*1 CO. TIDE- INSURANCE MUTUAL NATIONAL CO., INC. TRANSFER WATER June Argued 1948. Decided November No. 29. petitioner. With G. Bress cause
David argued E. 'Newmyer L. and Sheldon Alvin brief were him on the Bernstein. Solicitor General Perlman Court,
By special leave of curiae, States, as amicus for the United argued the cause brief were Assistant him With reversal. on- urging Raum, Morison, A. Swee- Paul Attorney General Arnold ney Harry I. Rand. B. Burch D. Allen and Francis argued
Wendell respondent. fcr and filed a cause brief announced judgment Justice Jackson Mr. opinion Court and an in which Mr. Justice Black *2 join. Justice Burton Mr.
This
up
case calls
review a
it is
holding that
un-
constitutional
for Congress
open
to
in the
several
states
action
a
of
citizen
the District.of
a
against
Columbia
citizen of one
The
of
states.
petitioner, as plaintiff, commenced in the United States
District
for Maryland
Court
an
a
action for money judg-
ment on a
arising
claim
out of an insurance contract.
No cause of action under the
laws
Constitution of
the United
pleaded,
States was
jurisdiction being predi-
upon
cated
an
of
allegation
citizenship.
diverse
The
diversity
plaintiff
set forth was that
corporation
is a
created
by District
Columbia law, while the defendant
corporation
is a
by Virginia,
chartered
amenable to suit
in Maryland by virtue of a license to do business there.
The learned District Judge-
that,
concluded
while this
jurisdictional
met
diversity
requirements
under
Act
Congress,1
it did
comply
require-
with diversity
ments
jurisdiction,
Constitution as to federal
and
so dismissed.2 The
court,
Court of
a
Appeals, by divided
affirmed.3 Of twelve district courts that had .considered
up
the question
the time
review in this Court was
except
sought, all
had
three
held the enabling Act uncon-
stitutional,4 and the
Appeals
two
Courts
which had
April 2.0,
117,
Act
e.
54 Stat. 143. For terms of the
statute see note 10.
opinion
No
Court,
dismissing
was filed
the District
which in
complaint
for lack of
upon
relied
its former decision
opinion
Feely
Sidney
Schupper
Hauling System,
S.
Interstate
Inc.,
Supp.
72 F.
3
4 The
upheld
Daniels,
Supp. 265;
Act had
been
Winkler v.
43 F.
Association,
925;
Supp.
Glaeser
Acacia Mutual
55 F.
Life
Hawaii).
Woolley,
(with
in Duze v.
Supp.
respect
72 F.
It
T he
subject agreed with that conclusion.5
spoken on the
review
obviously
appropriate
was' an
one for
controversy
in the case.6
and writ of certiorari
here
issued
begins with that of
history
controversy
oT the
defining
In
cases and controversies
Republic.
the.
could
which the
States
judicial power
Citi
extend,
included those “between
the Constitution
zens
In the
Act of
Judiciary
of different States.”7
of first in
a
federal courts
system
created
a
them
of -suits “between
gave
stance and'
citizen
brought,
the suit is
citizen of the State where
Supreme
through
In 1804,
Court,
another State.”8
Marshall, held
citizen of the District
Chief Justice
that a
mean
of Columbia was not a citizen
within the
.State
closed
This decision
ing and intendment of this Act.9
*3
to citizens of the District
federal courts in the states
they
years
for
diversity cases,
in
and
136
of Columbia
the statute
In 1940
enacted
Congress
remained closed.
here.
It
on such courts
challenged
confers
of different
or
if
“Is between citizens
the action
in
instant
held unconstitutional in
District Court
had been
case;
Transportation
v. Watson
Co-operatives
Bros.
in Central
States
Bethlehem,
392,
v.
McGarry
City
2d
and in
165 F.
Co.,
affirmed
Supp. 706;
F.
385;
v.
60
Foundation,
Supp.
F.
Behlert
James
45
593;
Guggen
Supp.
v.
Co.,
66 F.
v. Samuel Brilliant
Wilson
Ostrow
417;
Feely
Sidney
Schupper
Hau
Supp.
v.
Interstate
70 F.
heim,
S.
853;
Supp.
663;
and
Supp.
Willis v.
72 F.
Dennis,
F.
ling System,
72
Supp.
75 F.
832.
Dailey,
Acc. Assn. v.
in
Ben. Health &
Mutual
5
by
Appeals
the Court
held invalid
The Act had been
Judge
case,
Parker
F. 2d
with
165
Fourth Circuit
the instant
Circuit
by
Appeals for the Seventh
dissenting;
the Court
Co.,
Transportation
Co-operatives Bros.
Watson
States
Central
dissenting.
Judge
Evans
165 F. 2d
333 U. S.
Ill,
2, cl. 1.
U. S. Const. Art.
§
73,78.
24,1789, 20,1
Sept.
c.
Stat.
11 of the Act of
§
Dundas
The considerations which bid us congressional Constitution to enactments which invade powers fundamental freedoms or which reach for substantially between, would disturb the balance component present Union and its states, are not here. government In mere mechanics of and administration we *4 10 (1946 ed.) (1) The effect of the amend S. Act 28 U. C. 41§ pertinent part: so that read in “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction nature, as Of all civil follows: ... suits a at equity common or controversy law . . . where the matter in ex ceeds, costs, $3,000, exclusive of interest the sum or value (b) and . . . Is or between citizens different citizens of the Columbia, Hawaii,"or Territory Alaska, District of the Territory or State . . . .” 11 25,1948,62 Act of June Stat. 869. 1228 U. S. C. 5J332. fairly great of the Charter
should, language so far as the machinery adapt its Congress freedom to permit, give will In no case could the of changing to the needs times. appro- more Chief Justice be great of the admonition it is forget, never . we must priately heeded —“. . expounding.”13 a constitution we are third, Judi- the whether, under inquiry first Our extending Constitution,14 ciary, Article “be- or controversies to cases of the United States District a citizen of States,” of different tween Citizens a of one of the citizen standing of Columbia has opin- question which is the states of the Union. This negative, answered of Chief Justice Marshall ion Hepburn & if of actual decision. way not by of dicta- sure, nothing Ellzey, To be 445. Dundas Cranch aof statute15 except interpretation Court was before that substantially in the words which conferred or context nothing the text Constitution District as regard show that intended statutory question But Marshall resolved state. provisions analogy of-the invoking constitutional was not the District tenor and reasoned that the same and, hence, was purposes for the Constitution state summarily opinion of the Act. The purposes for contrary, including the one arguments to the disposed of provisions of the Constitution here repeated other used in its term is sometimes “the state indicate Here, there, examining “on sense.” enlarged more prove what was do not quoted, they passages his Cranch-445, Among contem- them”’ 453. shown generally Marshall was not Chief Justice poraries least, at lan- interpreting literalness undue censured Maryland, 316, 407. 4 Wheat. McCulloch III, §2, Art. cl. U.S. Const. 15See note 8. *5 guage deny of the Constitution to and he personal wrote from close knowledge the Founders and the foundation of our constitutional structure. Nor did he the equitable underestimate claims which his decision District, denied to residents for said that “It is he States, true that as of the United citizens and of that particular district which is subject to the congress, extraordinary it is that the courts the United open aliens, which are and' to the citizens every in the union, upon state should closed them.— subject judicial But this is a for legislative not for consideration.”16 sentence, latter at- importance which much is
tached, is somewhat ambiguous, because constitutional amendment well as as statutory revision is for legislative, judicial, not opinion consideration. But the as a whole leaves no doubt that the Court did not regard then a District as state for diversity purposes. early now overrule this
.To decision the Court on this point-and hold of Columbia a District is state would, opinion pointed as that out, give to the word meaning “state” a in the up Article which sets the quite establishment different that which it carries in those up Articles which set political departments other Articles of the instrument. While the word is one which can contain many meanings, such incon- sistency in single instrument implied only is to be where clearly requires context it. There no evidence that the Founders, pressed by general more and immediate anxieties, thought problems of the special of the District of Columbia in connection judiciary. with the This strange, only contemplated District then entity. they had thought it, But. there is nothing to indicate that it would have been referred a state and
16Hepburn Ellzey, & 445, 453. Dundas v. 2 Crunch *6 pro- required special would much to indicate that it have relationship into the new to fit visions its anomalous political new fit it into the judicial system, just as it did to system. instrument in the fateful referring to “States” Jn States,” the “United into the amalgamated them
which in the ab- of states obviously were not Founders speaking socie- organized those concrete They referred to stract. by contributing to the federation thereby ties which were sovereign powers and part somfe of their delegating to the admitted organized and those later be that-should obviously They prescribed. partnership in the method spaces dependent unorganized contemplate not did being nonexistent of Columbia The District states. as. of the com- at the time state, much less as a form, in Union of states into the pact, certainly was not taken state is as a new by it, nor it since been admitted has be admitted. required to Chief opinion decline overrule
We therefore Co- hold that the District Marshall, and we Justice III of within Article the Constitution. is not lumbia state District and citizens words, In other cases between catalogue of in included states were not those of the juris- give Congress could over which controversies III. of Art. virtue federal courts diction however, determine not, does This conclusion Con- provisions of the under other Congress power lacks Act Congress, by legislation. enact stitution to disagree with the challenge or question, sought in not to the District Marshall of Chief Justice decision It was careful purposes. a state for Columbia such by basing the new with that decision to avoid conflict upon had not been relied legislation powers passing the Congress in Act the First Representa- of the House Committee Judiciary “a April rea- recommended the Act tives power Congress, sonable exercise of the constitutional legislate for the District of Columbia and for the Territories.”17 This the Constitution confers By I, empowered broad terms. Art. “to ex- Legislation whatsoever, ercise all over exclusive Cases And such District.”18 of course it was also authorized necessary proper “To all Laws shall be make powers.19 pro- for carrying into Execution” such These relevant Chief Marshall’s in- visions were not Justice terpretation of the 1789 because it did not refer Act of It is terms to the District but to states. there- . significant that, citi- having fore decided that District *7 brought not within zens’ cases were federal by Art. Ill to pursuant it, and the statute enacted added, Chief Justice seen, ás-we have that it extraor- dinary that be federal courts should closed to the citizens particular subject of “that district which to is congress.” language clearly Such re- Congress’ fers to Art. I power of “exclusive Legislation all Cases whatsoever, over such And District.” mention power seems significant that particularly the context of Marshall’s further statement that is a the matter sub- ject “legislativé not for Even consideration.” if speculation it be say considered to an that this was expression by the Chief Justice that had Congress requisite'power I, under Art. it would be in the teeth of his language say it power. to is denial of such Congress The has acted possesses belief that' power. Wé believe their conclusion well founded. Rep. 1756,-76th 17 H. Sess.,. R. Cong.', p. No. 3d 3. Senate Judiciary report only Committee’s consists of a1recommendation that (H. 8822) passed. the bill Report Cong., R. 1399,76th Senate No. Passage 3d Sess. Cong. each House 86 was without discussion. Rec., 3, p. 3015; Pt. Cong. Ree., 4, p. Pt. 18U. I, 8, S. Const. Art. cl. 17. § I, §8, U.S. Const. Art. cl. 18. of. responsibility elementary that the exclusive It both includes of the District Congress for the welfare and citizens provide its inhabitants power duty to adjudge not controversies adequate courts to well against, their as but claims among themselves also It states. various brought by, suits citizens may clothe District Congress held that has been long pow jurisdiction and oniy with the Columbia with such states but in the several ers of federal courts Kendall v. on her courts. as a state confer authority States, Co. Capital Traction 619; Pet. Hof, O’Donoghue United 1; 174 U. S. challenge here does not The defendant U. S. 516. citizens of justice to the Congress to assure instrumentalities,, or of federal
District means fun its District empower a court within the here process part to summon defendants why a no reason has been advanced country. And could of District citizens special statutory for cases court in the United proceed not be authorized to elsewhere proper, discharge sit, necessary or where States District citizens. Congress toward the duties may not com- it is However, contended under Art. I, under Art. with those function, bine objec- Two States. the United Ill, in district courts of *8 other jurisdiction that to this. One is urged tions are no that on courts imposed Ill be specified in Art. can than there- States power of the United judicial exercise I the District powers over The other is that Art. under. geo- within that solely be of Columbia must exercised graphic area. duties which limits to the nature
Of there are course vested impose courts on the constitutional Congress sepa- judicial power. The doctrine with the federal arises, It system. in oiir is fundamental powers ration of however, Ill any Art. nor other' single provision Constitution, but because “behind words provisions postulates constitutional are which limit and control.” Hughes Chief Justice in Monaco v. Mis- sissippi, U. The permeative nature S. recognized this doctrine was early during the Con- Objection pro- stitutional Convention. present giving vision courts arising of cases “under permit usurpation this Constitution” would judicial non by the functions federal courts was over- ruled as since it was “generally supposed unwarranted given constructively limited to cases of Judiciary Farrand, nature.” Records Convention; the Federal re- 430. And this statute flects that doctrine. It does not require authorize or district, either the to participate courts or this Court any nonju- or legislative, administrative, political other any advisory dicial render opinion.- function to jurisdiction conferred is limited to of a controversies justiciable nature, the sole feature them distinguishing from countless other controversies the same handled being party courts the fact that one ais District citizen. Congress by Nor has the attempted usurp this statute judicial power. It deliberately has chosen the district appropriate instrumentality through which tq part judicial to exercise functions incidental of sovereignty exertion over the and its citizens. District we are Unless deny Congress the same choice through of means govern' which to- the District of Co- other, lumbia that we it in exercising have held to have legislative powers Article, enumerated in the same we hold that Congress sought cannot lacked the to exercise the Act before us.
It is too hold late to functions incidental I powers cannot conferred Art. *9 Ill, it has been done under Art. existing courts States, v. United O’Donoghue approval. Court’s although District that, U. 516. In that case it was held S. courts, they also Ill can of Columbia courts are Art. by Congress pursuant judicial power conferred exercise courts, as of Columbia Art. I. The fact that District legislative courts, also be administrative given local can exercise, Art. Ill courts cannot functions which other are the latter emphasize that, although does but the fact consti- judicial power, exercise of limited to the I, Ill or Art. tutionally from Art. received either flowing District, congressional power that over respect. I, plenary in every Art. is we reach this say It likewise late to should is too Marshall’s unless view, overruling result Chief Justice more, much prepared including we also are to overrule powers very Many of our utterances. some own recent power Columbia Congress govern other than its exercise require intelligent discriminating for their justiciable determination character. of controversies of In has held that yet no instance this Court placed regular in the cases could not be such Congress has been authorized to ordain courts that some, analogous situations establish. turn to We very course that approved which we have Congress has taken here. I power by pay debts of the given is Art.
United That involves as an incident the deter- States. ( unanimously have disputed mination We held claims. that congressional authority I, under not the Art. Art. Ill jurisdiction over to which suits the United States . is a party, power is sole source of establish Court of the judicial power Claims and of which' that Williams court exercises. S. 289 U. In decision we also noted that it this same Art. I conferred on district *10 Tucker Act20 which authorizes them to hear and deter mine such claims limited amounts. a legisla Since tive court such as the Court of “incapable Claims is Ill receiving” judicial Art. power, American Insurance Canter, Co. v. 1 511, Pet. it 546, is clear that thus exercised concurrently by court and the dis I, trict courts flows from not Art. Indeed, Art. III. more recently and again unanimously, this Court has said Congress the Tucker Act the authorized the district'-" courts to a court of exercising sit as claims21 the same judicial but no power. Sherwood, more United v. States 312 U. S. 591. And ago, but few terms con sidering an byAct which Congress rehearing directed a rejected claim and its in conformity redetermination with given Act, directions Chief Stone, Justice with the concurrence of all sitting colleagues, reasoned that problem “The presented here is no different than if Con gress given had a like direction to district court to be followed as in other Tucker Act v. Pope cases.” States, United 323 Congress U. S. 14. has taken us at our word and recently conferred on the district courts jurisdiction exclusive of tort claims cognizable under the Federal Tort Act, Claims 60 842, 843, Stat. also enacted 20 3,1887, Act of March 359,24 c. Stat. 505.
21 This frequently concurrent of the district courts has been referred opinions to in of this Court with no indication that presented any respect jurisdic constitutional problem to the tion of either the See, example, district courts or this Court. Pope States, Sherwood, United v. United 1; States 323 S. v. U. Shaw, United 584; 312 States 495; U. S. v. Williams 309 U. S. States, Smelting United v. Nassau 553; Works v. United U. S. States, Pfitsch, 547; Tempel 101; United States v. 266 U. S. 256 U. S. States, v. Greathouse, v. United States 121; 248 U. S. Jones, 601; United States legislative U. S. U. S. 1. grant basis for the to the district courts is delineated Mfg. States, in Bates v. Co. United S. 567. U. v. United powers.22 I See Brooks
pursuant to Art.
ante, p. 49. I power to make uniform given also is
Congress Art. bankruptcies. and not subject this, That on the of' laws Ill, Art. our power under the source obvious, bankruptcy system reorganizations Co., P. R. 294 U. S. Chicago, R. I. & Continental Bank han required only may the district courts Not juris to their dle but add proceedings, these that, but and others between the trustee diction cases juris beyond their powers, would be bankruptcy for the required Art. diversity under diction because lack *11 case, Beeler, In 367. that III. Schumacher v. 293 U. S. that, court wrote Hughes for a unanimous Chief Justice bankruptcies, I authority over by virtue of its Art. juris regular on the district
Congress could confer in as dis equity, of “all at law and diction controversies bankruptcy, in between trus proceedings tinguished specified extent as such and adverse claimants” to the tees ju Such Bankruptcy in 23b oí Act as aménded. § in a suit, a district upheld plenary risdiction was there in rely- by sought equitable relief court, which the trustee States, adjudi suggestion against the United here that claims by by solely by the district courts cated the Court Claims and jurisdiction sovereign immunity and the virtue the waiver of arising granted Act, may be “under iinder the Tucker cases self-defeating. laws of the United States” is both erroneous and 553, case, holds The unanimous decision in the Williams 289 U. S. contrary, 577, clearly stating, that to the at 289 U. S. controversies by party defendant to which the United States statute be made by wholly power scope “lie vested Art. outside Mississippi, 313, Ill . . .” U. S. 321. . And see Monaco Moreover, plaintiffs simply opens those courts to the Tucker Act already possessed, If of a action. that is sufficient make cause of arising States, the one under laws of the United same the case urges No view of this suit and all others like it. one that true present statute, they. note nor See 23 and text. could allegations on ing raising only questions of Ohio law con- cerning the validity under that law a levy sheriff’s execution. Possession not being shown, trustee ,and being ty, jurisdiction there no divers in the district court n could flow only iro the statute. Chief Justice noted Hughes that the in distinction between proceedings bankruptcy and suits at law equity recognized by the terms of the itself, statute held “Congress, but by virtue of its constitutional authority bankruptcies, over could confer or withhold to entertain such prescribe suits and could the conditions upon jurisdiction. federal courts Exercising should . . have . power, Congress prescribed in 23b the condi- § tion of part consent of the defendant sued the trustee. was thus effect grant Section.23b jurisdiction subject to that condition.” S.U. granted concluded that the statute He bankrupt to the “although district court' could not brought have suit if proceedings bankruptcy there had been instituted . . . .” 293 U. S. 377. And he stated the correct view be § conferred substan- jurisdiction, tive 367, 371, 293 U. S. disapproving state- ments an earlier case that lacked *12 jurisdiction. confer Id. Thus, such at 377. the Court Congress power held that had to an Ill authorize A.rt. judi- court a non-Art. Ill suit because such entertain . power cial was conferred under Indeed, Art. I. the pres- ent Court .assumed, has discussion, without that Con- even gress Austrian, has such power. Williams v. In U. S. 642, 657, the Chief Court, for speaking the said Justice, that “. . . Congress intended the of 23 elimination § Chapter X of the the Bankruptcy [from to establish Act] jurisdiction of federal plenary^suits brought courts to hear by a reorganization trustee, though diversity even or other ground lacking” (Em- usual jurisdiction is for federal vigorous -dissent phasis supplied.) There dissenting Justices re- statute, but meaning X Chapter “a trustee holding that thé Court’s ferred to a federal dis- personam in suit in may bring plenary this court, although neither reorganization court not trict juris- diversity citizenship ground nor other And the dissent S. 331 U. diction exists.” Congress authorize such “No doubt could continued: Beeler, 374.” U. S. suit. Schumacher See Ibid. in and the Beeler assumption the Court
This had on cases, power that the to confer Austrian suits júrisdiction nondiversity district courts unnecessary any questions, state law made involving In view power. the source of assumed discussion Court Congress’ plenary bankruptcies, control over on Art. I. Or grounded assumption have such jurisdiction it was based might have considered that the it, Ill, giving Art. and pursuant statutes enacted arising suits under the district courts over the United States. Had laws of Constitution such, a com- view, might Court held have this latter Consequently, mended itself as the most obvious answer. respect, case, in the of each seems silence decision particularly refer- significant, repeated contrast case, I sweeping to Art. Beeler ence in the language Austrian case that such despite of diversity ground existed lack “or other usual jurisdiction.” Nevertheless, asserted, for federal now retrospect, did arise under laws those cases justification States. No is offered say just why is no conclusion there effort how would indeed be the cases did so arise. This difficult if Holmes we still adhere to the doctrine of Mr. Justice “a suit law that creates the cause arises under the *13 action,” Co., American Well Works Co. v. Layne 257, 260, S. for
U. the cause of action eách case rested solely on state law.
But matter does not rest on inference alone. Other decisions of this Court conclusively demonstrate over the Beeler and Austrian suits was not and could not have been conferred under Art. Ill and statutes concerning suits arising under the laws of the United A States. most thoroughly-considered utterance of this Court on subject given by. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in Gully Bank, v. First National 299 U. S. said, where he without a dissent, “How and when case arises ‘under the or laws of the Constitution States’ has been much in the considered books. Some tests a bring are well To within the established. case statute, right immunity or created the Constitution or laws an and an element, the United States must be one, essential plaintiff’s cause . . action. . [Em phasis right immunity added. Thé or must be such ] will supportéd if the Constitution or laws of the United States are effect, construction or given one if defeated A they genuine receive another. ... present controversy, merely possible conjectural one, . must exist with thereto . . and the con reference troversy upon must be the face of the com disclosed plaint reviewing- . . . U. S. 112-113. After previous cases, Cardozo to a Mr. Justice referred then opinion recent said, Mr. Justice Stone in which he a unanimous court, that federal not be “may invoked non-federal, is right merely where the asserted plaintiff’s because the right to sue derived federal law, or property because the was obtained under involved right federal statute. The nature to.be established authority decisive—not the source of Co., establish it.” S. Puerto Rico v. & 288 U. Russell *14 598 Switchmen’s also added.)23 See (Emphasis
476, 483. Board, v. General Committee 297; S. Union v. U. Co., R. U. S. 323. M.-K.-T. nor the Beeler case meets these the Austrian
Neither said to under a case can be arise tests,, required before than does the case States, any more laws the United an for trustee, equity ac- Austrian, sued before us. as a that state-created charge on a affairs counting based in viola- the officers corporation had been conducted a trustee, on conten- Beeler, sued law. tion state void a an Ohio sheriff was levy that property by tion on controversies, one before- like the under state law. Both authority poin.t. For replete on this ex are books Rutter, 505, it ample, Mining 177 U. S. in Shoshone Co. least, out said, must, part at arise of a con p. at suit 507: “The operation troversy parties regard and effect between-the upon . . .” And at the facts involved. the Constitution or laws p. suit is an adverse suit authorized 513: . . mere fact that a “. to vest by, in and itself sufficient the statutes of not again p. And at 507 it in the Federal courts.” right takes considered “well settled that a suit to enforce a which (cid:127) origin necessarily one its in the laws the United States is not arising .” the Constitution or laws of the . . . under United States Casualty Co., Minneapolis, In St. P. S. M. Bankers Co. & S. R. p. though involving 384: . . or U. S. at “. suits the Constitution arising not laws of the United States are suits under the Constitution they parties controversy not or laws where do turn on a between the regard operation laws, on the to the of the or Constitution p. repeat settled . And at rule is facts. . .” 385: “We of the does not arise under the or laws case Constitution' statement, in appears plaintiff’s unless it own United States immunity outset, title, right, privilege (cid:127)the that some Con recovery depends will be one construction defeated opposite by the stitution or laws of the United or sustained Mottley, 211 In Co. v. construction.” Louisville & Nashville R. allegations designed arises 149, 152, that the case U. S. to establish they do not if the Constitution are said to be insufficient under of-action,” original suit, is, cause plaintiff’s show that “the does so arise.
us, except called no question determination of law arising way those under state laws. The in which only any law of the States contributed to the case opening was in district courts to the under trustee, I powers just Art. of Congress, present as the un- statute, opens Article, der same those courts residents of In case, the District Columbia. each in the words of Chief Justice law Stone, provided, the federal right sought authority established, but *15 the trustee The congres- to'establish it. fact power bankruptcy sional over Art. I granted could open the court to the trustee does not mean that such States; suits arise under the but does laws the United it I supply judicial power mean that Art. can a for source adjudication. their important distinction is and it is The on this decisive issue.
Neither nor Austrian case was one Beeler arising of the within the under laws United States holdings Un- language clear of recent this Court. jurisdiction in deny less we are to such cases has- rely I consistently upheld, pow- been we must on the Art. Congress. We have to holding ers been cited no jurisdiction spring that such cannot from that Article. Congress given Under I the has Art. the district courts only jurisdiction not over cases under arising the bank- judicial law but ruptcy power also over nondiversity cases which do under not arise that or other federal law. And this Court upheld has the latter grant.
Consequently, deny validity present we can Act to this of Congress, only by saying power over given by District' I ample Art. is' somehow less than given that over If bankruptcy by the same Article. Congress require could this district to decide this court very case if it it brought by trustee, were is hard to may why require see it decision for a its solvent pursuance claimant when I powers. done Art. other Congress that where the exercise We conclude necessary provide I finds powers under it its Art. power its is exerted with access to some those whom for determination of contro- kind of court or tribunal concept of the versies that are within the traditional open regular federal courts to may it justiciable, citizenship. diversity them of lack of regardless that, have discussed is when holdings basis we it owes forum purposes deems that such power its may execute trustees, claimants and ap- justification, equal this manner. The Congress, forum the owes such a parently that it also considers of its Columbia in execution residents of the District of power under same Article. We do not see duty other and the denied. how one could sustained power its Congress may exert We therefore hold that by imposing the govern the District of Columbia adjudicating justiciable function controversies on the which under the Constitution it regular federal courts24 to ordain and establish and may has the which it and from which it invest with withhold degrees “in the exact character which to *16 Lockerty public Congress may proper for the good.” seem Phillips, 319 U. S. v.
The argument congressional powers over Dis- the trict are not to be exercised outside of its limits territorial pressed upon also is But this us. same contention has held this In long Court to untenable. Cohens been question has been of this here as to the source Court’s raised N.o appellate jurisdiction how over Nor do we see that issue such cases. challenging past present could be without our and exercise of raised adjudicated in the the over cases district and in Pope solely United Claims, Act, v. Court under the Tucker see States, 1, 13-14, 21, 22; *17 as District, acts Congress legislates it for the when character, complete leg- exercising national legislature power of with the limited control as contrasted islative as contrasted hand, on the one legislature, a state Congress which exercises sovereignty the limited Neild states, on the other.” boundaries of the within the Columbia, D. 110 F. App. 306, 310, C. v. District of 2d not of course countenance exercise of
We could if it or without the District plenary power either within subjects congressional such as to draw into control were power delegation there has been no over out, But, pointed we have Government. the Federal this defendant suable a District power make compe- of federal is not claimed to be outside citizen power bring defendant If has tence. way all the to a forum within the Dis- from his home it denying for trict, seems little basis there plaintiff part way in another him to meet the require if whether, here defendant practical issue forum. citizens, he must be at all District is to be suable of Co- compelled to the of the District to come courts special sitting perhaps statutory to a court lumbia or it, Congress may authorize or whether outside no We see federal courts to entertain the suit. regular accomplishing Congress in holding justification to those admittedly power is restricted end within its an and burdensome to are most cumbersome means which the District citizen may provide it a defendant. Since of one in sue citizens federal forum which to with a imagine preju- a fairer or less states, is hard to sitting courts regular one than the diced jurisdiction in them To vest the own state. defendant’s of Columbia the District sitting than rather defendants and more .consistent seem less harsh to would prevail system venue that our principles with the *18 generally under which defendants are in suable their home forums.
.The Act before we us, it, see is not a resort Con gress to these means to reach forbidden ends. Rather, Congress reaching permissible ends a choice of means certainly expressly which are not forbidden by the Con good stitution. No reason is advanced for the Court to In deny by implication. them no pay matter should we opinions more deference to the Congress than its perform choice of instrumentalities to a function that is within power.25 put federally its To justice administered within the reach of District citizens, against claims state, object citizens of another is an Congress accomplish. has to right Its own carefully considered view that has it that it is necessary proper to States utilize United District means Courts as end, great respect. this is entitled to Our own ideas desirability as to wisdom such a statute or the provision constitutional authorizing totally it are irrele vant. a law of should Such be stricken down Marshall, Maryland, Chief Justice McCulloch 4 Wheat. of the said: “The result most careful-and attentive con 420-421, upon ‘necessary proper’] sideration bestowed clause [the is, enlarge, if does not it cannot that it be to restrain the .construed Congress, impair right legislature powers of or to judgment carry exercise its best the selection of measures to into powers government. execution constitutional . . . We admit, admit, powers government as all must that are of the limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the constitution must to the national allow legislature discretion, respect by.which with to the means powers execution, it which will enable confers are"to be carried into body perform high assigned it, in duties the manner legitimate, people. most beneficial to Let the end be let it appro scope constitution, which are within the and all means fend, pro priate, plainly which are not adapted which are to that constitution, hibited, spirit of but consist letter and with the are constitutional.” transgresses constitutional showing on a clear showing no has been made.26
limitations. We think such The is valid. Act judgment
Reversed. Rutledge, whom Mr. Justice Justice Mur- Mr. pht concurring. agrees, *19 strongly I I dissent join judgment. in the Court’s But support opinion it in the assigned from the reasons to of Mr. Justice Jackson. in lip decision giving
While service to venerable Ellzey, & Dundas Hepburn pur- and Cranch it, ignores nearly porting distinguish opinion to century a half subsequent and consistent construction.1 In all would overrule that deci- practical consequence, it it be Pertinently may sion with its later reaffirmations. if asked, operate, how are those decisions where just And, if presented by not in the this case? situation is they effectively there no be overruled? other, would not is far important, What worse and more the manner if made, in which this reversal adhered to would be majority every Court, entangle would district court the United the first time all States for have contradictions, complexities and subtleties which, profitable not It would be cases in review numerous during problems, the consideration of other this has made Court concerning Congress’ power to the nature statements and extent legislate jurisdic for the District of Columbia and its control over the now legislative The issue tion both constitutional courts. presented squarely for of them. We decision was not' decided Virginia, Justice Marshall’s admonition in Cohens adhere to Chief 264, 399, expressions “ought 6 Wheat. that such control judgment subsequent very point presented in a suit when the decision,” 1See
in the name of dual practical authority, convenience and or bécause find Congress might some other constitutional way to make citizens of the elsewhere District suable bring .or to any part for suit here citizens then country, imposed what the fed- a limitation eral courts generally is none when decides by to disregard purporting it to act under some other authorization. so self-contradictory.
The Constitution is not Nor are its limitations to be so very evaded. The essence easily of- problem is whether the Constitution cut meant to. out from the diversity jurisdiction of courts created under III Article by agaiñst suits brought citizens 2See text and authorities cited at notes 7-9. infra 606 by question That is not answered
District of Columbia. in did the next that it in breath that saying one not. did
I. today 1940 statute consid- Prior to enactment Columbia were the ered, federal courts of District of try federal courts which had nonfed- eral civil actions between citizens the District and citi- zens of the several states. The doors of federal courts every state, open parties to suits between of diverse state (as 2 citizenship by III, implemented virtue of § Article were congressional enactment), continuous closed the District of 1940 statute citizens of Columbia. The express attempt inequal- first Congress’ remedy Marshall, ity which has obtained ever since Chief Justice Hepburn Ellzey, & Dundas v. supra, construed the first Judiciary citizens of District of Colum- Act exclude statute was bia. construction the 1789 Marshall’s comparable language his that the founded on conclusion dif- III, 2—“Citizens of diversity § clause Article not embrace citizens the District. States” —did ferent, his Act, later Marshall’s view of 1789 iterated Winter, New Orleans dictum, 91, 94; v. cf. Wheat. Pitot, Sere 336, consistently been 6 Cranch has congressional to in later interpretation adhered jurisdiction.3 grants And, accretion, rule of Hepburn has acquired case the force of a considered that, III, within of Article meaning § determination its “the District of Columbia not a State” citizens within that citizens of Arti- are therefore state meaning. cle’s Wall, Barney Jamieson, Baltimore, 280; Hooe v. U. S.
395;
Werner,
Hooe v.
firms” view of this clause. an faced with explicit congressional command to extend jurisdiction nonfederal cases the citizens of Dis- trict of Columbia, Congress power it finds that has to add III jurisdiction Article of federal district- courts jurisdiction such Congress further as think “neces- sary I, proper,” Const., 8, 18, to implement § Art. cl. power I, Legislation,” Const., 8, its § “exclusive Art. 17, thereby cl. over the 'District of Columbia; and escape from the limitations of Article III. I reasoning
From I think dissent. For the. III vested, Article in the several courts states cannot be , provisions pow virtue of Constitution, other of the specifically ers denied them by the terms III. Article If we accept elementary doctrine that the words of Article III self-exercising grants jurisdiction are not I courts,5 inferior think then those words must mark the limits Congress may confer on the I district do several states. And not think or Congress through override we can those limits invocation of I without making Article the Constitution If self-contradicting correctly instrument. Marshall read III unlocking Article preventing may, “Of all the Courts which the their United States under general powers, constitute, only, Supreme Court, possesses one immediately constitution, derived from the and of which legislative power Hudson, deprive cannot it.” United States v. 32, 7 Cranch 33. And see Justice in Turner v. Chase’s remarks America, Bank 8, 10 North Dall. Martin v. n. But cf. Hunter’s Lessee, 304, pre Wheat. 328-331. For recent reaffirmation of the vailing view Co., see Kline v. Burke 233- Construction U. S. survey 234. And comprehensive congressional power see the over' Judiciary prepared federal courts Commit Representatives tee House of Mr. Justice Frankfurter Cong., Rep. before his accession to this bench. F R. No. 72d 12-14 1st Sess.
608 District, it seems door to citizens
the courthouse Con I to enable designed Article was past belief that here diversity jurisdiction pick the lock. For the gress di respects is in all thus sustained identical District citi versity jurisdiction to be closed to thought in the same justice zens Article III: It administered is judge; the same supervision and under the of courtroom Federal is, presumptively, justice it fashioned aegis under the arid, now, Rules Civil Procedure thus today Tompkins.6 jurisdiction Erie R. Co. v. The version of a banned upheld simply expurgated is an not thing. it is the real original; said, III, Article it
To circumvent the limits of in Article overriding intent finding contrary after III several states I, Article district courts that Ar jurisdiction springing vested with can also be conceivably only express holding ticle I. jurisdiction to this doctrine of dual could lend comfort O’Donoghue v. United Court’s conclusion this of the District 516, that certain courts 289 U. S. legislative deemed courts created Columbia, theretofore I owe their to Article I,7 under Article requires 64. If it were assumed that the Constitution U. S. (cf. diversity id. at application of suits local law traditional Co., 77-80; Black & White Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Taxicab 533; v. Industrial 518, dissenting opinion but cf. Cohen 276 U. at S. 557), may be won Corp., post 541, dissenting opinion at at Loan govern requirement the rationale would also dered whether might today rationale, advanced: Under body power, find in Article I to authorize articulation well involving diversity cases law for the decision of federal substantive District of Columbia. citizens of the Co., S. Electric 281 U. Federal Radio Commission General 693; Co., Fig 272 U. S. 464; Nut Postum Cereal Co. v. California parte Bakelite Co., Cf. Ex 428. Keller v. Potomac Electric U. S. Bros., v. Nelson 438, 450; Commission Corp., Federal Radio 279 U. S. 652, Jones, S. 274-276; 336 U. United States 289 U. S. n. O’Donoghue
Article III. merits of' deci- With III holding salary sion in barred Article reductions judges question, presently courts in we are point express concerned. Suffice it out language O’Donoghue negatives decision the view hybrid that federal courts in the several states share this heritage: *23 Congiess
“. . derives from clause dis- . the District powers in respect tinct of the constitutional courts possess of the District does not which 8 respect such courts outside the District.” O’Donoghue limits of the decision are under- scored view of dissenting Hughes Chief Justice and Justices Van Devanter Cardozo that all District solely of Columbia courts are creatures Article I: “As the courts of the District do not rest for their III, 1 Article creation on their creation is not § provision. subject any to limitations of of the limitations, would if Nor those considered to be applicable, susceptible be of division so that some obligatory be be might might deemed others at 552. ignored.” 289 U. S. is be sought drawn, however,
Comfort to States, rationale in Williams v. United U. S. Court’s 553, which, sanctioning salary for judges reductions Claims, of the Court óf held did that court jurisdiction derive its from Article That conclusion III. in part against suits proposition stemmed from the the United States are not “Controversies meaning United States shall Party,” be a within the III,- said, permissible 2. is infer- Hence, § Article it jurisdiction is that the long-established ence concurrent against of district courts over States claims the United 8 O’Donoghue Cf. Pitts 289 U. S. 195, 197. App. Peak, D. C. We need not not derived from Article III.9 likewise of district court
today determine nature say that, Suffice the United States. against suits to which the United if suits are not “Controversies such within they presumptively are Party,” States shall to which purview federal-question opinion directs our atten- Justice Frankfurter’s Mr. . III, grant Article over “Cases . § tion —the . . This under . . the Laws of United States.” arising juris- least, the view of district court is, at conventional Practice Moore, under the Federal diction Tucker Act. (2d ed., 1948) 1633. event, dispositive
But, rely on Williams bending reed: present case Williams rely argued O’Donoghue cases, together companion were were written opinions and decided and the together; was said in one Accordingly, what Justice. same in the other. in the what was said light must be read expressly rejected the O’Donoghue, observed, as has been *24 in Congress can vest proposition today announced —that Columbia the District of constitutional courts outside Article derived clause of I. jurisdiction from the District O’Donoghue doing so under further, and in But wrent III implication Article courts any in mined Williams any form with outside District could be vested III that no pointed when it out jurisdiction, non-Article granted of the District Columbia could courts if, creating “in jurisdiction,” and other “administrative District, courts of the defining dealing limited to Art. Ill, were More at 546. courts . . . .” 289 U. S. federal other O’Donoghue from the who dissented over, the Justices expressed disagreement no dual rationale of circumstances, cer opinion. In Williams these with the ,319'(1933). Comments, L. 43 Yale J. See tainly no more strength can be drawn from the language of a upholding case salary reductions for one group judges than from holding in a case down striking salary reductions for group another of judges.
Nor is there merit in the view that the bankruptcy jurisdiction of district courts does not stem from Article III. Of course it is true I that Article is the source of congressional power over bankruptcy, as it is the source of congressional power over interstate commerce, taxa? tion, the coining money, powers other confided by the states the exclusive exercise of the national legislature. But, as Mr. opinion Frankfurter’s Justice clear, makes adjudication federal court of disputes arising pursuant to bankruptcy and other legislation is conven- federal-question tional jurisdiction. And no case cited today’s opinions remotely suggests the contrary. Furthermore, supports no. case cited the view that jurisdiction over' a suit to collect estate assets under (b) § of the Bankruptcy Act, brought by the trustee in a district with the defendant, court “consent” of the departure is a general from the rule and is derived from I Article alone. To be sure, although indi Court cated a contrary early view the case of Lovell v. Newman Son,
& 412, 426, 227 U. Hughes’ Chief Justice S. opinion Beeler, S. 367, Schumacher made it U. perfectly clear that district can, with the consént proposed defendant, -entertain trustee suits under. (b) Act, bankrupt, Bankruptcy § 23 which the but prosecuted could not in a have federal court absent di versity independent some question “arising, n . . the Laws of the opinion, United States.” The under.. stated:
“Conflicting meaning views have been held provision In 123(b). for consent one view, provision venue, is, relates that merely jurisdiction.’ . a consent to the 'local . . by the below was forth opposing view set court Lyons, 290 Fed. Post Co. Fence & in Toledo in the instant followed that decision was 645, and ground that upon It proceeds case. ... by suits trustees power permit had
Congress against adverse courts bankruptcy in the federal and citizenship, claimants, regardless diversity fed that the intended (b) that § in cases should have that eral courts without gave consent,' and, where the defendant the stated consent, which fell within in cases exceptions. correct one.” view is the
“We think that the latter at 371. U. S. intimate that opinion does not Hughes’ Chief Justice I. solely from Article jurisdiction” this “consent arises Denison out- Quite opinion by Judge contrary, lining the “view” which Chief Justice described seg- correct suits are expressly “the one” stated such jurisdiction: ment of federal-question court’s district allege pro- that valid prove “The trustee must Act, ceedings taken under the lead- Bankruptcy were passed, ing adjudication, whereby to a valid title valid under the act he proceedings proof If the fails in of these chosen as trustee. step particulars, the suit fails. The suit one of the Bank- the collection of assets the execution 'arising That Act. such case would be one ruptcy think of the United States’ we is the under the laws It principles. will result well-settled be observed limitations fed- that under the constitutional power 2), excep- (article 3, eral sec. and with no question important, Congress tions has not to this jurisdiction on to confer the inferior arise; so excepting as to suits which do upholds in the every decision which sue right
613 federal court one merely who acquires title through operation of a federal law is therefore, by necessary implication, a holding that such suit under’ ‘arises federal laws.” Toledo Fence & Post Lyons, Co. v. 290 F. 641; and Beeler v. cf. Schu macher, 71 F. 2d
There seems no reason therefore to suppose that Court, holding “correct” the view that district courts have jurisdiction over a trustee suit which could not have been brought by the bankrupt, rejected explicit Arti- cle III basis jurisdiction. of that
And neither on Gully reliance v. Bank, First National 109; Co., U. S. Puerto Rico v. Russell & S.U. 476, and related cases, nor suggestion suit “a arises under the law that creates action,” the cause of American Well Works Layne, v. 257, 260, U. S. compels the conclusion that Congress could not and did not classify (b) 23§ suits to collect estate assets as federal-question cases arising under Bankruptcy Act. “ As this Court has had occasion to observe, a ‘cause of action’ mean thing purpose one for one and some- thing different another.” v. Memphis United States Co., Cotton Oil 62, 67-68; 288 U. Gully S. and see Bank, First National supra, Similarly, at 117. as stu- dents of jurisdiction pains point have taken out, the identity “substantial of the words” in the con- stitutional and statutory grants of federal-question juris-' diction, “does not, of course, on alone, that score require, an interpretation.” identical and Jaegerman, Shulman Some Jurisdictional Limitations Federal Procedure, Yale L. J. 393, 405, (1936). n. 47 Confusion of the two is a natural, Gully but not an insurmountable, hazard. and Puerto Rico general cases were concerned with the statutory grant to district courts of jurisdiction over federal questions; they were not concerned specific constitutional grant jurisdiction, nor with the Bankruptcy in the found grant statutory Beeler, supra. in Schumacher approved Act and con- doubted been It has never heretofore general broader than power is grant stitutional - has federal-question *27 (cid:127) by on district courts to confer thought to time time land-grant cases relied In "of the federal one statute. Court had opinion, this in Mr. Justice on Jackson's clear: this distinction make occasion judicial 2)’ the (art. sec. 3, “By the Constitution cases, extends ‘to all United States power of-the Constitution, arising under equity, in law and to controversies of United States’ the laws 4, By article of -States.’ citizens different ‘between dispose of and ‘power to Congress given 3, 2, s. cl. respecting the regulations all rules and make needful United belonging to the property territory other might doubt Under clauses these States.’ judicial of nature controversy provide less public disposal of arising in or out of the growing of the only in the courts litigated lands should . therefore, is not one question, States. The United intent. It has Congress, of but of its system United of so constructed States, litigation respecting of great bulk in their although rights those rights property, of some law of inception go back to in the the several courts is in fact carried ” Rutter, Mining Company Shoshone v. States. 505,
U. S. Gully adopt we to "view that Indeed, were we constitutional phrase, to the applicable test rule con- Marshall’s effectively repudiate Chief Justice would States, 9 Wheat. Bank the United clusion Osborn federally cor- Congress can allow a chartered 738, that into iporation bring litigation all its for the reason that, solely by corporation’s virtue origin, corporation federal' all suits to which the is a party are “arising suits under . . . the Laws the' United rule, meaning States” within the Article III. The case, the Bank the United States in The reiterated Cases, 115 1; Railroad Removal U. S. Matter Pacific Dunn, 212 374; U. S. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank, Federal 350; U. S. Sowell Federal Reserve Bank, Mitchell, 268 U. S. 449; Federal Bank v. U. has been by S. limited statute but never sub sequent constitutional construction. The survival of the rule was acknowledged by. Mr. Justice Stone Puerto in. Co., Rico v. Russell & supra at and Mr. Justice Gully Bank, Cardozo v. First supra, National at 114. short, Congress In has at no time conferred on federal original jurisdiction district courts over all federal ques- tions, preferring many perháps to leave trial of most *28 questions, such to state adjudication, subject to the ulti- exceptions mate of review this Court. But to con- gressional of policy been, limitation there have and one of these is the trustee suit under (b). Moore, 23§ (2d Federal ed., 1948) Practice I Thus see no warrant for gymnastic éxpansion of the jurisdiction of federal courts outside the District. At as to these I sitting states, latter courts in the have least thought plain III Article and described defined “judicial their and Power,” “power proposed that where ; to . judicial power be conferred . was not within the meaning . was, of the Constitution . . therefore, [it] unconstitutional, lawfully could not be by exercised the courts.”
10 Note Taney Chief Justice inserted order of the Court opinion Ferreira, after the' 40, 53, 13 How. States summarizing Haybum’s Case, the Court’s conclusions in 2 Dall. Todd, opinion by United States v. Yale decided without 17/1794, Court on February apparently unreported. . as the criterion longer
If III were no serve Article under I be at a loss to jurisdiction, should district court competence of tasks, within the constitutional stand what allAt courts. assigned district Congress, might be under courts could district events, intimations that seem “justiciable” controversies determination take the today I Article very since the clause inappropriate, as the source long regarded been on has relied Co., U. S. v. Potomac Electric Keller “legislative,” Co. Calif Postum Cereal “administrative,” 428, and Co., powers of the Fig Nut 272 U. S. ornia Moreover, suggestion Columbia. of the District of a con recognized. Constitutional Convention jurisdiction to “cases structive limitation of federal Federal nature,” Farrand, II Records of a Judiciary fallacy ultimate merely lays bare the 430-431, Convention of Article III. rejection of the boundaries underlying >in Con limitation referred to For the constructive III, by Article imposed is a limitation vention debates by hypothe of Mr. opinion and the Jackson Justice measure III the full expresses denies that Article sis courts. to federal district delegated which can be I agree they are —as are —confined If district courts are confined Judiciary nature,” they then too of a “cases except States," different Citizens of cases “between poten provisions expand the III as other Article insofar words For —to borrow grant jurisdiction. tiál. III, of Article limitations dissent —the O’Donoghue suscepti applicable, to be [would
“if considered not] *29 obligatory might deemed that some be ble of division so at 289 U. S. ignored.” be might and others by Mr. adopted In of the rationale view Justice necessity I do not understand opinion, Jackson’s of diversity clause limits of the of the its examination has, however, made clear opinion That Article III. of excludes citizens diversity clause
(cid:127)view that Columbia, District of although where that view may now applied be point If I boefemot out. in concurred conception diversity I clause would to affirm vote judgment of Appeals. the Court of
II. However, nothing but naked precedent, great age of the Hepburn ruling, and prestige name, Marshall’s supports such a result. It is doubtful whether anyone could be found who now would into write the Constitu- tion unjust such an and discriminatory exclusion of Dis- n trict citizens from the federal courts. All reasons of justice, convenience, and practicality which have been set allowing forth for District citizens a furtive access courts, to federal point to the conclusion that they should freely enter and fully as other citizens and even aliens do. Precedent course is lightly to be disregarded, greater in fluidity even process decision which the adjudication constitutional concededly affords.11 And Cf. v. 91, Screws 325 U. S. 112-113. See the trenchant discussion Mr. Justice Brandéis impact of the lesser of stare construction, decisis the realm of constitutional Burnet Co., v. 393, Coronado Oil (dissenting & Gas S.U. 405-410 opinion), and the views of Mr. dissenting Justice Frankfurter Church, Commissioner v. 632, Estate 335 U. S. 676-677. In stances in which this prior Court has overruled constitutional catalogued determinations are in Burnet v. Oil & Gas Coronado Co., supra 409, 4, 407, 2, Helvering at n. Griffiths, n. and in S. 371, 401, 52; compare compilations U. n. Mr. Justice Brandéis’ Co., 1, Burnet v. Oil supra 406, Coronado & Gas at n. and in dissenting opinion Washington Co., Dawson & 264 U. S. .his Justice'Stone, speaking n. 21. Chief for the Court Brandéis, prime death Mr. Justice took occasion note the played by liberating role the' latter in the Court from mechanical to- precedent adherence where constitutional issues are at stake: sight “He never lost of the fact primarily the Constitution Is Marshall,s great government, repeated charter and often words: ages ‘it expounding’ constitution we are ‘intended endure for come, and, consequently, adapted to to the various crises *30 618 always weighty. in such matters
Marshall’s'sponsorship fallacy the of has disclosed long experience But when re- nothing injustice,’ its ruling, a. time has shown and which is to of only the effect but technicality mains are wrong, those hardship and perpetuate inequity, call repeatedly said Court has which this circumstances decisiqns. If those conditions prior of for reexamination are in this one. case, they are fulfilled through time, before made Hepburn The decision and premise destroyed its basic had here, decisions later he career, when of Marshall’s beginning at the work, expounding hardly upon his-great started had and opinion very brevity The the Constitution. especially ambiguity, show their groundings, its his work which latér made master hand immortal the. faltered.12 Hence, provisions to be were read
of human affairs.’ its statute, penal but code or a thé narrow .literalism of a municipal every phrase high sentence and purposes should illumine so that its given part frame- effect as a of a harmonious of the document and be decisis, Notwithstanding government. of stare the doctrine work beyond Constitution, they judicial interpretations of since were They correction, legislative the final word. could not be taken'as reconsideration, light experience and open to new were knowledge wisdom.” greater 317 U. S. xlii, xlvii. years Hepburn was not the one in those earlier case lacking; Cf. Bank States touch was where master Boardman, 61; Hope Insurance Co. v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch Woods, Maryland Cranch Insurance Co. v. 57; Cranch Fiction, Supreme 402; McGovney, 56 Harv. L. A Court Cranch (1943). particularly See the discussion at 876-883. 853, 863-885 Rev. under to sue or be sued corporation of a By capacity positing shareholders, citizenship its (iiversity on the clause ultimately' corporations way for opened the (cid:127)Deveaux decision long only by the diversity jurisdiction, but brought within stages rebut- through first of the law tortuous evolution most) contrary (now often finally presumption conclusive table of the state fact) citizens shareholders are that’ all the to the Letson, 2 How. Louisville, Co. incorporation. C. & C. R. See The sole assigned reason for the Marshall decision was “a conviction members of the American con- *31 federacy only are contemplated the states in the con- stitution,” a conviction as resulting he said an from examination of the use that word the charter to determine “whether Columbia is a in the state sensé of instrument.” Cranch at 452. “When the same , term which has been plainly used this limited sense designating a member of the in the [as articles union] legislative respecting departments, and executive employed depart- also respects that which ment, it must be retaining orig- understood as the sense Ibid. inally given to it.”
This narrow and literal reading
grounded
was
exclu-
provisions:
three constitutional
sively
require-
Representatives
ments
members
the House of
be
by
people
chosen
states;
the several
that the Sen-
ate shall
composed
be
of two Sénátors from each state;
and that each
“shall
appoint,
state
.election
executive,”
specified
number of electors; all,
it
be
‘
noted, provisions relating
organization
to the
and struc-
political
ture of the
departments government,
rights
to the civil
of citizens as such. Put
to one side
provisions
were other
advanced in argument
showing
as
“that
the term state is sometimes used in its more en-
larged sense” on
ground
that “they
not prove
do
what
cf;
was to
Ibid.
be shown
them.”
446^-448,
But
450.
or not this
Whether
answer
adequate
time,13
at the
13Counsel for
plaintiffs
made,-among
had
others,
different,
two
though closely related, arguments. One was that “state” as used
diversity
in the
given
clause should be
what -Marshall characterized
as “the
attached to
nations,”
it
writers
signification
'on the law of
political'entity
general
argument
a broad and
sense. To this
his
obviously appropriate.
answer was
But in view of other constitu
provisions
tional
upon
argument,
relied
446-448, 450,
in the
2 Cranch
it
questionable
seems-at
least
the answer met the other con
tention, namely,
that “those territories which are under the exclu-
very different
would be
today
our Constitution-
literal construction
what
if .such a narrow and
into an inflexible
transmuted
each of its terms
been
had
remem
It is
be
interpretation.
rule of constitutional
us, that
bearing on the
issue before
bered,
very
impartial
jury of
guarantee
Amendment’s
of “an
Sixth
com
shall have been
. . . wherein the crime
the State
in the Nation’s
prosecutions
extends
criminal
mitted”
has a broader
the word “Citizens”
capital.14 Similarly,
in some
government
considered
sive
United States are
in the constitution.”
respects
in the term ‘states’ as used
as included
at
Id.
District
residents were
determination that
The Court’s initial
Wilson,
jury
cases,
127 U. S.
trial in
Callan
criminal
entitled
large
language of Article
inclusive
rested in
measure on the more
*32
Crimes,
Impeachment,
III,
except in Cases of
2: “The Trial of all
§
in
where
Jury;
be held
the
by
Trial shall
State
shall be
and such
committed;
committed
but when not
shall
been
the said Crimes
have
State,
such Place or Places as the
be at
within
the Trial shall
may by
in the Callan case
Congress
Court
Law have directed.”
III,
2, permits
rejected
argument
Article
the Government’s
§
jury
place
takes
in the
dispense
when the crime
with a
does not seem to have
in
Article III
District rather than
a state. But
decision,
said,
Amendment. States of words: In United a mere form is this distinction Nor weighing Hughes, 142-143, Wood, supra, at Chief Justice jury, Article III noted the impartiality of a District Columbia corp 2, meaning III, Article § where it now includes orations,15 than it privileges has and immunities IV, 2,16 clause of or in § Article the like clause Fourteenth Amendment.17 might, Instances but need not, multiplied. construing
In
diversity
clause
arewe
faced with
the apparent
gave
fact
the Framers
no deliberate
way
consideration
one
another
liti-
diversity
gation of citizens of the District of Columbia. And
indeed,
since
District was
existence when the
guarantee
jury
of a
trial and then observed: “The Sixth Amendment
provided further
prosecu-
assurances.
It added that in all criminal
enjoy
right
speedy
tions the
trial,
accused shall
public
‘to a
impartial
jury
an
of the State and district wherein the crime
committed,
shall have been
previously
which district shall have been
by law,
ascertained
and to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation;
to be
against him;
confronted with the witnesses
compulsory process
obtaining
have
for
favor,
witnesses in his
”
to have
the Assistance Counsel for his defence.’
Thus
uniformly
it has been
assumed that in
prosecutions
criminal
of the
possessed
a resident
District of Columbia is
of Sixth Amend
rights
speedy
trial,”
ment
“to . . .
McWilliams,
States v.
Supp.
695;
69 F.
affirmed 163 F. 2d
“to be
informed
accusation,”
nature and cause
cf. Johnson v. United
405, 409, 411;
U. S.
“to
against
be confronted with the witnesses
him,”
Rives,
Curtis
937;
Bondy,
F. 2d
Jordon v.
599, 602,
F.
compulsory
2d
process
obtaining
“to have
for
witnesses
favor,” ibid.;
in his
“and to have the Assistance of
Counsel
*33
defence,”
Eicher,
1001;
his
Noble v.
143 F. 2d
Williams v.
see
Huff,
91,
F.
142
2d
Constitution seems in plenary Framers, conferring after on express no capital, over the future federal made hypo- the boundaries of provision litigating outside unborn conjectured controversies between city thetical cir- neighbors. and their unknown Under these citizens that absence accept proposition I cumstances cannot deliberate is, here, affirmative inclusion of tantamount exclusion. compelled is not
If of citizens exclusion District clause, likewise cannot diversity of the language purposes from the historic spelled out inference with have, say, no concern of clause. We needless nor need we resolve diversity jurisdiction;18 the merits local dispute Substantiality those scholarly over of. drafted, the the Constitution was prejudices which, when nullify.19 designed grant diversity scope jurisdic- duty is to determine the Our congressional and we must bow to deter- grant, tional adjudication whether federal of local issues mination But, resolving than harm. good imme-- does more 18 Tompkins, R. to Erie Co. 304 U. S. contrasting prior views For Yntema, of the Federal Courts in Con 64, compare The Jurisdiction Citizens Different 19 B. A. J. 71 between A. troversies Jaffin, Analysis (1933), Preliminary of Concurrent Yntema and Frankfurter, (1931), Jurisdiction,.79 L. A Note Pa. Rev. 869 U. Yntema, Diversity Reply 79 Pa. to Professor U. Jurisdiction —In on Power (1931), Frankfurter, Distribution Judicial Rev. L. Courts, Q. 499, L. 520- 13 Corn. United States State between Shulman, §30 (1928). analyses post-Fne For see The Demise Clark, in the Tyson, (1938); State Law 47 Yale L.'.J. 1336 Swift v. Tompkins, Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Courts: The Federal (1946). L. J. Yale Diversity Friendly, The Historic Basis note and see also See Rev, Warren, Light Jurisdiction, (1928); New 41 Harv. L. Judiciary L. Rev. History Act of 37 Harv. of the Federal Frank, Federal (1923); Historical Bases Judicial 49, 81-90 (1948). 3,22-28 Prob. System, 13 Law Contem. & *34 issue, we should not blink that, diate the fact whatever the need for federal over between liti-- kuits sájne gant states, citizens of several the the need equally- compels safeguards federal trial brought suits for of the District of against citizens Columbia citizens Conversely, states. if the several we to- assume that day’s tacitly ruling validates brought by suits state against citizens citizens of the of Columbia, District would a plaintiff seem the citizen of state as'deserying is of a federal forum when suing District defendant as suing when a neighbor defendant state. premise
Marshall’s sole decision in Hepburn case ¿s _ancL.later has failed, under the decision, stress time a test of constitutional construction. Key words like “state,” “citizen,” and do not always and invari- “person” ably thing.20 mean application His literal dis- same regarded possible distinction between purely political affecting clauses civil rights citizens, those a distinction later to receive recognition.
Moreover, Marshall recognized himself the incongruity of the decision: “It is true that as citizens of the United- States, and of particular district subject of congress, it extraordinary , courts of the which are open to aliens^ and to the citizens of every union, state should upon closed them.” But, he added, subject “this is a legislative not for consideration.” Cranch at
With all this we may agree, well with one reservation. Mar-, spite In of subsequent contrary interpretation and own shall’s identification of statutory word “state"” with the same word in Constitution, we cannot be unreservedly sure that last-quoted sentence referred process to the of constitutional than rather amendment 20Cf. notes 14-17 supra and text. had If the former been reconsideration.
congressional *35 in words likely would have been stated it it intent, seems was process. The Court of the latter characteristic not so inclu- explicit made statute,21 which no construing the if it had done Whéther, District. sion of of the citizens aif ruling or, been the same so, would have the Courtis citizens, it would sought to include District later act had only speculate. we unconstitutional, can have been held in especially ambiguity, I do not rest on this more But accepting clearly Hepburn of the later the view decisions import. as On other of constitutional the decision one general and hand, repudiation the later the decision’s construing Constitution, in narrow and literal rule for the part small, has cut from which Marshall’s own was not it, and grounding the with Hepburn beneath its case ruling my anomaly in the in result which the judgment, far go has It always perhaps unnecessary been. so in aby judge the as done who criticizing decision long afterwards bowed it.22 But the time has come arguments two, statutory, for the the defendant were one They if other constitutional. were stated as follows: “Even the juris enlarged constitution the United States authorises a more judiciary given, yet than the of 1789 has the court can act diction given by no the . take which is act. . . states,
“This is not of different a case between citizens within meaning of the 2 Craneh at 449-450. constitution.” noting Hepburn After decision been extended had Winter, citizens, their New Orleans v. to territories and Wheat. Brooks, opinion stated at “But Watson F. 543-544: very ruling question if it is doubtful if this would now be made impression; hoped may yet it was one first and is to be reviewed and overthrown.
“By it, upon and a narrow and construction of the word technical worthy ‘state,’ unsupported by argument of the able and dis- court, large, judge tinguished opinion who announced growing population District of American citizens resident eight de- Columbia territories of the United States' are prived citizens, privilege of the other' American accorded all expressed hope removing highly when the he un- just of our group discrimination from larger citizens than population of several states Union should be realized.
III. stated, problem not of Pragmatically perhaps, by present hypothesis, earth-shaking proportions. For, disposition diversity must be court suits But accord with local law all substance. matters impor- symbolically very the matter is of considerable perhaps tance. men over whether Reasonable differ or, more citizens of the appropriately, what extent political equality District should have status *36 their But with to their civil fellow citizens. reference rights, equal in such a to the especially matter access now found to dis- courts, none can defend be strictly ground crimination them save against precedent.
I cannot impose believe that the Framers intended to so purposeless although discrimination, and indefensible .a they may guilty oversight have been of understandable in not it. explicitly against Despite great providing its age and subsequent acceptance, Hepburn I think the deci- sion was Nothing ill-considered and decided. wrongly hangs on except it a now the continuance or removal of gross and applied a wholly inequality anomalous against substantial group citizens, in to American not relation their rights, respect substantive but to the forums available for their This determination. Court has not (cid:127) aliens, going well as obliged to into the courts when national legal assert or rights away- Indeed, defend their home. in the language say: Hepburn Ellzey, supra, they may of the court well is extraordinary ‘It which are courts the United open aliens, Union, to every and the citizens of state should upon ruling long force, be closed them.’ But so remains in as this judgment governed this court must be it.” when decisions long-standing toxoverride even hesitated involved change substantial by way more much clearly justified than much less taken was the action Erie Co. being instance R. pertinent case, in this a most Tompkins, supra. fol- It followed here. should should be That course I with the Although agree deviously. directly, not lowed Hepburn I overrules think it judgment, Court’s I am in accord. effect. "With that in, practical all decision extension proposed But I am in. accord with I for the first time under Article “legislative'* jurisdiction of Co- District federal district outside III, the con- to Article organized pursuant lumbia limitations impairment latter Article’s of the sequent from such I would dissent judicial power; and upon decision I wuuld from a strongly than holding even more extension, ruling. That reaffirming Hepburn today important part be the most my opinion, would by majority it decision, accepted were today’s return dangerous doctrine which Court. It is a would in the district courts ourselves plague both the say. The impossible future, to whát extent take on would then O’Donoghue and Williams decisions were had and importance they have never before an never, likely to considered attain.^ *37 whom Mr. Justice Vinson, with
Mr. Chief Justice Douglas joins, dissenting. by expressed Mr. Justice.. I with agree the views
While Rutledge which relate and Mr. Justice Frankfurter I Constitution Art. of the Congress of under power the over jurisdiction courts with suits to vest federal district Columbia, of States and the District between citizens qf ánd of Mr. Frankfurter the views Justice interpretation of the,proper Jackson as to Justice Mr. Ill, I diversity in the clause of Art. word “States”
627 my to state individually am constrained views because questions of these to the administra- importance of the ~ system. of federal court tion
I.
question
power
has the
extend
whether
diversity jurisdiction of the
courts to
district
its au
citizens of
District
Columbia
virtue of
thority over the
I of
District
Art.
the Constitution
under
depends,
upon
turn,
whether the enumeration
Art.
Ill of
judicial power
the cases to which the
of the United
States
shall extend defines
the outer limits
or is
merely listing
types
with which
Congress may
invoking any
federal courts without
invest
specific
powers
body by
Arti
granted
other
long
cles
the Constitution.
It has
been settled that
powers
inferior federal
receive ho
directly
authority
the Constitution
in-
but
such
as is vested
North-America,
Congress. Turner Bank of
them the
v.
Wood,
4 Dall.
; McIntire v.
(1799)
8
504 (1813);
7 Cranch
Kendall v.
Cary
12
Pet. 524 (1838);
v.
Curtis, 3 How.
(1845).1
236
Since, therefore, there is no
minimum of power préscribed for the inferior federal
courts, and Congress
have established
áuch
need
courts, Lockerty Phillips,
v.
182, 187
(1943),
U. S.
question whether
is
Ill,
cases Art.
enumeration
prescribes
§
-maximum of power
performs only
limited
very
office mentioned above.2
The theory
merely
§
of Art. Ill
a supplement
powers specifically
granted Congress by
Con-
Sill,
(1850);
1 See also Sheldon
v.
Kline Burke Construction
But as Brothers Frankfurter merely out, grant if Art. Ill pointed contains limita- no more reason to find Congress, there is to only to judicial power extends in the fact that tion specific in the enumeration cases and controversies than it shall to which of the kinds of or controversies cases I see position, extend. The fundamental error entirely dif- two it, distinguish is the failure to between in Art. as elsewhere in principles Ill, ferent embodied Constitution, were repeatedly both of which adverted in the Constitutional since been to Convention and have substantial, by deviation. followed this Court without The three principles first of these that the branches are of government established the Constitution co- rank, upon and that encroach ordinate none in- functions entrusted to the others powers principle expression require- This found strument. Ill judicial power of Art. that the shall extend ment equal Of .importance, and controversies. how- cases ever, principle, was the second that the Constitution con; power by gov- tains a grant states the federal ernment, powers specifically granted all were people.3 powers reserved the states or principle, arguments implicit This in the at the Constitutional Convention, explicit made in the 10th Amendment.
granted spelled the federal were judiciary out with care by and Ill precision Art. delineation the kinds of which power cases to the could be extended. principle The first under attack, not now proper but perspective in viewing requires the second some examina- of its origin history. tion framers of Con- the presented with, stitution were rejected, proposals nonjudicial powers would have vested in the na- - tional judiciary. Pinckney Charles of South Carolina proposed, example, that “Each Legis- branch of the lature, as Supreme well as the shall Executive have au-" thority require, opinions to supreme the the Judicial upon Court important questions law, upon solemn Early occasions.”4 Convention, however, in the the principle that the courts to be established have should jurisdiction only over cases became fixed. Thus it was that when proposal was on made the floor of the words, “arising Convention that the under this Constitu- tion” be inserted before Laws “the of the States,” Ill, what is now objection Art. Madison’s § it that “going was jurisdiction too far to extend the of the Court generally to cases arising Under the Constitution, & ought whether it be to limited to cases of a Judiciary by Nature” was met the answer was, it in his own words, “generally supposed jurisdiction given constructively to limited cases of a Judiciary nature —.”5 is, however,
Clear as this principle it was attacked precisely this Court on grounds same now asserted to jurisdiction sustain the diversity question. here In Co., Keller v. Potomac Electric (1923), U. S. 428 where this Court had before it an Act which the under the District of given Columbia were revisory power over rates set the Public Utilities Commission 4 FarrancI, Records the Federal Convention hereinafter cited as Fárrand. 5Id. at 430. appel sought sustain appellee District, Act the basis Court given late Constitution limits Ill of the Art. “Although courts, this limitation sub jurisdiction of jurisdiction, enlarge power ject to reasonably required to enlargement such where express powers conferred Congress to exercise enable There, S. at 435. U. upon by the Constitution.” given Congress was that upon here, the relied District of Co over the exercise exclusive necessary and proper all laws lumbia, and to make *40 clearly But this Court and powers such into effect. carry rejected that contention could unequivocally courts, cit of constitutional thus extend Case, 2 (1792); Dall. 410 Hayburn’s ing, the note to Ferreira, 40, note, p. (1851), 52 v. How. United States 13 States, (1864). U. S. 697 These and United 117 Gordon v. clearly condition the this Court and other. decisions of cognizance any to power of a court take constitutional according a suit instituted to upon the existence of cause v. judicial procedure, Marbury Madi regular course to son, (1803), power judg 1 137 pronounce Cranch parties persons between and carry effect ment it into decision, v. it for Muskrat United bring who a case before States, States, v. Gordon United (1911); 219 U. S. revisory power or supra, appellate any the absence of Case, Hayburn’s supra; branch-of Government, other Ferreira, supra; and the absence United States of ad controversies, issues legislative ministrative or or Keller Co., Cereal supra; v. Potomac Electric Postum v. Cali Co. Co., Fig (1927). “judicial Nut S. 693 U. While fornia “cases,” have power,” “controversies” sometimes been concepts given separate definitions,6 inextricably these are power” term intertwined. The “Judicial was itself sub- (1911). S. 6 See Muskrat U. phrase, Supreme for the “The
stituted Ill Court” to conform Art. to the “leg- use the terms Powers” and “executive Power” in Arts. I islative and. thus draws II.7 It life to which it extends: much, tó cases and controversies. That at any rate, is clear. Whether it draws life from or cases contro- than specifically versies other those enumerated Art. Ill must now be considered. principle, any powers
The second specifically granted the national Art. Ill judiciary by reserved were people, the states is here challenged. The rea- such an possible son attack is at is, ironically this late date enough, implicit acceptance because prin- of that ciple by the framers, Congress, by litigants ever question since. Unlike the of the relations between the branches of government, which during first arose Wash- ington’s presidency and subsequently gave rise, in the cases previously to, frequent adverted definition of the nature of controversies, cases and acceptance prin- ciple that Ill Art. a limitation contains on the the federal judiciary complete was so question did not often directly. arise Nevertheless, possible in a demonstrate number contexts the intent of true the framers.
First, the rejection examination and of various alter- native proposals concerning the of the na- tional judiciary by the Convention throws considerable light upon compromise the reached.8 On the one hand
72 Farrand 425. propriety- considering of proposals the and debates of' the long ago Constitutional Convention was considered those most intimately Washington, concerned with its formulation. in his mes sage to refusing the House Representatives of the demands' of that body papers for Jay’s relating treaty, proofs other to stated: “If these, plain than itself, letter Constitution be neces sary to point consideration, they may ascertain the under found- be thought no tribunals were those who inferior federal authorized; should be en- should be that state courts questions, subject trusted with the decision of all federal appeal Supreme Court. re- one Madison’s notes veal ’that rule Rutlidge hiavg.
“Mr. obtained a for recon establishing for sideration of clause tri inferior authority, bunals under the now moved that national . . . be part expunged: clause should might ought Tribunals arguing that the State in all decide in the first to be left cases to instance supreme national right appeal tribunal being rights sufficient to the national & uni secure unnec formity Judgmts: making it was an essary on the encroachment adoption obstacles to their creating unnecessary .”9 system of the new in- establishing and the clause
The motion was carried from the draft Constitu- ferior federal tribunals excised however, immediately “that Madison, tion. moved empowered Legislature institute inferior National provision tribunals,” that some urging such courts system. in a necessity was a Madison’s notes then record the reaction Pierce Butler of South Carolina proposal: to this Convention, deposited
in the Journals of the General which I have Department ap- the office of of State. In those Journals it will made, Treaty pear, proposition binding ‘that that a no should be law,’ the United States which was ratified and that explicitly rejected.” Congress, proposition was Annals Fourth Sess., Congress, p. 1st 761. the comment of at See also Madison Writings later date. 9 James Madison 240. argument of Luther Martin before the 1 Farrand 124. See opposing Maryland Representatives House ratification of the Con- Elliot, 408; 3 id. Debates at stitution 3 Farrand See also seq. 562 et *42 people
“The will not bear The such innovations. will Suppos- States revolt at such encroachments. such an establishment be ing we must useful, not venture it. example on We must follow the Govt, Solon who not gave Athenians best devise; they he could but the best wd. receive.”10 On hand, the other some members of the Convention jurisdiction ultimately favored a wider federal than was by authorized. The Connecticut led delegation, Roger Sherman, proposed legislature “That of the United tribunal, States supreme be authorised to institute one may and they judge necessary such other tribunals as for purpose respective aforesaid, and ascertain their powers jurisdictions.” and proposal, This which substantially interpreta from the different its effect urged adopted tion upon us, now was not the Con When vention. it became established that inferior fed Constitution, eral courts be were to authorized jurisdiction immediately limits their became an paramount issue of importance. outline federal only give after much and was established take, proposal counterproposal, and —in the end— compromise. early proposed, example, It was piracies be to extend to made “all seas, & captures enemy; from high an felonies cases in foreigners apply which citizens of othér States ing may jurisdictions such or which interested, respect impeach revenue; the collection of the National officers, ments questions National peace harmony.”12 involve the But national many one of the extent proposals concerning account, notes, This in 1 Farrand taken Madison’s is found 124-125.
11 3Farrand 616.
12 1Farrand at 22. *43 ano before concessions jurisdiction,13 many of federal had been made was the enumeration compromises and agreed upon. 2 Ill, of now found in Art. § cases by the judicial power jealously guarded, The was thus judiciary. the unwillingly-granted states and to national Only particular when it could be demonstrated that jurisdiction acutely purposes needed for the head of was In harmony granted. of was it uniformity, national for of the Constitu- every state convention ratification tion,' opponents advocates and of ratification considered in kinds which the of cases and controversies to detail Each had judicial power the national to extend. was the justified.14 assuming to be Far that of constitutional be, any could means short pro- amendment, beyond expressly extended those cases Ill, subjected in was to severe vided for Art. Article that powers specifically given ground attacks the those that point, this of the Convention at Id. at 231. sense Randolph expressed in Yates’ “Gov. observed Notes as follows: object .difficulty estáblishing powers judiciary of the the the —the security wit, present principle, at is to to the however establish preserve foreigners favor, to of where treaties are their being harmony of This once states and that of the citizens thereof. it; established, it to detail will be business of a sub-committee parts resolve so as to obliterate such of the therefore moved jurisdiction wit, principle, that to establish judiciary revenue, im national shall extend to all cases national questions involve the peachment officers, and national harmony. Agreed unanimously.”. peace 1 Farrand or national ' " . Judiciary See, g., Article e. Madison’s defense before Writings 216-225; Elliot, Virginia .Convention, 5 James Madison affecting 109; among the at where resolutions Art. id. Debates “Resolved, opinion committee, as the of this III was one which Supreme or of Court any ought not, any Congress, be instituted other court to extended, by fiction, collusion, increased, enlarged, case, Elliot, 489-4Í94; suggestion”; id. Debates 517-584. or mere at would A destroy the state courts. delegate to .the Vir- Convention, ginia example, stated that “My next objection judiciary to the is, ex-, it is not pressed in a definite manner. The of all cases under, arising the Constitution and the laws of the Union stupendous magnitude.”15 If, addition jus- tifying every particle power given to-federal courts by the Constitution, its defenders had been obliged to justify competence of Congress suspect by —itself those opposed jurisdic- who ratification —to-extend *44 tion necessary whenever it was thought to effectuate one powers of the expressly given that their task would body, insuperable. have been The debates make that fact . plain. judicial power
That the federal was restricted to those Ill clearly classes of cases set forth Art. the opinion drafting of those who had most to do with its acceptance. Federalist, In the 80th Number of The types thought Hamilton listed the cases to which it was necessary judiciary authority that the of the nation should represented All are found in Art. In the extend. III.16 Number, he wrote: 81st / . id. Debates 565 And see Patrick Elliot, Henry’s remarks, at 539-546. (cid:127) “1st, following: those The cases' enumerated were the to lall States, passed which arise of the laws of in pursuance out United the just legislation; 2d, powers of their to all and constitutional expressly provisions those which concern con execution the Union; 3d, in the the United articles of to all those which tained peace of party; 4th, are a which involve the States to all those Confederacy, they between the relate to the intercourse whether foreign nations, States States and or that between the high seas, themselves; originate 5th, to all those on the which admiralty and, lastly, those jurisdiction; to all are maritime supposed in which the State tribunals cannot be to be impartial unbiased.” P. 494. of the made
“The amount observations hitherto authority judicial department of the this: carefully been to those causes it has restricted manifestly proper cognizance which for the are judicature (Emphasis . . national . P.511. added.) appears:
while in the following No. “The only described inferior are outlines [for courts] Supreme they Court,’ ‘inferior to the shall they specified lim- and that shall exceed the judiciary.” (Emphasis its P. 516. of. federal added.) correspondent
And
in a
had
Madison,
letter to
who
incorporated
law
contended that
the common
had been
law,
Constitution
wrote:
Govt,
“A
peculiarity of the
characteristic
special
is,
powers
grants
U. States
that its
consist of
taken
other
general
power,
mass of
whereas
Govts,
special excep-
with
possess
general mass
plan
Constitution,
tions
only.
being
Such
.
Body
be supposed
cannot well
deliberation, and
so
framed it with so much
*45
purpose
specifying
objects,
manifest a
of
its
boundaries, would,
intending
its
if
the
defining
part
code,
Law
the national
Common
shd. be a
of
express
distinctly
have omitted to
or
the
indicate
intention;
many
provisions
when so
far
are
inferior
carefully inserted,
appears
so
and such
to have been
public
Instrument,
the
view
taken
whether
period
States,
the
its
the
we recur to
of
ratification
practice
to
federal
under
or
the
it.”17
17
States
Writings
James Madison 199-200.
see And
9
Tomp
Goodwin,
(1812); Erie R. Co.
7
v. Hudson and
32
Cranch
kins,
637 Cases in this support Court which the view that Art. Ill, 2 limits the § of constitutional courts are not In lacking. Mayor v. Cooper, 6 247, Wall. 252 (1867), the Court defined the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts as follows:
“As regards all courts of the United States inferior tribunal, to things this two necessary are to create jurisdiction, original appellate. whether The Con- given stitution must have to court capacity it, to take and an Congress supplied act of must have it. Their is necessary concurrence to it. It is vest duty up to purpose act for that granted power. They may jail to the limits it,oj added.) short but cannot it.” (Emphasis exceed inAnd a series of three cases decided between 1800 and 1809, give the Court refused literal effect to § Judiciary juris Act had extended diction of alien is Circuit Courts to suits where' “an a. party,” imposed by because of the limitations Art. III. In Higginson, (1800), Mossman v. 4 Dall. it was legislative power conferring juris decided that “as the Courts, is, respect, diction confined must so ex foreigners, suits between citizens and we ‘where, pound case, law, the terms to meet the other.” indeed, an alien one but a is the party,’ citizen This adhered in Mon construction statute Hodgson Murray, talet v. (1807); Cranch Bowerbank, where Justice (1809), Chief Cranch 303 judiciary “The Marshall dismissed the contention that suits in gives act circuit all jurisdiction to the “Turn which an alien with this admonition-: party” is a the United article of the constitution of jurisdiction beyond for the cannot extend the statute limits of the constitution.”
638 examples may
Other be cited of the Court’s consistent adherence principle to the part is a constituent concessions
United States government and not made the states to the federal North-America, be See v. Bank extended. Turner Goodwin, supra; States v. Hudson 7 Cranch United 32, (1812); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken 33 Land Co., v. 272, (1855); Kline Improvement 18 How. 280-281 Co., 226, (1922); Burke U. S. 233-234 Construction 260 parte Corp., (1929); Ex Bakelite 279 U. S. 449 Fed Co.; Radio eral Commission v. General Electric 281 U. S. (1930). century Over half of consistent a and a interpretation up Ill sen of Art. well summed in one Sill, tence from Court’s How. opinion this Sheldon 441, 449 (1850): has limits of
“The defined the Constitution judicial power pre- United has not States, but much Cir- scribed how of it shall be exercised consequently, pre- cuit which ; Court statute does jurisdiction, scribe limits of their cannot be in Constitution, conflict with the unless it pow- confers added,) ers not (Emphasis enumerated therein.” chiefly upon by who cases relied those contend Ill Art. judicial power limits does define the States, O’Donoghue are 516 (1933), S.U. and Williams v. United (1933), U. S.
concerned in salary reductions judges the District Court the District of Columbia the Court of Claims respectively. cases, In these Court held that Ill, Art. 1 of the § Constitution forbade reduction of former, salary who was judge found to be inferior, e., (i. an “constitutional” used Arts. court as III) I and court, but judge “legis not of the á of a latter, lative” court.
Two separate points concerning but related the O’Don- oghue should emphasized. case The first is that since
639 given nonjudicial be of Columbia courts District Hoe, 112 Bald (1884); U. S. 50 duties, Butterworth v. Co., (1921); win Howard 256 U. S. Keller Co. v. Co., supra, upon Potomac Electric reliance case to incompatible is support the Act now under consideration may only de position with that constitutional courts the of a cide “cases” and “controversies” nature. O’Donoghue The second is that rationale the case the terms, For is, by its limited to courts of the District. the (at 546): “If, in p. creating defining Court and said the jurisdiction of the the were District, Congress courts of A,rt. Ill, dealing limited-to as it is in with the other federal and courts, jurisdiction spoken administrative other the upon not be the could conferred former.” limitation, O’Donoghue In the express view this case question. now in support lends no Act To extend the its District war- applicability beyond courts of the is reasoning ranted neither of that language nor way case. The Court in authority no diminished the Canter, 511 (1828), American Insurance Co. Pet. Territory which had held of Florida were that the courts pursuant courts Ill legislative not to Art. created incapable of therein. receiving judicial power set out Ill Since territorial with Art. courts cannot invested power, legislative the strict between con- dichotomy except stitutional courts still District of exists — enough It is Columbia.' to refer the breadth of to. congressional power over the that such District; national rather than local. merely character The power of Congress equally broad, over the territories is- yet territorial cannot be Ill courts invested Art. power under O’Donoghue case. And some -of the very upon statements indicating scope now relied as of Congress’ power quoted over District18 were (1896). v. Wright, From Grether 75 F. O’Donoghue but the rationale of case was case, ex- District, limited to courts of as abové. pressly noted regardéd District of Columbia were there courts unique powers makeup ter- either —different ritorial courts or other constitutional courts. Extension O’Donoghue to all constitutional case circumstances, especially unwarranted under clearly these history in the face of the uncontradicted constitutional outlined. previously *48 Except in District of Columbia, therefore, the Ameri-
. Canter, Insurance Co. a long can v. and of supra, line cases prohibit in the same vein19 intermixture combina- personnel, powers, tion of the or duties of constitutional legislative courts. a court of cate- Whether is one gory depends upon or the power Congress other what of in was utilized creation. If power its it was the to create courts, may inferior constitutional court exercise judicial power outlined III. If Congress Art. cre- a judicial implement ates of another its consti- body body tutional' is a powers, legislative that court and power none of III.20 judicial exercise of Art. have We 19 Porter, g., (1850); Engle e. 9 v. See Benner v. How. 235 Clinton Reynolds States, (1871); brecht. 13 145 Wall. 434 v. United U. S. 98 (1878); States, (1891); McAllister v. United 141 174 United U. S. parte Corp., v. Burroughs, (1933); States 159 Ex Bakelite 289 U. S. (1929). 279 U.S. (1933), In Williams v. United the Court 289 U. S. pursuant of to the found that Court Claims had been created Congress power pay under Art. I to the debts the United powers had inconsistent with those been and duties States ^iven question Art. Ill The Court’s consideration an court. Party” shall be a whether “Controversies which States against States was therefore in Art. Ill includes suits the United not unnecessary decision, answer since an affirmative would It Claims a constitutional court. have converted the Court of into receiving” power. American Insurance “incapable of the Art. Ill recognized inferen Canter, Furthermore, supra. the Court Co. over some jurisdiction tially does exercise that the Court of Claims question the answer to the whether court held that kind or under power is of one another “lies in the jurisdiction was the court created and conferred.” supra Bakelite at 459. I parte Corp., Ex would adhere to test. course, mean, legis- been said does not What has questions courts cannot exercise over lative Ill, nature as those enumerated in Art. 2.§ same by It clearly contemplated the framers that state question jurisdiction courts should have federal concur- courts, with that inferior they rent exercised yet are constitutional nor they courts do exercise the legislative of Art. III. The courts created questions also can arising and do decide under (and, Constitution and laws United States courts, types the case territorial other Ill, well), jurisdic- enumerated Art. § but not, part tion “a be, judicial power cannot of that which is defined in article of the 3d the Constitution.” “incapable These are of receiving it.” American Canter, Co. supra 546; at Reynolds Insurance v. United States, supra at 154.21
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The is a kind upon fact that case reviewed of pendent the That article, III after within the Art: enumeration. inferior, which take setting out the cases of (1933) against States, suits U. S. 553 the United States phrase, Ill “Controversies to which the United within Art. are-not correct, 20, supra, Party,” proves see such shall be a note States clearly question juris- to be within the Art. Ill federal actions seem (1948 ed.) Moore, 1633. Of course diction. See Federal Practice extends,the Congress, jurisdiction of federal courts the fact that' involving subject to certain does not itself make them suits matter- n sovereign’s subject question jurisdiction. But federal regarded simply question immunity from süit a has never been Federalist, unavailability in The forum. As Hamilton said a 81, are p. nation and individuals No. 508: ‘-‘Thecontracts between a preten- binding sovereign, of the and have no conscience the. right action, They inde- compulsive to confer no sions force. sovereign be pendent sovereign of the will.” When consents sued, therefore, considerably opening than the courts more is involved already plaintiffs possessed of of action. For as Mr. Jus- causes Lynch States, 292 U. S. tice Brandéis said in United ‘ (1934): .immunity sovereign’s from suit exists whatever “The right sought be proceeding or the source character arising applies action under acts enforced. It alike to causes of some, rights arising Congress, . those from violation . . and to .of character, Constitution, . . upon the citizen . conferred distinguished it is in contract as cause action—-the fact that (as important determining m^ty be under from the-Tucker tort — (cid:127) sig- Otherwise, it of no Act) given. is whether consent sue was sovereignty immunity .of' For is an suit attribute nificance. 'away.” may not be bartered against completely any right of action the United States Since dependent upon has wholly whether an Act of author Co., suit, United States Minnesota Mutual Investment see ized tlie (1926), arising question under the laws of- 271 U. S. Ill, clearly presented Art. phrase is used in as that government. Congress has Since by any against the 'federal claim brought courts, such actions all shall decreed that Gully Bank, 299 S. v. First National U. (cid:127)question presented in *50 (1933): and Co., S. (1936), 288 U. Rico Russell & Puerto not involved:- related cases is
cognizance jurisdiction and the original Court, the appellate extends of the Supreme Court only as far as “all the other Cases mentioned.” before (Emphasis added.) We can no more review a legislative court’s decision of a among case which is not enu- those merated Art. Ill than can hear a a we case from state court involving purely questions. state law But a ques- tion under the Constitution States-, and laws the United in a arising whether court, constitutional court, state a legislative may, court under the Constitution, be subject appellate jurisdiction. of this Court’s It long ago held that appellate power
“The is not limited the terms of the third particular article to courts. The words are, (which ‘the appellate includes power) shall extend to all &c., and ‘in all .cases/ other cases before supreme mentioned the court shall- appellate have jurisdiction.’ case, It is the then, and court, - gives jurisdiction. that If the judicial power extends to case, it will in vain -the to search in the letter of the constitution for any qualification a's to the tribunal it depends.” where Martin Lessee, v. Hunter’s 1 Wheat. (1816). There therefore, that legisla- is. the fact no^anomaly, tive courts, as well as courts, constitutional fed- exercise eral question jurisdiction, and that they sometimes exer- cise concurrent over the That same matters. does not the former courts, make constitutional American Canter, Insurance supra; Co. v. Ex parte Corp., Bakelite supra. Still courts, less does it make legislative the latter which is the effect of the being statute now considered. It is one thing say legislative may courts exercise jurisdiction over some of the same matters within are Ill Art. judicial.power. It is quite thing another to hold that constitutional cognizance take causes which are not scope within the power. *51 the between con that distinction may argued be
It if meaningless the courts legislative stitutional subjects over the jurisdiction be invested may latter are limitations But there power. judicial Ill of Art. system of federal preservation which insure In courts. legislative distinct courts constitutional must be established court legislative place, the first Congress, given to powers specific of the one under some judicial subjects all of unlikely it is that powers.22 those exercise of justified as an power could be intent impute to an we Furthermore, cannot from con jurisdiction or in the future to transfer now of emas purpose courts stitutional legislative former; suggested Chief Justice Marshall culating the when he said that case, limitation another Canter admiralty jurisdiction, can be exercised within the although that limitation solely by courts, constitutional open at It least apply the Territories. does subjects of Art. whether all of the question, therefore, question jurisdiction, judicial power, Ill be courts within States. may legislative transferred read Finally, parte supra, Ex Bakelite has been Corp., legislative courts jurisdiction that- suggesting subjects which, proper is limited to matters while determination, need not be so under judicial determined said is The- the Constitution.23 least .that suggested legislative have no of this decisions Court field of federal over may take courts the.entire authority. argument that, appeal to is a certain
There surface statutory to hear Congress may if create these cases, -adopt expensive the less it should be able? to jurisdiction vesting that practical expedient and more Congress legislates Except', perhaps,, for the Territories or when tyf the District Columbia. Legislative Courts, 916-917. Katz, 43 Harv. L. Rev. Federal in the existing and functioning federal courts throughout the country. No doubt similar argument pressed upon judges in Hayburn’s Case. Unless expediency is to be the test of of the federal courts, however, argument falls of its own weight. The unquestionably framers intended inferior federal courts be limited to those cases and con- *52 troversies enumerated Art. I III. would not sacrifice that principle on the altar of expediency.
II. There are numerous sections of the Constitution which are concerned solely with the government mechanics of and, of necessity, arbitrary set rather upon limits exercise of power by the three government. branches of requirements No doubt proven this kind have in the past, may, future, and prove unduly restrictive (cid:127) if undesirable. Yet a question one concerning any of them us, were before I suppose do not member of the Court would read into the Constitution the changes thought desirable in our day.
The in respect explicit difference of the most these limitations of imposed the limitation and' by the word “State” in Ill Art. is that the meaning urged upon the expressly Court not controverted the lan- guage of the it specific Constitution. That was not the intent of the framers to extend diversity jurisdiction to suits between citizens of the District Columbia and the States seems to be well conceded. One versed subject, writing the Court within a few years of adoption of Constitution, so held.
The question is, then, whether this is one of those sections of experience the Constitution which time were give content, provision intended a concerned solely with the I think mechanics there government. can be little doubt but that it was the latter. That we a hardly differently seems section now write the would admittedly interpretation an justification for sufficient Ours the framers. intent of with the inconsonant amendatory an function. uncon- finding of I a
I consider hardly need add grave of- concern. a matter- a statute stitutionality Con- do that which Nevertheless, Congress cannot has at- I think that forbids. specifically stitution do so here. tempted to with whom Frankfurter, Justice Mr.
Mb. Justice dissenting. concurs, Reed only those barring Constitution,, provisions
No qualifying prescribing the arithmetic, as in that draw on or the and members of age for President explicit spe- more office, are length of their tenure of under established to courts pertaining cific than those which power” is “vested” III.' Article “The under their .safeguards tribunals and the these *53 Their particularity. are with judges function enumerated may. be compensation, and the controversies tenure and original and of brought them, before the distribution among these tribunals are appellate-Jurisdiction defined and large by vague elastic circumscribed, not left at por- these which characterizes phrasing.’ precision impreci- striking III is in contrast the of Article tions of Constitution provisions the many of other sion so very government. aspects dealing with other vital on ineptitude part chance or not due This was subject-matter in account The differences Framers. concepts in treatment. Great differences for drastic States,” “due among . several like “Commerce . . purposely left were process law,” “liberty,” “property” they For relate to meaning experience. from gather fact, the whole domain of social and economic knew too well who this Nation statesmen founded But when unchanged. stagnant society remains Constitution turn gives strict definition of or specific limitations upon it we cannot extend the defi- nition or remove the Precisely translation. because “it is we are expounding," constitution v. Mary- M’Culloch land, 407, 4 Wheat. we 316, ought not to take liberties with it. deep
There was distrust of a federal system, against judiciaries, the State in the Constitutional Convention. This distrust was reflected the evolu- tion of III.1 Moreover, they Article with when dealt distribution of judicial power as between the courts States and the courts of the United the Framers were with dealing subject professional a technical in a way. More tirat, judges than since of the courts III provision which Article not only made had the last (apart word amending Constitution) but also enjoyed tenure, life it was an safeguard essential against judiciary control jurisdiction, its own define the particular- those courts ity. The guarded against Framers the self-will of the against as well as by marking the will Congress with exactitude the judicial power. outer of federal limits
According to III, only “judicial power” Article can be “vested” in the courts established under it. At least this limitation, which has been the the land since law Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. yet called into ques And tion. so President could not today elicit this Court’s problems ticklish views international law than Washington more was able See to'd.o the exchange Secretary between of'State Jefferson Jay Chief Justice 3 Johnston, Correspondence and *54 story scope of the of of devised the federal courts by easily Article III is through traceable index in admirable Farrand, The (Rev. ed., 1937) Records ; the Federal Convention of the data are Drafting Constitution, in Prescott, assembled the Federal (1941); Diversity ch. 17 Friendly, see also The Historic Basis of Jurisdiction, (1928). 41 Harv. L. Rev. (1891), Sparks, and 10 Jay, 486-89 Papers John
Public of 45 (1840). Washington, 542- George of Writings III can exer- under Article if courts established But that defined and confined than cise wider are available to effectuate they and if III, Article Congress, as the powers of such power various substantive justification what Columbia, of for the District legislate to one re- imposing III Article as interpreting for is there powers of the other in the exercise of those striction “judicial tp the of exercise Congress restriction —the the restric- imposing it interpreting not power" yet— namely, particularization explicit, tions that are most judicial Power shall extend”? which “the to “cases" sought for which access that the claim It conceded one Maryland, of in the District' Court among III, is not included Article established under be made power can the “cases” to which of cases as precise But enumeration to extend. if grant juris- Congress III authorized to which Article does not District Courts to the United States diction with au- these courts vesting from preclude Congress rule of disallows, by what III thority which Article precluded bringing Congress is. to be reason opinions this Court or of the advisory its aid In exercise its constitutional Appeals? Courts rules to establish uniform commerce, regulate power to armies, or exe- support naturalization, to raise that are no less Congress powers other cute Colum- for the District of legislate its vital than need informed and may greatly Congress bia, the grant to the may If advice. legal disinterested authority to act situa- Courts District States why it, III which Article denies tions Congress if confronted respond upon to calls Court such call Congress.that conscientious belief with the in order Proper'Clause Necessary-and under the is made con- effectively with some substantive wisely tp deal *55 power Congress? stitutional if Again, the United jurisdiction States District Courts are not limited to the rigidly by III, defined why is the Article original jurisdiction this Court restricted “Cases affecting Ambassadors, public other Ministers and Con- suls, and those in a Party”? Why State shall be is not Congress justified original conferring upon this in litigation Court involving the exercise of power its to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper “for carrying into Execution” its de- “To War,” clare or “To support raise and' Armies”? up
Courts set under III Article to exercise the power of the United do States so either of the because subject-matter nature of the or special because position of parties. far subject-matter So as the concerned, it extends to cases under the arising “Consti- tution, the Laws of the United Treaties,” as well as “to all of admiralty Cases and maritime Jurisdic- tion.” I, Article an § subjects enumeration in relation to which the Constitution authorizes Congress to make eighteen laws. Its of legislative power divisions are the sources of federal rights and sanctions. en- Laws acted under them are “the Laws of States,” the United to which the “judicial power,” granted by III, Article extends. Laws affecting revenue, war, immi- commerce, gration, naturalization, trip bankruptcy, rest, well as the vast range of laws “Necessary- authorized tK& and-Proper” Clause, are generating of “all sources Cases, .\., in Law and Equity, arising under . the Laws States,” and therefore\cognizable by the courts established under Article III. Congress, au- can making thorize it can contracts; author- therefore ize suit thereon in any district court. can post establish offices; it can therefore authorize suits the United against States for the negligent killing of a child post-office truck. III under Article can courts established
Insofar as the laws Constitution, involving case entertain concerning admiralty, treaties, nor States of the United enumer- parties, do so because the status they III. in Article particularity *56 ated with the of the federal concerned are here We citizenship of merely of the because adjudicate courts to of dif- adjudicate between citizens to Power parties. the different of they are citizens merely states, because ferent rights created any substantive relation to has no states,- right to be of the the sole source by Congress. When a to resort State, right is law a the the of enforced of different States.” is restricted to “Citizens federal court de- obligations such State-created right to enforce provi- III. No other strength from Article its sole rives But for Article support. lends sion of the Constitution State, only which a rights of III, the enforcement State confined to States, creates would be not the United it that au- nothing III It outside courts. is Article another “only courts as Congress to treat federal thorizes York, S. 326 U. State,” Guaranty Trust Co. of the court the 108, III do so when and Article allows If Congress, are citizens “States.” parties different Columbia, law-making power over the District of in its District, for of the right inhabitants some created for enforcement provide choose it could the case because court of the right arising under “the Laws of the United would be one controversy arising is one not un- But here States.” laws of but under the of the United States der laws Constitution, By command Maryland. in a federal court right can be enforced
Maryland-created controversy “Citizens of different only if is between court in which State States” relation to the sitting. courts was jurisdiction of the federal diversity .The. and most unwill- tenuously the most founded probably granted of all of federal ingly the heads which empowered by Article-Ill to confer. It is knowledge matter common the federal courts merely diversity citizenship based has continuously been more than any under fire other.2 largely Inertia for By accounts its retention. withdraw- ing the advantages meretricious diversity jurisdic- which tion afforded one of the parties in some types litigation, R. Erie Co. Tompkins, S. happily U. has practical eliminated some but indefensible reasons for its retention. An Act for the juris- elimination of diversity diction could fairly be called an Act relief the federal Concededly, courts. no great public interest or libertarian at principle stake cor- desire poration happens to have been chartered Columbia, District of pursue claim against its a citizen of Maryland in federal court in Maryland the. on the *57 that theory right the of this artificial citizen of the Dis- trict of Columbia cannot be vindicated the State courts of Maryland.
But in any event, dislocation of the Constitutional scheme for the establishment of the judiciary federal of jurisdiction distribution among its so tribunals carefully formulated in III Article heavy too a price to for pay advantage whatever may there be to a citizen of the District, natural or artificial, go a federal court .to in a particular State instead of to the State suing court in a citizen of that State. Nor is it merely a dislocation for the purpose of accomplishing a result of trivial importance in practical affairs of process life. The 2 example, See for Hearings Rep. 3151, 626, and S. No. on S. Cong., 70th 1st (1928); Rep. 691, Sess. 4357, S. No. on S. 71st Cong., (1930); 937, 2d Sess. 939, 10594, 11508, S. S. H. R. H. R. Rep. S. No. Rep. 701, 530 and S. Cong., (1932); No. 72d 1st Sess. Hearings Cong., (1945). S. 79th on 1st Sess. Earlier attacks diversity jurisdiction are Landis, summarized in Frankfurter and Supreme Court, Business seq., seq. (1928). et 90 136 et of a is reached invites which this result reasoning by whole breaks with the courts which of the federal use disregards the wise history judiciary federal the. III because Article history. It was policy behind limits of defines and confines III under Article which are established Gordon fell, Court Claims Act first And it was observance 697. Wall. U. S. this Court had to decline limits that Constitutional these by Congress sought to be conferred appellate powers tlje District. legislative power over in an of its exercise Co., Electric Power v. Potomac U. S. Keller therefore, judicial Power,” a “the To source for find under Arti- by courts established may be exercised that Article would be III of cle the Constitution outside powers made the Consti- disregard the distribution “the expand tution.3 The other alternative —to Austrian, 642, 657, singu seems 331 U. S. on Williams Reliance filed, may bankruptcy is there larly petition inapposite.' When bankrupt against credi outstanding by the debtors and claims Congress bankrupt. has to deter against course Of tors for, against, and those all such claims—those mine whether through the federal courts. bankrupt be enforced estate —should bankruptcy fact of would claim dissociated from the particular That any ground of brought in court for want to be a State have of its the exercise This is so because'in is irrelevant. subject bankruptcies” "pass power to laws on the uniform for all the the federal courts be utilized deem it desirable that bankrupt, whether in the federal court pertain to the estate claims in a more con bankruptcy pending proceeding in which *58 brought congeries of controversies thus The venient court. lodged being may be in the federal bankruptcy into reason States,” of the United they‘arise “the Laws because under “subject bankruptcies.” It wit, concerning is a matter the laws be a of all congressional policy there must concourse whether bankrupt’s in the federal court in which affecting the estate claims auxiliary pending or whether proceeding is suits bankruptcy courts. pursued other federal
Power” of Article III a controversy include between citizen the District of Columbia and of one of citizen the States virtue of provision extending “the judicial Power” to controversies “between of dif- Citizens ferent disregard explicit States” —would an limitation of Article III. For a fifty hundred and “States” as years there used meant political “Statés” —the organizations' that form the Union and alone have to amend the which, Constitution. The word did not cover the district was to become Seat of “the the Government of the United States,” nor “Territory” belonging to the United States, both of which the Constitution dealt with dif- ferentiation from the A un- respect States. decent history broken country’s since foundation, for con- temporaneous interpretation by qualified best those it, make for the of the capacity distinguished lawyers among the express Framers to precision themselves when dealing matters, with technical unite to admonish against disregarding explicit language III Article of. extending diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts “to Controversies between .... Citizens of different States,” not to controversies between “Citizens different including the District and Territory of the United States.” Framers, making provision in regard “States,”
meant the States which sent them delegates to the Philadelphia Convention and the States which were to be admitted later. It was contemplated district which was to become the. government seat of could ever become a State. had Marshall no mean share in securing adoption special of the Constitution and took interest in Judiciary expres- Article. He gave merely sion to the common understanding- best test —the meaning of words—when rejected summarily he no- tion that Citizens the District included among are. Citizens of “States.” *59 III is 2 of Article subject-matter §§ very
The and These sec- that term. sense of the esteemed technical in ex- expanding generalities with do not deal tions with and of courts organization for the perience. Provisions precision and definiteness presuppose their bymet heeded and requirements were phrasing. These framing Judiciary with who were concerned those Rutledge and and Article; and Madison Morris Wilson astuteness. lawyers learning and were Sherman power with which judicial scope one of was, said, as I have be entrusted courts were to subjects thoroughly canvassed sharply most debated finally decided Hall. When the Framers in Independence “between Power to controversies to extend the restrictive States,” they meant- to be different Citizens of not unaware They were in the use of that term. Ter- Northwest outside the States there
fact that of Government. there was to be Seat ritory, and that professional habits, their Considering responsibility, their III, the regarding the details of Article and their alertness made of the heads of precise enumeration they preclude the notion that ought Framers by attitude of Alice shared latitudinarian in.Wonderland language. 'toward provisions of Constitution that other suggested
It is If mere the District. apply to relating to “States” that state- inaccuracy begets truth, of an then repetition true, not otherwise. Decisions concerned ment jury in criminal and civil involving trial the District its and the proceedings, cases, full faith credit provisions in the Con- residents, rest tax be a deci- limited to “States.” There not- stitution obligations affecting rights the source of sion in which legal relating from a right derives the District of Columbia must duty “States” “States” or a solely to of no such I know case. be obedient. every indulgence
Of course must be entertained in favor when constitutionality legislation of Congress can *60 fairly an be deemed exercise of the discretion, the for- policy, given mulation of Congress by the Constitution. jurisdiction But the cases to which may be un- extended der III Article to the courts preclude established it under discretionary claim of authority to add to the cases by listed Article III change or to the distribution as be- original tween and appellate jurisdiction made by Congress Article. need not establish courts; inferior Congress grant need not scope the full which it empowered in them; Congress vest need not give this Court any appellate it withdraw power; may appellate jurisdiction once conferred and it do so McCardle, judice. even while a parte Ex case sub Wall. 506. But when the Constitution ulti- defined the of judicial mate limits exercisable derive their authority beyond sole III, Article it is power Congress If to extend those limits. there is subject one in- ought as to which this Court not to feel hibited in passing validity on the legislation doubts of its competence judge Congress done, own what has is legislation affecting the of the federal Congress courts. When on a through rare occasion inad- generosity limitations, vertence or exceeds those transgres- Court should not good-naturedly ignore such a sion of congressional powers.
A majority agrees substantial that ..each Court grounds attempt by of the two urged support of the casps to extend diversity jurisdiction to involv- ing rejected— citizens of the District must be of Columbia but not the same minorities majority. so, conflicting And ,it in combination bring' pass paradoxical a result — find may appear Court differing majorities of the —which insupportable. notes under the Federal U. S. and see and States, ante, p. 49. Act, Brooks United Tort Claims see v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 425, 429, Marshall, Chief Justice answering argument that Congress, legislating when District, for the a legislature, “was reduced to mere local possess whose laws could obligation no out the ten said square,” “Congress miles is not a legislature, local particular power, but exercises this like all its other pow ers, high its character, legislature Union. people a thought American and necessary power, they Being conferred it for their own benefit. so con ferred, it carries with it all powers those incidental which necessary are complete to its and effectual execution.” In O’Donoghue 516, 539, United U. S. approved Taft, Court a Judge statement made Circuit later Court, Chief Justice of this for himself speaking Judge (later and Justice) Lurton, object that “The Mr. grant legislation was, of exclusive over the district therefore, city national in the highest sense, and organized state, grant city, under the became the not of a district, not off a of a In but nation. the same article granted powers legislation exclusive over its seat of are conferred all government great the other powers power which make the nation, including money borrow on the credit of the States. He deny would be a strict should constructionist, indeed, who congress exercise this latter further proper ance of and organizing maintaining local government. at the seat of Each is government for pf in aid purpose, may national and one be used prior And, just other. . the statute . .” to enactment of Appeals ground, now on this the Court for challenged banc, itself, sitting relying en on the District “possesses foregoing had authorities, said that provide general full unlimited “by any every leg welfare” of District citizens act of end islation which it deem conducive to that . . (cid:127).
Notes
notes and 4 and text infra. surrounded the courts of the District of Columbia “legislative the maze woven court —constitutional controversy running through court” this Court’s decisions concerning them.2 In opinion it be my would better to following continue Hepburn I what conceive to be the error of original decision and than progeny general. its thus to ensnarl the system of federal courts. Jurisdictional and doctrinal enough have concerning troubles we add- them without ing by ruling they Origin others now that have “legislative” courts in addition to that of III, “constitutional” courts created under Article which alone they heretofore have been held endowed. Moreover, may however this case there decided, escape ño real from deciding what the word “State” as 2 of III, used Article § the Constitution For means. Congress’ power if it is a limitation on as to courts cre- ated under Article, is hard to see how it becomes no limitation when decides cast it off under some Article,, other even one to its relating authority over the District of If Columbia. be done