action.11 congressional further absent
Affirmed. Doug- whom Mr. Justice with Brennan, Mr. Justice dissenting. join, Marshall Mr. Justice las diversity class action suit, a that, holds The Court (3) is maintainable (b) Civ. Proc. Fed. Rule under appear- whether an class, every member only when jurisdictional-amount $10,000 meets the ing party not, ruling (a). It finds this § of 28 U. C. requirement prior cases Court's this the “rationale compelled jurisdiction of defining the construing the statutes respectfully dissent. I disagree Court.” jurisd federal-question invoking general action Because a class juris subject to the same be S. C. would iction under U. § having separate respect dictional-amount rules cause the same even if a claims, the result here would be distinct City stated, Illinois under federal law could see of action (1972), or Milwaukee, 406 98-101 if substantive federal U. S. course, Congress exempted Of has held to control case. law were federal-question jurisdiction any jurisdictional- major from areas of requirements, 1333-1334, 1336-1340, 1343- see 28 U. S. C. §§ 1345, 1347-1358, 1361-1362, being widely appli exemption so cable, fact, Snyder S., Harris, 394 U. at holding impact of its in federal discounted cases.
The provision of 1332 (a) tersely states “the matter controversy [must the sum or value of . exceed] . . $10,000 words, Those substantially since unchanged the passage of the Judi- *11 ciary of 1789,1 Act apply to “civil actions,” say nothing about the requirements applicable to individual and individual claimants claims. Although Congress has several times altered amount required,2 generally upward,3 it has left the task of defining require- those ments to judiciary.4 The result has been relatively
1 11, Section 1 Judiciary Stat. 78. The First Act used the term dispute,” “matter in ibid., phrase 1911, that was retained until when the $2,000 amount $3,000, was increased from 3, Act of 1911, 24, Mar. 1091, 36 Stat. and the “matter § words controversy” in were substituted. 2The catalogued amendments are opinion. in 1n. of the Court’s 3Adjustments changes purchasing in power of the dollar generally given explanation have been phenomenon. as the for this See, g., Rep. e. 1830, Cong., Sess., No. (1958): 85th 2d 4 present requirement “The $3,000 has been books statute since obviously 1913 and the value of dollar in its terms of purchasing power undergone depreciation has marked since date. The Consumers Price Index for moderate families income large in cities percent 1913, indicates a rise of about since shortly present $3,000 after the minimum was established. . . Ac- . cordingly the committee fixing juris- believes that the standard for dictional $10,000.” amounts should be increased to Rep. See H. R. Cong., Sess., No. (1958) (containing 85th 2d language). identical only decrease, The in is discussed n. 1 opinion. of the Court’s The suggestion congressional recent purpose is an oft- repeated legislative statement history of the 1958 amendments: “The recommendations of the Judicial Conference United [of regarding controversy, States] which this committee approves, is premise based on the that the amount should be fixed money at a sum of that will make available all sub- stantial controversies where other elements of Federal present. are high amount should not be so as to complex designed implement set of rules sensitive way broad directive in a Congress’ responsive is efficiency in adjudication. the demands of fairness and One line” “bright emerged has to control all there must be at joint actions: least one plaintiff, statutory more than interest, seeking amount. Harris, Snyder Troy Bank v. (1969); U. S. 332 Co., G. A. Whitehead & U. S. 39 The “long- standing” and “well aggregation established” rule on Court invokes was developed to deter- mine a group whether sufficiently claims was inter- related to “joint” constitute such a claim or “common and undivided interest.” big convert the Federal courts into courts of business nor so low away petty as to fritter their time in the trial of controversies.” *12 Rep. 1830, supra, S. (emphasis added); No. at Rep. 3-4 H. R. No. 1706, supra, (containing at 3 language). identical 5 Troy See Co., Bank v. G. A. Whitehead & U. S. 39 opinion. cases cited in n. 3 of the Court’s also ob serves, quite correctly, that aggregation the same rule on has been applied federal-question jurisdiction, to the 28 U. S. C. 1331. But § assertion, footnote, jurisdic in the Court’s final the same tional it apply 1331, rules announces for 1332 will is even § § questionable more application than its of those rules this case. The continued need diversity jurisdiction, for exercise of at least showing prejudice made, challenged where a is not has been respected Wechsler, authorities. See Federal Jurisdiction and the Code, Contemp. Revision of the Judicial 13 Law & Prob. 234- (1948); Currie, The Federal Courts the American Law (pts. II), Institute I (1968, 1969). & 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. Cf. Rep. 1830, supra, S. No. sharply n. 3. But a different view been has federal-question jurisdiction, taken of the and the Court has reflected upholding jurisdiction that view its decisions the exercise of over pendent claims Gibbs, under state law. Mine Workers v. See (1966). Similarly significant U. S. 715 disincentives to assertion rights of federal likely in federal forums are if are barred claimants combining from litigation. to reduce the time and cost of how- “action,” to the has attached jurisdiction
Once of several rule has but one “aggregation” been ever, ways jurisdiction to establish over additional claims In parties. case, the claims of the named provided jurisdiction over District Court with diversity petitioners argument action. And make no theory inconsistent with holding the Court’s “joint” claims or support interests will not over the nonappearing members Their of their class. contention is rather that a second theory, ancillary jurisdiction, supports a determination those may be entertained.
Ancillary
adjudicate
claims that cannot
be fitted within
aggregation
rules has long been
recognized by this Court,
Howe,
see Freeman v.
24 How.
450 (1861);
Oaks,
Phelps
“New rule 23 pattern alters the actions; of class subdivision (b)(3), particular, category is a new deliberately created. Like other innovations from time to time introduced Rules, into the Civil 306 has the Court factors, these consideration
After over com ancillary jurisdiction exercise sustained v. Horton (a), 13 Rule under counterclaims pulsory aff’g (1961), 348 Co., U. S. 367 Insurance Mutual Liberty Cotton York v. New Moore 1960); (CA5 148 F. 2d 275 so done also has It (1926). 593 U. S. 270 Exchange, matter be a held was intervention party's where Oaks, Phelps v. (a), 24 Rule provided is now as right, Practice Federal Holtzoff, A.& 2 Barron W. see supra; Following 1961). ed. Wright (C. 593§ Procedure & juris ancillary have sustained appeals the courts lead, M.R. (g), 13 by Rule permitted over cross-claims diction 721 F. Bank, 291 2d National Chase Co. v. & Smythe 798 (CA5 2d Cook, F. 245 Childress (CA2 1961); Penn 14, Rule under defendants impleaded 1957); over F. Co., 302 Warehouse Avenue Erie Co. v. R. sylvania interpleaded defendants over 1962); (CA3 2d 843 Isaacs, F. 2d Co. v. Walmac Rule under Law —Multi Developments 1955). See (CA1 L. Rev. Courts, Harv. the Federal Litigation party (1958).7 passim appro- equally (b)(3) are Rule under actions Class assurances, ample are There for such treatment. priate which change total situation as to class those are subject matter regarding statutes theories Com- Civil Continuing Work Kaplan, brought to bear.” Procedure of Civil Rules Federal Amendments mittee: 1966 356, 399-400 (I), Harv. L. Rev. & Procedure Miller, Practice federal Wright & also C. A. See corol “a natural approving sound 564-565 pp. concept,” a ancillary applications lary to other juris party need meet representative holding one Lesch action in a class support requirement to dictional-amount (ND Ill. Supp. 908 Co., 279 F. R. Chicago Illinois & Eastern 1968). *14 provisions of the Rule “the questions of law
or fact common to the members the class pre- [must] dominate any over questions affecting individual guarantee that ancillary jurisdiction will members/'8 not become a facade hiding attempts to secure federal ad- judication of parties’ nondiverse disputes over unrelated claims. And practical reasons permitting adjudi- cation of the claims of the entire class are certainly as strong as those ancillary supporting jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims parties that are entitled to intervene as of right. Class actions were born of necessity.9 The joinder alternatives were of the entire class, or redundant litigation of the common issues. The cost to litigants and the drain on the resources of the judiciary resulting from either alternative would have been intolerable. And this case presents precisely those difficulties: approximately 240 claimants are involved, and the issues will doubtless call for extensive use of expert testimony on difficult scientific issues. is, of
It course, true that an exercise of ancillary juris- diction in such cases would result in some increase in the federal courts’ workload, for unless the class action is permitted many of the claimants will be unable to obtain any federal determination of their rights. But objection is applicable to every other exercise of ancil- (b)(3). Rule 23 This Rule further states: pertinent “The matters findings (A) include: the interest of members of the class in individually controlling prosecution or defense separate actions; (B) the extent and any nature of litigation concerning the controversy already against members of the class; (C) the desirability commenced or undesirability of concentrating litigation of the claims in particular forum; (D) likely difficulties to be encountered management of a class action.” 9See 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice [1], ¶¶ 23.02 passim 23.05 (2d 1969). ed. *15 that answer a sufficient be It should lary jurisdiction. larger a much impose will ancillary jurisdiction denial whole, aas judiciary federal the state burden prospec- the ability of the impair substantially and will claims. their to assert members class tive comparable device action class a provides If the State unfair- inefficiency and some (b)(3), Rule to named not certainly all. but avoided, may be ness can who class of their members any other plaintiffs, choose may requirement, jurisdictional-amount the meet these courts, district claims those litigate to Moreover, preference. be their shown have plaintiffs litigate separately required be now probably they will enlarg- possibly thus cases,10 in their issues the common ironically revers- burden, and judiciary's federal ing the purpose. apparent Court's ing the Rule a provide not does if State Moreover, members of class claims of the litigation device, (3) (b) prefer simply lack the either who they would courts —as state claims their litigate of the any construction under free to do And of suits. multitude a produce requirement —will fact that flood—the that mitigating influence the chief worth- to be likely are these landowners’ many case-by-case aon asserting them cost of less because judi- no do value —will potential their basis will exceed credit. system cial sustaining desirability of practical does only
Not (b) (3) class bring Rule ancillary jurisdiction long Court has but decisions, logic of our within deter consequence Court's probable is This had holding class member to meet mination, each after appro requirement, find “no it could 430, 433 jurisdiction.” F. R. D. priate which class [it had] over (Vt. 1971); infra, at 311-312. see ancillary fact, sustained and has recognized
since
members
nonappearing
over the
of traditional
requirements
who do not meet the
action
Strawbridge
diversity laid down
complete
rule of
Curtiss,
Tribe Ben
Supreme
In
3 Cranch
only
Cauble,
Hur
the Court
Certainly compelled by Snyder this result is not Harris, 394 U. 332 (1969), for that decision turned solely on diversity jurisdiction whether federal could be established over I accept the “action.” Nor can Snyder’s, Court’s contention Clark citation to Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U. S. 583 controls here. That case dealt jurisdictional-amount with the require- ments for the original named who litigated the case. petitioners Here clearly requirement. meet Snyder’s characterization of Clark as a class action did turn case a precedent into for applying the requirements to nonappearing who, members so far indicated in Clark, were not even involved in that case.
It would be far more consistent with Clark for the Court to it rule, as did in Supreme Tribe Ben-Hur, that only the original named plaintiffs must meet jurisdic- tional requirements, and that nonappearing class mem- bers and intervenors need not. ruling, Such a going while a step farther than petitioners seek, would be reasonable and pragmatically justified. There is a dif- substantial ference between the impact on a case of an appearing party a nonappearing class member, interven- tion poses no threat since the district courts are given discretion by Rule (d) (3) permit intervention sub- ject to appropriate conditions. See 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice (3), p. ¶ 23.73 (2d 1969). ed. The ques- tion in this case is not whether the class action must be permitted, but whether the District Court has the power to determine whether permit it, taking into account guidance elaborate provided discretion by Rule 23.
The Court also appears rely on Snyder’s rejection of “the notion that the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to effect, any effected, change in the meaning and application of requirement insofar as class actions are concerned.” Ante, at 299. Snyder based rejection on Rule 82’s admonition that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not to be “construed to extend or limit the United States district courts . . . .” Reliance on *17 Rule 82 was proper there because petitioner con- tended that restructuring Rule 23 to abolish “spurious” class actions in favor of a “functional” approach that took into account the nature of the litiga- tion and its effects undercut this Court’s long line of decisions establishing the minimum requirements diversity jurisdiction over a “civil action.” But presents case no suggestion that the 1966 amendments override the Court’s decisions construing § 1332. There are no earlier decisions construing the requirements for the nonappearing members of a “spurious” class, probably because the old Rule did not bind members of the class unless they did the 1966
affirmatively Nor requested inclusion.11 within bring (b)(3) amendments Rule class actions any other If made the holdings. they merely anything, permitted determination whether the class should be turn directly more on the kinds of that have concerns motivated the ancillary jurisdiction.12 exercise of question ought, this case to be whether instead, changes may in the Civil Rules and affect, be affected by, the juris- determination whether to existing exercise diction. course, they Of Reporter must. As the to the Advisory Committee on Civil that prepared Rules 1966 amendments has' observed: “From the start Civil Rules, elaborating complicating through joinder of claims and have parties, profoundly influenced result.”13 prior The Court’s decisions upholding novel ancillary exercises have made liberal use of the opportunities presented by the Civil Rules amendments of them, and Rule 82 has stood as no bar to that action.
Indeed, today’s effects of decision also will influenced by the form of Rule 23. The Court, after ruling that ancillary jurisdiction could not be exer- was cised, confronted with a dilemma that did not exist prior to the 1966 amendments: identification the mem- bers of the class that would be by bound the decision so they could be provided the required notice.14 After Developments See Multiparty Litigation in the Law — Courts, Federal Harv. L. Rev. 941-942 and eases cited n. 493 23(a)(1), 12 See Rules (3) (b)(3)(A), (B), (C). Cf. H. Weehsler, supra, Hart & H. (“Under n. at 1078. the revised rule, contemplates which a class action all members properly excluded will be by bound judgment, ‘spurious’ longer exists, class action no and ancillary may support intervention cases.”) class members in all 13Kaplan, supra, *18 6,n. at 400. (c)(2), Rules 23 which determine to possible not it was that determining require- $10,000 met members proposed But all. action status class denied court ment, themselves lend will classes (3) (b) Rule any, if few, that pleadings, of basis on the determination, Inter- requirement. that meets member proposed each jurisdic- establishing purpose least at vention, even than more is that necessary, may be tion, mem- class specified it when contemplated Rule old bound. order inclusion request had to bers holding implicit the Court’s basis on the Thus, aof recognition support would ancillary jurisdiction still will amendments class, (3) (b) Rule federal in which cases number influence cur- simply case, in this They will, be exercised. will it. expand than rather exercise tail practical concern previous Court’s In view its involving cases its both realities I ancillary jurisdiction, exercise involving cases unwarranted both is limitation think unwise.